Judges: MARK PRYOR, Attorney General
Filed Date: 1/27/1999
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The Honorable Doyle Webb State Senator P.O. Box 1998 Benton, Arkansas 72018-1998
Dear Senator Webb:
You have requested an official Attorney General opinion concerning the City of Alexander's ability to establish a municipal court.
You indicate that the Alexander Municipal Court was originally established by ordinance in 1977, but was designated in the ordinance as a "City Court." Despite this designation, the ordinance established the jurisdiction of a municipal court, including a civil docket. In 1992, another ordinance was passed by the city in an attempt to clarify the situation. This ordinance purported to create a municipal court pursuant to A.C.A. §
In light of this situation, you have presented the following questions:
(1) Did the City of Alexander legally establish a municipal court prior to 1985, since at that time it maintained county-wide jurisdiction and kept a civil docket, neither of which would have been possible with a city court?
(2) Does the City of Alexander qualify to establish a municipal court under A.C.A. §
16-17-501 ?(3) Is it legally possible for a city to maintain both a municipal court and a city court?
RESPONSE
Question 1 — Did the City of Alexander legally establish a municipalcourt prior to 1985, since at that time it maintained county-widejurisdiction and kept a civil docket, neither of which would have beenpossible with a city court?
I am unable to opine in response to this question. In order to determine the effect of the 1977 ordinance, it would be essential not only to review the ordinance itself, but also to ascertain the intent of the council that enacted the ordinance. These are functions that the Attorney General is not authorized to undertake. Only a court can ultimately determine such matters.
Nevertheless, I will point out several rules of legislative construction that should impact upon the ultimate decision. First, in determining the intent of lawmakers, the courts are required to look to the whole act, rather than to isolated words or sections. See Kifer v. Liberty Mut.Ins. Co.
All of these rules of legislative interpretation should be considered in determining the intent of the city council that enacted the 1977 ordinance creating a "city court," but giving it the jurisdiction of a municipal court. I reiterate that I cannot make any determination concerning that council's intent. However, I note the possibility that under the above-referenced rules of interpretation, a finder of fact could conclude that the jurisdictional language in the ordinance should take precedence over the technical designation "city court" as an indicator of the council's intent. Nevertheless, other factors considered by the finder of fact might indicate otherwise.
Question 2 — Does the City of Alexander qualify to establish a municipalcourt under A.C.A. §
The provisions of A.C.A. §
Any city with a population of less than three thousand (3,000) persons, according to any federal census, which had a municipal court in existence on March 4, 1985, may create a municipal court under this subchapter.
A.C.A. §
Under the above-quoted statute, Alexander's ability to establish a municipal court under A.C.A. §
Question 3 — Is it legally possible for a city to maintain both amunicipal court and a city court?
I am aware of no legal impediments to the maintenance by a city of the second class, such as Alexander, of both a municipal court and a city court. Cities of the second class are authorized to create both city courts (see A.C.A. §
Assistant Attorney General Suzanne Antley prepared the foregoing opinion, which I hereby approve.
Sincerely,
MARK PRYOR Attorney General
MP:SBA/cyh