Judges: WINSTON BRYANT, Attorney General
Filed Date: 1/13/1995
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The Honorable Brent Davis Prosecuting Attorney Second Judicial District 1021 South Main Street Jonesboro, Arkansas 72401
Dear Mr. Davis:
This is in response to Deputy Prosecuting Attorney John Fogleman's request for an opinion on two unrelated questions. The first question pertains to the constitutionality of Act 863 of 1993, which is codified at A.C.A. §§
With respect to Mr. Fogleman's first question, it is my opinion that Act 863 of 1993 is not violative of the equal protection clause.
Act 863 of 1993 makes it unlawful (and punishable as provided therein) "for any underage person to operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or similar intoxicant" and "for any underage person to operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle if at that time there was one-fiftieth of one percent (0.02%) but less than one-tenth of one percent (0.10%) by weight of alcohol in the person's blood. . . ." Ark. Acts 1993, No. 863, § 3 (codified at A.C.A. §
With respect to the constitutionality of Act 863 of 1993, it is important to note from the outset that "all legislation is presumed to be constitutionally valid and all doubt is resolved in favor of constitutionality." Beck v. State,
Under federal equal protection analysis, age is not considered a suspect classification, and, therefore, strict scrutiny does not apply. Gregoryv. Ashcroft,
On an equal protection challenge to a statute, it is not our role to discover the actual basis for the legislation. Instead we are merely to consider whether any rational basis exists which demonstrates the possibility of a deliberate nexus with state objectives, so that the legislation is not the product of utterly arbitrary and capricious government purpose and void of any hint of deliberate and lawful purpose.
In analyzing state statutes and policies, the federal courts have granted wide latitude to the states to deal with the "practical problems of government." Dandridge v. Williams,
This same rationale may be applied to the situation in question. As noted above, the state's authority to supervise the conduct of children is broader than its power over similar actions by adults. The court inCarney stated ". . . we recognize that the General Assembly had to draw the line with accompanying penalties somewhere. Whether this line is drawn at age seventeen, eighteen, or twenty-one involves many factors including existing classifications under state law, which the General Assembly, no doubt, considered." The line drawn at age twenty-one in Act 863 is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. The easy accessibility to alcohol, coupled with the underage driver's inexperience, poses a serious threat to other motorists, a threat which the legislature recognized in Act 863 of 1993, § 2(1) which states:
"Influence" means being controlled or affected by the ingestion of an alcoholic beverage or similar intoxicant, or any combination thereof, to such a degree that the driver's reactions, motor skills, and judgment are altered or diminished, even to the slightest scale, and the underage driver, therefore, due to inexperience and lack of skill, constitutes a danger of physical injury or death to himself and other motorists or pedestrians. . . . [Emphasis added.]
Thus, given the legislature's intent, the wide latitude granted to the states to deal with the practical problems of government and the State's broad enforcement authority over the actions of minors, it appears Act 863 does have a rational basis which will withstand a constitutional challenge.
It is therefore my opinion that Act 863 of 1993 does not constitute a violation of equal protection, in that there is a rational basis for distinguishing between persons under twenty-one (21) and those over twenty-one (21).
The second issue is whether the state may appeal a decision of law by a municipal court or police court to the circuit court, notwithstanding A.C.A. §
Section
Initially, it must be determined if municipal and police courts are classified as "justices' courts." Although there is no express definition of "justices' courts," one can be inferred through a reading of the statutes. Title 16, Chapter 96 of the Arkansas Code governs proceedings in inferior courts. Subchapter 2 of Chapter 96 specifically deals with proceedings in justice of the peace courts. The term "justices' courts" is used in this subchapter in reference to justice of the peace courts. It appears the legislature's use of the term "justices' courts" is intended to refer to justice of the peace courts. Chapter 96 also distinguishes justice of the peace courts from municipal courts and police courts in A.C.A. §
Although the statute above is thus no bar to an appeal by the state, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that the state has no unqualified right of appeal from municipal court to circuit court. State v. Bostick,
The foregoing opinion, which I hereby approve, was prepared by Deputy Attorney General Elana C. Wills.
Sincerely,
WINSTON BRYANT Attorney General
WB:TKS/cyh
Gregory v. Ashcroft , 111 S. Ct. 2395 ( 1991 )
Weiss v. Walsh , 461 F.2d 846 ( 1972 )
Beck v. State , 317 Ark. 154 ( 1994 )
Streight v. Ragland , 280 Ark. 206 ( 1983 )
Hamilton v. Hamilton , 317 Ark. 572 ( 1994 )
People v. Arthur W. , 217 Cal. Rptr. 183 ( 1985 )
Dandridge v. Williams , 90 S. Ct. 1153 ( 1970 )