Tyler v. Director, Department of Workforce Services

Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 545
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. E-17-218
CRYSTAL TYLER Opinion Delivered: October 25, 2017
APPELLANT
V. APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
BOARD OF REVIEW
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF [NO. 2017-BR-00605 ]
WORKFORCE SERVICES, AND SAINT
JEAN INDUSTRIES, INC.
APPELLEES REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR
AN AWARD OF BENEFITS
RITA W. GRUBER, Chief Judge
In this unbriefed employment-security case, Crystal Tyler appeals the Board of
Review’s (Board) denial of her claim for unemployment benefits. The Board based its
decision on a finding that Tyler voluntarily left last work without good cause connected
with the work. The Board affirmed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal, which affirmed
the Department of Workforce Services’ determination to deny benefits. We reverse and
remand for an award of benefits.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-513(a)(1) (Repl. 2012) provides that an
individual shall be disqualified for benefits if he or she voluntarily and without good cause
connected with the work left his or her last work. Where a claimant has voluntarily quit
work and is seeking unemployment-insurance benefits, the burden is on the claimant to
show that he or she had good cause connected with the work for quitting. Owens v. Dir.,
55 Ark. App. 255, 256, 935 S.W.2d 285, 286 (1996). A cause that would reasonably impel
Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 545
the average able-bodied, qualified worker to give up employment is good cause, Teel v.
Daniels, 270 Ark. 766, 769, 606 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Ark. App. 1980); it includes “whether
the employee took appropriate steps to prevent the mistreatment from continuing.” Id. at
769, 606 S.W.2d at 152.
In appeals of unemployment-compensation cases, we review the evidence and all
reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s findings.
Coker v. Dir., 99 Ark. App. 455, 456, 262 S.W.3d 175, 176 (2007). The findings of fact
made by the Board are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial
evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Id. However, that is not to say that our function on appeal is merely to ratify
whatever decision is made by the Board. Boothe v. Dir., 59 Ark. App. 169, 954 S.W.2d 946
(1997). We will reverse the Board’s decision when it is not supported by substantial
evidence. Id.
The employer did not appear in the telephone conference before the Appeal
Tribunal. Tyler was employed as a “casting finishing cell operator” at Saint Jean Industries,
Inc., from December 13, 2016, to March 13, 2017. Documents in the record indicated that
she complained to the company’s human-resources department on March 2 about her direct
supervisor’s harassment; specifically, he had walked up behind her and pulled her shirt up
without permission. Tyler testified at the hearing that two days after she had filed the
complaint, she was notified that the individual would no longer be her supervisor and she
would no longer have to work near him. Tyler testified that the next week, the same man
2
Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 545
was assigned to work on a line approximately ten feet from her, which caused her extreme
anxiety.
Tyler testified that she complained to her new supervisor about her proximity to her
previous supervisor, but her new supervisor discouraged her from speaking with the human-
resources representative again. Tyler testified that she spoke to her new supervisor several
times about why the previous supervisor was still working near her, but the new supervisor
would not talk to her. She testified that the new supervisor seemed unaware that the
previous supervisor was not supposed to be working around her. Finally, she testified that
when she asked about going to human resources again, her new supervisor told her that the
human-resources representative was in meetings all day due to an ongoing audit. Tyler
testified that she quit her job later that day.
The Board affirmed the Tribunal’s findings that Tyler did not show that the average,
able-bodied worker would have been impelled to quit under similar circumstances and that
she had voluntarily left last work without good cause connected with the work:
The claimant quit her job because she was upset that her coworker was not reassigned
within the time she felt he should have been reassigned. . . . The primary reason the
claimant quit her job was that she believed the coworker was not being appropriately
punished by being removed to a different area of the employer’s facility within the timeframe
she wanted it to be done. The Tribunal does not find that the average person would quit her
job for that reason.
(Emphasis added.)
We disagree with the Board’s findings that Tyler did not have good cause connected
with the work for quitting. The Board’s decision that the primary reason Tyler quit was
that she believed the previous supervisor was not being appropriately punished within her
specific timeframe is not based on the evidence. The facts of this case show that Tyler
3
Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 545
attempted to remedy a problem created by the employer. After Tyler initially complained
to the human-resources department about her previous supervisor’s harassment, she was
informed she would not have to work near him again. Instead, the employer placed the
previous supervisor at a work place within ten feet of her. Tyler attempted to prevent the
mistreatment from continuing and to have the previous supervisor moved. She was denied
assistance from her new supervisor and denied access to the human-resources department.
We therefore hold that there is no substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that
the average person would not have quit her job for that reason.
Reversed and remanded for an award of benefits.
HIXSON and MURPHY, JJ., agree.
Crystal Tyler, pro se appellant.
Phyllis Edwards, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.
4