Donaldson v. State

Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 391
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CR-15-981
Opinion Delivered: September 14, 2016
JOSEPH DONALDSON
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE DREW
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. CR-2015-27-3]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE ROBERT BYNUM
GIBSON, JR., JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
A Drew County jury convicted appellant Joseph “Joe” Donaldson of third-degree
domestic battery and felony fleeing, and sentenced him as a habitual offender to concurrent
sentences of one year and six years’ imprisonment, respectively, in the Arkansas Department
of Correction. Donaldson’s sole point on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.
We affirm.
At Donaldson’s August 12, 2015 trial, the State called several witnesses to testify
about the encounter between Donaldson and his wife, Ruby, on March 12, 2015. Witnesses
observed Donaldson using a metal tire tool to break out the window of his wife’s car in the
parking lot outside of H&R Block, where she worked. Another witness testified that he saw
Donaldson get out of his Ford truck, walk over to Ruby, and strike her in the face—
knocking the glasses off her head. Four of Ruby’s co-workers testified that, when she came
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 391
back into the office shortly thereafter, she was crying and had a handprint on the side of her
face where her husband had hit her.
Ruby Donaldson’s boss, Amanda Nall, testified that Donaldson called Ruby; Nall
could hear him making threats and cursing over the speakerphone. Donaldson then drove
back to the parking lot and parked right next to the front door. The H&R Block employees
had locked the door, and Donaldson stood outside the door threatening to ram his truck
into the building and to kill all of them. When the police arrived, Nall observed Donaldson
drive out of the parking lot with “squealing tires and going as fast as he could.”
The State introduced evidence of the pursuit from the police dash-cam video, and it
was admitted as State’s Exhibit 3. The video showed that it was raining heavily as Donaldson
fled and that the officer had to slow down to avoid hitting a car during the pursuit. Vehicles
that had pulled over to the side of the road were also observed. Officers followed Donaldson
in the rain at speeds ranging from 40 to 75 miles per hour before calling off the chase due
to the dangerous conditions, including the speed which Donaldson was traveling, the rain,
and the traffic on the road at the time.
After the State rested, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict on the third-
degree domestic-battery charge, arguing that the State failed to prove beyond speculation
and conjecture that Donaldson had any purpose to cause physical injury and that there was
insufficient evidence to establish that there was actual physical injury. On the fleeing charge,
Donaldson moved for a directed verdict, citing that the State failed to show that he knew
of his imminent arrest or the imminent detention by law enforcement or that he was acting
in a manner that would create a substantial risk or manifesting extreme indifference to the
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Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 391
value of human life. The trial court denied the motions for directed verdict. The defense
did not put on any evidence and rested. 1
On appeal, Donaldson argues that there is insufficient evidence to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that he operated his vehicle in a manner that created a substantial danger
of death or serious physical injury to another person, and therefore his conviction should be
reversed and dismissed or, at a minimum, should be reduced to a misdemeanor fleeing
offense.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal conviction, our
court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and considers only the
evidence supporting it. Adkins v. State, 371 Ark. 159, 264 S.W.3d 523 (2007). We will
affirm if the finding of guilt is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is
evidence of such sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel
a conclusion one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Fernandez
v. State, 2010 Ark. 148, 362 S.W.3d 905. Circumstantial evidence may constitute substantial
evidence to support a conviction. Thornton v. State, 2014 Ark. 157, at 5, 433 S.W.3d 216,
219. To be substantial, circumstantial evidence must exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. Id. Such a determination is a question of
1
Rule 33.1(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that in a jury
trial, if a motion for directed verdict is to be made, it shall be made at the close of the
evidence offered by the prosecution and at the close of all the evidence. Ark. R. Crim. P.
33.1(a). However, renewal of a directed-verdict motion is not required to preserve a
sufficiency challenge on appeal when the defense rests without presenting any evidence.
Patton v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 453.
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Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 391
fact for the trier of fact, who is free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony and who
may resolve issues of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Id.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-54-125(d)(2) (Supp. 2015) provides as follows:
(2) Fleeing by means of any vehicle or conveyance is considered a Class D felony if,
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, a
person purposely operates the vehicle or conveyance in such a manner that creates a
substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person.
Donaldson argues that the State failed to show that he operated a vehicle in a manner
that created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person, and
therefore his conviction cannot be sustained. In support of his argument, Donaldson cites
cases in which Arkansas appellate courts have upheld Class D felony fleeing convictions and
contends that his conduct pales in comparison to the facts in those cases. He argues that
there was no testimony that he ever ran stop signs or lights, and notes that each of the
affirmed cases he cites from the appellate courts in Arkansas have involved running stoplights
and/or stop signs in addition to erratic driving. However, as this court has held before, there
is not an exhaustive list of examples of conduct that constitutes purposely driving in a
manner that creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury. See Medley v.
State, 2016 Ark. App. 79, at 3.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, we hold there is substantial evidence
to support Donaldson’s conviction for Class D felony vehicular fleeing. The road conditions
were dangerous due to the heavy rain. Donaldson traveled at such a high rate of speed that
officers had to eventually call off the pursuit because it was so unsafe. Several cars had to
pull over to avoid being hit. This evidence supported the jury’s determination that
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Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 391
Donaldson purposely operated his vehicle in a manner that created a substantial danger of
death or serious physical injury to others.
Donaldson’s second argument on appeal is that his conviction for domestic battery
in the third degree cannot be sustained because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he had struck his wife or that he had caused the mark on her face. A person
commits the Class A misdemeanor crime of third-degree domestic battering if “[w]ith the
purpose of causing physical injury to a family or household member, the person causes
physical injury to a family or household member[.]” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-305(a)(2)
(Repl. 2013).
Donaldson avers that Ruby Donaldson testified on behalf of the State and denied
that her husband had hit her. Furthermore, Donaldson asserts that only one of the State’s
witnesses claimed to have witnessed him hit his wife, and that witness did not testify that
the strike caused injury. The matters emphasized and argued by Donaldson bear exclusively
on the credibility of the State’s witnesses. However, it is not the role of appellate courts to
assess the credibility of witnesses. We have long held that it is within the province of the
trier of fact, and we are bound by the fact-finder’s determination on the credibility of
witnesses. Likewise, it is axiomatic that the trier of fact is free to believe all or part of a
witness’s testimony. E.g., Burley v. State, 348 Ark. 422, 430, 73 S.W.3d 600, 605 (2002).
Moreover, inconsistent testimony does not render proof insufficient as a matter of law, and
one eyewitness’s testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction. See Williams v. State, 338
Ark. 178, 992 S.W.2d 89 (1999); Rawls v. State, 327 Ark. 34, 937 S.W.2d 637 (1997).
Here, Ruby Donaldson’s coworkers identified the photographs of the marks they
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Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 391
saw on her face just after her husband had hit her, and Donaldson fled the scene when the
police arrived. Substantial evidence supports Donaldson’s conviction for domestic battery in
the third degree. Given the totality of the evidence submitted at trial, and taking that
evidence in the light most favorable to the State as we must do, there was sufficient evidence
to support the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
VIRDEN and GRUBER, JJ., agree.
James Law Firm, by: William O. “Bill” James, Jr., for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Rebecca Kane, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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