Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Skender

Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 206
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-15-1050
Opinion Delivered April 13, 2016
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 35CV-13-532]
V. HONORABLE ROBERT H. WYATT,
JR., JUDGE
BRIAN SKENDER REVERSED AND REMANDED ON
APPELLEE DIRECT APPEAL; AFFIRMED ON
CROSS-APPEAL
PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge
This appeal arises from the dismissal without prejudice of a Federal Employers’ Liability
Act (FELA)1 complaint filed by appellant, Brian Skender, against the Union Pacific Railroad
Company (UPRR). UPRR filed a timely notice of appeal of the trial court’s determination
that the complaint should be dismissed without prejudice (i.e., direct appeal). Skender then
filed a timely notice of cross-appeal from the trial court’s determination that the summons was
fatally deficient. We reverse and remand on direct appeal. We affirm on cross-appeal.
I. Validity of Summons
Because a finding of error on the cross-appeal would cause the direct appeal to be
moot, we address it first. In order to address the merits of the cross-appeal, a brief
understanding of the facts and procedural history of the case is essential.
1
45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 206
On July 11, 2012, Skender was injured while working at a UPRR repair track in Pine
Bluff, Arkansas. He timely filed and served his FELA claim against UPRR on October 25,
2013. UPRR filed an answer denying Skender’s claims and pleading, among other 12(b)
defenses, insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process.
On July 25, 2014, shortly after the statute of limitations had run on Skender’s claim,2
UPRR filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice, alleging that it had not been served with a
summons. Skender responded, asserting that summons had been served with the complaint
and attaching the Sheriff’s proof of service indicating that a copy of the summons and
complaint had been served on The Corporation Company, UPRR’s registered agent for
service of process. UPRR then renewed its motion, contending that the summons
purportedly served with the complaint was fatally defective in that it was directed to its
registered agent rather than to UPRR. Skender responded denying that the summons was
fatally deficient. After reviewing the pleadings and hearing arguments of counsel, the trial
court granted UPRR’s motion to dismiss finding the summons was fatally deficient. In his
cross-appeal, Skender challenges the trial court’s determination that the summons issued in
this case was fatally deficient. We now turn our attention to the summons issued by the clerk
in this case.
Our attention to the summons will focus on two sections: the caption of the summons
and the “directed to” provision of the summons. The caption correctly designated UPRR as
2
A FELA claim has a three-year statute of limitations.
2
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 206
the defendant in the action, but then listed its registered agent as a “Claimant.” The “directed
to” provision of the summons then provided, in part,
“THE STATE OF ARKANSAS TO DEFENDANT: Registered Agent, The
Corporation Company, 124 West Capitol Avenue, Suite 1900, Little Rock, Ar. 72201
A lawsuit has been filed against you. The relief demanded is stated in the attached
complaint. Within 30 days after service of summons on you (not counting the day you
received it) . . . you must file with the clerk of this court a written answer to the
complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Emphasis added.)
Clearly the “directed to” provision of the summons incorrectly listed the The
Corporation Company, rather than UPRR, as the defendant against whom the lawsuit was
pending, the defendant who had been served, and the defendant responsible for filing an
answer. The trial court found that because the summons failed to include the name “Union
Pacific Railroad Company” and its address following the phrase “THE STATE OF
ARKANSAS DIRECTED TO DEFENDANT,” it failed to strictly comply with Rule 4 of
the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.3
Our law is well settled. A circuit court acquires no jurisdiction over a defendant unless
the plaintiff strictly complies with the service-of-process rules. Simmons Ltd. P’ship v. Finch,
2010 Ark. 451, 370 S.W.3d 257; Cagle v. Terwilliger, 2015 Ark. App. 191, 458 S.W.3d 770.
Strict compliance specifically applies to the technical requirements of a summons, and a
defendant’s personal knowledge of the litigation will not cure a fatal defect in the summons.
See Earls v. Harvest Credit Mgmt. VI–B, LLC, 2015 Ark. 175, 460 S.W.3d 795, and Smith v.
3
Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) (2015) governs the form and content of a
summons, including that it shall “be directed to the defendant.” Hall v. State Farm Bank, 2015
Ark. App. 287, at 2, 462 S.W.3d 701, 703.
3
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 206
Sidney Moncrief Pontiac, Buick, GMC Co., 353 Ark. 701, 120 S.W.3d 525 (2003). This court
reviews a circuit court’s factual conclusions regarding service of process under a clearly-
erroneous standard, and when dismissal is a matter of law, the court conducts a de novo
review of the record. McMahan v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 590, 446
S.W.3d 640.
Our supreme court has held that “statutory service requirements, being in derogation
of common law rights, must be strictly construed and compliance with them must be exact.”
Steward v. Kuettel, 2014 Ark. 499, at 8, 450 S.W.3d 672, 676; Carruth v. Design Interiors, Inc.,
324 Ark. 373, 374–75, 921 S.W.2d 944, 945 (1996); Hall v. State Farm Bank, supra. Skender
acknowledges this rule, but cites to our supreme court’s decision in Nucor v. Kilman, 358 Ark.
107, 186 S.W.3d 720 (2004), to support his contention that a literal application of the rule
in this case would lead to an absurd consequence because UPRR never argued that they were
not on notice of the suit or that they were denied an opportunity to be heard. In fact, UPRR
timely answered the complaint and participated in the litigation.
Skender’s argument must fail for two reasons. First, our supreme court has clearly held
that a defendant’s personal knowledge of the litigation does not cure a fatal defect in the
summons. Earls v. Harvest Credit Mgmt. VI–B, LLC, supra. Second, the Nucor case cited by
Skender is distinguishable. In Nucor, the defendant was correctly named in the summons, but
its codefendants were not. Thus, Nucor was clearly apprised on the face of the summons of
the pendency of the suit against it. Here, UPRR was not correctly named in the summons.
While it was listed as the sole defendant in the caption, the summons was not directed to it
4
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 206
in the body of the document as required under our rules. To make matters even more
confusing, its registered agent— which was inexplicably listed as a claimant in the caption—
was listed as the defendant to whom the summons was directed in the body of the summons.
Thus, unlike Nucor who was correctly listed in both places in the summons, UPRR was
incorrectly identified. Thus, the trial court’s determination that the summons was fatally
deficient was not in error.
II. Dismissal With or Without Prejudice
We next turn to the issue on direct appeal—whether the dismissal should have been
issued with or without prejudice. Below, UPRR argued that the court should dismiss with
prejudice due to the defective summons. While disagreeing that the summons was defective,
Skender argued, in the alternative, that equitable tolling would allow a dismissal without
prejudice. The court found that the refiling of Skender’s claim was not barred by the statute
of limitations, citing an Arkansas savings statute case,4 and ordered the dismissal to be without
prejudice. UPRR contends that the trial court erred in applying the Arkansas savings statute
in a FELA action and that, because the statute of limitations had run on Skender’s claim, the
trial court erred in dismissing the complaint without prejudice. UPRR also contends on
appeal that Skender is not entitled to an equitable tolling of the limitations period under
federal law.
We agree with UPRR’s contention that the trial court erred in applying the Arkansas
savings statute. Relying on Clouse v. Tu, supra, an Arkansas savings statute case, the trial court
4
Clouse v. Tu, 101 Ark. App. 260, 274 S.W.3d 260 (2008).
5
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 206
ruled that because service was perfected within 120 days of the timely commencement of the
FELA action, Skender was not barred by the statute of limitations from refiling his complaint.
However, the United States Supreme Court has clearly stated that the savings statutes of the
individual states do not apply in FELA actions. See Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S.
424 (1965). Thus, the trial court’s reliance on the Arkansas savings statute was erroneous as
a matter of law.
This does not automatically conclude Skender’s case, however. Federal law also allows
the statute of limitations to be tolled under certain circumstances, and Skender argued to the
trial court that equitable tolling should apply in this case. Because the trial court found that
the savings statute applied, it did not make any findings with respect to Skender’s equitable
tolling argument. As a result, we remand this issue to the trial court to make the requisite
findings on whether equitable tolling is available to suspend the statute and whether dismissal
with or without prejudice is appropriate.
Reversed and remanded on direct appeal; affirmed on cross-appeal.
GLADWIN, C.J., and HARRISON, J., agree.
Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, by: Robert S. Shafer and Jamie Huffman Jones, for
appellant.
McKissic & Associates, PLLC, by: Jackie B. Harris, for appellee.
6