Williams v. Butler

Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 37
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-16-351
JACQUELINE WILLIAMS AND Opinion Delivered January 25, 2017
MARCIE JOHNSON
APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 35CV-09-1027]
HONORABLE JODI RAINES
TINA BUTLER AND KENNETH DENNIS, JUDGE
BUTLER
APPELLEES APPEAL DISMISSED
PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge
Jacqueline Williams and Marcie Johnson (hereinafter collectively “Williams”) obtained
a writ of garnishment against Tina and Kenneth Butler (“the Butlers”). The Butlers filed suit
in the Jefferson County Circuit Court seeking satisfaction of the judgment. The circuit court
entered an order vacating the writ of garnishment and directing Williams to repay the funds
withheld pursuant to that writ to the Butlers. Williams appeals the order, arguing that the
circuit court erred in vacating the writ of garnishment because it lost jurisdiction to do so
more than ninety days following entry of the original judgment. For the reasons set forth
below, we dismiss Williams’s appeal.
Williams’s current appeal is a subsequent appeal following this court’s decision in Butler
v. Williams, 2012 Ark. App. 5. Butler involved a claim of specific performance regarding a
timeshare condominium in Branson, Missouri. Williams offered to sell the Butlers her interest
Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 37
in the timeshare for $6,000. The Butlers gave Williams $3,000, but they subsequently decided
not to buy the condominium. Williams refused to refund their $3,000, and the Butlers sued
for the return of their money. Williams counterclaimed for specific performance of the
contract, including payment of the additional $3,000 owed on the property by the Butlers.
The circuit court found that the parties had contracted for the Butlers to purchase the
timeshare and that Williams was entitled to specific performance of the contract. Butler, 2012
Ark. App. 5, at 1. This court affirmed. Id. at 3–4.
Following the issuance of this court’s mandate, Williams caused a writ of garnishment
to be issued in July 2013 against the Butlers’ bank account at Relyance Bank, contending that
the Butlers were indebted to her in the amount of $4,509.24.1 Relyance Bank answered and
stated that it held a total of $787 in two accounts belonging to the Butlers. In February 2014,
Williams conveyed her interest in the condominium to Wyndham Vacation Resorts—the
owner of the timeshare property—by execution of a special warranty deed. Despite having
conveyed her interest in the condominium, Williams obtained and served a writ of
garnishment on Tina Butler’s employer, the State of Arkansas, in October 2015. The State
agreed to withhold funds from Tina Butler’s paycheck until the total amount of the judgment
was paid or satisfied.
After Williams caused the writ of garnishment to be executed on the State, the Butlers
filed an answer to the garnishment and a motion to satisfy judgment based on Williams’s
1
This amount represented the judgment of $3,000; $689.24 in interest; $800 in
attorney’s fees; and $20 in writ fees.
2
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conveyance of her interest in the condominium. Following a hearing on the Butlers’ motion,
the circuit court ruled that the money that Williams held as a result of the garnishment was
to be returned to the Butlers. Noting the impossibility of specific performance, the court
stated that it did “not see how Ms. Williams can come to court and ask for money when she
doesn’t have anything to produce when the money is paid.” The court subsequently entered
a written order in which it found that the writ of garnishment was invalid and “all moneys
collected as a result of the garnishment must be returned to Kenneth or Tina Butler or
released from a garnishment hold.” It is from this written order that this appeal ensues.
Following entry of the circuit court’s order, but prior to the filing of the notice of
appeal,2 several events occurred that inform our conclusion to dismiss this appeal. On January
25, 2016, the circuit clerk of Jefferson County caused to be filed a document titled
“Supersedeas,” which reflected that Williams had “represente[ed] to the clerk of this court
that the garnishment issued herein has been settled by the parties, and the plaintiff requests and
agrees to the release and discharge of the garnishee.” The garnishee named in that document
was the State of Arkansas, Tina Butler’s employer. Another supersedeas, dated January 26,
2016, likewise stated that Williams “requests and agrees to the release and discharge of the
garnishee, State of Arkansas.” On February 1, 2016, Williams’s attorney sent a letter to the
2
Williams filed her notice of appeal on February 16, 2016.
3
Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 37
Butlers with a check for $2,597.923 “as refund in the above named matter, along with a copy
of the Order superseding the garnishment at State of Arkansas.”
We must dismiss this appeal. Arkansas caselaw is clear that the voluntary satisfaction
of a judgment constitutes a waiver to an appeal of that judgment. See Sherman Waterproofing,
Inc. v. Darragh Co., 81 Ark. App. 74, 98 S.W.3d 446 (2003); DeHaven v. T & D Dev., Inc.,
50 Ark. App. 193, 901 S.W.2d 30 (1995); Lytle v. Citizens Bank of Batesville, 4 Ark. App. 294,
630 S.W.2d 546 (1982) (holding that if an appellant’s payment is voluntary, then the case is
moot, but if the payment is involuntary, an appeal is not precluded). The supreme court has
held that voluntary payment of even part of a judgment can render an appeal moot. See Hall
v. Hall, 2012 Ark. 429, at 2. More specifically, in Shepherd v. State Auto Property & Casualty
Insurance Co., 312 Ark. 502, 511, 850 S.W.2d 324, 328 (1993), the supreme court stated that
it viewed “voluntary payment of a judgment amount assessed against a party as entirely
inconsistent with a subsequent appeal directly related to that payment.”
Here, the circuit court ordered Williams to return to the Butlers the funds held
pursuant to the order of garnishment. She did exactly that, and she released and discharged
the garnishee. On appeal, Williams argues that the court erred in vacating and setting aside
the writs of garnishment and ordering her to repay the garnished funds to the Butlers;
however, she has already done exactly what the court ordered. There is no indication in any
of the documents relating to the release of the garnishees or the letter to the Butlers that she
3
The parties had previously agreed that Williams’s attorney was holding funds totaling
$2,597.92 that had been submitted by the garnishees, the State of Arkansas and Relyance
Bank.
4
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was making that payment involuntarily. Because she voluntarily satisfied the judgment, we
must dismiss her appeal in its entirety.
Appeal dismissed.
HARRISON and KLAPPENBACH, JJ., agree.
Maxie G. Kizer, P.A., by: Maxie G. Kizer, for appellants.
Hewitt Law Firm, by: Marceliers Hewett, for appellees.
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