Robinson v. Lindsey

Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 148
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-14-720
MARIANNE ROBINSON Opinion Delivered MARCH 4, 2015
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CLEBURNE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. DR-11-305]
CHARLES LINDSEY HONORABLE ADAM HARKEY,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
DAVID M. GLOVER, Judge
This is a one-brief challenge to the trial court’s division of property in the divorce
action between appellant, Marianne Robinson, and appellee, Charles Lindsey. Marianne
sought an unequal distribution of assets in the divorce, but the trial court rejected her attempt
to justify an unequal distribution and divided the property at issue equally between the two
parties. Our court dismissed an earlier appeal, finding that the decree was not final and
appealable.1 In an amended decree entered on July 30, 2014, the trial court included a Rule
54(b) certificate, and this appeal followed. For her sole point on appeal, Marianne contends
that the trial court’s property division was not equitable and should be reversed. We affirm.
1
Robinson v. Lindsey, 2014 Ark. App. 287.
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 148
Background
The parties were married on March 11, 2002, and separated on or about October 13,
2011. There were no children born of the marriage. Pertinent findings from the June 30,
2014 amended divorce decree can be summarized as follows:
All accounts held in both parties’ names at any time during the course of the marriage
constituted marital property;
All accounts held in one party’s individual name during the course of the marriage
would be the separate property of the account holder;
Assets inherited by Marianne during the course of the marriage that had become joint
property would be considered marital property;
The “Antioch House” and surrounding buildings were ruled marital property and
ordered to be sold together or separately. Following the sale, Charles was to
reimburse Marianne from his share of the proceeds for any mortgage payments or
taxes that she made on the property and for which Charles did not pay half;
The “Lake House” was ruled marital property and ordered to be sold, with the
proceeds divided equally between the parties;
The Branson Timeshare was ruled marital property and ordered to be sold or
otherwise partitioned.
The trial court also disposed of designated personal property, setting out which property was
to be sold, with the proceeds divided, and which property was the parties’ individual
property, to be retained by them individually.
Standard of Review
We review domestic-relations cases de novo on the record, but we will not reverse
the circuit court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Ransom v. Ransom, 2009 Ark.
App. 273, 309 S.W.3d 204. A circuit court’s finding is clearly erroneous when, although
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there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire record is left with a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. We give due deference to the
superior position of the circuit court to view and judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id.
Division of Property
At the time a divorce decree is entered, all marital property shall be distributed one-
half to each party unless the court finds such a division to be inequitable. Ark. Code Ann.
§ 9-12-315 (Repl. 2009). In that event, the court shall make some other division of property
that the court deems equitable, stating in its order the basis and reasons for doing so, and
taking into consideration the following factors: 1) the length of the marriage; 2) the age,
health, and station in life of the parties; 3) the parties’ occupations; 4) their amount and
sources of income; 5) their vocational skills; 6) their employability; 7) the estate, liabilities,
and needs of each party and the opportunity for each to acquire further capital assets and
income; 8) the contribution of each party in the acquisition, preservation, or appreciation of
marital property, including the services of a homemaker; and 9) the federal income-tax
consequences of the court’s division of property. Id.
“Marital property” means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the
marriage, with certain designated statutory exceptions that include and are associated with
property acquired prior to the marriage, or by gift, or by reason of the death of another,
along with property that is excluded by a valid agreement of the parties. See Ark. Code Ann.
§ 9-12-315 (b) (1) - (7).
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Where property is placed in the names of persons who are husband and wife, without
specifying the manner in which they take, there is a presumption that they own the property
as tenants by the entirety, and clear and convincing evidence is required to overcome that
presumption. Bradford v. Bradford, 2013 Ark. App. 615. The rights of the parties under a
tenancy by the entirety is a question of law. Id. The fact that consideration given for property
taken in the two names belonged to only one spouse is of little, if any, significance where
that spouse is responsible for the property being taken in both names, as the presumption is
that there was a gift of an interest by the husband to the wife. Id. The tracing of money or
property into different forms is not to be considered as an end in itself, and the fact that a
spouse made contributions to certain property does not necessarily require recognizing those
contributions in the property division upon divorce. Id.
Discussion
Marianne’s argument is that Charles brought nothing into the marriage; he made little
or no money during the marriage; living expenses were paid from her money; she had
significant monetary interests prior to the marriage and inherited a great deal of money
during the marriage; and even though certain accounts and real property were changed to
reflect joint ownership, the overall circumstances should overcome the presumption that such
property should be divided equally between them upon divorce. Although Charles did not
file a responsive brief, it is fair to say that his overall position during the course of the
litigation was that the property in question should be divided equally, which is what was
done by the trial court in the decree.
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Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 148
The primary properties at issue in this appeal are two jointly titled houses, which the
parties identify as the “Antioch House” and the “Lake House,” along with jointly titled
financial accounts. The facts surrounding these properties are essentially undisputed.
Marianne owned the Antioch House prior to the marriage. She used the Antioch House as
collateral for a loan to purchase the Lake House, and she put Charles’s name on the Antioch
House deed so that he could also be on the mortgage for the Antioch House. Charles
contributed $40,000 toward the $270,000 price on the Lake House, and Marianne paid the
remaining $230,000. Both parties are the grantees on the deed for the Lake House.
With respect to the jointly titled financial accounts, Marianne testified that she and
Charles had verbally agreed before their marriage that their properties would remain separate
and that they would not commingle them. She explained that she did not add Charles’s
name to her financial accounts until 2006, and that she “had his name added because [she]
was told [she] was going to die within five years.” She further explained that Charles did not
add her name to his financial account until after she had named him on hers. She basically
traced the funds in her accounts to monies she had prior to the marriage or had acquired by
inheritance from her mother.
Our de novo review of the record has not left us with a definite and firm conviction
that the trial court erred in its division of property. The verbal agreement between the
parties described by Marianne does not constitute a valid agreement under the law to exclude
the properties at issue here from marital property, and Marianne does not truly make such
a contention. Moreover, the facts surrounding the placement of both names on the deeds
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Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 148
for the Antioch House and the Lake House are more convincing that joint ownership was
intended rather than providing clear and convincing evidence that it was not. Furthermore,
Marianne herself testified that she put Charles’s name on her accounts in anticipation of her
own death. As explained in the Bradford case, supra, the tracing of money or property into
different forms is not an end in itself, and titling the properties jointly was sufficient in itself
to raise the presumption that a gift was thereby made to the other spouse. Again, Marianne’s
own testimony that it was done in anticipation of death supports, rather than dispels, that
presumption.
Affirmed.
VIRDEN and GRUBER, JJ., agree.
Schmidt Law Firm, PLC, by: Paul A. Schmidt, for appellant.
No response.
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