Brown v. State

Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 79
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CR-13-548
Opinion Delivered: January 29, 2014
FRANKIE LEE BROWN APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
APPELLANT SECOND DIVISION
[NO. CR-2012-2683]
V.
HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER
STATE OF ARKANSAS CHARLES PIAZZA, JUDGE
APPELLEE AFFIRMED
RHONDA K.WOOD, Judge
A jury found Frankie Lee Brown guilty of first-degree battery. His sole point on
appeal is that the circuit court erred by denying his directed-verdict motion. The evidence
that Brown stabbed the victim in the chest is substantial evidence to support the jury’s
verdict that he caused serious injury to the victim under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life. We affirm.
On July 12, 2012, Brown approached Herbert Johnson, a homeless man, outside a
gas station in Little Rock and asked for money. Johnson said he did not have any money
and entered the store. When Johnson exited the store, Brown approached him again and
pushed him to the ground. A brief skirmish followed. Johnson realized he was bleeding
badly, re-entered the store for assistance, and was taken to a local hospital where he
underwent emergency surgery to repair a life-threatening laceration to his chest.
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 79
On appeal, Brown contends the circuit court should have granted his motion for a
directed verdict, which is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Baughman v. State,
353 Ark. 1, 110 S.W.3d 740 (2003). When a defendant makes a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the State and only consider evidence supporting the verdict. Id. The test for determining
the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence,
direct or circumstantial. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a
conclusion beyond suspicion or conjecture. Id.
The State charged Brown with first-degree battery under Arkansas Code
Annotated section 5-13-201(a)(3) (Supp. 2011), which provides that “[a] person commits
battery in the first degree if [t]he person causes serious physical injury to another person
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]”
Circumstances manifesting extreme indifference are akin to a mental state, requiring
deliberate conduct with a knowledge or awareness that one’s actions are practically certain
to bring about the prohibited result. Williamson v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 73, 381 S.W.3d
134. The circumstances from which the jury may infer intent include the type of weapon
used, the manner in which it was employed by the defendant, and the nature, extent, and
location of the trauma suffered by the victim. Harmon v. State, 340 Ark. 18, 8 S.W.3d 472
(2000).
Brown argues that there was insufficient evidence that he caused the injury to
Johnson under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
We disagree. The cardiothoracic surgeon who performed Johnson’s surgery testified that
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Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 79
the injury inflicted by Brown was nearly fatal. Further, the stab wound, which was an inch
or two long and penetrated five-to-six inches into Johnson’s chest cavity, cut through
several arteries and veins inside Johnson’s chest and lacerated one of his lungs. Johnson
identified Brown as his attacker at trial and testified that Brown instigated the scuffle and
stabbed him. The surveillance footage corroborated Johnson’s account of the events. The
evidence introduced at trial easily constitutes substantial evidence that Brown caused
serious injury to Johnson under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to
human life. Consequently, we affirm the circuit court.
Affirmed.
GLADWIN, C.J., and BROWN, J., agree.
Lisa Thompson, Deputy Public Defender, by: Clint Miller, Deputy Public Defender,
for appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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