Flippen v. Jones

Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 220ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-13-875
DANNY WAYNE FLIPPEN Opinion Delivered April 9, 2014
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT
V. SMITH DISTRICT [NO. CV-2009-387]
HONORABLE STEPHEN TABOR,
MICHAEL R. JONES AND DENISE A. JUDGE
JONES
APPELLEES AFFIRMED
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge
This is an appeal from a finding of civil contempt. Appellant contracted to purchase
a home but did not close the transaction, citing structural defects in the foundation as his
reason. Appellees sued for specific performance and prevailed at trial. Appellant appealed
to this court, and we affirmed the trial court’s decision in Flippen v. Jones, 2011 Ark. App.
191, 382 S.W.3d 695. Following the appeal upholding the order of specific performance,
appellant twice attempted to obtain financing for the home purchase but was unable to do
so because he lacked sufficient funds for an adequate down payment and his debt-to-income
ratio was too high. Appellant filed a report of these efforts with the trial court. Shortly
thereafter, appellant purchased a different home with his fiancée as a co-signer. The trial
court found him in contempt for failure to explore alternative financing options and for
rendering himself incapable of specifically performing by purchasing another home. On
appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s order.
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 220The trial court wrote a well-reasoned opinion explaining the finding of contempt and
award to appellees of $3,906.37 for real-estate taxes and insurance. The court said:
Certain facts seem evident to the Court after the hearing of testimony in this
case. First, [appellant] made some good-faith efforts to obtain a loan to purchase the
subject house after the mandate was received from the Arkansas Court of Appeals.
Second, [appellant] subsequently made a conscious decision to purchase another house
knowing his actions would render it impossible for him to comply with the Court’s
previous order. It is likely, in the Court’s view, that he could have obtained a loan
to purchase the subject residence with the aid of his fiancée, Shannon Gould (as was
done with the home he purchased). While Ms. Gould was under no obligation to
assist [appellant] in complying with the Court’s directives, [appellant] had an
obligation to the Court he ignored in choosing his course of action. It is not lost on
the Court that the purchase of the second home was consummated just weeks after
the filing of the Report on [Appellant’s] Efforts. The combination of these factors
leads the Court to the inescapable conclusion that [appellant] acted in contempt of
this Court’s Opinion and Judgment filed November 24, 2009, when he purchased the
second home on June 9, 2011.
The disobedience of any valid judgment, order, or decree of a court having
jurisdiction to enter it may constitute contempt. Scudder v. Ramsey, 2013 Ark. 115, ___
S.W.3d ___. Noncompliance with a court’s order is not of itself contemptuous; the
noncompliance must constitute willful disobedience for a finding of contempt. Albarran v.
Liberty Healthcare Management, 2013 Ark. App. 738, ___ S.W.3d ___. Civil contempt
proceedings are instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to suits and to
compel obedience to orders made for the benefit of those parties. Scudder v. Ramsey, supra.The standard of review for civil contempt proceedings is whether the circuit court’s finding
is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id. Here, although appellant filed a
report with the trial court concerning his limited efforts to comply with the order of specific
performance, he neither sought nor obtained the trial court’s permission to terminate his
2
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 220efforts to comply with the court’s order and our mandate before willfully rendering himself
incapable of doing so by purchasing a different house. Under these circumstances, we hold
that the trial court did not clearly err in finding appellant to be in contempt.
Affirmed.
GLOVER and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.
Gean, Gean & Gean, by: Roy Gean, III, for appellant.
Gilker & Jones, P.A., by: Christopher F. Woomer, for appellees.
3