Ciesielki v. State

Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 329
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CR-13-1070
Opinion Delivered May 28, 2014
ROBERT STEVEN CIESIELSKI
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
SEVENTH DIVISION [NO. CR-2011-
V. 2450]
HONORABLE BARRY SIMS, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE REVERSED AND REMANDED
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge
In this appeal from his criminal convictions and resulting sentences, appellant argues
that the trial court erred by failing to conduct the proper inquiry before refusing to allow him
to personally represent himself at trial. The State concedes error, and we agree. We reverse
and remand for a new trial.
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee
an accused in a state court the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. Pierce
v. State, 362 Ark. 491, 209 S.W.3d 364 (2005). The Sixth Amendment not only provides
the right to assistance of counsel, but it also grants to the accused personally the right to make
a defense by self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). No sentence
involving loss of liberty may be imposed where there has been a denial of an accused’s Sixth
Amendment rights. Pierce, supra.
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 329
An accused may waive his right to counsel, but to be effective, a waiver must be made
knowingly and intelligently. Faretta, supra. The trial court maintains a weighty responsibility
in determining whether an accused has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
counsel. Pierce, supra. Determining whether an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel has
been made depends in each case on the particular facts and circumstances, including the
background, the experience, and the conduct of the accused. A specific warning of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, or a record showing that the defendant
possessed such required knowledge from other sources, is required to establish the validity
of a waiver, and the burden is upon the State to show that an accused voluntarily and
intelligently waived his fundamental right to the assistance of counsel. Id.
Here, the record shows that the trial court made no inquiry into appellant’s
background and issued no specific warning of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation; instead the court limited its inquiry to appellant’s technical legal knowledge
before denying his request to represent himself. However, Faretta expressly holds that such
knowledge is not relevant in deciding whether a waiver of counsel was knowingly and
intelligently made. Faretta, supra; Pierce, supra. A violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
self-representation is a fundamental, structural error that is not amenable to a harmless-error
analysis. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984); Arroyo v. State, 2013 Ark. 244, ___
S.W.3d ___. Consequently, we must reverse and remand for a retrial, prior to which the
trial court shall conduct a proper inquiry into and decide appellant’s request to represent
himself.
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Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 329
Reversed and remanded.
HIXSON and WOOD, JJ., agree.
Cheryl Barnard, Deputy Public Defender, by: Clint Miller, Deputy Public Defender, for
appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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