Smith v. State

George K. Cracraft, Chief Judge,

concurring. I concur with the result reached by the majority and with the reasoning of Judge Mayfield’s concurring opinion, but write separately in order to state an additional reason for reversal. As stated in the dissent, it is well settled that we will affirm the ruling of a trial court if it reaches a correct result even for the wrong reason and, in view of Ricarte, we must look to the law as it existed prior to its attempted supersession by the Uniform Rules of Evidence in applying that rule.

Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 28-605 and 28-707 (Repl. 1962) provide that evidence of a former felony conviction is admissible for the purpose of going to the credibility of a witness and the weight to be given his testimony. There are no such limitations on admissibility as are contained in Unif. R. Evid. 609. Burton v. State, 260 Ark. 688, 543 S.W.2d 760 (1976).

Here appellant stated that he had been convicted, but had received a ten-year suspended sentence. At the time that sentence was imposed, a suspended sentence did not constitute a “conviction” within the meaning of similarly-worded disqualifying statutes. See Sutherland v. Arkansas Dept. of Insurance, 250 Ark. 903, 467 S.W.2d 724 (1971); Tucker v. State, 248 Ark. 979, 455 S.W.2d 888 (1970); State Medical Board v. Rodgers, 190 Ark. 266,79 S.W.2d 83 (1935). These cases hold that where one’s sentence is suspended he has not been “convicted” because he has not been required to suffer the punishment prescribed in the judgment of sentence.

As, apparently, there had been no “conviction” within the meaning of prior law, it would likewise appear to have been error to permit the introduction of this evidence in any event.