Beavers v. State

Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 124
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CR-14-216
CLINT BEAVERS Opinion Delivered February 25, 2015
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR 2012-65-I]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE JOHN HOMER
APPELLEE WRIGHT, JUDGE
AFFIRMED
RITA W. GRUBER, Judge
Appellant Clint Beavers was convicted by a jury of raping a thirteen-year-old girl. His
sole point on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to suppress a statement to a child-
maltreatment investigator because the statement was involuntary. We hold that the trial
court’s findings are not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence and affirm its
decision.
Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress a statement that he had given to
investigator Sarah Longtin Brady, alleging that the statement had been made without the
benefit of Miranda warnings or the advice of counsel and violated Rules 2.2 and 2.3 of the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Arkansas Constitution, and the United States
Constitution. After a hearing on the issue, the trial court denied appellant’s motion, finding
that appellant was not in custody during the interview; that Brady was not a “law
enforcement officer” and therefore Rules 2.2 and 2.3 of the Arkansas Criminal Rules of
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 124
Procedure did not apply to her; and that the totality of the circumstances established that
appellant was within his rights not to come to the interview and was free to leave at any time.
In cases involving a ruling on the voluntariness of a confession, this court makes an
independent determination based upon the totality of the circumstances. Clark v. State, 374
Ark. 292, 299, 287 S.W.3d 567, 572 (2008). We review the trial court’s findings of fact for
clear error, and the ultimate question of whether the confession was voluntary is subject to
an independent, or de novo, determination by this court. Id. Any conflicts in testimony are
for the trial court to resolve, as it is in a superior position to determine the credibility of the
witnesses. Clark v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 349, at 5.
On appeal, appellant does not challenge the court’s finding that his statement was
noncustodial; rather, he argues that his statement was involuntary and that the trial court
should have suppressed it. Miranda warnings are required only in the context of a custodial
interrogation. Hall v. State, 361 Ark. 379, 387, 206 S.W.3d 830, 836 (2005).
Appellant gave his statement to Sarah Brady, a child-maltreatment investigator with
the Crimes Against Children Division of the Arkansas State Police. Brady testified that she
was not a law-enforcement officer, had no law-enforcement training, did not have authority
to make arrests, and did not carry a gun. The interview stemmed from a call to the child-
abuse hotline. Brady testified that appellant was not in custody when she interviewed him and
that he had come to the police station after she had called him the previous day and asked him
to come discuss “some allegations.” Brady also notified appellant’s father of her desire to
question appellant. Appellant wanted his father to be present during the interview, but Brady
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denied his request because appellant was an adult. She did not recall whether appellant’s father
asked if they should have a lawyer present for the interview. She also testified that appellant
never said he wanted an attorney or invoked his right to remain silent. Appellant’s father
testified that he never spoke with Brady about having an attorney at the interview.
Appellant testified that Brady told him that she wanted to talk to him about an accident
when she called him. Appellant had been in a car accident several weeks before the interview.
He claimed he did not understand what the interview was about until he spoke on the phone
with Brady while on the way to the police station. He said that Brady did not have a gun or
a badge and that he was not handcuffed. He testified that he left immediately after the
interview and was not arrested until a month or two later. He did say that Brady told him that
he would be in contempt of court if he did not come to the interview, although Brady
testified that she had never told anyone they would be in contempt if they did not speak with
her. Finally, appellant testified that he asked Brady if he needed a lawyer before they began
the interview and she told him he did not. He admitted that he did not say that he wanted
an attorney present.
In the transcript of the interview, appellant did not mention the need for a lawyer until
after he had admitted that the allegations were true. He asked, “[A]m I gonna need a lawyer
or what?” Brady responded, “I can’t give you legal advice. I don’t—you know. But if [you]
feel like you need to get an attorney.” Appellant then said that he had already talked to one.
Toward the end of the interview, appellant asked Brady if he would “get in trouble because
of this or what” and said that he did not know what to do. Brady told him that the file would
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go to the prosecutor’s office and it would be up to the prosecutor.
To support his argument that his confession was involuntary, he argues that Brady
misrepresented facts: claiming that they possessed DNA when they did not; saying that the
victims alleged force when they did not; and telling appellant that the age of consent in
Arkansas was fourteen (the age he claimed to have thought the victims were) when Brady
knew it was untrue. Appellant claims Brady lied to get him to admit to having had consensual
sex with the victims. Even if Brady had been a police officer, the fact that a police officer
made an untrue statement during the course of an interrogation does not make an otherwise
voluntary confession inadmissible. Goodwin v. State, 373 Ark. 53, 61, 281 S.W.3d 258, 265
(2008). A misrepresentation of fact does not render a statement involuntary as long as it was
not calculated to procure an untrue statement. Id. In this case, Brady was attempting to get
appellant to tell the truth, not to procure an untrue statement. Appellant does not argue that
he was otherwise coerced, intimidated, or deceived into admitting his actions.
Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we hold that appellant’s confession was not
involuntary and that the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress was not clearly against
the preponderance of the evidence.
Affirmed.
GLOVER, J., agrees.
VIRDEN, J., concurs.
BART F. VIRDEN, Judge, concurring. I agree that the case should be affirmed. I
agree with the trial court and this court that Beavers’s statement was admissible at trial.
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Beavers acknowledges he was not “in custody” when he gave the statement. As such, there
was no requirement to advise him of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). However, I write separately in this concurrence to address
an unsettling situation that is highlighted by this case.
The trial court denied Beavers’s motion to suppress based on the finding that Beavers
was not in custody and the conclusion that Sarah Longtin Brady, a child-maltreatment
investigator with the Crimes Against Children Division of the Arkansas State Police, was not
a law-enforcement officer, and hence was not under a duty to comply with criminal
procedure or constitutional safeguards when questioning Beavers. It is on this second point
that I disagree. I believe that in instances such as this, where the State has created a “hybrid
investigator,”1 that person is, to all appearances, part of law enforcement, and her methods
of investigation should be conducted accordingly.
In this instance, Brady testified:
• that she was employed by the Crimes Against Children Division of the Arkansas
State Police;
• that she was paid as a State Police employee;
• that she called Beavers from Arkansas State Police Headquarters, Troop K;
• that she identified herself to Beavers as an investigator with the Arkansas State
1
The General Assembly has authorized the Department of the Arkansas State Police
to create a Crimes Against Children Division, consisting of an investigation section that is
staffed with civilian personnel. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 12-8-501(b)(1)–502(b)(1) (Repl. 2009).
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Police; and
• that she interviewed Beavers at the State Police Headquarters, Troop K.
The State takes the position that Brady “can’t charge” anybody with a crime and thus
it is clear she is not a law-enforcement officer. But, in fact, she was gathering evidence in her
investigation of an alleged crime, which she turned over to the prosecutor, and which
resulted in criminal charges against Beavers. The United States Supreme Court has addressed
the application of Miranda in questioning by nonpolice officers. Most notably, and analogous
to this case, is Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984). The court found that when the
defendant was questioned by a parole agent, Miranda warnings were not required because the
defendant was not in custody. The court specifically noted, however, that “[a] different
question would be presented if he had been interviewed by his probation officer while being
held in police custody.” Id. at 430 n. 5. Here, Brady had all the trappings of law
enforcement, which no doubt is an asset in investigating these important and serious cases.
However, the investigator should not be allowed to circumvent constitutional safeguards
simply by a statement on the back of her identification card that states, “Cardholder is not
a Police Officer.”
Benca & Benca, by: Patrick J. Benca, for appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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