Ridley v. Director, Department of Workforce Services

Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 465
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. E-15-761
Opinion Delivered October 5, 2016
BRENDA RIDLEY
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
BOARD OF REVIEW
V. [NO. 2015-BR-02273]
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES, AND DAVID
PEPPERS DDS PLLC
APPELLEES AFFIRMED
LARRY D. VAUGHT, Judge
Brenda Ridley was disqualified by the Employment Security Department for
unemployment benefits on the grounds that she left her last employment voluntarily and
without good cause connected to the work. This decision was affirmed by both the Appeals
Tribunal (Tribunal) and the Board of Review (Board). On appeal, Ridley argues that the
findings of the Board are not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-513(a) (Repl. 2012), an individual
shall be disqualified for unemployment benefits if she voluntarily and without good cause
connected with the work left her last work. Whether there is good cause for an employee to
quit her job is a question of fact. Claflin v. Dir., 53 Ark. App. 126, 127, 920 S.W.2d 20, 21
(1996). “Good cause has been defined as a cause that would reasonably impel the average able-
bodied, qualified worker to give up his or her employment.” Carpenter v. Dir., 55 Ark. App. 39,
41, 929 S.W.2d 177, 178 (1996) (citing Perdrix-Wang v. Dir., 42 Ark. App. 218, 856 S.W.2d 636
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(1993)). Other elements in determining good cause are “whether the employee took
appropriate steps to prevent the mistreatment from continuing,” Teel v. Dir., 270 Ark. 766, 606
S.W.2d 151 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980), and “whether the employee took appropriate steps to rectify
the problem.” Claflin, 53 Ark. App. at 128, 920 S.W.2d at 22.
We review the Board’s findings in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and
affirm the Board’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Voss v. Dir., 2015 Ark.
App. 521, at 3, 471 S.W.3d 661, 664. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id., 471 S.W.3d at 664.
Even when there is evidence on which the Board might have reached a different decision, the
scope of our review is limited to a determination of whether the Board reasonably could have
reached the decision that it did based upon the evidence before it. Id. at 3–4, 471 S.W.3d at
664. Issues of credibility of witnesses and weight to be afforded their testimony are matters
for the Board to determine. Id. at 4, 471 S.W.3d at 664.
Ridley, a dental assistant, began working for Dr. David Peppers 1 in January 2014. On
the morning of August 24, 2015, Ridley learned that a coworker, Amanda Sponsel, was
planning to tell Dr. Peppers’s wife that Ridley and Dr. Peppers had exchanged text messages
of nude pictures of each other. Later that morning, Ridley left the office and never returned.
In September 2015, Ridley filed a claim for unemployment benefits. She received a notice of
agency determination denying her claim, stating that she left her work voluntarily and without
good cause connected with the work.
1 Ridley had previously worked for Dr. Peppers in 2007 for six to eight months.
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Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 465
Ridley appealed the agency determination to the Appeals Tribunal, and a hearing was
held on October 22, 2015. Ridley testified that from October to December 2014, Dr. Peppers
flirted with her, asked her for naked pictures, touched her breasts and butt and, on one
occasion, asked her to have sexual intercourse. She admitted that she sent him nude pictures
of herself on more than five occasions thinking that he would treat her better. She said he sent
her pictures of his penis. Ridley also testified that Dr. Peppers was verbally and mentally
abusive to her at work. She said that he was violent in the office, throwing things and knocking
pictures off the wall. She said that he once threw a “curing light” at her because he was upset
about a procedure.
According to Ridley, on August 24, 2015, Sponsel said she planned to leave the office
to tell Mrs. Peppers about the nude pictures that Ridley and Dr. Peppers had exchanged. Ridley
said she thereafter received a text message from Sponsel advising that Mrs. Peppers
recommended that she (Ridley) leave the office immediately because “[Mrs. Peppers] had no
idea what [Dr. Peppers] would do” when he learned that his wife knew about the pictures.
Ridley testified that she left the office immediately and went to Mrs. Peppers’s office.
Once she left, Ridley testified that she believed she no longer had a job at the dental
practice, although she conceded she was never told by Dr. Peppers that she was fired. She
admitted that she left the office because Mrs. Peppers suggested she should. Ridley said that
she exchanged emails with Dr. Peppers on August 26. She said that he did not ask her to
return to work and that she did not ask him at that time if she could return to work. She said
that she loved her job but did not ask him about it because she was afraid of him.
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Sponsel testified that she worked as a dental assistant for Dr. Peppers for eight-and-
one-half years and that she carried on a sexual relationship with him for eight years. She stated
that Dr. Peppers confided in her that he abused pharmaceutical drugs. Sponsel further stated
that while Dr. Peppers “picked on” Ridley about her work, she (Sponsel) was unaware of the
nude pictures or any sexual contact between Ridley and Dr. Peppers. Sponsel learned of the
pictures on August 24 and advised Ridley that she planned to tell Mrs. Peppers about them.
Sponsel also said that she and Mrs. Peppers told Ridley to leave the office because they were
afraid of what Dr. Peppers might do.
Dr. Peppers admitted that he had a problem with prescription medication following
failed surgeries. However, he denied engaging in violent behavior in the office, requesting nude
pictures from Ridley, and touching her. He stated that she sent him the first nude picture and
that he asked for more, which she sent.
Dr. Peppers also stated that he did not fire Ridley and that she could have had her job
back if she would have returned to work. He stated that he was expecting her to return to
work the following day. He testified that he sent her a text message asking if she was okay, but
she did not respond. Dr. Peppers also testified that Ridley did not fear him, she never made
any complaints about his behavior, and she thanked him for giving her the job.
The Tribunal affirmed the department’s denial of benefits, finding that Ridley quit her
job due to a personally adverse circumstance. The Tribunal found that Ridley claimed she was
discharged, but her employer did not fire her, and that she voluntarily left work and refused
to return. The Tribunal further found that Ridley’s fear of Dr. Peppers was not rational and
that she left the office before working conditions could have been affected.
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Ridley appealed the Tribunal decision to the Board, and the Board affirmed. It
concluded that Ridley voluntarily left her work without good cause connected to the work.
The Board found that Ridley left her work based on the recommendation of a coemployee
and her supervisor’s wife; not her supervisor. The Board further found that Ridley did not
take any steps to address the situation with Dr. Peppers before quitting; that she failed to
prove that she was mistreated; or in the event that she was mistreated, she failed to prove that
she took appropriate steps to attempt to prevent the mistreatment from continuing. Finally,
although Ridley testified that she left her work and did not return because she was afraid of
Dr. Peppers, the Board found her fear was unwarranted.
Ridley argues that substantial evidence fails to support the Board’s decision that she
voluntarily left her work without good cause connected to the work because the evidence
showed that Dr. Peppers was abusing prescription medication, he mentally and verbally
abused her, he sexually harassed her, and his wife recommended that she leave the office for
her safety. While acknowledging the unfortunate and inappropriate work environment at Dr.
Peppers’s dental practice, we must adhere to our standard of review in unemployment-
compensation cases. Even when there is evidence on which the Board might have reached a
different decision, the scope of our judicial review is limited to a determination of whether the
Board could reasonably reach its decision on the evidence before it. Voss, 2015 Ark. App. 521,
at 3–4, 471 S.W.3d at 664. We also recognize that the credibility of witnesses and the weight
to be accorded their testimony are matters to be resolved by the Board. Johnson v. Dir., 84 Ark.
App. 349, 352, 141 S.W.3d 1, 3 (2004). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Board and accepting that it is not our function to determine the weight and credibility of the
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testimony, we hold that the Board could have reasonably reached its decision—that Ridley
voluntarily left her last work without good cause connected with the work—based on the
evidence before it.
First, substantial evidence demonstrated that Ridley voluntarily left her last work. When
Ridley learned that Sponsel was going to tell Mrs. Peppers about the nude pictures, Ridley left
work. There was no evidence that Dr. Peppers fired her. Ridley admitted that she left work
because Sponsel and Mrs. Peppers—not her supervisor—recommended it. Ridley exchanged
emails with Dr. Peppers two days after she quit, and in those emails, she did not ask him about
returning to work. Finally, there was evidence that Dr. Peppers did not want Ridley to quit, he
was expecting her to return to work the following day, and he would have let her stay if she
wanted.
Second, substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that Ridley voluntarily left
her work without good cause connected to the work. Ridley claims that she had good cause
not to return to work and did not inquire about her job after she left because she was afraid
of Dr. Peppers. However, the Board did not believe that Ridley was afraid of Dr. Peppers.
Issues of credibility of witnesses and weight to be afforded their testimony are matters for the
Board to determine. Weinstein v. Dir., 2013 Ark. App. 374, at 3, 428 S.W.3d 560, 562.
Based on the evidence, the Board could have reasonably found that Ridley did not leave
her work because she was afraid of Dr. Peppers but rather because she was uncomfortable
knowing that Dr. Peppers’s wife had the nude pictures. Ridley testified that she was afraid that
Mrs. Peppers would show the pictures to her boyfriend and that he would leave her. This same
concern was stated in Ridley’s emails to Dr. Peppers on August 26, two days after she left
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work. According to Ridley, Dr. Peppers wrote to her, “Look, no hard feelings, but [my wife]
has every text message.” Ridley responded, “Oh, dear God. I don’t want to lose Troy.” She
emailed, “I feel my whole life has crumpled. I’m too old for all this.” To which Dr. Peppers
emailed, “Yes, it’s tough. I doubt she’ll ever say anything.” And Ridley wrote, “Please do give
me a heads up, Doc, and thank you.” Ridley did not express any fear of Dr. Peppers in her
emails.
Additional evidence contradicted Ridley’s claim that she was afraid of Dr. Peppers.
After Ridley quit, Dr. Peppers sent her a message and asked if she was okay. Dr. Peppers
stated that Ridley never made any complaints about his behavior; she thanked him for giving
her the job; and she never said that she feared him. Ridley testified that she loved her job. We
further note that there is no evidence that Ridley had any interaction on August 24, 2015, with
Dr. Peppers to justify her alleged fear. There was no evidence that Dr. Peppers was angry
when Ridley left work or upon learning that his wife knew of his relationship with Ridley or
Sponsel. Therefore, the Board could have concluded that Ridley was not afraid of him as she
claimed.
We are aware of cases in which we held that sexual harassment by a supervisor was
good cause for an employee to voluntarily terminate her employment. Relyea v. Dir., 104 Ark.
App. 235, 238–39, 290 S.W.3d 34, 37 (2008); McEwen v. Everett, 6 Ark. App. 32, 637 S.W.2d
617 (1982). However, these cases are distinguishable because they did not hinge on the Board’s
determination that the claimants’ reasons for quitting were not credible.
Based on our duty to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Board’s
findings and based on the Board’s finding that Ridley’s testimony lacked credibility, we hold
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that the Board’s decision that Ridley voluntarily quit her last work without good cause
connected with the work is supported by substantial evidence.
Affirmed.
HIXSON and BROWN, JJ., agree.
Michael Hamby, for appellant.
Phyllis A. Edwards, for appellee.
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