Springs v. State

Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 364
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CR-16-1050
JACOB TAYLOR SPRINGS Opinion Delivered: May 31, 2017
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FORT SMITH DISTRICT
STATE OF ARKANSAS [NO. 66 CR-14-512]
APPELLEE
HONORABLE STEPHEN TABOR,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
Appellant appeals from the circuit court’s revocation of his suspended imposition of
sentence (SIS). His sole point on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to support
the revocation. We affirm.
Following events occurring on January 18, 2014, appellant was charged with second-
degree battery, a Class D felony. He pled guilty to the same on June 6, 2014, and was
sentenced to three years’ SIS, conditioned on good behavior and payment of a $1,000
fine, court costs of $150, a $31 jail fee, and a $250 DNA fee, at the rate of $50 per
month starting on July 6, 2014. 1
1
At the revocation hearing, appellee submitted the June 4, 2014 criminal information
showing that appellant had been charged with battery in the second degree; the appellant-
signed terms and conditions of SIS, filed June 6, 2014; appellant’s guilty plea statement,
signed by him on June 6, 2014; and the sentencing order, filed June 10, 2014, sentencing
appellant to thirty-six months’ SIS.
Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 364
Appellant was at the courthouse on August 1, 2016, when the circuit judge requested
to speak with him about events occurring with appellant and the district clerk on that day.
An altercation eventually ensued between appellant and the bailiff causing injury to the
bailiff and requiring assistance from a second bailiff. Appellant was arrested and charged with
second-degree battery. Appellee filed a petition to revoke on August 9, 2016, alleging failure
to pay his fine, costs and fees as ordered, leaving an unpaid balance of sixty-one dollars; and
conduct that violated the terms and conditions of appellant’s SIS.
At his October 12, 2016 revocation hearing, appellee submitted the payment ledger
showing appellant’s failure to make any payments since June 17, 2016. Miller Scott, the
injured bailiff, as well as James McCaslin, the bailiff who assisted Scott in detaining appellant,
testified to the events of that date. Appellant testified denying all pertinent portions of Scott’s
and McCaslin’s testimony.
At the conclusion of all testimony, the circuit court found that appellant had violated
the terms of his SIS for failure to pay and for having committed the offense of resisting arrest
for which appellant was convicted as well as committing the offense of battery in the second
degree. Noting its concern with appellant’s “history of violence[,]” the fact that he was
continuing “to engage in the same pattern of behavior[,]” and, “more disturbing[, . . . ]
what can only be interpreted as a threatening post on Facebook saying that the judge, the
DA and the cops were, quote, going to burn[,]” 2 the circuit court sentenced appellant to
2
Appellant made the Facebook post nine hours after he bonded out of jail.
2
Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 364
three years’ imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. The circuit court filed
its sentencing order reflecting the same on October 20, 2016. This timely appeal followed.
In order to revoke a probation or a suspended imposition of sentence, the circuit
court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has inexcusably
violated a condition of the probation or suspension. 3 Thus, to sustain a revocation, the State
need show only that the defendant committed one violation. 4 The State’s burden of proof
in a revocation proceeding is less than that required to convict in a criminal trial, and
evidence that is insufficient for a conviction thus may be sufficient for a revocation. 5
We will not reverse the circuit court’s findings unless they are clearly against the
preponderance of the evidence. 6 Evidence that would not support a criminal conviction in
the first instance may be enough to revoke probation or a suspended sentence. 7 Determining
whether a preponderance of the evidence exists turns on questions of credibility and weight
to be given to the testimony. 8
3
Mosley v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 353, at 2, 499 S.W.3d 226, 228 (citing Ark. Code
Ann. § 16-93-308(d) (Supp. 2015)).
4
Id. (citing Prackett v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 394, at 2).
5
Mahomes v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 215, at 2, 427 S.W.3d 123, 126 (citing Dooly v.
State, 2010 Ark. App. 591, 377 S.W.3d 471).
6
McClain v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 205, at 3, 489 S.W.3d 179, 181 (citing Green v.
State, 2015 Ark. App. 291, 461 S.W.3d 731).
7
Id.
8
Id.
3
Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 364
Where the alleged violation involves the failure to pay ordered amounts, after the
State has introduced evidence of nonpayment, the burden shifts to the probationer to
provide a reasonable excuse for the failure to pay. 9 It is the probationer’s obligation to justify
his failure to pay, and this shifting of the burden of production provides an opportunity to
explain the reasons for nonpayment. 10 If the probationer asserts an inability to pay and
provides evidence demonstrating that inability, then the State must demonstrate that the
probationer did not make a good-faith effort to pay. 11 Despite the shifting of the burden of
production, the State shoulders the ultimate burden of proving that the probationer’s failure
to pay was inexcusable. 12 If the probationer offers no reasonable explanation for his failure
to pay, then it is difficult to find clear error in a trial court’s finding of inexcusable failure. 13
Appellee submitted a payment ledger showing appellant’s failure to make any
payments since June 17, 2016. The burden then shifted to appellant to provide a reasonable
excuse. 14 Appellant testified that he had been working up until the day of his arrest, had
9
Vail v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 407, at 3, 438 S.W.3d 286, 288 (citing Scroggins v.
State, 2012 Ark. App. 87, at 9, 389 S.W.3d 40, 45).
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Peals v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 1, at 4, 453 S.W.3d 151, 154 (citing Scroggins v. State,
2012 Ark. App. 87, 389 S.W.3d 40) (“Where the alleged violation involves the failure to
pay ordered amounts, after the State has introduced evidence of nonpayment, the burden
shifts to the probationer to provide a reasonable excuse for the failure to pay.”).
4
Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 364
failed to pay his remaining balance because “the mother of [his] child lost her job, so [he]
was paying bills, paying her fine”; and that he was “at the business office to pay a fine for
[his] fines and costs.”
The term “inexcusable” is defined as “incapable of being excused or justified—Syn.
unpardonable, unforgivable, intolerable.” 15 By appellant’s own admission, he had an ability
to pay his fine because he was “paying [his child’s mother’s] fine.” Furthermore, the circuit
court clearly found appellant’s testimony not credible for he stated that he was at the circuit
court to pay a fine, but Scott testified that he waited in the business office “until [appellant]
finished his business at the window, then asked [appellant] to follow [Scott] down to the
courtroom” to speak with the judge.
While the statute governing revocations requires the circuit court’s consideration of
certain factors in determining whether a party’s inability to pay is inexcusable, the statute
does not require explicit findings of fact on those factors. 16 When considering the lower
burden of proof in revocation proceedings and giving the proper deference to the superior
position of the circuit court to determine questions of credibility and the weight to be given
the evidence, 17 this court cannot hold that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that
appellant willfully violated the condition of his probation requiring him to make payments
as directed. Appellee need only prove that appellant committed one violation of the
15
Barbee v. State, 346 Ark. 185, 189, 56 S.W.3d 370, 372 (2001) (quoting Random
House Compact Unabridged Dictionary 977 (1996)).
16
Bohannon v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 434, at 8, 439 S.W.3d 735
17
Bohannon, supra.
5
Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 364
conditions of his probation, 18 so we do not address appellant’s second violation found by
the circuit court.
Affirmed.
HARRISON and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.
David L. Dunagin, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Kathryn Henry, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
18
Holmes-Childers v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 464, at 4, 504 S.W.3d 645, 648 (citing
Major v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 501).
6