David Feltner v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 299ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CR-22-773
DAVID FELTNER OPINION DELIVERED MAY 24, 2023
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE POPE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 58CR-21-809]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE JAMES DUNHAM,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge
Appellant David Feltner (“Feltner”) appeals after a jury in the Pope County Circuit
Court found him guilty of aggravated assault on a family member; third-degree domestic
battery; and endangering the welfare of a minor. Feltner argues on appeal that the circuit
court erred by admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic violence between Feltner and the
victim to show his intent and absence of mistake. We affirm.
I. Background Facts
On August 18, 2021, Feltner was charged with one count of aggravated assault on a
family or household member, one misdemeanor count of third-degree domestic battery, one
count of first-degree terroristic threatening, and one count of endangering the welfare of a
minor. The charges arose from Feltner’s alleged attack on his fourteen-year-old daughter in
the early morning hours of July 23, 2021, at their residence in Russellville.
The court held a jury trial on July 12–13, 2022. Prior to trial, the court handled
pretrial matters, including the issue relevant in this appeal involving the State’s request
regarding Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b) and its proposed admission of evidence thereof.
The prosecuting attorney stated that the anticipated testimony—which it disclosed during
discovery—would be from the victim and potentially her stepmother as to prior incidents of
domestic violence between Feltner and the victim. The State alleged that the testimony was
relevant to prove Feltner’s intent and motive. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the
testimony should be precluded because it was being offered solely as character evidence and
was unfairly prejudicial. Furthermore, defense counsel declared that Feltner’s defense was,
“in essence,” that he was attempting to prevent his daughter from fleeing in the middle of
the night during a verbal altercation.
The circuit court held that the anticipated testimony was relevant to establish
Feltner’s intent to commit harm against a family member; thus, it would be allowed for
“those permitted purposes,” which was to show Feltner’s motive in committing the alleged
acts and that the actions were committed in the absence of any mistake or accident. The
court acknowledged that the evidence was prejudicial; however, it considered the testimony
to be highly relevant and meaningful. Moreover, the court held that the anticipated
testimony was to be offered consistent with the State’s proffered Rule 404(b) jury instruction
and noted that Feltner was “of course, free to contest it” during the trial.
At trial, the victim testified as follows: that on the night in question her father had
been drinking heavily; she went into her bedroom and fell asleep around midnight; Feltner
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came into her room, and an argument ensued; Feltner began throwing and breaking lamps,
then he choked her on the bed; and she ultimately ran out of the house into the carport to
get away from Feltner, but he—along with his dog—chased her down, and he choked and
injured her as she was attempting to flee. The victim testified to other various incidents of
domestic abuse between her and Feltner and the physical injuries she sustained, including
dog bites resulting from Feltner’s commanding his dog to bite her. Furthermore, she testified
about previously observing her stepmother with a bloody nose and eyes caused by Feltner.
The defense did not object to any of the foregoing testimony. Additionally, a police officer
who arrived on the scene testified that the victim had relayed that Feltner had “done this
before.” No objection was raised.
Home-security video footage obtained by the police was played for the jury—without
objection—which showed the altercation that took place between the victim and Feltner in
the carport of the residence. Feltner took the stand and described the incident as a family
altercation in which he was upset and overreacted when his daughter ran out of the house
at one thirty in the morning. Feltner alleged that as he chased his daughter out of the
residence, he tripped and fell, then held her by her hair in an attempt to restrain her from
leaving the premises in the middle of the night. Feltner denied choking his daughter and
asserted that her only injuries were made by his dog.
A proffered model jury instruction regarding Rule 404(b) evidence was read by the
court and provided to the jury prior to deliberation. No objection to the instruction was
raised. The jury found Feltner guilty of aggravated assault on a family or household member,
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third-degree domestic battery, and endangering the welfare of a minor. Feltner was
sentenced to an aggregate of twelve years, to be served consecutively, in the Arkansas
Department of Correction. He filed a timely notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
Upon review, “the admission or rejection of evidence under Rule 404(b) is committed
to the sound discretion of the circuit court, and this court will not reverse absent a showing
of manifest abuse of discretion.” Dimas-Martinez v. State, 2011 Ark. 515, 385 S.W.3d 238.
Likewise, the balancing mandated by Rule 403 is also a matter left to a circuit court’s sound
discretion, and an appellate court will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling absent a showing
of manifest abuse. Croy v. State, 2011 Ark. 284, 383 S.W.3d 367. Abuse of discretion is a
high threshold that does not simply require error in the circuit court’s decision, but requires
that the circuit court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Craigg
v. State, 2012 Ark. 387, 424 S.W.3d 264.
III. Discussion
Feltner maintains that, pursuant to Rule 404(b), the circuit court abused its discretion
in allowing the admission of evidence of prior acts of domestic violence between him and
the victim. He also challenges the admission of the bad-acts evidence under Rule 403 and
further argues that such admission violated the Rule 404(b) instruction provided to the jury.
Specifically, Feltner argues that because his defense was one of general denial, and intent
“was not truly at issue,” the circuit court’s admission of the Rule 404(b) evidence served no
other purpose than to show that he had done something similar in the past and was therefore
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more likely to be guilty of the crimes committed. He contends that the risk of prejudice
outweighed the probative value of the evidence and that the admission thereof violated the
Rule 404(b) instruction provided to the jury. We disagree.
A. Arkansas Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403
Rule 404(b) states that
[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
The supreme court has explained that the first sentence provides the general rule excluding
evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts, while the second sentence provides an exemplary,
but not exhaustive, list of exceptions to that rule. Craigg, 2012 Ark. 387, 424 S.W.3d 264.
Evidence is not admissible under Rule 404(b) simply to establish that the defendant is a bad
person who does bad things. Id. Rule 404(b) permits the introduction of evidence of prior
bad acts if the evidence is independently relevant to make the existence of any fact or
consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. See, e.g., Vance v.
State, 2011 Ark. 243, 383 S.W.3d 325.
Additionally, “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.” Ark. R. Evid. 403 (2022). Thus, a circuit court may refuse to admit evidence that
is unfairly prejudicial to the defendant, even if it might be relevant. Lockhart v. State, 2010
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Ark. 278, 367 S.W.3d 530. The supreme court has noted that evidence offered by the State
is likely to be prejudicial to the accused; however, the evidence should not be excluded unless
the accused can show that it lacks probative value in view of the risk of unfair prejudice.
Chunestudy v. State, 2012 Ark. 222, 408 S.W.3d 55.
Here, Feltner’s defense was that the incident was merely a family altercation during
which he tripped and then restrained his daughter to prevent her from fleeing the residence
in the middle of the night. Thus, Feltner’s defense triggered the admission of the evidence
in question. Feltner’s argument that his defense was one of general denial—“not an accident”
and “not with some lesser intent”—is inaccurate and not supported by the record. At trial,
defense counsel used the words “I believe it was an accident” in his closing statement.
Further, regarding whether Feltner “purposefully created substantial risk of death or serious
physical injury, defense counsel argued: “He’s made a mistake. He had too much to drink.
He overreacted, and this was the result.” Accordingly, Feltner’s defense at trial centered on
lack of intent and accident. As held in Coakley v. State, “intent was at the crux of the jury’s
determination of guilt, as the jury was required to determine whether appellant acted with
the requisite intent for the charged offense.” 2019 Ark. 259, at 6, 584 S.W.3d 236, 239. The
victim’s testimony that she had been on the receiving end of Feltner’s abuse on several
occasions was independently relevant to demonstrate Feltner’s relationship with his
daughter—as well as other household members—and to establish the absence of mistake or
accident.
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The existence and admission of the home-security videos effectively limited the
defenses available to Feltner. Feltner could not reasonably deny that he was involved in a
heated altercation with his daughter in the early morning hours of July 23; he could not deny
that he physically restrained his daughter while his wife stood next to him screaming “let her
go” repeatedly; nor could he maintain that his daughter did not sustain severe injuries during
the incident. Instead, Feltner argued that he lacked the intent to cause harm to his daughter;
that he tripped while angrily chasing her out of the residence; that his dog attacked her
without provocation; and that it was all the result of a terrible accident. As a result, the cases
Feltner cites on appeal—wherein our appellate courts held that Rule 404(b) evidence was
inadmissible to prove intent—are distinguishable from these facts because the defendants did
not claim that their conduct was the result of an accident or mistake. Here, however, Feltner
placed his intent squarely at issue.
For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by finding
the testimony relevant for the purpose of establishing motive and absence of any mistake or
accident. Nor did the circuit court err in finding that the probative value of the testimony
outweighed its potentially prejudicial effect.
B. Jury Instruction
Feltner also argues that the State used the Rule 404(b) evidence contrary to the jury
instruction. This argument is not properly preserved for appeal. During trial, Feltner never
objected to the jury instruction, nor did he express any belief that the prosecutor’s statements
or the testimony presented violated the instruction. Feltner concedes such, stating in his
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brief that testimony and argument by the State progressed “without a peep from defense
counsel nor any effort to have a limiting instruction read at the time of admission.”
Objections made at trial must be sufficient to apprise the lower court of the error alleged.
Dorn v. State, 360 Ark. 1, 199 S.W.3d 647 (2004). Here, Feltner’s failure to notify the circuit
court of his objection concerning an alleged violation of the jury instruction prohibited the
court from making a ruling; thus, we will not address this argument.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm Feltner’s convictions.
Affirmed.
KLAPPENBACH and GRUBER, JJ., agree.
John Wesley Hall and Samantha J. Carpenter, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: David L. Eanes, Jr., Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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