United States v. Stoneman

UNITED STATES, Appellee
V.
John S. STONEMAN, Specialist
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 01-0295
Crim. App. No. 9800137
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued January 22, 2002
Decided July 5, 2002
GIERKE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
EFFRON and BAKER, JJ., and SULLIVAN, S.J., joined.
SULLIVAN, S.J., filed a concurring opinion.
CRAWFORD, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Sean S. Park (argued); Colonel Adele H.
Odegard, Lieutenant Colonel E. Allen Chandler, Jr., and Major
Imogene M. Jamison (on brief); Lieutenant Colonel David A.
Mayfield.
For Appellee: Captain Paul T. Cygnarowicz (argued); Colonel
Steven T. Salata, Lieutenant Colonel Paul H. Turney, and
Major Anthony P. Nicastro (on brief).
Military Judges: Stephen V. Saynisch and Debra L. Boudreau
This opinion is subject to editorial correction before final publication.
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
Judge GIERKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted
members convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of raping and
sodomizing a child under the age of sixteen, in violation of
Articles 120 and 125, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10
USC §§ 920 and 925, respectively. The adjudged and approved
sentence provides for a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for
seventy-eight months, total forfeitures, and reduction to the
lowest enlisted grade. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
the findings and sentence. 54 MJ 664 (2000).
This Court granted review of the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED TO THE SUBSTANTIAL
PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY DENYING THE DEFENSE’S MOTION TO
STAY THE PROCEEDINGS UNTIL THE PANEL WAS PROPERLY SELECTED
SO AS NOT TO INCLUDE THE MEMBERS OF THE FIRST BRIGADE WHO
RECEIVED AN E-MAIL FROM THE BRIGADE COMMANDER, AND/OR
ATTENDED THE RELATED BRIEFING IN WHICH THE COMMANDER STATED
HIS INTENT TO “CRUSH” THOSE WHO DID NOT LIVE UP TO A CERTAIN
STANDARD.
II. WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED TO THE SUBSTANTIAL
PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY FAILING TO SHIFT THE BURDEN TO THE
GOVERNMENT ONCE THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHED A CASE OF UNLAWFUL
COMMAND INFLUENCE BY MAKING A WRITTEN MOTION, APPENDING AN
INCRIMINATING E-MAIL MESSAGE TO THE MOTION, AND PROFERRING
TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS TO A BRIEFING AT WHICH THE BRIGADE
COMMANDER MADE INAPPROPRIATE COMMENTS ABOUT DISCIPLINE IN
THE PRESENCE OF SEVERAL COURT MEMBERS.
III. WHETHER THE ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN
ATTEMPTING TO “RECREATE” THE UNLAWFUL COMMAND INFLUENCE
HEARING THAT THE MILITARY JUDGE SHOULD HAVE CONDUCTED.
IV. WHETHER THE ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE MILITARY JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION
BY DENYING THE DEFENSE’S CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE AGAINST PANEL
MEMBERS WHO RECEIVED AN E-MAIL MESSAGE FROM THEIR BRIGADE
COMMANDER THAT CONTAINED STATEMENTS REGARDING HIS INTENT TO
“CRUSH” THOSE WHO DID NOT LIVE UP TO A CERTAIN STANDARD.
For the reasons set out below, we remand for further proceedings.
2
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
Background
Appellant was a member of Headquarters and Headquarters
Company, 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, a subordinate unit of the
1st Brigade, 6th Infantry Division (Light). On December 21, 1997,
Colonel (COL) Brook, the brigade commander, sent an e-mail to the
brigade leadership and supporting unit commanders, notifying them
of mandatory leaders’ training on December 23, 1997. The e-mail
informed all battalion and company commanders that he expected
them “to ensure the following happens after [his] leader
training”:
(1) “Declare war on all leaders not leading by example, both
on and off duty,” and inform them that failure to lead by example
“will result in relief, negative [evaluation reports]; or UCMJ
action.”
(2) Develop a unit plan for “ZERO DUIs [driving under the
influence] during the holiday period”;
(3) “Ensure EVERY single soldier, or geographical batchelor
[sic], in the Brigade is invited over to someone’s home, or the
unit is having a special barracks function” on Christmas Day;
(4) “Ensure all new soldiers . . . are integrated into the
unit, and NOT being treated as the ‘FNG’ [f------ new guy] prior
to Christmas. If you don’t’ have a good integration plan for the
new soldiers, you will have a rash of problems, DUIs, etc. over
the holiday period. Be proactive, and ensure this doesn’t
happen.”
COL Brook then articulated his leadership philosophy,
including the following comments:
3
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
I am sick of leaders who are leaders by virtue of their
rank only. My New Years Resolution is to CRUSH all
leaders in this Brigade who don’t lead by example, on
and off duty. Leaders must focus on developing their
REFERENT power, the power given to them by subordinates
who respect them because of caring competent
leadership, rather than their LEGAL power, which is the
power they have by virtue of their rank.
* * *
I’m sick of leaders getting DUIs, abusing their
position, being lazy, not achieving [Brigade physical
training] standards, taking the easy way out regarding
safety, and never going the extra mile. I’m sick of
encountering leaders who could care less about
soldiers, and are SELF CENTERED pukes. I am sick of
hearing about leaders who are morally and spiritually
bankrupt. I am declaring war on leaders like this,
because they don’t deserve to be leaders of America’s
sons and daughters, and they are not doing what the
American taxpayer expects them to do.
* * *
. . . If leaders don't lead by example, and practice
self-discipline, then the very soul of our Army is at
risk. No more [platoon sergeants] getting DUIs, no
more NCOs [noncommissioned officers] raping female
soldiers, no more E7s coming up "hot" for coke, no more
stolen equipment, no more "lost" equipment, no more
approved personnel actions for leaders with less than
260 APFT [Army physical fitness test scores], no more
leader APFT failures at [Department of the Army]
schools, --- all of this is BULLSHIT, and I'm going to
CRUSH leaders who fail to lead by example, both on and
off duty.
54 MJ at 676.
On January 9, 1998, COL Brook sent a second e-mail, stating
that nothing in his previous e-mail was intended to suggest
specific actions for leadership failures. He informed his
commanders that appropriate action for particular cases was
defined as “what each individual commander . . . deem[ed] so in
the exercise of independent discretion.” COL Brook further
stated:
4
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
. . . Nothing in what I have said in this or the
earlier e-mail, or what I said at the Leader Training,
has anything to do with what any soldier does as a
member of a court-martial panel or as a witness before
a court-martial. The sworn duty of any court-martial
panel member is to follow the instructions of the
military judge, apply law to admissible facts, and
decide a sentence based solely on the evidence
presented in court. Nothing said outside a
court-martial by anybody, TO INCLUDE ME, may have any
bearing on the outcome of any given case or sentence.
Id. at 678.
On January 22, 1998, defense counsel submitted a motion to
the military judge asking her to stay the proceedings until all
members of the 1st Brigade were removed from the panel. The
defense asserted that several NCOs perceived COL Brook’s message
to be “that leaders who found themselves in trouble needed to be
‘crushed.’” The defense proffered the testimony of Staff
Sergeant (SSG) Mallerard that no one present at the leaders’
training “ha[d] any doubt what COL Brook meant to get across --
that is, crush these soldiers that get into trouble.” The
defense asserted that the members of the brigade should be
removed from the court-martial panel for implied bias. The
defense conceded that the unlawful command influence only
affected court members from the 1st Brigade, and not potential
witnesses.
When appellant’s court-martial convened on January 25, 1998,
the military judge ruled that the request for a stay was
premature, because any issues involving unlawful command
influence could be addressed during individual voir dire. During
group voir dire, five of the nine members of the panel
acknowledged seeing an e-mail regarding disciplinary problems
5
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
within the brigade. The members were then questioned
individually.
Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Saul was COL Brook’s second in
command and had assumed command of the brigade on three occasions
in COL Brook’s absence. He recalled that COL Brook’s first e-
mail suggested “the appearance of a lack of law and order among
certain elements of the brigade.” He thought that the message
was directed at all enlisted members of the brigade. He
described the leaders’ training session on December 23 as
follows:
[A] discussion, a monologue from the brigade
commander, in regards that a series of
criminal acts or violations of the law, to
include a number of driving under the
influence or drunk driving cases; there was
reference to a rape of a female enlisted
soldier by a noncommissioned officer; some
details were discussed in that case; and a
general perception on the part of the brigade
commander was that there was an element
within the brigade that violation of the law
was common.
The only guidance that LTC Saul recalled was “a tightening up of
the chain of command and enforcement of discipline and
standards.” LTC Saul had no recollection of the second e-mail
message.
LTC Saul told the military judge that he did not think that
COL Brook’s actions had any impact on him as a court member. He
did not perceive COL Brook’s actions as an “exhortation to . . .
be tough in this case.”
LTC Withers, the brigade executive officer, perceived the
first e-mail as “aimed at the leaders,” addressing “the problems
we had had with discipline,” and “urging leaders not to accept
6
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
substandard performance, especially by leaders.” He recalled
that the e-mail “made a statement that leaders should scrunch or
squash, or something, NCOs especially and other officers, who
committed crimes, had a DUI, something like that.”
LTC Withers recalled that the December 23 leaders’ training
had “[c]ertainly the same tone, the same subject matter.” He
explained:
The brigade had had several DUIs, there was a rash of
DUIs; it was an attention getter, trying to get people
to wake up and realize the seriousness of DUIs and so
he was talking that leaders should exhibit a higher
standard, and any leader who did something like that it
was questionable if they should be around.
LTC Withers perceived the second e-mail as an attempt to
clarify the first, and to make it clear that the first e-mail
“was not in any way, shape or form, intended to make us -- or to
inhibit his subordinates in the proper handling of UCMJ and other
legal matters.” When asked if COL Brook’s actions would affect
his performance as a court member, he responded, “Not at all.”
He explained:
Colonel Brook is a very impassioned man; he holds his
values very high; he shoots from the hip; he knows he
shoots from the hip. I had talked to him about that
and a wide variety of subjects. I've been in the Army
long enough to have seen statements like that before;
and quite frankly I've been in the Army so long that
I'm not really concerned at this point what my rater
thinks; I'm going to do what I think is right, because
that's what I've done all my career.
LTC Moody commanded an aviation battalion that supported the
1st Brigade but was not part of it. He stated that he probably
read the e-mail messages because he receives a courtesy copy of
brigade correspondence. He recalled that the message “may have
had something to do with accountability, integrity.” He stated
7
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
that he respects COL Brook, “but he’s not my brigade commander.”
LTC Moody was invited to the leadership training but did not
attend.
Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Pagan was the brigade command
sergeant major. Although he worked directly for COL Brook, he
did not participate in the drafting of the e-mail messages. His
perception of the first e-mail was as follows:
[J]ust trying to convey to everybody how serious these
situations are, and that we should do everything in our
power as leaders to make sure that we’re talking to our
soldiers about all the pitfalls that are out there
awaiting you, and keep these things in mind and convey
that to the soldiers so that they’re thinking about
that, those situations; the situation that could happen
to them, or either -- DUIs, or putting themselves in a
compromising situation, so forth and so on. And trying
to prevent people from getting into trouble.
Asked whether he thought the e-mail told him what he should do
when “confronted with someone who is in trouble,” he responded,
“No, not at all.” CSM Pagan had no recollection of the second e-
mail.
CSM Pagan was asked to comment on the first e-mail, and he
responded:
[H]e was thinking about a few leaders out there at
different levels, and that he probably overreacted and
put it on e-mail. He shot from the hip, versus talking
to somebody else and maybe let them, kind of, see what
he was writing and maybe say “Hey sir, you need to calm
that down a little bit.”
CSM Pagan believed that COL Brook sent the same message at
the December 23 leaders’ training. He believed that the briefing
“covered all soldiers from Private to Colonel.” However, he
thought that the tone of the briefing “was completely different.”
At the briefing, “it was an upbeat tone by [Col Brook], and it
8
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
was more on the verge of ‘Let me tell you how I can keep you and
your soldiers out of trouble.’”
When the military judge asked CSM Pagan whether one of the
civilian spectators in the courtroom could be assured that he
would be a fair and impartial court member, he responded:
Well, I've been a fair and impartial member of the
United States Army, as well as my nation, serving for
close to 25 years; and I'm not one to be swayed, I'm
not one to comply with something just because somebody
else said it. I'll stick by my guns and come to the
conclusion that I feel is appropriate; no matter who's
in that group, or in this members [sic] of the jury; I
will take all the information that's given to me, make
a rational decision, evaluate all that information, and
I will make the best decision that I see possible with
that information, and listening to others that have an
opinion on that subject.
Master Sergeant (MSG) Peele was the brigade chemical NCO.
He stated that he read some of the first e-mail, and “what [he]
got out of it was about the incidents about the drunk driving and
things like that.” He did not think that the e-mail conveyed any
message to him that he “didn’t already have in [his] mind about
drunk driving.” He did not think that it gave him any guidance
about being a leader. He disagreed with the focus of the
leaders’ training. Regarding his duties as a court member, he
told the military judge, “I don’t need a Colonel to tell me now
to do my duties, ma’am, I can do them on my own; and I think that
he could take a message from me” regarding the treatment of
soldiers in the brigade. MSG Peele thought that racism and the
standards of treatment of soldiers in the brigade were more
appropriate issues than focusing on DUI. Asked by defense
counsel what effect the message had on him, MSG Peele responded:
9
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
Well, if you’re doing your job, sir, everyday like you
should be doing, as I do, I feel it had no affect [sic]
on me. It does affect me to the point of you can’t
tell me to lead by example if you don’t do it; and
that’s just my opinion, sir.
MSG Peele did not see the second e-mail.
Sergeant First Class (SFC) Robbins, a member of appellant’s
battalion, did not see either e-mail, but he did attend the
leaders’ training on December 23. He told the military judge
that he did not think the December 23 briefing had any bearing on
his court-martial duties.
The military judge denied the motion for a stay and the
defense challenges for cause based on implied bias. She
explained:
I've read United States versus Youngblood, [47 M.J. 338(1997)], and I certainly agree with the court in that
case that implied bias is critical and it's reviewed
through the eyes of the public; but if it was reviewed
through the eyes of the public the responses that the
court members gave, if members of the public were
sitting in the back of the courtroom and heard their
responses given on voir dire by the members of 1st
Brigade who have been selected to serve in this
court-martial, I think they would see that these
members represent the finest traditions of the United
States Army as court members, and would certainly not
be swayed by anything Colonel Brook might say; they
viewed his comments as being intemperate, and I think
that everyone heard them say loudly and clearly that
they will discharge their responsibilities as court
members and vote in accordance with their conscience.
Defense counsel later challenged LTC Saul for cause on
several grounds, including his answers on voir dire about COL
Brook’s message. The military judge granted the challenge,
explaining:
In the interest of granting challenge[s] for
cause liberally, based upon my observations
as well of Lieutenant Colonel Saul, he was
the only one that didn’t take great pains to
10
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
distance himself from Colonel Brook’s
comments; he was the only one who believed
that, I think, the message extended to all
soldiers, including those at the Private
level.
A defense challenge for cause against CSM Pagan was granted
on multiple grounds, including a recent conflict with defense
counsel. After challenges, four members of the 1st Brigade
remained on the panel: LTC Withers, LTC Moody, MSG Peele, and SFC
Robbins.
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the military judge
did not err by declining to rule on the motion for a stay until
after voir dire. 54 MJ at 671. It held that she did not abuse
her discretion by denying the implied bias challenges. Id. at
673. It noted that she “never articulated whether, under command
influence law, the appellant had met his initial burden to show
facts constituting unlawful command influence that were logically
connected to the court-martial, and which had the potential to
cause unfairness in the proceedings, thereby shifting the burden
of proof to the government.” Id.; see United States v. Biagase,
50 MJ 143, 150 (1999). Instead, the military judge based her
ruling “purely on the law of causal challenges.” Id. The court
below held that any error based on failure to apply the burden-
shifting mandated by Biagase was harmless. Id.The court below also noted that the military judge “did not
make any specific findings of fact as to the content of the
leaders’ training or conclusions of law as to whether COL Brook’s
comments constituted unlawful command influence.” It found this
omission harmless. Id. at 674.
11
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
The court below then conducted a de novo review of the
record to determine whether the trial was tainted by unlawful
command influence. Based on the members’ responses during voir
dire, the court concluded that COL Brook “did not attempt to
coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence the action” of
the court-martial. Id., quoting Art. 37, UCMJ, 10 USC § 837. The
court agreed that COL Brook was “shoot[ing] from the hip,” that
his language was intemperate, and that his comments “may have
been inappropriate,” but it held that his comments were not
unlawful. Id. The court below concluded “beyond a reasonable
doubt that the findings and sentence in the appellant’s case were
not affected by COL Brook’s e-mails and leaders’ training.” Id.Discussion
Appellant asserts that the military judge erred by failing
to stay the proceedings, by misapplying the test for implied bias
based on unlawful command influence, by failing to hold a hearing
on the issue of unlawful command influence, and by failing to
shift the burden of proof to the Government as required by
Biagase, supra. Appellant also asserts that the court below
erred when it “recreated” the hearing that the military judge
should have conducted. The Government asserts that the military
judge correctly denied the challenges founded on implied bias,
and that the court below correctly determined, after a de novo
review of the record, that appellant failed to establish unlawful
command influence.
Unlawful command influence is “the mortal enemy of military
justice.” United States v. Thomas, 22 MJ 388, 393 (CMA 1986).
On appeal, this Court reviews de novo the question whether the
12
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
facts constitute unlawful command influence. United States v.
Johnson, 54 MJ 32, 34 (2000). Once the issue has been raised,
the Government must persuade this Court beyond a reasonable doubt
either that there was no unlawful command influence or that the
proceedings were untainted. Biagase, supra; Thomas, supra.
In Thomas, supra at 396, this Court placed the burden on
defense counsel, trial counsel, and the military judge to “fully
question the court members during voir dire” to determine whether
a commander’s comments “had an adverse impact on the member’s
ability to render an impartial judgment.” This Court recognized,
however, that in some cases, voir dire may not be enough, and
that witnesses may be required to testify on the issue of
unlawful command influence.
In Youngblood, supra, relied on by the military judge in
this case, this Court held that the military judge erred by
denying challenges for cause based on unlawful command influence.
Youngblood was decided as an implied bias case, not an unlawful
command influence case. Because this Court did not reach the
question whether unlawful command influence was raised, it did
not apply the burden-shifting analysis set out in its later
Biagase decision. 47 MJ at 339.
In Biagase, this Court set out the analytical framework for
resolving claims of unlawful command influence. At trial, the
initial burden is on the defense to “raise” the issue. The
burden of proof is low, but more than mere allegation or
speculation. The quantum of evidence required to raise unlawful
command influence is “some evidence.” 50 MJ at 150.
13
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
The defense must show facts that, if true, constitute
unlawful command influence, and it must show that the unlawful
command influence has a logical connection to the court-martial
in terms of potential to cause unfairness in the proceedings. If
the defense shows such facts by “some evidence,” the issue is
raised. Id.
Once the issue is raised, the burden shifts to the
Government. Id. The Government may show either that there was
no unlawful command influence or that any unlawful command
influence did not taint the proceedings. If the Government
elects to show that there was no unlawful command influence, it
may do so either by disproving the predicate facts on which the
allegation of unlawful command influence is based, or by
persuading the military judge that the facts do not constitute
unlawful command influence. The Government also may choose to
not disprove the existence of unlawful command influence but to
prove that it will not affect the proceedings. Whichever tactic
the Government chooses, the quantum of evidence required is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 151.
Unlike the law pertaining to unlawful command influence,
there is no burden shifting in the law pertaining to challenges.
RCM 912(f)(3), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2000
ed.),1 places the burden of establishing the grounds for
challenge on the challenging party. However, RCM 912(f)(3) does
not define the quantum of proof required to establish a ground
1
This Manual provision is identical to the one in effect at the
time of appellant’s court-martial.
14
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
for challenge. This Court has not addressed the quantum of proof
required under Rule 912(f)(3), and we need not precisely define
it in this case. We are satisfied, however, that the quantum of
proof required under RCM 912(f)(3) is higher than the “some
evidence” required to raise an issue of unlawful command
influence. Thus, a military judge’s determination that the
defense has not sustained the greater burden of establishing a
challenge under RCM 912(f)(3) does not answer the question
whether the defense has met the lesser burden of presenting “some
evidence” of unlawful command influence, thereby shifting the
burden to the Government.
As noted by the court below, the military judge did not make
findings of fact and conclusions of law, nor did she analyze the
evidence in accordance with the Biagase framework.2 54 MJ at
673-74. Thus, the question before us is whether the lower
2
The dissent notes that Biagase was decided after appellant’s
trial. However, the Biagase decision, which then-Judge Crawford
joined, did not establish a new requirement for making findings
of fact and conclusions of law or otherwise announce new law; it
merely synthesized this Court’s jurisprudence and established an
analytical framework for resolving issues of unlawful command
influence. Long before Biagase, this Court recognized that
unlawful command influence involves questions of fact as well as
questions of law. Once the issue is raised, a military judge
must determine the facts and then decide whether those facts
constitute unlawful command influence. See United States v.
Gerlich, 45 MJ 309, 310-11 (1996); United States v. Ayala, 43 MJ
296, 299 (1995); United States v. Stombaugh, 40 MJ 208, 213-14
(CMA 1994). The “some evidence” standard was set out in Ayala,
supra at 300. The burden-shifting was set out in Gerlich, supra
at 310. The requirement to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the proceedings were unaffected by unlawful command influence was
announced in United States v. Thomas, 22 MJ 388, 394 (CMA 1986).
15
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
court’s de novo review of the record and its analysis under the
Biagase framework are an adequate substitute for a hearing at the
trial level and are sufficient to ensure that this case was not
tainted by unlawful command influence. We hold that further
proceedings are necessary to determine if the court-martial was
tainted.
In United States v. Ginn, 47 MJ 236, 242 (1997), this Court
concluded that Congress intended the Courts of Criminal Appeals
“to act as factfinder in an appellate-review capacity and not in
the first instance as a trial court.” In this case, there was no
factfinding hearing, and no analysis under the Biagase framework
at the trial level. As a result, there are no trial-level
findings of fact regarding the content, tone, and impact of COL
Brook’s leadership training session on December 23. We cannot
determine if additional witnesses would shed light on the issue.
In this regard, we note that the defense proffered the testimony
of SSG Mallerard, the brigade training NCO, but the military
judge did not act on that proffer.
Finally, the record of trial does not provide an appellate
court the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the court
members. This Court has long recognized that, once unlawful
command influence is raised, “we believe it incumbent on the
military judge to act in the spirit of the Code by avoiding even
the appearance of evil in his courtroom and by establishing the
confidence of the general public in the fairness of the court-
martial proceedings.” United States v. Rosser, 6 MJ 267, 271
(CMA 1979). Accordingly, disposition of an issue of unlawful
command influence falls short if it “fails to take into
16
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
consideration the concern of Congress and this Court in
eliminating even the appearance of unlawful command influence at
courts-martial.” Id.; see United States v. Ayers, 54 MJ 85, 94-
95 (2000), quoting United States v. Allen, 33 MJ 209, 212 (CMA
1991) (“[T]he appearance of unlawful command influence is as
devastating to the military justice system as the actual
manipulation of any given trial.”).
The question whether there is an appearance of unlawful
command influence is similar in one respect to the question
whether there is implied bias, because both are judged
objectively, through the eyes of the community. In the implied
bias area, this Court has recognized that “[o]bservation of the
member’s demeanor may inform judgments” about the public
perception of the fairness of a trial. United States v. Downing,
56 MJ 419, 422 (2002). While demeanor is “[a] measure of actual
bias,” it is “also relevant to an objective observer’s
consideration.” Id. at 423. On an issue as sensitive as
unlawful command influence, evaluation of demeanor of the court
members as well as other witnesses, viewed through the prism of
Biagase and the presumption of prejudice, is critical to evaluate
whether there is an objective appearance of unfairness. Even if
there was no actual unlawful command influence, there may be a
question whether the influence of command placed an “intolerable
strain on public perception of the military justice system.” See
United States v. Wiesen, 56 MJ 172, 175 (2001). For these
reasons, we conclude that a hearing before a military judge is
necessary to resolve appellant’s claim of unlawful command
influence.
17
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
Decision
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is set aside. The record of trial is returned to the
Judge Advocate General of the Army for submission to a convening
authority for a hearing on appellant’s claim of unlawful command
influence under United States v. DuBay, 17 USCMA 147, 37 CMR 411
(1967). If a hearing is impracticable, the convening authority
may set aside the findings and sentence and order a rehearing or
dismiss the charges. If a hearing is conducted, the record of
trial, including the hearing, will then be transmitted to the
Court of Criminal Appeals for review under Article 66, UCMJ, 10
USC § 866. Thereafter, Article 67, UCMJ, 10 USC § 867, shall
apply.
18
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
SULLIVAN, Senior Judge (concurring):
I agree with the majority. This is consistent with my
position in United States v. Youngblood, 47 MJ 338, 342-43
(1997)(Sullivan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(the real issue is unlawful command influence, not jury bias).
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
CRAWFORD, Chief Judge (dissenting):
The majority chastises the military judge because she did
not make “findings of fact and conclusions of law, nor did she
analyze the evidence in accordance with the Biagase framework.”
___ MJ at (15). I do not find this “failure” surprising or
erroneous since the court-martial that tried appellant took
place fifteen months before this Court rendered its decision in
United States v. Biagase, 50 MJ 143 (1999), setting forth a
framework for analyzing questions of unlawful command influence.
Although the clairvoyance which the majority apparently demands
of trial judges was not present in this case, I believe the
trial judge properly applied the law in rejecting appellant’s
challenge to those members who were subjected to COL Brook’s e-
mail and December 23, 1997, leadership class.
At the time of trial, the law was clear. As with pretrial
publicity, see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), the
party raising an unlawful command influence motion had to show
the impact on the jurors or panel members. United States v.
Thomas, 22 MJ 388 (CMA 1986). Where there was an allegation of
command influence,
an appellant [had to] (1) ‘allege[] sufficient
facts which, if true, constitute unlawful command
influence’; (2) show that the proceedings were
unfair; and (3) show that the unlawful command
influence was the proximate cause of that
[alleged] unfairness.
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
United States v. Stombaugh, 40 MJ 208, 213 (CMA 1994), citing
United States v. Levite, 25 MJ 334, 341 (CMA 1987)(Cox, J.,
concurring); see also United States v. Lorenzen, 47 MJ 8, 15
(1997).
We made it crystal clear in Thomas, supra at 396, that
[i]n determining whether an accused’s trial
in a contested case before court members was
adversely affected by command influence, we first
consider the impact that such activities and
communications may have had on the court members.
In this regard, we place the burden upon both
defense and trial counsel, as well as the military
judge, to fully question the court members during
voir dire and to determine thereby whether any of the
members had knowledge of the commander’s comments and,
if so, whether the comments had an adverse impact on
the member’s ability to render an impartial judgment.
When required, witnesses may be called to testify on
this issue. United States v. Karlson, 16 MJ 469 (CMA
1983). However, we are not prepared to disqualify
members of a court-martial panel simply because they
were assigned or were in close proximity to the
command where the comments were made. To do so would
ignore the members’ oath to adhere to the military
judge’s instructions and to determine the facts in
accordance therewith. Cf. United States v. Garwood,
20 MJ 148 (CMA 1985).
VOIR DIRE
The judge permitted an extensive voir dire of all the
members. In the preliminary instructions, the judge reminded
the members that their decision should be based on the law and
instructions given during the case that appellant was presumed
to be innocent and the Government had the burden of proof.
Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Withers, LTC Saul, LTC Moody, Master
2
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
Sergeant (MSG) Peele, and Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Pagan
indicated they were aware of e-mail messages from the First
Brigade. All of the members also indicated they were not “aware
of anything at all that might raise a substantial question
concerning [their] participation in this trial as a court
member.”
On individual voir dire, LTC Saul stated that he remembered
the first e-mail message from COL Brook but did not “recall the
specifics.” He remembered that this e-mail was aimed at
“tightening up of the chain of command and enforcement of
discipline and standards ....” His recollection was that “there
was the appearance of a lack of law and order and discipline
among certain elements of the brigade.” As to the “certain
elements,” he meant “enlisted personnel and noncommissioned
officers.” He stated that he “saw the second message ... but
[did not] recall any specific points in the second message.” He
did not read the e-mail as an “exhortation to ... be tough in
this case.” He agreed that any decision must be based on the
evidence presented and the judge’s instructions, and that such
instructions override any information received from the brigade
commander. He would not “bump” up the punishment, but would
base it only on the evidence presented. As the majority notes,
LTC Saul was challenged for cause, and the military judge
granted that challenge.
3
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
LTC Withers, as did LTC Saul, responded to voir dire
questions based on recollection, without that recollection being
refreshed by the e-mails. He emphasized that the e-mails were
aimed at “urging leaders not to accept substandard
performance....” He said the follow-up e-mail was meant to
“clarify his statement, I think the real key statement was the
one to squash people who did something wrong. It was not in any
way, shape or form, intended to make us -- or to inhibit his
subordinates in the proper handling of UCMJ and other legal
matters.” “[S]itting as a member,” there was nothing in the e-
mail messages that would cause him “to hesitate in fulfilling
[his] duty as a court member.” He would not be concerned about
what COL Brook would think about his performance in this case or
any other case. He would not be influenced by the e-mail
because
[COL] Brook is a very impassioned man; he holds
his values very high; he shoots from the hip; he
knows he shoots from the hip. I had talked to
him about that and a wide variety of subjects.
I’ve been in the Army long enough to have seen
statements like that before; and quite frankly
I’ve been in the Army so long that I’m not really
concerned at this point what my rater thinks; I’m
going to do what I think is right, because that’s
what I’ve done all my career.
After that response, the defense counsel had no more questions.
As the majority notes, LTC Moody indicated that he read the
e-mail in a cursory manner and did not attend the follow-up
4
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
briefing. Major (MAJ) Fields, another court member, did not
have any information about the e-mails.
The brigade’s top noncommissioned officer, CSM Pagan,
stated that he saw a lot of e-mail on a daily basis, and that he
did not remember that e-mail conveying anything about his
responsibilities as a court member. He saw the second e-mail
but did not recall it. He added:
You know, I’ve worked for quite a few brigade
commanders since being a Command Sergeant Major,
and knowing Colonel Brook, as well as those other
commanders in the past; I tell you, knowing him,
when he sent out that e-mail message and when he
talked to soldiers he was looking after the
welfare of the leaders, as well as the soldiers,
and trying to keep them from getting themselves
into trouble; and that was his thoughts on that.
* * *
MJ [MILITARY JUDGE]: Sergeant Major, it looks like
we’ve got some civilians sitting in the back of
the courtroom; I know that you received this
message and have had the briefing; how can you
assure them that you’ll be a fair and impartial
court member?
MBR [CSM PAGAN]: Well, I’ve been a fair and impartial
member of the United States Army, as well as my
nation, serving for close to 25 years; and I’m not
one to be swayed, I’m not one to comply with
something just because somebody else said it.
I’ll stick by my guns and come to the conclusion
that I feel is appropriate; no matter who’s in
that group, or in this members [sic] of the jury;
I will take all the information that’s given to
me, make a rational decision, evaluate all that
information, and I will make the best decision
that I see possible with that information, and
listening to others that have an opinion on that
subject.
5
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
CSM Pagan had a follow-up briefing with the noncommissioned
officers of his brigade following COL Brook’s briefing. He
could not remember the exact words he used during the briefing,
“but it was about basically ensuring that they did the right
things, talk to their soldiers, mentored their leaders.”
Compared to the 10th Mountain Division, where he was a Battalion
Sergeant Major, the instances of misconduct in his current
brigade were “very small.” After being read part of the e-mail,
CSM Pagan said COL Brook was shooting from the hip and
“overreacted.” CSM Pagan further stated:
He was really looking after the – trying to look
after the soldiers, by making sure that he, kind
of, emphasized to the leaders “Hey, I want you to
be proactive, I want you to go out there and talk
to your soldiers, I want you to make sure that
you’re communicating with your subordinates,
because that will keep soldiers out of trouble.”
That’s what he really wanted to say. He was a
little more strong in his method of delivery
there, but....
The military judge also sustained appellant’s causal
challenge of CSM Pagan.
MSG Peele did not interpret the December briefing as a need
to be tough as a court member. He thought there were more
important issues than DUI. He received the first message but
did not read it “because [he] knew those things already.” He
did not receive the second e-mail. Obviously, the messages had
no effect on him.
6
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
MSG Geyer, another court member, responded that he could
set aside any pretrial knowledge about the case he had gained
from the media and base his decision solely on the evidence
introduced at trial. He did not receive the first e-mail
because he was not assigned to COL Brook’s brigade. Although
MSG Geyer was the only noncommissioned officer not exposed to
the brigade commander’s written or oral remarks, he was
successfully challenged by the defense.
Sergeant First Class (SFC) Robbins, a member of appellant’s
battalion, said he did not see either e-mail but he did attend a
leader’s training briefing on December 23, 1997. As noted by
the majority, SFC Robbins stated that the session had no bearing
on his court-martial duties.
DISCUSSION
The majority errs in two significant ways. First, it
indicates that the burden on the defense is merely to present
“some evidence,” and that alone is sufficient to raise command
influence. ___ MJ at (14). While the majority gives no
indication whether “some” means colorable evidence or a
different evidentiary standard, Stombaugh makes it clear that
more than “some evidence” is required to shift the burden to the
Government. 40 MJ at 213. We have previously rejected
“[command influence] in the air,” United States v. Allen, 33 MJ
209, 212 (CMA 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992), yet the
7
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
majority’s definition of “some evidence” would certainly
encompass such ethereal notions. Stombaugh, however, required
an appellant to “allege[] sufficient facts which, if true,
constitute unlawful command influence” before any burden shifted
to the Government to disprove the facts or show that the facts
did not constitute command influence. 40 MJ at 213, quoting
Levite, 25 MJ at 341 (Cox, J., concurring). Appellant has
failed to clear the first hurdle.
Even under the Biagase standard, the defense is required to
do more than raise an allegation of unlawful command influence.
It must “show facts which, if true, constitute unlawful command
influence, and that the alleged unlawful command influence has a
logical connection to the court-martial, in terms of its potential
to cause unfairness in the proceedings.” 50 MJ at 150.
Second, the majority stretches the holding of Thomas, 22 MJ
at 388, beyond its intended limits by implying that witnesses
are required to testify on the issue of command influence. ___
MJ at (13). Thomas established no such requirement. However,
in looking at the statements given by the prospective court
members under oath during voir dire, I conclude that the trial
judge was in the best position to observe the court members’
demeanor during their examination under oath; to evaluate their
answers; and to determine who was and who was not improperly and
adversely affected by COL Brook. That military judge’s ruling
8
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
denying a challenge for cause ought to be overturned only for a
clear abuse of discretion. See United States v. Downing, 56 MJ
419, 423 (2002)(Crawford, C.J., concurring in part and in the
result); United States v. Wiesen, 56 MJ 172, 177
(2001)(Crawford, C.J., dissenting)(pet. for recon. filed Dec.
21, 2001).
All the members swore that their decision would be based on
the evidence presented and the judge’s instructions. Under
oath, they indicated they were not aware of anything at all that
might raise a substantial question concerning their
participation in this trial as court members. We do not need to
dismiss their sworn responses so effortlessly, especially when
one looks at the extensive voir dire in the context of this case
and defense tactics. After appellant’s causal challenge of all
1st Brigade members was denied, the member challenged by the
defense peremptorily (MSG Geyer) was one who did not know of COL
Brook’s e-mail.
Finally, the majority is wrong when it criticizes the trial
judge for not making “findings of fact and conclusions of law,
nor ... analyz[ing] the evidence in accordance with the Biagase
framework.” ___ MJ at (15). Biagase does not require a
military judge to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Additionally, that rule is not to be found in any of the cases
9
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
from this Court that had been decided at the time of appellant’s
court-martial.
CONCLUSION
The thrust of COL Brook’s e-mail, despite its bombastic
tone, was to enhance leadership, eliminate noncommissioned
officer incidents of drunk driving, encourage leaders to set a
good example, and incorporate single and recently arrived
soldiers in unit activities. A good digest of the e-mails can
be found in the Army Court of Criminal Appeals opinion. 54 MJ
671-72.
Notwithstanding appellant’s failure to show sufficient
facts that constituted improper command influence, the
Government “produced” evidence during voir dire by showing that
none of the e-mails had any impact on the members. This was
reinforced by the members saying that the brigade commander was
shooting from the hip. Three of the members testified that COL
Brook had no business telling them what their duties were as
court members, and that he (COL Brook) did not have the same set
of values as they. See, e.g., LTC Withers’s voir dire
responses, supra at (4). Said differently by MSG Peele when
talking about COL Brook’s December 23 briefing and email: “I
don’t need a Colonel to tell me how to do my duties, ma’am, I
can do them on my own; and I think he could take a message from
me.”
10
United States v. Stoneman, No. 01-0295/AR
Finally, this is a good case to show the importance of
remedial action by a staff judge advocate -- the type of action
which the majority discourages with their holding. Once the
staff judge advocate discovered that COL Brook had sent the
first e-mail to members of his command, he ensured that remedial
action was taken through the second e-mail. The remedial action
of the second e-mail put the first e-mail in perspective. As
COL Brook said in his second e-mail:
Let me make something else perfectly clear.
Nothing in what I have said in this or the
earlier e-mail, or what I said at the Leader
Training, has anything to do with what any
soldier does as a member of a court-martial panel
or as a witness before a court-martial. The
sworn duty of any court-martial panel member is
to follow the instructions of the military judge,
apply law to admissible facts, and decide a
sentence based solely on the evidence presented
in court. Nothing said outside a court-martial
by anybody, TO INCLUDE ME, may have any bearing
on the outcome of any given case or sentence.
54 MJ at 678.
Whether this case is decided under pre-Biagase law or that
set forth in Biagase, appellant has failed to prove or produce
the quantum of evidence required to raise the issue of unlawful
command influence and, thus, shift the burden to the Government
to refute the facts, to show that the facts do not constitute
unlawful command influence, or that command influence did not
taint the proceedings.
For these reasons, I dissent.
11