United States v. Piolunek

UNITED STATES, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
v.
Justin M. PIOLUNEK, Senior Airman
U.S. Air Force, Appellant/Cross-Appellee
Nos. 14-0283 and 14-5006
Crim. App. No. 38099
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 8, 2014
Decided March 26, 2015
RYAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BAKER,
C.J., STUCKY, and OHLSON, JJ., joined. ERDMANN, J., filed a
separate opinion dissenting in part and concurring in the
result.
Counsel
For Appellant/Cross-Appellee: Greg Gagne, Esq. (argued);
Captain Lauren A. Shure (on brief); Major Zaven Saroyan.
For Appellee/Cross-Appellant: Captain Thomas J. Alford
(argued); Colonel Don M. Christensen and Gerald R. Bruce, Esq.
(on brief).
Military Judge: Jefferson B. Brown
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Piolunek, Nos. 14-0283/AF & 14-5006/AF
Judge RYAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted
members convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of knowing
and wrongful possession, on divers occasions, of one or more
visual depictions of a sexually explicit nature of a minor
child; knowing and wrongful receipt, on divers occasions, of one
or more visual depictions of a sexually explicit nature of a
minor child; enticing a minor child, on divers occasions, to
send him visual depictions of a sexually explicit nature; and
communicating indecent language to a minor on divers occasions,
all in violation of clause (2) of Article 134, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934. United States v.
Piolunek, 72 M.J. 830, 833 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2013). The
members sentenced Appellant to a dishonorable discharge,
confinement for one year and six months, and reduction to the
grade of E-1. The convening authority approved the sentence as
adjudged. Id.
On April 1, 2014, we granted review of the following issue:
WHETHER APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS FOR POSSESSION AND RECEIPT
OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON DIVERS OCCASIONS MUST BE SET ASIDE
BECAUSE SEVERAL IMAGES OFFERED IN SUPPORT OF THE
SPECIFICATIONS ARE NOT CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND ARE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED, A GENERAL VERDICT WAS ENTERED,
AND IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER SAID IMAGES
CONTRIBUTED TO THE VERDICT.
On April 18, 2014, on certification under Article 67(a)(2),
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(2) (2012), the Judge Advocate General
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of the Air Force asked this Court to consider the following
question:
WHETHER THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THAT IMAGES 8308, 8313, AND 0870 DID NOT CONSTITUTE
VISUAL DEPICTIONS OF A MINOR ENGAGED IN SEXUALLY EXPLICIT
CONDUCT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The certified question, while phrased as a question of law,
misapprehends the underlying basis for the decision of the
United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA), which
was, “none of these three images contain an exhibition of her
genitals or pubic region.” Piolunek, 72 M.J. at 837. Whether
any given image does or does not display the genitals or pubic
region is a question of fact, albeit one with legal
consequences. This Court may “take action only with respect to
matters of law.” Article 67(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (2012).
Our conclusion that the CCA’s decision turned on a question
of fact causes us to revisit the premise of our recent decision
in United States v. Barberi, 71 M.J. 127 (C.A.A.F. 2012), and
determine that it was wrongly decided. Barberi set aside a
general verdict for possession of child pornography. Id. at
128-29. Since four of six images presented to the members were
found by the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals not to
constitute child pornography, we reasoned that Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-70 (1931), required us to set
aside the verdict because we could not know whether the members
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based their verdict on those images. Barberi, 71 M.J. at 128-
29, 131-32. We erred.
In this case, the military judge instructed members that it
was their role to find which, if any, images in question
exhibited the features that met the definition of minors
“engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” Absent an
unconstitutional definition of criminal conduct, flawed
instructions, or evidence that members did not follow those
instructions, none of which are present here, and none of which
were present in Barberi, there is simply no basis in law to
upset the ordinary assumption that members are well suited to
assess the evidence in light of the military judge’s
instructions. Barberi was not a case of Stromberg error.
Neither is the instant case.
Our decision supersedes Barberi, and Appellant’s
convictions are affirmed.
I. FACTS
From December 2009 to September 2010, Appellant received a
series of e-mails from KLR, a minor under the age of sixteen,
containing images depicting her nude or semi-nude. Appellant
was charged with “wrongfully and knowingly” receiving and
possessing “visual depictions of a sexually explicit nature
of . . . a minor child” on divers occasions.
The military judge instructed the members that, in order to
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convict on both specifications, they needed to find that
Appellant knowingly received and possessed “visual depictions”
of minors “engaging in sexually explicit conduct” on more than
one occasion. 1 The military judge offered a definition of
“sexually explicit conduct” that closely mirrored the definition
contained in the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
(CPPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A-2260 (2006). See 18 U.S.C. §
2256(2)(A)(v). He noted that “‘[s]exually explicit conduct’
means lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any
person.” Members were instructed to consider the following
factors, in conjunction with “an overall consideration of the
totality of circumstances,” to determine whether an exhibition
was lascivious:
[W]hether the focal point of the depiction is on the
genitals or pubic area[;] whether the setting is
sexually suggestive[;] whether the child is depicted
in an unnatural pose or in inappropriate attire
considering the child’s age; whether the child is
partially clothed or nude; whether the depiction
suggests sexual coyness or willingness to engage in
sexual activity; whether the depiction is intended to
elicit a sexual response in the viewer; whether the
depiction portrays the child as a sexual object; and
any captions that may appear on the depiction or
materials accompanying the depiction.
The members thus had to determine that the images did or
1
The military judge told members that Appellant was charged with
“knowing receipt of child pornography,” and “knowing possession
of child pornography.” The military judge misstated the
charges. However, the military judge’s instructions regarding
the elements of the crime were consistent with the charges.
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did not display the genitals or pubic area, and then apply
the so-called Dost factors, inter alia, to determine
whether that depiction constituted a “lascivious
exhibition.” See United States v. Roderick, 62 M.J. 425,
429-30 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citing United States v. Dost, 636
F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986)). Members evaluated
twenty-two images in total, reaching a general verdict of
guilty on the specifications related to the images.
II. AFCCA DECISION
The AFCCA affirmed the findings and sentence, but
determined that only nineteen of the twenty-two images
constituted “visual depictions of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct,” as three images did not show KLR’s genitals
or pubic area, the threshold question for whether the images met
the definition of sexually explicit conduct provided by the
military judge. Piolunek, 72 M.J. at 836-37 (“If the images do
not depict the genital or pubic region, we stop our analysis.”).
The court held that these three images were constitutionally
protected and that, based on our decision in Barberi, this was
Stromberg error. Id. at 837. It nonetheless determined, based
on a three-factor test of its own devising, that there was no
“reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might
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have contributed to the conviction.” 2 Id. (quoting Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)); see also Piolunek, 72 M.J.
at 838.
III. DISCUSSION
A.
Article 67(c), UCMJ, states that “[t]he Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces shall take action only with respect to
matters of law.” 10 U.S.C. § 867. In this Court’s first
published opinion, United States v. McCrary, the majority
stated, “[t]here can be no question that the Congress of the
United States . . . did not intend to extend review by this
court to questions of fact. . . . [T]he Uniform Code of Military
Justice expressly limits review by this court.” 1 C.M.A. 1, 3,
1 C.M.R. 1, 3 (1951) (internal citation omitted). A subsequent
opinion specified that “questions of credibility, or assertions
that the factual basis for a ruling should be reinterpreted are
not reviewable by the Court.” United States v. Nargi, 2 M.J.
96, 98 (C.M.A. 1977); see also United States v. Burris, 21 M.J.
140, 144 (C.M.A. 1985). “[W]e may not reassess a lower court’s
fact-finding.” United States v. Leak, 61 M.J. 234, 241
(C.A.A.F. 2005).
2
We leave for another day the question whether Stromberg error
is susceptible to a harmless error analysis: If in fact a
conviction rests on an unconstitutional statute or legal theory,
it is at best questionable why or how the weight of the evidence
overcomes that constitutional infirmity.
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“Recognizing that the distinction between a question of law
and a question of fact is not always clearly defined, we must
nevertheless avoid resolving questions of fact which are
separable from a question of law.” United States v. Lowry, 2
M.J. 55, 58 (C.M.A. 1976), superseded on other grounds by
Military Rule of Evidence 305(e), as recognized in United States
v. Spencer, 19 M.J. 184, 186-87 (C.M.A. 1985). In our view,
what the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force seeks is to
have us revisit the factual basis for the CCA’s legal ruling.
The CCA’s determination that three images did not constitute
visual depictions of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct was based on its conclusion that “none of these three
images contain an exhibition of her genitals or pubic region.”
Piolunek, 72 M.J. at 837. Since that threshold factual
determination is eminently separable from its legal consequence,
it is not one that this Court may revise. 3
B.
Having parsed this analysis in a way we did not in Barberi,
we recognize that properly instructed members are well suited to
assess the evidence and make the same factual determination that
3
Consistent with Article 67(c), UCMJ, a different analysis
pertains if a CCA’s finding of fact is clearly erroneous or
unsupported by the record. See, e.g., United States v. Gore, 60
M.J. 178, 185 (C.A.A.F. 2004); United States v. Teffeau, 58 M.J.
62, 66-67 (C.A.A.F. 2003); United States v. Tollinchi, 54 M.J.
80, 82 (C.A.A.F. 2000); United States v. Avery, 40 M.J. 325, 328
(C.M.A. 1994). This is not such a case.
8
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the CCA did with respect to whether an image does or does not
depict the genitals or pubic region, and is, or is not, a visual
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
This is distinguishable from the altogether different situation
in Stromberg and its progeny. In Stromberg, jurors were told
that they could convict the appellant under any of three clauses
of a statute. 283 U.S. at 363-64. The jury returned a general
verdict without specifying the clause under which it had
convicted. Id. at 367-68. The Supreme Court found one of the
three clauses to be unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness and
ruled that “the conviction of the appellant, which so far as the
record discloses may have rested upon that clause exclusively,
must be set aside.” Id. at 370.
Stromberg applies only where members may have convicted on
the basis of an unconstitutional statute or legal theory. See,
e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 31-32 (1969) (“It has
long been settled that when a case is submitted to the jury on
alternative theories the unconstitutionality of any of the
theories requires that the conviction be set aside.”); Williams
v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942) (“To say that a
general verdict of guilty should be upheld though we cannot know
that it did not rest on the invalid constitutional ground on
which the case was submitted to the jury, would be to
countenance a procedure which would cause a serious impairment
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of constitutional rights.”); United States v. Cendejas, 62 M.J.
334, 339 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (setting aside a conviction where it
was not possible to “determine that the military judge relied
only on those portions of the definition later found to be
constitutional by the Supreme Court”); cf. Cramer v. United
States, 325 U.S. 1, 36 n.45 (1945). 4
That is not this case, as neither the statute nor the legal
theory presented to the members was constitutionally infirm.
Here, as in Barberi, the military judge’s definition of the
charged behavior was consistent with the CPPA’s definition of
child pornography as revised pursuant to the decision in
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). See 18
U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v); 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A). Similarly, this
Court has adopted the Dost factors. Roderick, 62 M.J. at 430.
While the Court in Barberi divided on whether there is an
additional category of images that constitute child pornography,
see Barberi, 71 M.J. at 131; see also United States v. Warner,
4
See also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 586-87, 589, 593-94
(1969) (applying the Stromberg rule because an unconstitutional
statutory ban on verbal contempt of the national flag might have
formed a basis for the petitioner’s conviction); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540-41 (1945) (reversing judgment of
contempt against union representative for violating restraining
order proscribing solicitations, where motion for judgment of
contempt and contempt order did not distinguish between
constitutionally protected “general” solicitations and
unprotected solicitations); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884
(1983) (not applying Stromberg because constitutionally
protected conduct was neither a basis for the conviction nor an
aggravating factor in sentencing).
10
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73 M.J. 1, 3-4 (C.A.A.F. 2013), we all agree that images that
meet the CPPA’s definition of child pornography are not
constitutionally protected.
While members are not presumed to be suited to make legal
determinations of constitutional law, they are presumed to be
competent to make factual determinations as to guilt.
When . . . jurors have been left the option of relying upon
a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think
that their own intelligence and expertise will save them
from that error. . . . [T]he opposite is true, however,
when they have been left the option of relying upon a
factually inadequate theory, since jurors are well equipped
to analyze the evidence.
Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991) (citations
omitted). 5 Moreover, “[i]n the absence of evidence indicating
otherwise, a jury is presumed to have complied with the
instructions given them by the judge.” United States v.
Ricketts, 23 C.M.A. 487, 490, 50 C.M.R. 567, 570 (1975); see
also United States v. Hill, 62 M.J. 271, 276 (C.A.A.F. 2006);
United States v. Holt, 33 M.J. 400, 408 (C.M.A. 1991).
5
Cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973) (explaining
that “[t]he adversary system, with lay jurors as the usual
ultimate factfinders in criminal prosecutions, has historically
permitted triers of fact to draw on the standards of their
community” to determine whether material is obscene and
therefore not subject to constitutional protection); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489-90 (1957) (affirming a judgment
obtained after the judge recited the proper definition of
obscenity and told jurors “you and you alone are the exclusive
judges of” whether the materials in question are obscene).
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Contrary to our conclusion in Barberi, convictions by
general verdict for possession and receipt of visual depictions
of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct on divers
occasions by a properly instructed panel need not be set aside
after the CCA decides several images considered by the members
do not depict the genitals or pubic region. This case involves
a straightforward application of the “general verdict rule.” 71
M.J. at 131. As we noted in United States v. Rodriguez, “[t]he
longstanding common law rule is that when the factfinder returns
a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts, the
verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any
one of the acts charged.” 66 M.J. 201, 204 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
The record shows that the members were required to
determine whether one or more of the twenty-two images
constituted sexually explicit conduct based on the definition
and explanation given by the military judge. The military judge
directed the members to “consider whether the depictions as set
forth in my written instructions constitute sexually explicit
conduct as I have previously defined” when “determining whether
the accused is guilty of this offense, beyond a reasonable
doubt.” The members convicted Appellant of possession and
receipt of one or more depictions on divers occasions.
Piolunek, 72 M.J. at 833. As the CCA found that the evidence
was legally and factually sufficient with respect to nineteen of
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the twenty-two images, id. at 837, and with no reason to disturb
well-settled precedent on the application of the general verdict
rule, Appellant’s conviction stands.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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ERDMANN, Judge (dissenting in part and concurring in the
result):
As I cannot agree with the majority’s interpretation of
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), and the impact of
that decision on United States v. Barberi, 71 M.J. 127 (C.A.A.F.
2012), I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority
opinion. However, as I agree that the decision of the United
States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals should be affirmed, I
concur in the result.
Background
Among other specifications, Piolunek was charged with
receipt and possession of visual depictions of a sexually
explicit nature of a minor under Article 134(2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 934(2). Although not charged with violation of the Child
Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) under Article 134(3) (crimes
and offenses not capital), the military judge provided the
members with definitions which were largely consistent with
those found in that act. The government introduced twenty-two
images of alleged child pornography to prove the receipt and
possession specifications. The military judge instructed the
members that the specifications required “visual depictions of
minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct” and then defined
“sexually explicit conduct” as the “lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of any person.” The members subsequently
United States v. Piolunek, No. 14-0283/AF & 14-5006/AF
found Piolunek guilty of those specifications in a general
verdict.
The CCA affirmed the conviction, but upon reviewing the
images, held that three of the images did not meet the
definition that the military judge had provided for “sexually
explicit conduct.” United States v. Piolunek, 72 M.J. 830, 837
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2013). Specifically, the CCA found that
the three images did not contain an exhibition of the genitals
or pubic area and therefore did not constitute visual depictions
of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Id. As a
result, those images did not constitute child pornography as
defined by the military judge. Id. The CCA, however, went on
to hold that the error was harmless, reasoning that there was no
possibility that the three images might have contributed to the
conviction. Id. at 837–39.
We initially granted an issue brought by Piolunek, which
asked this court to set aside his convictions of possession and
receipt of child pornography because three of the images
considered by the members did not constitute child pornography
and were therefore constitutionally protected, citing Barberi.
The government then certified an issue which asked whether the
CCA erred when it found that the three images in question did
not constitute child pornography.
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Granted Issue
We were faced with a strikingly similar factual situation
in Barberi. The appellant in that case had been convicted of
possession of child pornography on the basis of six images
introduced by the government. 71 M.J. at 129. The military
judge had, similar to this case, provided the members with the
relevant definitions from the CPPA. Id. at 130. The Army Court
of Criminal Appeals (CCA) found that four of the six images were
legally and factually insufficient “to support Barberi’s
conviction for knowing possession of child pornography because
none of the four images depicted any portion of SD’s genitalia
or pubic area.” Id. at 130 (citation omitted).
Before this court, Barberi argued that since four of the
six images were constitutionally protected, the entire
conviction must be set aside as this court could not determine
whether the conviction rested upon constitutional or
unconstitutional grounds, relying on Stromberg. Id. at 129.
In Barberi, we initially cited the common law rule that
when a factfinder returns a general verdict on an indictment
charging several acts, the verdict will stand if the evidence is
sufficient to any one of the acts. Id. at 131. However, we
went on to note that an exception to the general verdict rule
exists when one of the grounds of the conviction is found to be
unconstitutional. Id. That rule originated in Stromberg, where
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the Supreme Court held that when there was a general verdict on
a single-count indictment which rested on both constitutional
and unconstitutional grounds, the guilty verdict must be set
aside. Id. Accordingly, in Barberi we reversed the CCA,
holding:
Because we cannot know which prosecution exhibits
formed the basis for the member’s decision, and their
findings may have been based on constitutionally
protected images, the general verdict to the
possession of child pornography charge must be set
aside.
Id. at 132.
Today the majority reverses our opinion in Barberi, holding
that Stromberg “applies only where members may have convicted on
the basis of an unconstitutional statute or legal theory.”
United States v. Piolunek, __ M.J. __, __ (9) (C.A.A.F. 2015).
In affirming the CCA, the majority also holds:
Absent an unconstitutional definition of criminal
conduct, flawed instructions, or evidence that members
did not follow those instructions, none of which are
present here, and none of which were present in
Barberi, there is simply no basis in law to upset the
ordinary assumption that members are well suited to
assess the evidence in light of the military judge’s
instructions.
Id. at __ (4).
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s holding that
Stromberg is limited to only those situations where the
government relies on an unconstitutional statute or legal
theory. My reading of Stromberg, and its progeny, indicates
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that the rule should apply to all situations where the
conviction rests on both constitutionally protected conduct and
unprotected conduct, regardless of the litigation process which
revealed the constitutional infirmity.
In Barberi, we looked to Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862
(1983), to inform our interpretation of Stromberg. 71 M.J. at
131. In Zant, the Supreme Court discussed the Stromberg line of
cases in which the conviction rested upon both protected and
unprotected conduct:
The second rule derived from the Stromberg case
is illustrated by Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
528-529 (1945), and Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,
586-590 (1969). In those cases we made clear that the
reasoning of Stromberg encompasses a situation in
which the general verdict on a single-count indictment
or information rested on both a constitutional and an
unconstitutional ground. In Thomas v. Collins, a
labor organizer’s contempt citation was predicated
both upon a speech expressing a general invitation to
a group of nonunion workers, which the Court held to
be constitutionally protected speech, and upon
solicitation of a single individual. The Court
declined to consider the State’s contention that the
judgment could be sustained on the basis of the
individual solicitation alone, for the record showed
that the penalty had been imposed on account of both
solicitations. “The judgment therefore must be
affirmed as to both or as to neither.” 323 U.S. at
529. Similarly, in Street, the record indicated that
petitioner’s conviction on a single-count indictment
could have been based on his protected words as well
as on his arguably unprotected conduct, flag burning.
We stated that, “unless the record negates the
possibility that the conviction was based on both
alleged violations,” the judgment could not be
affirmed unless both were valid. 394 U.S. at 588.
The Court’s opinion in Street explained:
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“We take the rationale of Thomas to be that when a
single-count indictment or information charges the
commission of a crime by virtue of the defendant’s
having done both a constitutionally protected act and
one which may be unprotected, and a guilty verdict
ensues without elucidation, there is an unacceptable
danger that the trier of fact will have regarded the
two acts as ‘intertwined’ and have rested the
conviction on both together. See 323 U.S. at 528-529,
540-541. There is no comparable hazard when the
indictment or information is in several counts and the
conviction is explicitly declared to rest on findings
of guilt on certain of these counts, for in such
instances there is positive evidence that the trier of
fact considered each count on its own merits and
separately from the others.” Ibid. (footnote
omitted).
The rationale of Thomas and Street applies to
cases in which there is no uncertainty about the
multiple grounds on which a general verdict rests.
If, under the instructions to the jury, one way of
committing the offense charged is to perform an act
protected by the Constitution, the rule of these cases
requires that a general verdict of guilt be set aside
even if the defendant’s unprotected conduct,
considered separately, would support the verdict.
462 U.S. at 882-83 (footnote and citations omitted).
I see no constitutionally significant distinction between
the situations presented in this case and Barberi, and the
situations presented in Thomas and Street. Here, the
constitutionality of a particular criminal statute is not at
issue, but rather a situation where the proof relied on by the
government in two single count charges contained both
constitutionally protected and unprotected images. In my view,
the Stromberg rule should be read to include a general verdict
conviction based on both constitutionally protected conduct and
6
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unprotected conduct regardless of the litigation process that
revealed the constitutionality infirmity. 1 I would therefore
reaffirm our rationale in Barberi.
However, even if I were to assume the majority’s position
to be correct, under its analytical framework the result would
appear to be the same. The majority holds that Stromberg
applies only to those “convicted on the basis of an
unconstitutional statute or legal theory.” Piolunek, __ M.J. at
__ (9). Certainly the constitutionally protected images were
part and parcel of the government’s legal theory of the case.
The majority also holds:
Absent an unconstitutional definition of criminal
conduct, flawed instructions, or evidence that members
did not follow those instructions, none of which are
present here, and none of which were present in
Barberi, there is simply no basis in law to upset the
ordinary assumption that members are well suited to
assess the evidence in light of the military judge’s
instructions.
Id. at __ (4).
1
I agree that there are no Supreme Court or circuit court cases
which address the situation presented in this case. That lack
of precedent from the Article III system may be explained by the
different roles of the intermediate courts in the military
justice system and the Article III system. Unlike the Courts of
Criminal Appeals in the military system, federal circuit courts
lack the ability to make a factual finding that one or more of
the images submitted to a jury, which resulted in a general
verdict conviction, contained constitutionally protected
conduct. As a result, this factual circumstance will not
present itself in the Article III system.
7
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In both this case and Barberi, the military judge provided
the members with instructions which contained constitutional
definitions of the criminal conduct. However, in both cases the
CCA found that some of the images reviewed by the members did
not meet the statutory definitions and were therefore
constitutionally protected, indicating that the members had not
followed the military judge’s instructions. 2
As for the assertion that members are well suited to make
constitutional determinations, the Supreme Court in Griffin v.
United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991), noted:
Jurors are not generally equipped to determine whether
a particular theory of conviction submitted to them is
contrary to the law -- whether, for example, the
action in question is protected by the Constitution,
is time barred, or fails to come within the statutory
definition of the crime. When, therefore, jurors have
been left the option of relying upon a legally
inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that
their own intelligence and expertise will save them
from that error. Quite the opposite is true, however,
when they have been left the option of relying upon a
factually inadequate theory, since jurors are well
equipped to analyze the evidence.
Prejudice
The CCA held that although the error was of constitutional
dimension, it could be reviewed for prejudice. Piolunek, 72
2
Contrary to the government’s concerns that this application of
Stromberg and Barberi will make the prosecution of child
pornography offenses difficult if not impossible, the proper
procedure is for the United States to review all of the images
prior to their introduction at trial to assure that the images
fall within the definition of child pornography in the CPPA and
are therefore not constitutionally protected.
8
United States v. Piolunek, No. 14-0283/AF & 14-5006/AF
M.J. at 837. The CCA then distinguished this case from Barberi
and was “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational
jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.”
Id. at 839 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In Barberi we recognized that this type of constitutional
error is reviewable for harmlessness and applied the Chapman
test as to “‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the
evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction.’” Barberi, 71 M.J. at 132 (quoting Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)). In performing its
harmlessness analysis, the CCA reviewed the quantitative
strength of the admissible evidence, the qualitative nature of
that evidence and the circumstances surrounding the offense as
they related to the elements of the offense. Piolunek, 73 M.J.
at 837-39. While I view the CCA’s analysis appropriate in this
case, I would stress that the three-part test relied upon by the
CCA is not an exhaustive list of considerations that courts
should consider, as the harmlessness analysis will necessarily
differ in each case.
I would hold that Barberi correctly interprets Stromberg
and that the CCA correctly applied both the Stromberg analysis
and the harmless test as set forth in Barberi. I would
therefore affirm the decision of the CCA, although on the
grounds set forth in this separate opinion.
9