United States v. Marshall

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Bradley W. MARSHALL, Private
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 08-0779
Crim. App. No. 20060229
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued April 14, 2009
Decided June 18, 2009
STUCKY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and BAKER and ERDMANN, JJ., joined. RYAN, J., filed a
separate opinion concurring in the judgment.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain William Jeremy Stephens (argued);
Lieutenant Colonel Matthew M. Miller, Lieutenant Colonel Mark
Tellitocci, and Major Bradley M. Voorhees (on brief).
For Appellee: Captain Stephanie R. Cooper (argued); Colonel
Denise R. Lind and Captain Philip M. Staten (on brief).
Military Judge: Thomas Berg
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Marshall, No. 08-0779/AR
Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant pled not guilty to escaping from the custody of
Captain (CPT) Kreitman but was convicted, by exceptions and
substitutions, of escaping from the custody of Staff Sergeant
(SSG) Fleming. We granted review to consider whether the
military judge’s findings created a fatal variance. We hold
that it did. We reverse the decision of the United States Army
Court of Criminal Appeals and remand for sentence reassessment.
I. Background
A military judge sitting as a special court-martial
convicted Appellant, in accordance with his pleas, of one
specification of failing to go to his appointed place of duty at
the time prescribed and two specifications of absenting himself
from his unit; wrongfully using marijuana; and disobeying the
order of a superior commissioned officer. Articles 86, 112a,
and 90, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§
886, 912a, and 890 (2000). The military judge also convicted
Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of escaping from custody. The
convening authority approved the adjudged sentence of a bad-
conduct discharge, confinement for six months, and forfeiture of
$500 pay per month for six months. The United States Army Court
of Criminal Appeals (CCA) affirmed in a summary disposition over
the dissent of Judge Chiarella. United States v. Marshall, No.
ARMY 20060229 (A. Ct. Crim. App. June 30, 2008).
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United States v. Marshall, No. 08-0779/AR
II. Facts
The Government alleged that Appellant “did, at Fort Polk,
Louisiana, on or about 19 December 2005, escape from the custody
of CPT Kelvin K. Kreitman, a person authorized to apprehend the
accused.” The evidence established that CPT Kreitman directed
one SSG Fleming to go to the local police department and assume
custody of Appellant from the police. SSG Fleming did so,
assuming custody of Appellant and returning him to the company
offices. Appellant was told that pretrial confinement orders
were being prepared and that, in the meantime, he was to sit
down and not leave his seat without an escort. Appellant was
permitted to step outside the building to smoke. During one of
his smoke breaks, Appellant walked away.
At the conclusion of the Government’s case, the defense
counsel moved for a finding of not guilty under Rule for Courts-
Martial (R.C.M.) 917, asserting that the Government had failed
to establish that Appellant escaped from the custody of CPT
Kreitman. The military judge denied the motion.
In his closing argument, the defense counsel stated the
following concerning the escape from custody allegation:
Escape from custody. The defense would reiterate
that the person he is charged with violating custody
from is Captain Kreitman. We have no testimony
regarding the actions of Captain Kreitman as it
relates to the accused, as it relates to Staff
Sergeant Fleming, yes, we do.
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As far as Captain Kreitman giving the order
saying, “You are confined to the limits of this area.
You are in custody.” We have nothing.
We have the previous counseling statement he got
a few days before, which, I guess, would be breaking
restriction because he violated that. It’s not the
same thing as custody. We don’t have any testimony
whatsoever as to what additional restrictions Captain
Kreitman placed upon Private Marshall. In the absence
of that, we don’t have escape from custody.
The military judge thereafter convicted Appellant, by exceptions
and substitutions, of escaping from the custody of SSG Fleming.
III. Analysis
The Government argues that by failing to object to the
finding of guilty by exceptions and substitutions at the time it
was announced, Appellant forfeited the issue in the absence of
plain error. We do not agree. The purpose of the forfeiture1
rule is to ensure that the trial judge has the opportunity to
rule on issues arising at trial, and to prevent the raising of
such issues for the first time on appeal, after any chance to
correct them has vanished. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152, 163 (1982); United States v. Reist, 50 M.J. 108, 110
(C.A.A.F. 1999); United States v. Causey, 37 M.J. 308,
311 (C.M.A. 1993). The motion to dismiss under R.C.M. 917
placed the fundamental issue -- whether there was any evidence
1
“Forfeiture” and “waiver,” although frequently conflated, are
not the same. See United States v. Gladue, 67 M.J. 311, 313
(C.A.A.F. 2009).
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United States v. Marshall, No. 08-0779/AR
that the accused escaped from the custody of CPT Kreitman rather
than SSG Fleming -- squarely before the military judge as trier
of fact. Once that motion was denied, Appellant had no duty to
engage in the empty exercise of repeating the objection after
the military judge announced his findings. United States v.
Richardson, 1 C.M.A. 558, 567, 4 C.M.R. 150, 159-60 (1952). The
issue was preserved.
From the earliest days of this Court, we have held that to
prevail on a fatal variance claim, an appellant must show both
that the variance was material and that he was substantially
prejudiced thereby. United States v. Finch, 64 M.J. 118, 121
(C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Hunt, 37 M.J. 344, 347 (C.M.A.
1993); United States v. Lee, 1 M.J. 15, 16 (C.M.A. 1975); United
States v. Hopf, 1 C.M.A. 584, 586-87, 5 C.M.R. 12, 14-15 (1952).
“A variance that is ‘material’ is one that, for instance,
substantially changes the nature of the offense, increases the
seriousness of the offense, or increases the punishment of the
offense.” Finch, 64 M.J. at 121 (citing United States v.
Teffeau, 58 M.J. 62, 66 (C.A.A.F. 2003)). A variance can
prejudice an appellant by (1) putting “him at risk of another
prosecution for the same conduct,” (2) misleading him
“to the extent that he has been unable adequately to prepare for
trial,” or (3) denying him “the opportunity to defend against
the charge.” Teffeau, 58 M.J. at 67.
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The elements of escape from custody under Article 95, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 895 (2000), are as follows:
(a) That a certain person apprehended the accused;
(b) That said person was authorized to apprehend the
accused; and
(c) That the accused freed himself or herself from
custody before being released by proper authority.
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States pt. IV, para. 19.b(4)
(2005 ed.) (MCM).
Here, Appellant was charged with escaping from the custody
of CPT Kreitman. Assuming, arguendo, that CPT Kreitman was in
fact authorized to apprehend Appellant, no evidence was
presented that Appellant was in his custody at any time. In
response to the R.C.M. 917 motion, the Government attempted to
argue an agency theory that SSG Fleming was ordered by the
captain to place Appellant in custody. The military judge
denied the motion, and later found that Appellant had escaped
from SSG Fleming.
At trial and on appeal, the Government has argued that the
substitution of SSG Fleming for CPT Kreitman created only a
minor variance, similar to the changes in Hopf and Finch.
Appellant’s case is different and requires a different result.
In Hopf, the appellant was convicted of aggravated assault
on a named Korean male, but the court substituted for the
victim’s name the term “unknown Korean male,” when the victim
was unable to testify due to his injuries and the two American
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United States v. Marshall, No. 08-0779/AR
soldiers who witnessed the assault did not know the victim’s
name. 1 C.M.A. at 586, 5 C.M.R. at 14. This Court concluded
the variance was not fatal because neither the nature nor
identity of the offense was changed. Id. The appellant was
convicted of the same assault for which he was charged, and the
defense preparations to meet the charge were unaffected. Id.
The appellant in Finch was charged with conspiracy to
commit the offense of providing alcoholic beverages to a person
enrolled in the delayed-entry program, in violation of a general
order. Id. at 119-20. The military judge found the appellant
guilty of the offense but substituted a different location for
the place at which the overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy was alleged to have occurred. Id. at 120-21. We
held this change did not result in a major variance. “Although
an overt act is an element of the offense of conspiracy, it is
not the core of the offense” and did not “substantially change
the nature or seriousness of the offense or increase the
punishment to which Appellant was subject.” Id. at 122
(citations omitted).
On the facts in this case, we are convinced the
substitution was material. The military judge convicted
Appellant by exceptions and substitutions of an offense that was
substantially different from that described in the specification
upon which he was arraigned. See Teffeau, 58 M.J. at 67.
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United States v. Marshall, No. 08-0779/AR
Although the nature of the offense remained the same -- escape
from custody -- by substituting SSG Fleming for CPT Kreitman as
the custodian from whom Appellant escaped, the military judge
changed the identity of the offense against which the accused
had to defend. This denied him the “opportunity to defend
against the charge.” Id.
Having found the variance to be material, we must test for
prejudice. Appellant argues that the military judge’s findings
by exceptions and substitutions “gave the appellant no chance to
defend himself against this new charge.” The Government argues
that there is no prejudice, because regardless of whose custody
he escaped from, there was only one event, Appellant knew the
nature of the offense, and was able to defend against it. We
disagree. Appellant was charged with escaping from CPT
Kreitman’s custody; the Government presented no evidence that he
was in the captain’s custody, but attempted to prove that SSG
Fleming was acting as CPT Kreitman’s agent; the military judge
found Appellant guilty by exceptions and substitutions of
escaping from SSG Fleming’s custody. Had he known that he would
be called upon to refute an agency theory or to defend against a
charge that he escaped from SSG Fleming, Appellant is unlikely
to have focused his defense and his closing argument on the lack
of evidence that CPT Kreitman placed him in custody or that he
escaped from the custody of CPT Kreitman. “Fundamental due
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United States v. Marshall, No. 08-0779/AR
process demands that an accused be afforded the opportunity to
defend against a charge before a conviction on the basis of that
charge can be sustained.” Teffeau, 58 M.J. at 67; accord Dunn
v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1979). Under these
circumstances, we do not believe that Appellant could have
anticipated being forced to defend against the charge of which
he was ultimately convicted.2 Accordingly, we find the material
variance prejudiced Appellant such that the military judge’s
finding by exceptions and substitutions cannot stand.3
IV. Decision
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is set aside as to the findings of guilty to Charge III
and its specification and the sentence. Charge III and its
specification are dismissed. The remaining findings of guilty
are affirmed. The case is returned to the Judge Advocate
General of the Army for remand to the CCA for sentence
reassessment.
2
We need not address the Government’s double jeopardy argument
as the two prongs of the prejudice test are alternatives.
Teffeau, 58 M.J. at 67 n.2.
3
The Government also argues that it is immaterial from whom
Appellant escaped, because the escape was wrongful in any event.
The fact that two alternative theories of a case may both
involve criminal conduct does not relieve the government of its
due process obligations of notice to the accused and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense alleged. See United
States v. Ellsey, 16 C.M.A. 455, 458-59, 37 C.M.R. 75, 78-79
(1966).
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RYAN, J. (concurring in the judgment):
I write separately because I disagree that Appellant’s Rule
for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 917 motion for a finding of not
guilty preserved the issue of fatal variance for appeal by
placing the “fundamental issue . . . squarely before the
military judge.” United States v. Marshall, __ M.J. __ (4-5)
(C.A.A.F. 2009). Appellant’s R.C.M. 917 motion at trial and
Appellant’s argument before this Court -- that the military
judge created a fatal variance -- address two separate legal
issues. In my view, because Appellant failed to object to the
variance when the military judge announced his findings,
Appellant forfeited the issue absent plain error. See United
States v. Finch, 64 M.J. 118, 121 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (stating that
if trial defense counsel fails to object to findings by
exception and substitution at trial, the issue is waived and may
only be reviewed on appeal if the appellate court establishes
plain error); see also R.C.M. 905(e) (“Other motions, requests,
defenses, or objections, except lack of jurisdiction or failure
of a charge to allege an offense, must be raised before the
court-martial is adjourned for that case and, unless otherwise
provided in this Manual, failure to do so shall constitute
waiver.”). But because I believe that the military judge’s
exception and substitution was error, that the error was plain
United States v. Marshall, No. 08-0779/AR
and obvious, and that Appellant was materially prejudiced by it,
I concur in the judgment.
The Court granted the issue, “Whether the military judge’s
finding by exceptions and substitutions created a material fatal
variance in Charge III and its specification (escape from
custody).” Although the same factual circumstances underlie
Appellant’s R.C.M. 917 motion and the granted issue, the legal
tests and standards of review for the legal issues involved are
distinct. When considering whether a military judge should
grant a R.C.M. 917 motion, “the test is whether ‘there is any
substantial evidence before the court which, together with all
justifiable inferences to be drawn therefrom, reasonably tends
to establish every essential element of these offenses.’”
United States v. Davis, 37 M.J. 152, 153 (C.M.A. 1993) (quoting
United States v. Tobin, 17 C.M.A. 625, 628-29, 38 C.M.R. 423,
426-27 (1968)). In contrast, as correctly stated by the
majority, “to prevail on a fatal variance claim, an appellant
must show both that the variance was material and that he was
substantially prejudiced thereby.” Marshall, __ M.J. at __ (5)
(citing United States v. Hunt, 37 M.J. 344, 347 (C.M.A. 1993)).
Appellant’s R.C.M. 917 motion for a finding of not guilty
raised the issue whether there was substantial evidence to
establish every element of the charged offense. The motion
undoubtedly put the military judge on notice that the evidence
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United States v. Marshall, No. 08-0779/AR
was insufficient to convict Appellant of the escape from custody
offense, as that offense had been charged. Although the
military judge denied the motion, he subsequently found guilt by
exception and substitution, something he is explicitly
authorized to do. See R.C.M. 918(a)(1) (listing as one of the
permissible general findings to a specification, “guilty with
exceptions, . . . not guilty of the exceptions, but guilty of
the substitutions”). What the military judge was not allowed to
do was create a fatal variance by exception and substitution --
one that is both material and prejudices the accused. United
States v. Teffeau, 58 M.J. 62, 66 (C.A.A.F. 2003). Appellant
had a duty to object to the findings when they were announced.
Finch, 64 M.J. at 121. Having failed to object, I believe that
Appellant forfeited the issue absent plain error. Id.
I would, however, hold that Appellant has established that
an error was committed, that the error was plain, and that it
resulted in material prejudice to his substantial rights. See
United States v. Maynard, 66 M.J. 242, 244 (C.A.A.F. 2008)
(stating the three prongs of this Court’s plain error test). As
demonstrated by the majority’s analysis, the first and third
prongs of the plain error test have been satisfied. Turning to
the second prong, the military judge was already on notice from
both Appellant’s R.C.M. 917 motion and defense counsel’s closing
argument that there were significant problems with Charge III
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United States v. Marshall, No. 08-0779/AR
and its specification. It should have been obvious to the
military judge that it was error to change the nature and
identity of the offense and thus deny Appellant the opportunity
to defend against the charge. See Teffeau, 58 M.J. at 67
(listing three ways a material variance can prejudice an
accused).
I respectfully concur in the judgment.
4