United States v. Phillips

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
David J. PHILLIPS, Corporal
U.S. Marine Corps, Appellant
No. 11-0148
Crim. App. No. 200900568
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued April 6, 2011
Decided June 28, 2011
STUCKY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and BAKER, J., joined. RYAN, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which ERDMANN, J., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Michael R. Torrisi, JAGC, USN
(argued).
For Appellee: Captain Robert E. Eckert Jr., USMC (argued);
Colonel Louis J. Puleo, USMC, and Brian K. Keller, Esq. (on
brief).
Amicus Curiae (for neither party): Clayton S. McCarl III (law
student) (argued); Jennifer A. Gibson, Esq. (supervising
attorney), and Lindsay I. McCarl (law student) (on brief) -- for
the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law Appellate
Advocacy Clinic.
Military Judge: David S. Oliver
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Phillips, No. 11-0148/MC
Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court.
To establish a violation of clause 2 of Article 134,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2006),
the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the
accused engaged in certain conduct; and (2) that the conduct was
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. We
granted review to consider the necessary quantum of proof to
establish the second element. We hold that evidence that the
public was actually aware of the conduct is not necessarily
required. Furthermore, proof of the conduct itself may be
sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that, under all the circumstances, it was of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. The evidence
was legally sufficient in this case.1
I.
Consistent with his plea, Appellant was convicted by a
military judge sitting as a general court-martial of larceny in
violation of Article 121, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 921 (2006).
Contrary to his plea, Appellant was convicted of wrongfully
possessing child pornography as conduct prejudicial to good
order and discipline (clause 1) and conduct of a nature to bring
1
We heard oral argument in this case at the University of the
Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, California, as part
of the Court’s “Project Outreach.” This practice was developed
2
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discredit upon the armed forces (clause 2) in violation of
Article 134.
The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence of a
dishonorable discharge, confinement for fifteen months,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the
lowest enlisted grade. The United States Navy-Marine Corps
Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) set aside the military judge’s
findings as to clause 1 of the Article 134 charge, affirmed
Appellant’s conviction under clause 2, and affirmed the larceny
conviction as well as the sentence. United States v. Phillips,
69 M.J. 642, 646-47 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2010). It is the
conviction under clause 2 that is at issue here.
II.
While Appellant was assigned to Combat Logistics Regiment
37, 3d Marine Logistics Group, Okinawa, Japan, he became the
subject of a Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)
investigation in relation to conduct resulting in Appellant’s
conviction for larceny. During the course of that
investigation, Appellant consented to a search of his barracks
room, including his personal computer. After the consent form
was completed, Appellant apparently asked one of the
investigators, Special Agent (SA) Michael A. Bonilla, whether it
as a public awareness program to demonstrate the operation of a
federal court of appeals and the military justice system.
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United States v. Phillips, No. 11-0148/MC
would be a problem if the investigators found pornography on his
computer. SA Bonilla responded that “we don’t look into [that]
unless, of course, we’re talking about child pornography.” SA
Bonilla testified that Appellant then acknowledged that “he had
either previously or recently downloaded or accidentally
downloaded a few images which might be child pornography.” SA
Bonilla obtained Appellant’s consent to expand the scope of the
consent search to include evidence of possession of child
pornography.
Upon arrival at Appellant’s barracks, SA Bonilla observed
that Appellant’s laptop was in the process of downloading
“numerous files” using LimeWire file sharing software, with “at
least 30 or 40” file names visible at the time, some of which
were “consistent with child pornography.” David E. Lutzow, a
contract worker at the United States Department of Defense
Computer Forensics Laboratory, testified that the LimeWire
software on Appellant’s computer had been used to search other
computers connected to the Internet using peer-to-peer
technology for files with filenames including the words
“underage” and “pedo.” Mr. Lutzow also testified that, of the
files examined in detail, five images and two movies matched
files in the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
database, connecting files in Appellant’s possession to known
child victims and demonstrating possession of actual child
4
United States v. Phillips, No. 11-0148/MC
pornography. No witnesses testified that they found Appellant’s
conduct to be service discrediting. No witnesses testified that
they had become aware or would have become aware of Appellant’s
conduct, absent Appellant’s admission to SA Bonilla.
III.
Appellant’s possession of actual child pornography resulted
in his conviction for wrongful possession of child pornography
in violation of clause 2 of Article 134. In reviewing his
conviction, the CCA issued an opinion that is subject to
multiple interpretations.
While the CCA recognized that service discrediting conduct
was an element of a clause 2 offense under Article 134, it then
observed that:
There has been no bright-line rule . . . as to what
evidence is required to prove the second element of
clause 2 offenses. . . . The initial question not
previously addressed by this court is whether the
public has to be aware of the appellant’s misconduct
and his military status in order to find him guilty of
the terminal element of a clause 2 offense. We answer
that question in the negative. The more substantive
question is whether the possession of child
pornography by a uniformed member of the Armed Forces
is per se service discrediting. We find that it is,
especially under the facts and circumstances of this
case.
69 M.J. at 645 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
We have previously considered the question of what need be
proven to establish guilt under clause 1 or 2 of Article 134. A
general article, in language not dissimilar to Article 134, has
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United States v. Phillips, No. 11-0148/MC
been part of American military law since 1775. William
Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 720 (2d ed. 1920 reprint).
Under well-established case law, the terminal element is an
“essential element of the offense” as to which members must be
instructed. See United States v. Williams, 8 C.M.A. 325, 327,
24 C.M.R. 135, 137 (1957).
Whether the CCA erred depends on what the CCA intended by
its statement that the conduct was “per se service
discrediting . . . especially under the facts and circumstances
of this case.” 69 M.J. at 645. We are confronted with three
options in reviewing the CCA’s opinion: (1) interpret the
opinion to mean that the CCA impermissibly applied a conclusive
presumption, as Appellant argues; (2) read the opinion to merely
state that no additional evidence need be presented, as the
Government contends; or (3) determine that the opinion is
sufficiently ambiguous that we cannot accept either party’s
suggested interpretation.
If, as the defense contends, the CCA used the phrase “per
se” to mean “[a]s a matter of law,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1257
(9th ed. 2009), and therefore that the service discrediting
nature of the conduct could be conclusively presumed from the
fact that it involved possession of child pornography, then it
erred. It is established that conviction of a criminal offense
under the Constitution requires proof of every element of the
6
United States v. Phillips, No. 11-0148/MC
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508
U.S. 275, 278 (1993); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64
(1970); United States v. Neal, 68 M.J. 289, 298 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
The use of conclusive presumptions to establish the elements of
an offense is unconstitutional because such presumptions
conflict with the presumption of innocence and invade the
province of the trier of fact. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.
510, 523 (1979); see County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442
U.S. 140, 156-60 (1979); see also Williams, 8 C.M.A. at 327, 24
C.M.R. at 137 (rejecting the government’s contention that
instructions to the members on the terminal element were not
necessary because the charged conduct constituted proof of the
terminal element “as a matter of law”).
The Government argued that the CCA was not stating a
conclusive presumption, but rather used “per se” in the sense of
“standing alone, without reference to additional facts,” Black’s
Law Dictionary, supra at 1257, and simply held that no evidence
of a direct injury or actual harm to the reputation of the
service need be introduced. The problem with this argument is
that the CCA explicitly treated the questions of whether actual
damage to the reputation of the service, and actual public
knowledge of Appellant’s actions and military status, needed to
be shown, as separate issues from whether the conduct was per se
service discrediting. 69 M.J. at 645.
7
United States v. Phillips, No. 11-0148/MC
Based on the wording of the CCA’s opinion, we are unable to
adopt either party’s interpretation. With two conflicting
definitions of “per se,” it is unclear whether the CCA held that
possession of such material is conclusively service
discrediting. As noted above, such a presumption is
constitutionally impermissible under In re Winship and
Sandstrom.
The terminal element in a clause 1 or 2 Article 134 case is
an element of the offense like any other. Conduct need not be
violative of any other criminal statute to violate clause 1 or
2. United States v. Davis, 26 M.J. 445, 448 (C.M.A. 1988). The
terminal element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt like
any other element. Whether any given conduct violates clause 1
or 2 is a question for the trier of fact to determine, based
upon all the facts and circumstances; it cannot be conclusively
presumed from any particular course of action.
IV.
There remains to be addressed the legal sufficiency of
Appellant’s conviction under clause 2 of Article 134. Before
doing so, we will briefly consider Appellant’s arguments that
clause 2 (1) “was never intended to criminalize the misconduct
of active duty servicemembers”; and (2) does not criminalize
conduct which is private, unknown to the public, and only became
known due to the investigation and prosecution of the case.
8
United States v. Phillips, No. 11-0148/MC
A.
Appellant asserts that the language now found in clause 2
first entered military law for a single purpose: to subject
noncommissioned officers on the retired list to criminal
sanctions. Since its enactment in 1916, as a clause of Article
of War 96,2 it is clear that the provision has never been so
restricted by its text or in practice. It has been applied to
active-duty personnel from very early times. See C.M. 139139
(1920) (soldier deserting and abandoning wife without cause or
excuse), cited in Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate
General of the Army, 1912–1940 348 (1942); see also United
States v. Parkman, 4 C.M.R. (A.F.) 270, 278, 281 (A.F.J.C.
1951); United States v. McDonald, 10 B.R. 61, 63 (A.B.R. 1939);
United States v. Klima, 4 B.R. 45, 46 (A.B.R. 1932). With no
statutory text to the contrary, we decline to overrule almost a
century of precedent.
B.
We also reject Appellant’s argument that for an accused to
be convicted of a clause 2 offense, military law requires that
the public know of the accused’s conduct. In deciphering the
meaning of a statute, we normally apply the common and ordinary
2
Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, Pub. L. No. 64-242, 39 Stat.
619, 666.
9
United States v. Phillips, No. 11-0148/MC
understanding of the words in the statute. See United States v.
Alston, 69 M.J. 214, 216 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
The focus of clause 2 is on the “nature” of the conduct,
whether the accused’s conduct would tend to bring discredit on
the armed forces if known by the public, not whether it was in
fact so known. The statute, which requires proof of the
“nature” of the conduct, does not require the government to
introduce testimony regarding views of “the public” or any
segment thereof. The responsibility for evaluation of the
nature of the conduct rests with the trier of fact. As
discussed below, the degree to which others became aware of the
accused’s conduct may bear upon whether the conduct is service
discrediting, but the statute does not establish a requirement
that the accused’s conduct must in every case be in some respect
public knowledge.
C.
In determining legal sufficiency, we apply the well-known
standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979), viz., whether, viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Lofton, 69 M.J. 386, 388 (C.A.A.F. 2011). The
trier of fact must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the
conduct alleged actually occurred and must also evaluate the
10
United States v. Phillips, No. 11-0148/MC
nature of the conduct and determine beyond a reasonable doubt
that Appellant’s conduct would tend to bring the service into
disrepute if it were known. See United States v. Saunders,
59 M.J. 1, 11 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
In general, the government is not required to present
evidence that anyone witnessed or became aware of the conduct.
Nor is the government required to specifically articulate how
the conduct is service discrediting. Rather, the government’s
obligation is to introduce sufficient evidence of the accused’s
allegedly service discrediting conduct to support a conviction.
In a panel case, the military judge must instruct the members
how to evaluate that evidence. See Article 51(c), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 851(c) (2006); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9
(1999). When the military judge sits as the trier of fact, we
presume that the military judge knows the law and applies it
correctly. United States v. Robbins, 52 M.J. 455, 457
(C.A.A.F. 2000).
Whether conduct is of a “nature” to bring discredit upon
the armed forces is a question that depends on the facts and
circumstances of the conduct, which includes facts regarding the
setting as well as the extent to which Appellant’s conduct is
known to others. The trier of fact must consider all the
circumstances, but such facts -- including the fact that the
conduct may have been wholly private -- do not mandate a
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United States v. Phillips, No. 11-0148/MC
particular result unless no rational trier of fact could
conclude that the conduct was of a “nature” to bring discredit
upon the armed forces. For example, the extent to which conduct
is constitutionally protected may impact whether the facts of
record are sufficient to support a conviction.
In this case, forensic analysis of Appellant’s computer
showed that searches had been performed seeking filenames
associated with child pornography. Of the images the computer
retrieved using LimeWire that were examined in detail by the
forensic examiner, five images and two movies matched known
child victims engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Appellant
admitted downloading pornography that included child pornography
and viewing the images on several occasions.
The Government did not introduce any direct evidence that
the public was or would have become aware of Appellant’s
conduct, or that anyone at all was aware of it before Appellant
mentioned it to SA Bonilla. Nor was the Government required to
do so in this case. Regardless of public knowledge, the
evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant’s activity would have
tended to bring discredit upon the service had the public known
of it. See United States v. Harper, 22 M.J. 157, 161 (C.A.A.F.
1979) (stating that “sufficient evidence generally means some
legal and competent evidence from which a court-martial may find
12
United States v. Phillips, No. 11-0148/MC
or infer beyond a reasonable doubt those facts required by law
for conviction”) (citation omitted). The evidence is legally
sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for possession of
child pornography under clause 2 of Article 134.
V.
Although we hold the evidence is legally sufficient to
support his conviction for possession of child pornography, we
are concerned, as noted above, that the CCA may have
conclusively presumed that Appellant’s conduct was of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces because Appellant
possessed child pornography. In light of our holding that the
elements of an offense cannot be established by a conclusive
presumption, and because this Court does not review for factual
sufficiency, we must remand for the CCA to perform a factual
sufficiency review under the correct standard. See Article
66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2006).
VI.
The judgment of the United States Navy-Marine Corps
Court of Criminal Appeals is set aside, and the record is
returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy for
remand to the Court of Criminal Appeals for a full review
consistent with this opinion. Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 866(c) (2006).
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RYAN, Judge, with whom ERDMANN, Judge, joins
(dissenting):
I agree with the majority that the test for whether
evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction is
whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in
original); United States v. Phillips, __ M.J. __, __ (10)
(C.A.A.F. 2011). I also agree that a conclusive
presumption that the element of service discredit is met by
the possession of child pornography itself would violate
the Constitution. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510,
523 (1979); Phillips, __ M.J. at __ (7). I nonetheless
write separately for two reasons.
First, it is entirely unclear to me what the actual
distinction is between holding that the offense here cannot
be per se or conclusively service discrediting and holding,
at the same time, that “the evidence was sufficient for a
rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Appellant’s activity would have tended to bring
discredit to the service had the public known of it.”
Phillips, __ M.J. at __, __ (8, 12). There is nothing in
the record -- other than the fact of the activity itself --
United States v. Phillips, No. 11-0148/MC
upon which the military judge could have based this
finding.
Appellant was convicted under clause 2 of Article 134,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934(2006), which criminalizes “all conduct of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces.” The Due Process
Clause requires that the terminal elements of Article 134,
UCMJ, be independently proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Miller, 67 M.J. 385, 389 (C.A.A.F. 2009).
Relatedly, “an appellate court may not affirm on a theory
not presented to the trier of fact and adjudicated beyond a
reasonable doubt.” United States v. Medina, 66 M.J. 21, 27
(C.A.A.F. 2008). Therefore, to affirm Appellant’s
conviction under this Court’s precedents, one would expect
the record to establish that the Government presented a
theory at trial explaining why Appellant’s conduct was
service discrediting. But the Government presented no such
theory, either through evidence or through argument. In
fact, the record of trial contains no discussion whatsoever
of whether and how Appellant’s conduct was service
discrediting.1
1
While not dispositive, it is instructive that had
Appellant pled guilty, this Court would find the plea
improvident due to the complete absence of any discussion
of the service-discrediting element on the record. See
2
United States v. Phillips, No. 11-0148/MC
Second, and relatedly, there is thus no reason to
assume that the military judge independently determined
that the service-discrediting element was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Moreover, while not acknowledged by the
majority, our case law on whether and how to deal with
pleading and proof of the terminal element of an Article
134, UCMJ, offense has been, until recently, far from
clear. Compare United States v. Fuller, 54 M.J. 107, 112
(C.A.A.F. 2000) (“[E]very enumerated offense under the UCMJ
is per se prejudicial to good order and discipline or
service discrediting.”), and United States v. Foster, 40
M.J. 140, 143 (C.M.A. 1994) (“The enumerated articles are
rooted in the principle that such conduct per se is either
prejudicial to good order and discipline or brings
discredit to the armed forces; these elements are implicit
in the enumerated articles.”), with Miller, 67 M.J. at 389
(overruling Foster and its progeny “[t]o the extent those
cases support the proposition that clauses 1 and 2 of
Article 134, UCMJ, are per se included in every enumerated
offense”), and Medina, 66 M.J. at 26 (holding that the
terminal elements under clauses 1 and 2 are not implied
United States v. Jordan, 57 M.J. 236, 237-39 (C.A.A.F.
2002) (finding the appellant’s guilty plea to an Article
134, UCMJ, offense improvident when there was no factual
basis for the terminal elements developed on the record).
3
United States v. Phillips, No. 11-0148/MC
elements of a prosecution under clause 3). This record
provides no basis upon which to conclude that the military
judge did anything other than assume that the conduct was
per se or conclusively service discrediting based on the
law at the time of trial. Appellant’s court-martial
predated our decision in Miller.2 We presume the military
judge followed the law at the time of the court-martial.
See United States v. Raya, 45 M.J. 251, 253 (C.A.A.F.
1996). Under some of this law at the time, the conduct
might be viewed as per se service discrediting. See, e.g.,
Foster, 40 M.J. at 143. There is simply no way to know
that the military judge knew he must make, let alone made,
an independent factual determination on the element of
service discredit in this case, an issue compounded by the
complete dearth of reference to the element in the record
of trial.
Because the Government failed to present either
evidence or argument on the element of service discredit
and the military judge may have applied pre-Miller law that
2
Miller was decided on June 10, 2009, and Appellant’s
court-martial concluded four months earlier, on February 5,
2009. Therefore, the military judge presumably applied the
pre-Miller law in effect at Appellant’s court-martial,
whereas Miller governs this case on appeal. See United
States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113, 116 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (“[O]n
direct review, we apply the clear law at the time of
appeal, not the time of trial.”).
4
United States v. Phillips, No. 11-0148/MC
some conduct is per se service discrediting, I would set
aside the sentence and the finding of guilty on the child
pornography charge and authorize a rehearing.
5