United States v. Reyes

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Nicolas REYES, Corporal
U.S. Marine Corps, Appellant
No. 05-0550
Crim. App. No. 200301064
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued April 18, 2006
Decided June 29, 2006
EFFRON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GIERKE,
C.J., and CRAWFORD, BAKER, and ERDMANN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Brian L. Mizer, JAGC, USNR (argued).
For Appellee: Major Wilbur Lee, USMC (argued); Commander
Charles N. Purnell II, JAGC, USN (on brief); Colonel Ralph F.
Miller, USMC.
Military Judge: L. K. Burnett
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Reyes, No. 05-0550/MC
Judge EFFRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted
members convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of
conspiracy to commit assault, assault (two specifications), and
drunk and disorderly conduct, in violation of Articles 81, 128,
and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§
881, 928, 934 (2000). The adjudged sentence included a bad-
conduct discharge, restriction for twenty-three days, and
reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. The convening authority
approved the sentence, and the United States Navy-Marine Corps
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. United States v. Reyes, No.
NMCCA 200301064, 2005 CCA LEXIS 132, at *18, 2005 WL 995676, at
*7 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2005) (unpublished).
On Appellant’s petition, we granted review of the following
issues:
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
ERRED BY HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO
REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT THE RESULT
OF THE PROCEEDING WOULD HAVE BEEN
DIFFERENT BUT FOR DEFENSE COUNSEL’S
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN FAILING TO
OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION OF VARIOUS
DOCUMENTS IN THE APPELLANT’S SERVICE
RECORD BOOK.
II. WHETHER THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
ERRED BY HOLDING THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT
MATERIALLY PREJUDICED BY THE MILITARY
JUDGE’S PLAIN ERROR IN ADMITTING INTO
EVIDENCE VARIOUS DOCUMENTS IN
APPELLANT’S SERVICE RECORD BOOK.
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III. WHETHER THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
ERRED BY HOLDING THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT
MATERIALLY PREJUDICED BY THE MILITARY
JUDGE’S PLAIN ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE
PANEL THAT IT COULD SENTENCE THE
APPELLANT TO A DISHONORABLE DISCHARGE.
For the reasons set forth below, we authorize a rehearing on the
sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant’s court-martial stemmed from his participation in
a late night brawl involving two groups. The first group,
composed of five Marines, included Appellant. The second group
included two Marines and four civilians. The evidence, as
summarized by the Court of Criminal Appeals, showed that:
[A]ppellant and four of his friends walked
into a restaurant in Washington, D.C. and,
in short order, got into a scuffle with an
opposing party of 6 men. The police arrived
quickly, separated the two factions, and
after a cursory investigation, elected to
let each side go their own way.
Reyes, 2005 CCA LEXIS 132, at *11, 2005 WL 995676, at *4. The
next encounter between the two groups occurred on the highway
and continued when the vehicles pulled off the road:
Apparently dissatisfied with the outcome of
the initial round of pugilism, the appellant
and his group spotted the opposing group’s
vehicle and, after an exchange of
obscenities, began to give chase on a
highway.
The evidence also showed that the
appellant’s vehicle (operated by one of the
appellant’s co-conspirators) attempted to
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United States v. Reyes, No. 05-0550/MC
pull in front of the opposing group’s
vehicle in an effort to stop it, and that
the chase continued for a number of miles.
When the opposing group’s vehicle pulled off
the highway, the appellant’s vehicle
followed. There was no evidence presented
that the appellant voiced an objection to
the chase or otherwise attempted to dissuade
his cohorts. Instead, the evidence showed
that the appellant’s co-conspirators were
angry and combative, and the appellant
himself told investigators in a pretrial
statement that his intentions were, “I don’t
know, I guess to fight.”
2005 CCA LEXIS 132, at *11-*12, 2005 WL 995676, at *4. A fight
then ensued:
Once the vehicles stopped, the evidence
showed that Sergeant (Sgt) D’Leon, an
occupant of the other car who recognized the
appellant from work, attempted to act as a
peacemaker. In response, the appellant
punched Sgt D’Leon in the nose, which
ignited the fuse for the second brawl of the
evening. It was during the second round
that the appellant struck at least one other
person with a baseball bat.
2005 CCA LEXIS 132, at *12, 2005 WL 995676, at *4.
The members acquitted Appellant of one of the assault
charges, modified a charge of conspiracy to commit assault,
reduced a specification of assault with a deadly weapon to the
lesser included offense of assault consummated by a battery, and
convicted Appellant of the assault and related charges noted at
the outset of this opinion.
During the sentencing phase of Appellant’s court-martial,
the prosecution offered into evidence Prosecution Exhibit (PE)
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United States v. Reyes, No. 05-0550/MC
6, which trial counsel represented to be “excerpts from
[Appellant’s] Service Record Book.” The military judge admitted
the 139-page exhibit into evidence without further inquiry and
without an objection from trial defense counsel.
As noted by the Court of Criminal Appeals, a variety of
unrelated documents were “[t]ucked between the actual excerpts”
from the Service Record Book. Reyes, 2005 CCA LEXIS 132, at *3,
2005 WL 995676, at *1. The extraneous material included, among
other documents, the entire military police investigation and
the pretrial advice that the staff judge advocate (SJA)
submitted to the general court-martial convening authority under
Article 34, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 834 (2000).
The extraneous material included pictures that the military
judge had determined were inadmissible, substantial amounts of
inadmissible hearsay concerning the events, and Appellant’s
pretrial offer to plead guilty to charges on which the members
had just returned a verdict of acquittal. Reyes, 2005 CCA LEXIS
132, at *3-*4, 2005 WL 995676, at *1. The Court of Criminal
Appeals noted that the exhibit provided the members with a
substantial amount of inadmissible evidence, adding:
We are at a loss as to how the trial counsel
could in good faith represent to the
military judge that these materials were
excerpts from the appellant’s service record
without a further explanation as to their
contents. We are equally perplexed by the
trial defense counsel’s failure to object to
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the introduction of these portions of the
exhibit, and by the military judge’s failure
to inquire further before admitting the
exhibit.
2005 CCA LEXIS 132, at *4-*5, 2005 WL 995676, at *1.
The lower court applied our holding in United States v.
Powell, 49 M.J. 460, 463-65 (C.A.A.F. 1998), which states that
in the absence of objection at trial, the reviewing court will
apply a plain error analysis under which Appellant must show
that there was an error, that the error was plain or obvious,
and that the error materially prejudiced a substantial right.
2005 CCA LEXIS 132, at *2, 2005 WL 995676, at *1. The lower
court held that the military judge erred in admitting this
material and that defense counsel’s failure to object
constituted deficient performance. 2005 CCA LEXIS 132, at *5,
2005 WL 995676, at *1. The court also held that the military
judge erroneously instructed the members that they could impose
a dishonorable discharge, even though such a punishment was not
authorized for the offenses resulting in a conviction. 2005 CCA
LEXIS 132, at *17, 2005 WL 995676, at *6. The court concluded
that these errors were plain and obvious, but not prejudicial.
2005 CCA LEXIS 132, at *5-*6, *17-*18, 2005 WL 995676, at *1-*2,
*6.
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II. DISCUSSION
Issues II and III involve the third prong of the plain
error test -- whether Appellant has demonstrated that the errors
materially prejudiced a substantial right. In the present
appeal, Appellant has not challenged the sentence
appropriateness determination of the court below. The issue
before us is whether the errors during the sentencing phase of
Appellant’s court-martial had a prejudicial impact on the
process by which the members determined the appropriate
punishment. In that context, if this Court concludes that the
panel might have been “substantially swayed” by the error during
the sentencing process, Appellant has met his burden. See
United States v. Clark, 62 M.J. 195, 201 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (citing
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)).
The military judge instructed the members to deliberate on
all of the evidence that was presented. In light of the secrecy
of panel deliberations, see Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.)
606(b), and the presumption that the members follow the
instructions of the military judge, see United States v. Taylor,
53 M.J. 195, 198 (C.A.A.F. 2000), we presume that the members
viewed and considered all of the evidence placed before the
panel, including the erroneously admitted documents contained in
PE 6.
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United States v. Reyes, No. 05-0550/MC
Although some of the witness statements and photographs
included in the military police investigation reflected evidence
admitted on the merits, a number of key items contained
information that was not otherwise included in the record. For
example, PE 6 included eleven photographs of injuries not
directly attributable to the offenses of which Appellant was
convicted, creating the risk that the members sentenced
Appellant for injuries that he did not inflict. The SJA’s
pretrial advice contained Appellant’s offer to plead guilty to
all of the charges against him. In view of the fact that the
members had just acquitted Appellant of some of the charges, the
information in the SJA’s pretrial advice -- that before trial
Appellant was willing to admit guilt to those offenses -- could
have left the members with the negative impression that
Appellant had deceived them at trial. As such, this information
could have substantially influenced the members when imposing
the sentence. See United States v. Vasquez, 54 M.J. 303, 306
(C.A.A.F. 2001) (citing Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765).
In our assessment of prejudice, we also consider the
military judge’s erroneous instruction on the maximum punitive
discharge. An instruction on the maximum punishment advises the
members as to the seriousness of the offense or offenses.
Compare Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1003(b)(8)(B), with
R.C.M. 1003(b)(8)(C). Instructing the panel that they could
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adjudge a dishonorable discharge overstated the seriousness of
the offenses for sentencing purposes. When combined with the
erroneous admission of extraneous information, the instructional
error resulted in a substantial risk that the members were
misinformed both as to the evidence that they could consider and
the range of punishments that they could impose.
In the present case, the members adjudged a sentence that
included a bad-conduct discharge and restriction for twenty-
three days. In view of the relatively brief period of
restriction and the absence of confinement, a punitive discharge
was not a foregone conclusion. In that context, and in light of
the cumulative impact of the errors during sentencing, we cannot
be confident that the errors did not “substantially sway” the
members in their decision to adjudge a punitive discharge in
Appellant’s case. See Clark, 62 M.J. at 201 (citing Kotteakos,
328 U.S. at 765).
In light of this conclusion, we need not address the
remaining issue as to ineffective assistance of counsel.
III. CONCLUSION
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals is affirmed as to findings and reversed as
to sentence. The sentence is set aside, and the record is
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returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. A rehearing
on the sentence is authorized.
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