United States v. Paul

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Charles W. PAUL, Airman
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 14-0119
Crim. App. No. S32025
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued March 4, 2014
Decided May 29, 2014
BAKER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which
ERDMANN, STUCKY, RYAN, and OHLSON, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Christopher James (argued); Major Zaven
T. Saroyan (on brief).
For Appellee: Captain Matthew J. Neil (argued); Colonel Don M.
Christensen, Lieutenant Colonel C. Taylor Smith, and Gerald R.
Bruce, Esq. (on brief)
Military Judge: Jeffrey A. Ferguson
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Paul, No. 14-0119/AF
Chief Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Airman Charles W. Paul was convicted by a military judge,
contrary to his plea, of one specification of using ecstasy in
violation of Article 112a of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 912a (2012).1 The adjudged and
approved sentence included a bad-conduct discharge, five months
of confinement, and reduction to E-1. Appellant argued before
the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) that
the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction
on the ecstasy charge. The CCA affirmed, holding that a
reasonable factfinder could have found the essential elements
beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Paul, No. ACM
S32025, 2013 CCA LEXIS 747, at *2, *10 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug.
23, 2013) In doing so, the CCA took judicial notice of the fact
that ecstasy is a Schedule I controlled substance. Paul, 2013
CCA LEXIS 747, at *10.
We granted review on the following issue:
WHETHER THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE OF AN ELEMENT OF A CHARGE
IN VIOLATION OF GARNER v. LOUISIANA, 368 U.S. 157(1961) AND MILITARY RULE OF EVIDENCE (MRE) 201(c).
1
Appellant was also charged with two specifications of violating
an order by smoking spice (Article 92, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 892(2012)); one specification of using marijuana (Article 112a,
UCMJ); and one specification of soliciting fellow servicemembers
to disobey a general order by smoking spice (Article 134, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 934 (2012)). He pled guilty to smoking spice and
was convicted by the military judge, contrary to his pleas, of
the remaining charges.
2
United States v. Paul, No. 14-0119/AF
We conclude that the evidence presented at trial was not
legally sufficient to support a conviction for using 3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine in violation of Article 112a,
UCMJ. We further hold that the CCA erred in taking judicial
notice of a missing element of the crime charged.
BACKGROUND
Appellant was charged with one specification of using 3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine on diverse occasions. The
specification read:
In that AIRMAN CHARLES W. PAUL, United States Air
Force, 355th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Davis-
Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, did, at or near
Tucson, Arizona, on diverse occasions between on or
about 1 June 2011 and on or about 31 July 2011,
wrongfully use 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine, a
Schedule I controlled substance, commonly known as
Ecstasy, Ex or E.
Appellant was tried before a military judge alone at Davis-
Monthan Air Force base in Arizona on January 4 and 5, 2012. As
part of the prosecution’s case, a civilian witness, Holly Kern,
testified that she had seen Appellant using ecstasy in his
apartment on two separate occasions during the charged time
period. Ms. Kern described the tablets, explained her role in
procuring them, and detailed the drug’s effects when she took
the same pills herself. In addition, she testified to seeing
Appellant put the substance into his mouth under the belief that
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United States v. Paul, No. 14-0119/AF
it was ecstasy. The Government also admitted into evidence
several text messages sent from Appellant’s phone2 stating:
I’m gonna reward myself with some e tonight.
Hey grab me 4 rolls3 when you get yours. . . . I’m
being a designated driver tonight so I need some E.
[We] are excited about rolling. . . . We aren’t gonna
have any of my military friends over here for obvious
reasons.
Though the charge sheet stated that Appellant did
“wrongfully use 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine, a Schedule I
controlled substance, commonly known as Ecstasy,” and in
closing argument, the Government used a slide that read,
“Accused used 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine, commonly known
as Ecstasy, Ex or E,” the Government did not enter anything into
evidence indicating that Ecstasy is in fact 3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine.4 The military judge granted the
Government’s motion to take judicial notice of a general order
prohibiting use, possession, distribution, or purchase of spice.
However, the military judge did not take judicial notice of
anything else.
2
The messages were obtained by investigators through a
consensual search of Appellant’s phone.
3
Ms. Kern testified that “rolls” and “rolling” are common slang
associated with ecstasy use.
4
As discussed below, ecstasy is not listed in Schedule I.
4
United States v. Paul, No. 14-0119/AF
The military judge convicted Appellant of all charges,
including use of ecstasy. Appellant appealed to the CCA,
arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient to support
the ecstasy conviction. The CCA stated that “[t]he fact that
Ecstasy is a Schedule I controlled substance is an essential
element of the offense charged” and agreed that no evidence of
this fact was introduced at trial. It rejected the notion that
the military judge did or was entitled to take judicial notice,
sub silentio, that ecstasy is a Schedule I controlled substance.
However, noting that “judicial notice in this case involves a
question of domestic law rather than an adjudicative fact,” and
that “there is no question that Ecstasy is a Schedule I
controlled substance under the laws of the United States,” the
CCA decided to take “the extraordinary step of judicially
noticing domestic law on appeal.” The CCA determined that, had
the Government requested that the military judge take judicial
notice of this fact, the military judge would have done so. The
CCA approved the findings and the sentence of the military
judge.
DISCUSSION
Legal Sufficiency
Before ruling on the granted issue, we first address the
threshold question raised by Appellant before the CCA: Was the
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United States v. Paul, No. 14-0119/AF
evidence presented at trial legally sufficient to support the
ecstasy conviction?
The test for legal sufficiency is “‘whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v.
Oliver, 70 M.J. 64, 68 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Article 112a, UCMJ, has
two related elements: (1) use of a controlled substance, that
is (2) wrongful. The term “controlled substance” is defined in
Article 112(a), UCMJ, in three ways: (1) by what is listed in
the text of the article, (2) through reference to a schedule as
prescribed by the President, and (3) through reference to
Schedules I through V of the Controlled Substances Act.5 As
5
Specifically, Article 112a, UCMJ, provides:
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who wrongfully
uses, possesses, manufactures, distributes . . . a
substance described in subsection (b) shall be
punished as a court-martial may direct.
(b) The substances referred to in subsection (a) are
the following:
(1) Opium, heroin, cocaine, amphetamine, lysergic
acid diethylamide, methamphetamine,
phencyclidine, barbituric acid, and marijuana and
any compound or derivative of any such substance.
(2) Any substance not specified in clause (1)
that is listed on a schedule of controlled
6
United States v. Paul, No. 14-0119/AF
stated in the specification, 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine
is a Schedule I controlled substance. The substance 3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine is also commonly referred to as
ecstasy.
The problem in the present case, as the CCA observed, is
that the Government did not offer evidence at trial that
Appellant used 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine, that 3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine is a controlled substance, or that
3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine is commonly referred to as
ecstasy. To the contrary, the Government offered legally
sufficient evidence that Appellant used “ecstasy.” Ecstasy is
neither a named prohibited substance under Article 112a, nor has
it been listed on any schedule prescribed by the President.
Schedule I does not list ecstasy by name, or link the term to
3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(2013). Nowhere did the Government -- through expert testimony,
through stipulation on the part of Appellant, or through
requesting that the military judge take judicial notice --
establish that ecstasy and 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine are
substances prescribed by the President for the
purposes of this article.
(3) Any other substance not specified in clause
(1) or contained on a list prescribed by the
President under clause (2) that is listed in
schedules I through V of section 202 of the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 812).
7
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the same thing. Nor did the military judge indicate that he was
taking judicial notice of this on his own motion. In short, the
Government’s evidence did not make the essential connections
among ecstasy, 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine, and
Schedule I.
As a result, no rational trier of fact could have found an
essential element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, namely that Appellant used a Schedule I controlled
substance.
Judicial Notice
The question raised by the granted issue is whether the CCA
could take judicial notice of a fact necessary to establish an
element of the offense that the Government failed to establish
at trial. This Court reviews questions of law de novo. United
States v. Springer, 58 M.J. 164, 167 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
Judicial notice is regulated by Military Rules of Evidence
(M.R.E.) 201 and 202:6
Rule 201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts
(a) Scope. This rule governs judicial notice of an
adjudicative fact only, not a legislative fact.
6
Executive Order 13643, issued on May 15, 2013, contains the
current version of M.R.E. 201 and M.R.E. 202. Since the CCA
issued its decision on August 23, 2013, we apply this most
recent version. Exec. Order No. 13,643, 78 Fed. Reg. 29,561(May 21, 2013).
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(b) Kinds of Facts that May Be Judicially Noticed: The
military judge may judicially notice a fact that is not
subject to reasonable dispute because it:
(1) is generally known universally, locally, or
in the area pertinent to the event; or
(2) can be accurately and readily determined from
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned
(c) Taking Notice. The military judge:
(1) may take judicial notice whether requested or not;
or
(2) must take judicial notice if a party requests it
and the military judge is supplied with the necessary
information.
The military judge must inform the parties in open
court when, without being requested, he or she takes
judicial notice of an adjudicative fact essential to
establishing an element of the case.
(d) Timing. The military judge may take judicial notice at
any stage of the proceeding.
(e) Opportunity to Be Heard. On timely request, a party is
entitled to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial
notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed. If the
military judge takes judicial notice before notifying a
party, the party, on request, is still entitled to be
heard.
(f) Instructing the Members. The military judge must
instruct the members that they may or may not accept the
noticed fact as conclusive.
Rule 202. Judicial Notice of Law
(a) Domestic Law. The military judge may take judicial
notice of domestic law. If a domestic law is a fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action, the
procedural requirements of Mil. R. Evid. 201 -- except Rule
201(f) -- apply.
9
United States v. Paul, No. 14-0119/AF
As a threshold matter, we affirm that an appellate court
can take judicial notice of law and fact under certain
circumstances. M.R.E. 201 mentions only the military judge when
outlining the proper procedure for taking judicial notice.
However, case law is well settled that both military and
civilian appellate courts may take judicial notice of
indisputable facts. In Heller v. New York, for example, a case
concerning the seizure of film reels in an obscenity case, the
Supreme Court took judicial notice of the fact that such films
“may be compact, readily transported for exhibition in other
jurisdictions, easily destructible, and particularly susceptible
to alteration.” 413 U.S. 483, 493 (1973). In addition, the
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules for Fed. R. Evid. 201 state
that “judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceedings, whether in the trial court or on appeal.” Although
the M.R.E. does not contain a similar note, this Court has
consistently recognized the ability of appellate courts to take
judicial notice of indisputable facts. In United States v.
Williams, for example, despite finding that the jurisdictional
questions at issue in the case were disputable, the Court stated
that “[w]e are convinced, however, that this Court is entitled
to take judicial notice of indisputable facts.” 17 M.J. 207,
214 (C.M.A. 1984).7
7
See also United States v. Erickson:
10
United States v. Paul, No. 14-0119/AF
The problem in this case is that the CCA took the
“extraordinary step” of taking judicial notice of an element not
proven by the Government. The CCA justified this step, in part,
by noting that it was taking judicial notice of a question of
domestic law and not an adjudicative fact. However, this
analysis fails for two reasons. First, whether characterized as
a question of fact or law, M.R.E. 201 in this case would require
that the Appellant first have notice and an opportunity to be
heard. On adjudicative facts this is always the case. Id.However, as M.R.E. 202 states, it is also the case “[i]f a
domestic law is a fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action.” Second, and related, the CCA took
judicial notice of an element of the offense.8
Appellant has provided no information on appeal that would
undermine the validity of his acknowledgement at trial as
to the harmful effects of inhalation of nitrous oxide. On
the contrary, we take judicial notice of the fact that a
number of states have recognized the harmful effects by
criminalizing inhalation of nitrous oxide.
61 M.J. 230, 233 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
8
The issue before the CCA might have been framed as a question
of indisputable adjudicative fact: Are ecstasy and 3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine the same substance? It might also
have been framed, as the CCA chose to interpret it, as a
question of domestic law: Is ecstasy a statutorily regulated
Schedule I controlled substance for the purposes of Article
112a, UCMJ?
11
United States v. Paul, No. 14-0119/AF
It is a fundamental principle of due process that in order
to prove its case, the government must present evidence at trial
supporting each element of the charged offenses beyond a
reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
Further, “[t]he review of findings -- of guilt or innocence --
[is] limited to the evidence presented at trial.” United States
v. Beatty, 64 M.J. 456, 458 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (citation omitted).
“A fact essential to a finding of guilty must appear in the
evidence presented on the issue of guilt; it cannot be extracted
from evidence presented in other proceedings in the case.”
United States v. Boland, 1 M.J. 241, 242 (C.M.A. 1975).
In Garner v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court made clear these
principles apply to the taking of judicial notice on appeal:
To extend the doctrine of judicial notice to the length
pressed by the respondent would require us to allow the
prosecution to do through argument to this Court what it is
required by due process to do at the trial, and would be
“to turn the doctrine into a pretext for dispensing with a
trial.” Furthermore, unless an accused is informed at the
trial of the facts of which the court is taking judicial
notice, not only does he not know upon what evidence he is
being convicted, but, in addition, he is deprived of any
opportunity to challenge the deductions drawn from such
notice or to dispute the notoriety or truth of the facts
allegedly relied upon.
368 U.S. 157, 173, (1961) (citation omitted).9 When judicial
notice of an element is taken outside the context of the trial
9
The issue granted in this case references the CCA’s alleged
violation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Garner. However,
we do not find Garner on point for two reasons. First, Garner
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itself, the defendant is denied his due process right to
confront or challenge an essential fact establishing an element,
whether or not the fact is indisputable.
Thus, even if, as asserted by the CCA, “there is no
question that Ecstasy is a Schedule I controlled substance under
the laws of the United States” and “had the Government requested
the military judge to take judicial notice that Ecstasy is a
Schedule I controlled substance at trial, the military judge
would have done so, even over a possible objection by the
defense” an accused is entitled to have each element of the
charged crime established at trial. Paul, 2013 CCA LEXIS 747,
at *10.
This conclusion is consistent with longstanding case law.
In United States v. Williams, we reviewed the appellant’s
convictions for larceny, in violation of Article 121, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 921, and sale of marijuana in violation of Article 92,
UCMJ (disobeying a general order). 3 M.J. 155, 156 (C.M.A.
1977). At trial, before a military judge alone, the government
addressed whether a higher court can assume that the trial court
took judicial notice of a fact rather than the right of the
higher court to take judicial notice of that fact. Garner, 368
U.S. 157 at 173. In United States v. Irvin, this Court
dismissed the notion that a military judge could take judicial
notice “‘by implication’” and neither party is arguing before
this Court that the military judge did so in this case. 21 M.J.
184, 186 (C.M.A. 1986). Secondly, unlike in this case, the
question in Garner -- the state of racial tensions and relations
in the South -- concerned a matter of subjective judgment open
to dispute. Garner, 368 U.S. at 173.
13
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failed to introduce into evidence a copy of the regulation the
appellant had allegedly violated or to request that the military
judge take judicial notice of the regulation. Id. Nor was
there any indication that the military judge took judicial
notice of the regulation on his own motion. Id. This Court
found that, absent proof of this element of the crime, the
record was legally insufficient to warrant conviction, stating
that “[c]learly where the matter to be judicially noticed is
essential to the case in order for the act to become criminal,
it must be reflected in the record of trial and cannot be later
assumed.” Id. (citation omitted). Rather than opting to take
judicial notice of the regulation itself, this Court found that:
Judicial notice is a procedure for the adjudication of
certain facts or matters without the requirement of formal
proof. It cannot, however, be utilized as a procedure to
dispense with establishing the government’s case. Absent
clear indication on the record that the trial judge
properly judicially noticed a regulation in a prosecution
for a violation of Article 92(1), we must hold that the
judge did not have before him any evidence that what the
accused did was a crime. . . .
. . . .
As the evidence of record is legally insufficient to
sustain a finding of guilty of failure to obey a lawful
general regulation, we are required to dismiss that charge.
Id. at 157 (citations omitted). Like the regulation at issue in
Williams, the fact that ecstasy is a Schedule I controlled
substance is an essential element that was not established in
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the Government’s case, let alone proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.10
As a result, we hold that while a CCA might generally take
judicial notice of an undisputed fact or question of domestic
law that is important to the resolution of an appellate issue,
it cannot take judicial notice of facts necessary to establish
an element of the offense.
DECISION
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is reversed as to Specification 1 of Charge II
and the sentence. The finding of guilty to Specification 1 of
10
We note as well that the position is consistent with the Army
Court’s handling of a similar issue. In United States v.
Bradley, the Army CCA faced a set of facts almost identical to
those set forth in this case and reached a conclusion identical
to that in Williams. 68 M.J. 556, 557, 560 (A. Ct. Crim. App.
2009). Among other charges, the appellant was convicted,
contrary to his pleas, of wrongfully distributing ecstasy on
divers occasions in violation of Article 112a, UCMJ. Id.However, during the merits part of the court-martial, the
government offered no evidence that ecstasy was a Schedule I
controlled substance, nor did it request that the military judge
take judicial notice of this fact. Citing Williams, the Army
CCA found that:
As a statutory element of the offense, there is no
predicate for our court to presume that ecstasy is a
Schedule I controlled substance. The government must
otherwise prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of
an offense. They failed to do so in this case.
Evidentiary gaps may not be filled in post-trial by
appellate courts when the government fails to make a proper
offer of proof at trial.
Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
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Charge II is set aside and the specification is dismissed. The
decision as to the remaining findings of guilty is affirmed.
The record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of
the Air Force for remand to the Court of Criminal Appeals for
reassessment of the sentence.
16