United States v. Jones

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Steven L. JONES, Airman
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 09-0271
Crim. App. No. 36965
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued November 9, 2009
Decided April 19, 2010
RYAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and ERDMANN and STUCKY, JJ., joined. BAKER, J., filed a
separate dissenting opinion.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Reggie D. Yager (argued); Major Michael
A. Burnat (on brief); Major Lance J. Wood and Major Shannon A.
Bennett.
For Appellee: Captain Michael T. Rakowsi (argued); Colonel
Douglas P. Cordova, Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy S. Weber, and
Gerald R. Bruce, Esq. (on brief).
Military Judge: Gordon R. Hammock
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
Judge RYAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, Appellant was charged with rape in violation
of Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10
U.S.C. § 920 (2006). The military judge sua sponte instructed
on, and the members convicted Appellant of, an uncharged
violation of Article 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2006) --
indecent acts with another (indecent acts), presented as a
lesser included offense (LIO). No one disagrees that the
elements of indecent acts and rape are not the same,1 and the MCM
does not list indecent acts as an LIO of rape. However,
indecent acts is listed in the MCM as an LIO of indecent
assault, MCM, Punitive Articles Applicable to Sexual Assault
Offenses Committed Prior to 1 October 2007 app. 27 at A27-2
(2008 ed.); MCM pt. IV, para. 63.d(2) (2005 ed.), which in turn
is listed as an LIO of rape, MCM, Punitive Articles Applicable
to Sexual Assault Offenses Committed Prior to 1 October 2007
app. 27 at A27-2 (2008 ed.); MCM pt. IV, para. 45.d(1)(c) (2005
ed.). Further, indecent acts was held to itself be an LIO of
1
Compare Manual for Courts-Martial, United States pt. IV, para.
90(b) (2005 ed.) (MCM) (listing the elements of indecent acts
as: “(1) That the accused committed a certain wrongful act with
a certain person; (2) That the act was indecent; and (3) That,
under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or
was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces”), with
MCM pt. IV, para. 45.b(1) (2005 ed.) (listing the elements of
rape as: “(1) That the accused committed an act of sexual
intercourse; and (2) That the act of sexual intercourse was done
by force and without consent”).
2
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
rape in United States v. Schoolfield, 40 M.J. 132 (C.M.A. 1994),
on the grounds that the elements of the two offenses -- while
different -- were related, and that “although indecent acts
requires a service disorder or discrediting circumstances, such
an element is included by implication in Article 120.” Id. at
137 (citing United States v. Foster, 40 M.J. 140, 143 (C.M.A.
1994), overruled in part by United States v. Miller, 67 M.J.
385, 388-89 (C.A.A.F. 2009)).
This case, then, presents the question, not expressly
answered in our recent cases, whether an offense is “necessarily
included” in, a subset of, or an LIO of a charged “greater”
offense when it has no elements in common with the elements of
the charged offense but is nonetheless either listed as an LIO
in the MCM or has been held by this Court to be an LIO on some
other ground. See United States v. McCracken, 67 M.J. 467, 468
n.2 (C.A.A.F. 2009). We answer this question in the negative
and reverse that portion of the decision of the United States
Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA).2
2
We granted the following issue:
WHETHER APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR INDECENT ACTS WITH
ANOTHER MUST BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE THE MILITARY JUDGE ISSUED
ERRONEOUS AND MISLEADING INSTRUCTIONS SUPPORTING INDECENT
ACTS AS AN AVAILABLE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE TO THE
ORIGINAL RAPE CHARGE AND THE RESULTING CONVICTION UNDER
CHARGE I AND ITS SPECIFICATION AMOUNTED TO A FATAL
VARIANCE.
3
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
I. Facts
While stationed at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, Appellant
engaged in various activities that resulted in him being charged
with failure to go to his place of duty, rape, forcible sodomy,
purchasing alcohol for minors, and dishonorably failing to
maintain sufficient funds in his checking account, in violation
of Articles 86, 120, 125, and 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 886, 920,
925, 934 (2006). When instructing on the rape charge (Charge
I), the military judge also instructed the members on the
offense of indecent acts: “When you vote, if you find the
accused not guilty of the offense charged, that is, rape, then
you should next consider the lesser included offense of indecent
acts with another in violation of Article 134.” After listing
the elements of indecent acts, the military judge defined the
term “indecent act” and explained the circumstances under which
an accused could be convicted of the offense. Before reading
the instructions to the members, the military judge gave the
defense the opportunity to object to this instruction. The
defense did so, but its objection focused only on whether the
facts of the case were “r[aised] to that level”; defense counsel
explicitly agreed that indecent acts “[a]s a general concept”
could be an LIO of rape. The military judge never formally
ruled on the objection, but he did ultimately give the indecent
acts instruction. After the military judge read the
4
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
instructions to the members, he asked both parties whether they
objected to the instructions given or requested any additional
instructions. Both parties responded in the negative.
The members convicted Appellant of all the charges and
specifications under consideration but one:3 Instead of rape,
Appellant was convicted of indecent acts, as instructed upon by
the military judge as an LIO. Appellant was sentenced to a
reduction to the grade of E-1, forfeiture of all pay and
allowances for eighteen months, confinement for eighteen months,
and a bad-conduct discharge. The convening authority reduced
the forfeitures and confinement to fifteen months but otherwise
approved the adjudged sentence. The CCA affirmed the findings
and sentence. United States v. Jones, No. ACM 36965, 2008 CCA
LEXIS 484, at *25, 2008 WL 4898569, at *8 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
Oct. 22, 2008).
II. Discussion
The question presented in this case implicates
constitutional due process imperatives of notice, see United
States v. Medina, 66 M.J. 21, 26-27 (C.A.A.F. 2008), the text of
Article 79, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 879 (2006), and the legislative
prerogative to delineate the parameters of federal criminal
offenses, see Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424
3
One specification of dishonorably failing to maintain
sufficient funds in his checking account was thrown out post-
arraignment pursuant to Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 917.
5
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
(1985).
The due process principle of fair notice mandates that “an
accused has a right to know what offense and under what legal
theory” he will be convicted; an LIO meets this notice
requirement if “it is a subset of the greater offense alleged.”
Medina, 66 M.J. at 26-27. If indeed an LIO is a subset of the
greater charged offense, the constituent parts of the greater
and lesser offenses should be transparent, discernible ex ante,
and extant in every instance. While people are presumed to know
the law, e.g., Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985), they
can hardly be presumed to know that which is a moving target and
dependent on the facts of a particular case.
And it is for Congress to define criminal offenses and
their constituent parts. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424. One
offense either is or is not an LIO, necessarily included in
another offense.
While it has been said that “[t]he question of what
constitutes a lesser-included offense [in the military justice
system] . . . is a Hydra,” United States v. Weymouth, 43 M.J.
329, 342 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (Crawford, J., concurring in the
result), rather than embracing a “Hydra” we return to the
elements test, which is eminently straightforward and has the
added appeal of being fully consonant with the Constitution,
precedent of the Supreme Court, and another line of our own
6
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
cases. See infra Part II.A.
A.
“The Constitution requires that an accused be on notice as
to the offense that must be defended against, and that only
lesser included offenses that meet these notice requirements may
be affirmed by an appellate court.” Miller, 67 M.J. at 388
(citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314 (1979); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S.
196, 201 (1948)). The importance of defining LIOs in this
context cannot be understated, as an accused may be convicted of
uncharged LIOs precisely because they are deemed to have notice,
Medina, 66 M.J. at 27, and military judges must instruct the
members on LIOs reasonably raised by the evidence, United States
v. Miergrimado, 66 M.J. 34, 36 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
The statutory authority for affirming an LIO rather than
the facially charged offense derives from Article 79, UCMJ: “An
accused may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included
in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the
offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein.”
Earlier in this Court’s history, this Court -- relying on its
own precedent and the commentary to Article 79, UCMJ4 --
4
See MCM ch. XXVIII, para. 158 (1968 ed.) (Discussion to Article
79, UCMJ) (“An included offense exists when a specification
contains allegations, which are sufficient, either expressly or
by fair implication, to put the accused on notice that he must
7
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
interpreted the “necessarily included” language in Article 79,
UCMJ, out of the statute. Thus, while Article 79, UCMJ,
unquestionably contains the words “necessarily included,” this
Court in United States v. Virgilito, 22 C.M.A. 394, 47 C.M.R.
331 (1973), stated:
This Court has applied a liberal standard in
determining whether an offense is lesser included in one
that is charged. It has rejected the notion that the
lesser offense must necessarily be included in the greater.
The basic test to determine whether the court-martial may
properly find the accused guilty of an offense other than
that charged is whether the specification of the offense on
which the accused was arraigned alleges fairly, and the
proof raises reasonably, all elements of both crimes so
that they stand in the relationship of greater and lesser
offenses.
. . . .
The question respecting the allegations is whether they
fairly embrace the elements of the lesser offense and thus
give adequate notice to the accused of the
offenses against which he must defend.
Id. at 395-96, 47 C.M.R. at 332-33 (emphasis added) (quotation
marks and citation omitted) (citing and quoting United States v.
Thacker, 16 C.M.A. 408, 410, 37 C.M.R. 28, 30 (1966); citing
be prepared to defend against it in addition to the offense
specifically charged. This requirement of notice is met when
the elements of the included offense are necessary elements of
the offenses charged . . . . Also, this requirement of notice,
depending on the allegations in the specification of the offense
charged, may be met although an included offense requires proof
of an element not required in the offense specifically charged,
for example, assault in which grievous bodily harm is
intentionally inflicted may be included in assault with intent
to murder, although the actual intentional infliction of bodily
harm required in the former is not an element of the latter.”).
8
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
United States v. McVey, 4 C.M.A. 167, 15 C.M.R. 167 (1954));
accord McVey, 4 C.M.A. at 175, 15 C.M.R. at 175 (Brosman, J.,
concurring in the result) (“Traditionally this Court has worn an
outsize pair of spectacles in viewing the problem of lesser
included offenses, and has applied an extremely generous
standard in determining whether a related offense is included
within the principal one. I am sure of the overall soundness of
this policy.”). Under these loose theories -- whose
difficulties of application did not escape criticism5 -- whether
and when offense X was an LIO of offense Y depended on
subjective judgments as to whether the elements of one offense
were “close enough” to altogether different elements of another
offense.
Later, in Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989),
the Supreme Court analyzed Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c)6 -- whose
5
See, e.g., United States v. Zupancic, 18 M.J. 387, 391-93
(C.M.A. 1984) (Cook, S.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (criticizing the majority’s expansion of the “traditional
notion” of LIOs -- where “each element of one offense fits
either directly or by reasonable implication into some element
of another offense” -- to include offenses “which, in their
estimation, are ‘fairly embraced’ by the allegations relating to
another charge”; cataloging inconsistencies found in the Court’s
caselaw resulting from “the myriad, fickle rules propounded by
this Court, in light of my Brothers’ failure to follow even
their own dictates”) (footnotes omitted).
6
“The defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily
included in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit
either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included
therein if the attempt is an offense.” The current version --
9
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
language at that time was almost identical to Article 79, UCMJ
-- and adopted the “elements” test, holding that “one offense is
not ‘necessarily included’ in another unless the elements of the
lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged
offense. Where the lesser offense requires an element not
required for the greater offense, no instruction is to be given
under Rule 31(c).” Id. at 716. Analyzing the requirement of
“necessary inclusion of lesser offense in the greater,” the
Supreme Court noted:
While the elements test is true to this requirement, the
inherent relationship approach[7] dispenses with the
required relationship of necessary inclusion: the inherent
relationship approach permits a lesser included offense
instruction even if the proof of one offense does not
invariably require proof of the other as long as the two
which in 2002 was reworded in a stylistic, non-substantive way,
see Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c) advisory committee’s note -- reads:
A defendant may be found guilty of any of the following:
(1) an offense necessarily included in the offense charged;
(2) an attempt to commit the offense charged; or
(3) an attempt to commit an offense necessarily included in
the offense charged, if the attempt is an offense in its
own right.
7
This approach was formulated in United States v. Whitaker, 447
F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1971):
There must also be an “inherent” relationship between the
greater and lesser offenses, i.e., they must relate to the
protection of the same interests, and must be so related
that in the general nature of these crimes, though not
necessarily invariably, proof of the lesser offense is
necessarily presented as part of the showing of the
commission of the greater offense.
Id. at 319.
10
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
offenses serve the same legislative goals.
Id. at 717. With the elements test adopted in Schmuck, however,
the lesser offense is literally, and hence “necessarily,”
included in the greater.
After Schmuck, this Court in United States v. Teters, 37
M.J. 370, 375-76 (C.A.A.F. 1993), changed course by expressly
abandoning the “inherent relationship” and “fairly embraced”
tests for LIOs. Noting that the language of Article 79, UCMJ,
is virtually identical to Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c) and that the
former was patterned on the latter, this Court embraced the
elements test for identifying LIOs within the military justice
system. See Teters, 37 M.J. at 376.8 Under the elements test,
one compares the elements of each offense. If all of the
elements of offense X are also elements of offense Y, then X is
an LIO of Y. Offense Y is called the greater offense because it
contains all of the elements of offense X along with one or more
additional elements.
Although this Court drifted significantly from the Teters
application of Schmuck with respect to LIOs, see, e.g., United
States v. Hudson, 59 M.J. 357, 359 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (“Rather than
adopting a literal application of the elements test,” resolving
8
Although the commentary of the 1968 MCM and each one thereafter
has included the vague “or by fair implication” language, that
language predates and was effectively if not formally superseded
by Schmuck and Teters.
11
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
LIO issues “‘by lining up elements realistically and determining
whether each element of the supposed “lesser” offense is
rationally derivative of one or more elements of the other
offense -- and vice versa.’” (quoting Foster, 40 M.J. at 146)),
that modified position is no longer seriously supportable in
light of our more recent focus -- consonant with the
Constitution, precedent of the Supreme Court, and the Teters
line of cases9 -- on the significance of notice and elements in
determining whether an offense is a subset (and thus an LIO) of
the greater offense. See Miller, 67 M.J. at 388-89 (overruling
language from Foster suggesting that an accused is on notice of
an Article 134, UCMJ, LIO because every enumerated offense under
the UCMJ is per se prejudicial to good order and discipline or
service discrediting, and rejecting the notion of implied
elements); Medina, 66 M.J. at 26-27 (recognizing that the due
process principle of fair notice is met by an LIO if “it is a
subset of the greater offense alleged”).
B.
The Government suggests that none of the above matters,
because the elements test is merely a means to the end of
fulfilling the notice requirement of the Due Process Clause, and
9
For cases reiterating the Teters adoption of the elements test
and applying it in the context of multiplicity, see, for
example, United States v. Wheeler, 40 M.J. 242 (C.M.A. 1994);
United States v. Ramsey, 52 M.J. 322 (C.A.A.F. 2000); and United
States v. Dillon, 61 M.J. 221 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
12
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
the notice function of the elements test can be accommodated in
this case by either case law or LIOs listed within the
explanation sections of MCM pt. IV.
It is true that this Court in Schoolfield expressly held
that indecent acts was an LIO of rape. 40 M.J. at 137. But in
so holding, the Court reasoned that the service discrediting or
prejudicial to good order and discipline element of indecent
acts was implied in the offense of rape. Id. That reasoning
was based on the logic of Foster and was expressly overruled in
Miller. See Miller, 67 M.J. at 388-89. Therefore, to the
extent that Schoolfield holds that indecent acts is an LIO of
rape, it is no longer good law.
But, more directly, the Government’s suggestion that this
is merely a matter of due process fails in the face of Article
79, UCMJ. This case implicates not only the question whether
this Appellant was on notice that he would need to defend
against indecent acts, but also the interpretation and
application of Article 79, UCMJ, a provision enacted under the
constitutional authority of Congress to provide rules for the
government and regulation of the armed forces, U.S. Const. art.
I, § 8, cl. 14. As we noted in Teters, the language of this
article is substantially identical to language the Supreme Court
has interpreted to require the elements test in the civilian
13
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
context, 37 M.J. at 375-76, and the same interpretation was
applied in the military justice context, id. at 376.
Moreover, suggesting that listing a criminal offense as an
LIO within the MCM automatically makes it one, irrespective of
its elements, ignores the very definition of a crime. Crimes
are composed of elements, and they include both a required act
(actus reus) and a mental state (mens rea). See United States
v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980); 1 Wayne R. LaFave,
Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2, at 11 (2d ed. 2003). Save a few
minor exceptions, federal crimes are solely creatures of
statute. See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424; LaFave, § 2.1(c), at
107. Determinations as to what constitutes a federal crime, and
the delineation of the elements of such criminal offenses --
including those found in the UCMJ -- are entrusted to Congress.
See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424; 1 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s
Criminal Law § 10, at 37-38 (15th ed. 1993).
[There is no] basis for the proposition that the
President may create an offense under the Code. To
the contrary, our fore-fathers reposed in the Congress
alone the power “To make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” [U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8.] The President’s power as
Commander-in-Chief does not embody legislative
authority to provide crimes and offenses.
United States v. McCormick, 12 C.M.A. 26, 28, 30 C.M.R. 26, 28
(1960) (citations omitted).
It stands to reason, then, that an LIO -- the “subset”
14
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
“necessarily included” in the greater offense -- must be
determined with reference to the elements defined by Congress
for the greater offense. And that is indeed how courts have
proceeded. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255,
259 (2000) (“[Section] 2113(b) requires an element not required
by § 2113(a) -- three in fact -- and therefore is not a lesser
included offense of § 2113(a).”); United States v. Browner, 937
F.2d 165, 168 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying elements test to find
“assault with a dangerous weapon” under 18 U.S.C. § 113(c) not
an LIO of “voluntary manslaughter”).
In short, the case before us involves an analysis of the
substantive law promulgated by Congress with respect to lesser
included offenses and does not call on us to address the full
contours of presidential power, including the power of the
President as commander in chief. But see United States v.
Jones, __ M.J. __ (4, 7-18) (C.A.A.F. 2010) (Baker, J.,
dissenting). In particular, this opinion does not -- and should
not be read to -- question the President’s ability to list
examples of offenses with which one could be charged under
Article 134, UCMJ. See generally MCM pt. IV, paras. 61-113
(2008 ed.). The President in those instances is not defining
offenses but merely indicating various circumstances in which
the elements of Article 134, UCMJ, could be met. The
President’s listing of offenses under Article 134, UCMJ, is
15
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persuasive authority to the courts, see Miller, 67 M.J. at 388
n.5 (citation omitted) (noting that “MCM explanations of
offenses are not binding on this Court” and are instead
“generally treated as persuasive authority, to be evaluated in
light of this Court’s precedent”); United States v. Gonzalez, 42
M.J. 469, 474 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (citing United States v.
Hemingway, 36 M.J. 349, 351 (C.M.A. 1993)), and offers guidance
to judge advocates under his command regarding potential
violations of the article.
To be perfectly clear, this case concerns lesser included
offenses, not the constitutionality of Article 134, UCMJ. For
although the terms Congress chose for the article are broad, see
generally Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) (“For the
reasons which differentiate military society from civilian
society, we think Congress is permitted to legislate both with
greater breadth and with greater flexibility when prescribing
the rules by which the former shall be governed than it is when
prescribing rules for the latter.”), what is general is made
specific through the language of a given specification. The
charge sheet itself gives content to that general language, thus
providing the required notice of what an accused must defend
against. Presidential narrowing of the “general” article
through examples of how it may be violated is part of why
16
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Article 134, UCMJ, is not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 753-
56.
Moreover, we must take care to avoid the conflation of two
unrelated propositions: the President’s ability to suggest ways
in which Article 134, UCMJ, might be charged, which we do not
take issue with, and the ability of the President to declare
that a particular example of an Article 134, UCMJ, offense is a
lesser included offense of something Congress defined as a
criminal offense in a separate section of the UCMJ, and which is
defined by elements that have no common ground with Article 134,
UCMJ. This case addresses only the latter proposition.
Nor does this case either decide or foreclose the ability
of Congress to consider whether authority to define LIOs should
or could be delegated to the executive, and, if so, what
standards and limitations should apply to any such delegation.
Cf. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 446 (1987) (noting
that “Congress, and not the Executive, was given the authority
to make rules for the regulation of the Armed Forces”).
Congress has delegated specific authority to the President with
respect to designated areas of court-martial practice. See,
e.g., Article 36, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006) (authorizing the
President to prescribe rules of pretrial, trial, and post-trial
procedure and evidence); Article 56, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 856(2006) (authorizing the President to prescribe maximum limits of
17
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
punishment). But Congress has not delegated to the President a
general authority to determine whether an offense is
“necessarily included” in the charged offense under Article 79,
UCMJ.10 Cf. Ellis v. Jacob, 26 M.J. 90, 92 (C.M.A. 1988) (“[T]he
President’s rule-making authority does not extend to matters of
substantive military criminal law.”).
C.
Interpreting Article 79, UCMJ, to require the elements test
for LIOs has the constitutionally sound consequence of ensuring
that one can determine ex ante -- solely from what one is
charged with -- all that one may need to defend against. This
practice is surely preferable and more sound than judges at the
trial and appellate levels making subjective judgments as to
whether elements line up “‘realistically.’” Hudson, 59 M.J. at
359 (quoting Foster, 40 M.J. at 146). To the extent any of our
post-Teters cases have deviated from the elements test, they are
overruled.
Requiring this notice places no constraints on the
viability of Article 134, UCMJ, offenses, or the flexibility of
Article 134, UCMJ, for commanders. Nothing here prevented the
10
The absence of reference to either the President or
presidential authority within the text of Articles 79 or 134,
UCMJ, stands in stark contrast to the specific and reticulated
grant of authority to the President, 50 U.S.C. § 1702, within
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2006).
18
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
Government from charging indecent acts in addition to rape --
the government is always free to plead in the alternative. See
United States v. Medley, 33 M.J. 75, 76 (C.M.A. 1991) (quoting
United States v. Heyward, 22 M.J. 35, 37 (C.M.A. 1986)). Nor is
there anything to prevent the government, with the accused’s
consent, from amending the charge sheet in the course of trial
to allege a less serious or different offense than the one
originally charged. See R.C.M. 603(d). Finally, the accused is
always free to plead “not guilty to an offense as charged, but
guilty of a named lesser included offense; [or] guilty with
exceptions, with or without substitutions, not guilty of the
exceptions, but guilty of the substitutions, if any.” R.C.M.
910(a).
Regardless of what could have been done here, applying the
elements test to the case as it is before us, the elements of
rape do not include all (or indeed any) of the elements of
indecent acts, and the instruction on the latter in this case --
which included the element that “under the circumstances, the
conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces” -- was in error.11 And the
11
In the context of a plain error analysis, Appellant has the
burden of demonstrating that: (1) there was error; (2) the
error was plain or obvious; and (3) the error materially
prejudiced a substantial right. See United States v. Powell, 49
19
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
variance between what Appellant was charged with and what he was
convicted of was fatal: Appellant was charged with rape, and
nothing in that charge put Appellant on notice that he also
needed to defend against indecent acts. The Specification of
Charge I must therefore be set aside.
III. Decision
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is reversed as to the finding of indecent acts
under Charge I and the sentence. The findings of guilty to
Charge I and its Specification are set aside, and that Charge
and Specification are dismissed. The remaining findings of
guilty are affirmed. The record is returned to the Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force for remand to the Court of
Criminal Appeals for reassessment of the sentence or, if it
determines appropriate, for the ordering of a rehearing on
sentence.
M.J. 460, 463-65 (C.A.A.F. 1998). Under the first prong, the
military judge erred in giving the instruction for the reasons
set forth above. With respect to the second prong, the error
was “plain and obvious,” at least in the sense that those words
are legal terms of art, because Schoolfield was no longer good
law after Miller and McCracken. Cf. United States v. Harcrow,
66 M.J. 154, 159 (C.A.A.F. 2008). Regarding the third prong,
conviction of an offense not charged was clearly prejudicial in
the context of plain error analysis where, as here, the case was
not tried on a theory of indecent acts and the military judge
did not introduce the subject of indecent acts into the case
until after the parties had completed their presentation of the
evidence.
20
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BAKER, Judge (dissenting):
I agree with the majority opinion that “[t]he due process
principle of fair notice mandates that ‘an accused has a right
to know what offense and under what legal theory’ he will be
convicted; an LIO [lesser included offense] meets this notice
requirement if ‘it is a subset of the greater offense alleged.’”
United States v. Jones, __ M.J. __ (6) (C.A.A.F. 2010) (quoting
United States v. Medina, 66 M.J. 21, 26-27 (C.A.A.F. 2008)). I
also agree that “‘[t]he Constitution requires that an accused be
on notice as to the offense that must be defended against, and
that only lesser included offenses that meet these notice
requirements may be affirmed by an appellate court.’” Id. at __
(7) (quoting United States v. Miller, 67 M.J. 385, 388 (C.A.A.F.
2009)).
The dispute in this case is threefold. First, is whether
the elements test from Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705,
716-18 (1989), is the exclusive means by which fair notice may
be provided in the military context where offenses charged under
clauses 1 or 2 of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2006), serve as lesser included
offenses. Heretofore, notice has been provided by reference to
elements promulgated in the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) by
the President and through case law. See e.g., United States v.
Carr, 65 M.J. 39, 40 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (concluding that assault
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
consummated by a battery is a lesser included offense to
indecent assault under the MCM); United States v. McKeel, 63
M.J. 81, 82 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (upholding conviction for indecent
assault as a lesser included offense for rape under the MCM).
Going forward, however, the majority has concluded that in
the military “an LIO . . . must be determined with reference to
the elements defined by Congress for the greater offense.”
__ M.J. at __ (14-15). Specifically, the exclusive means of
notice regarding lesser included offenses is pursuant to the
Schmuck elements test in which: “one offense is not
‘necessarily included’ in another unless the elements of the
lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged
offense.” Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 716. As a result, because the
statutory elements of clauses 1 and 2 of Article 134, UCMJ, of
course, do not and cannot line up with any of the enumerated
offenses, the majority’s decision means that offenses charged
under clauses 1 and 2 of Article 134, UCMJ, can never be lesser
included offenses to any other punitive article in the UCMJ, or
with respect to clause 3 of Article 134, UCMJ. Additionally,
the eighteen enumerated offenses for which the President in the
MCM has expressly promulgated lesser included offenses under
Article 134, UCMJ,1 are invalid.2
1
MCM pt. IV, paras. 18.d(1)(f), 18.d(2)(d), 18.d(3)(c)
19.d(2)(a), 30a.d, 32.d(1)(b), 35.d(2)(c), 36.d, 38.d(1)(d),
2
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
Second, if the statutory elements are the only basis by
which an accused may receive fair notice of any lesser included
offense, and the statutory elements of Article 134, UCMJ, do not
adequately describe any lesser offense within the UCMJ, the
majority does not explain how those same elements can provide
fair notice of a charged offense under clauses 1 and 2 of
Article 134, UCMJ, without resorting to information derived from
outside the statutory elements. In other words, by implication
the majority’s analysis also challenges clauses 1 and 2 of
Article 134, UCMJ, themselves. Nonetheless, the majority does
not address this issue, nor does it follow the implications of
its analysis to their logical conclusion. However, given the
role Article 134, UCMJ, has heretofore played in the structure
of military justice and in providing commanders a flexible tool
to uphold good order and discipline, this issue should not be
left unresolved.
38.d(2)(b), 40.d(1), 41.d(1)(b), 41.d(2)(a), 43.d(2)(c),
43.d(3)(c)-(d), 44.d(1)(c)-(d), 44.d(2)(b), 45(d)(1)(b),
47.d(6), 49.d(1), 51.d(2)(b), 53.d(1), 55.d(2), 56.d(1) (2008
ed.).
2
By the same reasoning, the majority has also eliminated the
issue of multiplicity and claims of preemption for clauses 1 and
2 of Article 134, UCMJ, without comment. Further, if clauses 1
and 2 of Article 134, UCMJ, are no longer lesser included
offenses for any enumerated offense, the government may well
address evidentiary contingencies by charging a violation of
clauses 1 and 2 of Article 134, UCMJ, in every case in which it
charges a violation of an enumerated offense.
3
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
Finally, the majority’s analysis fails to account for the
constitutional distinctions between civilian law and practice
and military law and practice. In particular, the majority does
not address the unique role and place of Article 134, UCMJ, in
military discipline, command, and justice and in the context of
the President’s independent authority as commander in chief.
Whatever one might think of Article 134, UCMJ, the Supreme Court
has upheld its use, but only because fair notice of what is
criminal is derived from custom, practice, and presidential
directive, and not with reference to the legislatively defined
elements of the article. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751-
53 (1974). It might be better legal policy were the Congress to
use its Article I authority to define the elements to each
Article 134, UCMJ, offense and each Article 134, UCMJ, lesser
included offense, but that is not the same as saying the
President does not have the authority to do so as commander in
chief. In fact, he has exercised this authority for sixty years
under the UCMJ and before that under the Articles of War.
Congress has remained silent in the face of such historic
practice.
4
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
Discussion
The majority concludes that because “[d]eterminations as to
what constitutes a federal crime, and the delineation of the
elements of such criminal offenses -- including those found in
the UCMJ -- are entrusted to Congress,” the only means by which
an accused may be placed on fair notice of a lesser included
offense (and presumably the greater offense) is through
reference to statutorily defined elements. __ M.J. at __ (14)
(C.A.A.F. 2010). I am skeptical this is a required legal result
in the military constitutional context, rather than a legal
policy preference for a formulaic test, such as the test set out
in Schmuck, over the less certain standard of “fair notice”.
Article 134, UCMJ, does not fit neatly, if at all, into the
ordinary framework for construing criminal statutes. First,
Article 134, UCMJ, is unique to the military justice system.
This is evident with reference to the statutory elements, which
address service discrediting conduct and prejudice to good order
and discipline. The point is driven home in case law. Parker,
417 U.S. at 748-49 (recognizing that Article 134, UCMJ, must be
gauged by “an actual knowledge and experience of military life,
its usages and duties”); United States v. Mason, 60 M.J. 15, 20
(C.A.A.F. 2004) (“[The appellant’s] conduct in receiving those
images [of child pornography] on his government computer can
constitutionally be subjected to criminal sanction under the
5
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
uniquely military offenses embodied in clauses 1 and 2 of
Article 134.”).
Second, Article 134, UCMJ, is intended to provide the
commander with the flexibility to provide for the good order and
discipline of the armed forces and thus is not just directed
toward the punishment of traditional criminal offenses defined
by traditional statutory elements. See Parker, 417 U.S. at 745(“And to maintain the discipline essential to perform its
mission effectively, the military has developed what ‘may not
unfitly be called the customary military law’ or ‘general usage
of the military service.’”) (quoting Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat.
19, 35 (1827)); MCM pt. IV, para. 60.c(2)(a) (2008 ed.)
(“[Clause 1] refers only to acts directly prejudicial to good
order and discipline and not to acts which are prejudicial only
in a remote or indirect sense.”). For these reasons, Article
134, UCMJ, reaches conduct that would not necessarily be
criminal if committed by a civilian. E.g., Parker, 417 U.S. at
739, 760-61 (holding that making defamatory and provoking
statements to enlisted personnel in the hope of convincing them
to disobey orders can be criminalized under Article 134, UCMJ);
United States v. Rogers, 54 M.J. 244, 256-57 (C.A.A.F. 2000)
(holding that the prohibition on fraternization with
subordinates within appellant’s command was not vague under
Articles 133 and 134, UCMJ). It is also intentionally broad so
6
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
as to address the myriad of actions in the military context that
cannot be foreseen, but would nonetheless undermine good order
and discipline or bring discredit to the armed forces, like
jumping from a vessel or impersonating an officer. This is a
critical point.
Congress intended clauses 1 and 2 to be read broadly.
Indeed, the two clauses, and their antecedent clauses in the
Articles of War, have been read that way throughout more than
two hundred years of U.S. military practice. See William
Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 720 (2d ed. Government
Printing Office 1920) (1886); Parker, 417 U.S. at 745-56. In
light of the broad language of Article 134, UCMJ, this Court and
ultimately the Supreme Court have long held that custom and
constructions by military authorities must narrow, and have
narrowed, the reach of that language. Parker, 417 U.S. 753; see
also United States v. Ashby, 68 M.J. 108, 118 (C.A.A.F. 2009).
Heretofore, the narrowing of the language was usually provided
by the President’s promulgation of Article 134, UCMJ, delineated
offenses and lesser included offenses. Moreover, where the
President, as commander in chief, or his subordinates have
reached too far, this Court has not hesitated to say so,
consistent with the cautionary injunction of Parker. See, e.g.,
United States v. Jordan, 57 M.J. 236, 239-40 (C.A.A.F. 2002)
7
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
(concluding that the accused could not be charged with violating
Article 134, UCMJ, for leaning on a civilian boat in a marina).
The dilemma, of course, is that because Article 134, UCMJ,
is unique to military justice and discipline and was drafted in
an intentionally broad manner to give the commander flexibility,
it uses generalized statutory elements. The Article 134, UCMJ,
elements do not and cannot line up in a literal sense with the
statutory elements of the enumerated offenses, which were
codified in specific criminal element language.3 Congress did
not intend to do the same with clauses 1 and 2 of Article 134,
UCMJ. The general nature of the article’s elements makes it
more difficult for servicemembers to ascertain what is and is
not criminal under Article 134, UCMJ. Thus, where Article 134,
UCMJ, is concerned it is the commander as convening authority,
and ultimately the President as commander in chief, who gives
meaning to these elements and essentially defines their meaning
in context. As a result, Article 79, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 879(2006), does not address the question as to how the enumerated
articles and Article 134, UCMJ, as a lesser included offense
relate.
3
“[U]nlike federal offenses, military offenses are not
exclusively the product of statutes. Countless military
offenses derive their elemental essence from regulations or
orders, from customs of service, or from traditional military
crimes that have emerged from a military common law-like
process.” United States v. Weymouth, 43 M.J. 329, 335 (C.A.A.F.
1995) (citing Article 134, UCMJ).
8
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
The Congress has left it to the President to define clauses
1 and 2 of Article 134, UCMJ, and heretofore he has done so in a
manner that necessarily includes certain conduct under Article
134, UCMJ, as lesser included offenses to enumerated offenses.
Binding or not, the commander in chief’s view as to how conduct
listed under Article 134, UCMJ, necessarily also implicates
service discredit and good order and discipline should be
persuasive. It also can provide fair notice as to how clauses 1
and 2 of Article 134 relate to the enumerated articles with
regard to lesser included offenses.
Thus, while it is a constitutional truism that only
Congress can define crimes, and the elements of crimes, it does
not necessarily follow that the President is precluded from
giving those elements meaning in the military context where the
President acts as commander in chief and Congress has not
otherwise expressly precluded such exercise of authority.4 Nor
has the Supreme Court ruled otherwise. Since the UCMJ’s
inception, the President has done just that by delineating
4
In United States v. Foster, this Court read into the enumerated
offenses legislative text that was not there, namely implied
elements for good order and discipline. 40 M.J. 140, 143
(C.M.A. 1994), overruled in part by United States v. Miller, 67
M.J. 385, 389 (C.A.A.F. 2009). An Article 134, UCMJ, lesser
included offense is different. The President as commander in
chief gives meaning to Article 134, UCMJ, as the Supreme Court
and Congress intended, and indicates where an offense under
Article 134, UCMJ, might serve as a lesser included offense to
an enumerated offense.
9
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
offenses within Article 134, UCMJ.5 In defining Article 134,
UCMJ, he has also delineated offenses as lesser included
offenses for enumerated offenses. That is what Congress
intended with respect to Article 134, UCMJ. Schmuck, a 1989
case occurring in a civilian context, did not abrogate this
authority either expressly or by implication.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized the President’s
authority to narrow the meaning of Article 134, UCMJ, and has
validated this practice. Parker, 417 U.S. at 753, 760-61(upholding a conviction for making defamatory and provoking
statements, which was a sub-offense under Article 134, UCMJ,
described in the MCM). Moreover, the Court has insisted upon
such practice as a constitutional requirement given the broad
statutory elements contained in Article 134, UCMJ. Id. at 752-
53. And, of course, the Constitution in a specified context and
the courts more generally recognize that while the Constitution
most certainly applies to members of the military it may apply
differently depending on the context. Id. at 758 (“The
fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent
necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible
within the military that which would be constitutionally
5
Arguably, the President’s duty to “take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed” is also implicated, for in the absence of
congressional enumeration, there is no other way to give meaning
to the Article 134, UCMJ, elements without executive
implementation. U.S. Const. art. II, §3.
10
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
impermissible outside it.”); U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person
shall be held to answer for a capital . . . crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces . . . .”). Is not the
application of Article 134, UCMJ, as a delineated offense or a
lesser included offense one of those circumstances?
Recognition of this distinction is particularly compelling
in an area where the President and the Congress possess specific
and additional constitutional authority over the military
instrument that extends beyond the legislative authority to
define crimes. Among other things, the Congress has the power
“[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. The President is,
of course, the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States,” granting him some measure of authority to
maintain good order and discipline within the military. U.S.
Const. art. II, § 2. The President’s authority is not limited
to Article 36, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006), granting the
President the power to prescribe “[p]retrial, trial, and post-
trial procedures.” If the President’s power were so limited,
then he could hardly promulgate the Article 134, UCMJ, offenses
listed in the MCM, and Congress would hardly have tolerated and
acquiesced to such a practice for sixty years.
11
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
To apply the paradigm from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), the
President’s authority is at its zenith when he acts pursuant to
Article 36, UCMJ, because he operates with his own authority as
well as that expressly delegated by the Congress. But Article
36, UCMJ, does not purport to extinguish authority the President
as commander in chief might otherwise assert over military
discipline through operation of Article 134, UCMJ, and the
delineation of Article 134, UCMJ, elements in the MCM. Military
discipline is an area of concurrent authority between Congress
and the President, and therefore Congress’s acquiescence has
allowed the President to take on more responsibility in
clarifying the meaning of Article 134. Id. at 637.6 Such
acquiescence may be particularly instructive and valid where the
President is exercising a parallel constitutional authority.
There is also parallel precedent for such constitutional
practice. In the area of foreign affairs, for example, Congress
has delegated to the President the authority to define and
enforce the criminal sanctions generally authorized by Congress
6
See United States v. Rorie, 58 M.J. 399, 411 (C.A.A.F. 2003)
(Effron, J., with whom Baker, J., joined, dissenting) (noting
that since Congress did not act when the Department of Defense
submitted comprehensive legislation that did not address
abatement, it “provide[d] additional grounds for concluding that
the proponents of changing our interpretation of the UCMJ have
not surmounted the hurdle imposed by the doctrine of stare
decisis”).
12
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). 50
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2006). In this foreign affairs context, it
is the President who determines to whom, to what, and to where
the criminal sanctions will apply. See Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654, 670-71 (1981). Fair notice of these criminal
sanctions comes not in the form of statutory elements, but
through the vehicles of presidential executive orders and the
actions of the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), as posted
on its website.
Of course, the predicate for Presidential action was
express in IEEPA; whereas here it is implied, derived as it is
from the President’s command authority and Congress’s
understanding of and acquiescence in the manner in which that
authority has been exercised. That is the difference between
what is generally referred to as Category I and Category II of
the Youngstown paradigm.7 But that does not place the
7
In Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown, he laid out
three categories of how presidential power may be viewed
depending on congressional action. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-
38. In Category I, “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is
at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own
right plus all that Congress can delegate.” Id. In Category
II:
[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can
only rely upon his own independent powers, but there
is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may
have concurrent authority, or in which its
13
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
President’s action into Category III of the paradigm as the
majority implies. Thus, contrary to the majority’s assertion,
while Congress alone can legislate crimes and define the
elements, it is the President in certain contexts who gives
substantive meaning to the general elements of the offense in
military practice. Given the nature and importance of the
constitutional interests at stake for all three branches, if
sixty years of law and practice are to change with regard to the
application of Article 134, UCMJ, it should be done on the basis
of an exercise of authority more contextually definitive than
Schmuck.
In the military context, it would seem that Article 134,
UCMJ, might well be fleshed out in the same manner as the crimes
under IEEPA are given specific meaning and application, which is
to say by the President. This is certainly what has happened to
date in both the promulgation of Article 134, UCMJ, delineated
offenses and Article 134, UCMJ, lesser included offenses for
enumerated offenses. However, the majority has concluded as a
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at
least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite,
measures on independent presidential responsibility.
Id. at 637. Finally, in Category III, “[w]hen the President
takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will
of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.” Id.14
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
matter of constitutional law that while the Congress could
delegate this authority to the President it has not done so and
Schmuck necessitates the conclusion that the only way to provide
fair notice of a criminal offense is through the promulgation of
legislative elements. __ M.J. at __ 11, 17. Moreover, in the
view of the majority, the President’s authority as commander in
chief is merely persuasive, or more accurately, unpersuasive,
notwithstanding the President’s exercise of this authority in
concert with Congress’s Article I authority since 1951. Nor
does the majority explain what has happened between 1989, when
Schmuck was decided, and today that would change this Court’s
approach to Article 134, UCMJ, lesser included offenses.
That is not to say that it would not be better for Congress
to define the elements of every Article 134, UCMJ, offense if it
were possible to do so. Nor does it mean that it would not be
better for Congress to expressly delegate its authority to the
President to define criminal conduct as it has done with IEEPA
(or for that matter expressly precluding the President from
doing so). Certainly, from the standpoint of authority, the
President acts with more certain strength when he acts with the
express will of the Congress and his own authority. That is the
first category of the Youngstown paradigm. Here the President
acts in the gray zone of Category II of Youngstown.
15
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
In either zone the President’s authority as commander in
chief is not unlimited and unchecked. The President cannot make
rape a lesser included offense of forgery. Clauses 1 and 2 of
Article 134, UCMJ, must be read, interpreted and applied in a
manner consistent with Congress’s exercise of its Article I
authority and this Court’s interpretation of the Constitution
and other law. But the President’s authority does factor into
the analysis. Clauses 1 and 2 of Article 134, UCMJ, are
meaningless without it.
In short then, the majority has determined, based on
Schmuck alone, that the only manner in military practice by
which constitutional notice of a lesser included offense can be
provided is through application of a literal statutory elements
test. As a result, all offenses in the military that were
heretofore predicated on Article 134, UCMJ, as lesser included
offenses to enumerated offenses are invalid and will remain so
unless Congress provides delineated Article 134, UCMJ, offenses
with statutory elements that align with the enumerated offenses.
This Congress cannot do if it intends for clauses 1 and 2 of
Article 134, UCMJ, to serve as a flexible commander’s tool
addressing good order and discipline and service discrediting
conduct as delimited by the commander in chief.
Of course, for that same reason, the majority’s decision
puts in doubt the application of Article 134, UCMJ, itself. If
16
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
statutory elements are the only means by which an accused might
receive fair notice of a lesser included offense; then why are
statutory elements not the only means by which an accused might
receive fair notice of any offense. Article 134, UCMJ, does not
provide such notice. Rather, the practice, custom, case law,
and the commander in chief’s directives provide notice of what
is criminal under Article 134, UCMJ. Parker, 417 U.S. at 751-
53. “Decisions of this Court during the last century have
recognized that the longstanding customs and usages of the
services impart accepted meaning to the seemingly imprecise
standards of [Articles] 133 and 134.” Id. at 746-47.
The effect of these constructions of Arts. 133 and 134
by the Court of Military Appeals and by other military
authorities has been twofold: It has narrowed the
very broad reach of the literal language of the
articles, and at the same time has supplied
considerable specificity by way of examples of the
conduct which they cover.
Id. at 754. However, under the Court’s reasoning today, as a
matter of logic it appears that custom, practice, and case law
cannot provide fair notice; only the elements will do. Thus,
unless one finds specific notice in the actual statutory text of
Article 134, UCMJ, that conduct is criminal it would seem to
falter for the same reason that Article 134, UCMJ, delineated
offenses cannot be lesser included offenses for enumerated
offenses.
17
United States v. Jones, No. 09-0271/AF
Conclusion
In this case, Appellant was charged with rape, but found
guilty of indecent acts with another. Given that I have
concluded the President has the authority to delineate offenses
under Article 134, UCMJ, as lesser included offenses to the
enumerated offenses, indecent assault was a lesser included
offense of rape. At the time of Appellant’s court-martial,
committing an indecent act was a possible lesser included
offense of indecent assault, both of which were delineated under
Article 134, UCMJ. In this case, the facts fit and Appellant,
by his own trial admission, was on fair notice that committing
an indecent act was a lesser included offense of rape through
operation of Article 134, UCMJ. Therefore, I would affirm the
decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals and respectfully dissent.
18