United States v. Lewis

UNITED STATES, Appellant
v.
Terrel L. LEWIS, Private First Class
U.S. Army, Appellee
No. 07-5002
Crim. App. No. 20030835
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued March 12, 2007
Decided June 13, 2007
STUCKY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and BAKER, ERDMANN, and RYAN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Adam S. Kazin (argued); Colonel John W.
Miller II, Lieutenant Colonel Michele B. Shields, and Major Tami
L. Dillahunt (on brief).
For Appellee: Captain Frank B. Ulmer (argued); Colonel John T.
Phelps II, Lieutenant Colonel Steven C. Henricks, and Major
Billy B. Ruhling II (on brief).
Amicus Curiae for Appellee: Steven H. Goldblatt, Esq.
(supervising attorney), Brendon DeMay (law student), and Martin
A. Hewett (law student) (on brief) - for the Appellate
Litigation Program, Georgetown University Law Center.
Military Judge: Robin L. Hall
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Lewis, No. 07-5002/AR
Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Judge Advocate General of the Army certified this case
to this Court to determine whether the United States Army Court
of Criminal Appeals incorrectly held that the military judge
erred in refusing to give an instruction that a mutual combatant
could regain the right to self-defense when the opposing party
escalates the level of conflict, even when the combatant does
not withdraw in good faith. We affirm the lower court and hold
that Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 916(e) is not inconsistent
with prior precedent on the right to self-defense.
A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted
members convicted Appellee, contrary to his pleas, of aggravated
assault with a dangerous weapon, a violation of Article 128,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 928 (2000).
The sentence adjudged by the court-martial, and approved by the
convening authority, included a dishonorable discharge,
confinement for eighteen months, forfeiture of all pay and
allowances, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. Citing
United States v. Dearing, 63 M.J. 478 (C.A.A.F. 2006), the
United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding
that the military judge erred when she refused to instruct the
members that a mutual combatant can regain the right to self-
defense if the other side escalates the level of conflict.
2
United States v. Lewis, No. 07-5002/AR
United States v. Lewis, No. ARMY 20030835 (A. Ct. Crim. App.
Oct. 18, 2006).
I.
Appellee’s conviction stems from a fight outside a German
club that left two people with multiple stab wounds. Private
Harvey, the alleged victim, does not remember the incident.
He recalls going to an off-post club with his friend, Mr.
Bryant. Private Harvey went into the club for a short time,
then left the club and saw Appellee leaning against a vehicle
outside the club. The next thing Private Harvey remembers is
waking up on the ground, covered in blood, and somebody telling
him not to die.
Several other people testified, including Mr. Bryant
(Private Harvey’s friend), Specialist Trexler (an acquaintance
of the Appellee, who had just approached Appellee to ask him if
he wanted to share a taxi ride back to the post), Mr. Vareen (a
sixteen-year-old acquaintance of Private Harvey and Mr. Bryant),
and Private First Class Felder.
The witnesses explained that the fight started when Mr.
Bryant and Private Harvey approached Appellee and Specialist
Trexler, who were waiting for a taxi, and asked for a cigarette.
Appellee denied having a cigarette.
Specialist Trexler testified that, when denied a cigarette,
Private Harvey started to throw a punch, but Appellee charged
3
United States v. Lewis, No. 07-5002/AR
him and both ended up on the ground. Private First Class Felder
saw Private Harvey pick Appellee up and “slam” Appellee to the
ground. Mr. Bryant, Mr. Vareen, and Private First Class Felder
all recall seeing Appellee and Private Harvey on the ground,
with Appellee on the bottom and Private Harvey on the top. Mr.
Bryant described the fracas as looking “like they were
wrestling.” Private First Class Felder recalled Private Harvey
punching Appellee in the face and torso and “beating him up.”
He testified Private Harvey was “basically just winning –-
winning the fight.”
Mr. Bryant testified he noticed Private Harvey was not
moving, so he entered the fight and kicked Appellee in the head.
Mr. Vareen recalls that Mr. Bryant, who is a powerlifter, kicked
Appellee in the face four or five times as Appellee laid on the
ground with Private Harvey on top of him. Private First Class
Felder also recalled Mr. Bryant joined the fight and kicked
Appellee in the face.
Mr. Vareen testified that Appellee had Private Harvey in a
headlock with his left arm and stabbed Private Harvey “about
sixteen or seventeen times” with a knife held in his right hand.
Private First Class Felder also recalled seeing Appellee stab
Private Harvey in the upper back area “probably eight to ten”
times after Mr. Bryant had entered the fight.
4
United States v. Lewis, No. 07-5002/AR
Specialist Trexler testified he got between Mr. Bryant and
Appellee in order to stop the fight. He said when Appellee was
able to get up from the ground, they immediately left the club’s
parking lot. Mr. Vareen also testified that Appellee stopped
stabbing Private Harvey once he was able to get up.
It is not surprising there is differing testimony from
eyewitnesses and those involved in the fight; however, there is
some evidence upon which the members could rely, if they chose,
to find that Appellee and Private Harvey were engaged in mutual
combat and that Appellee defended himself.
The military judge determined that the evidence presented
raised the special defense of self-defense, and instructed the
members on the issue. The certified question here is whether
the instruction given was correct. The military judge
instructed:
There exists evidence in this case that the
accused may have been a person who voluntarily
engaged in mutual fighting. A person who
voluntarily engaged in mutual fighting, is not
entitled to self defense unless he previously
withdrew in good faith. The burden of proof on
this issue is on the prosecution. If you are
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused voluntarily engaged in mutual fighting,
then you have found that the accused gave up the
right to self defense.
Emphasis added.
Appellee’s civilian defense counsel objected to this
language, arguing that a combatant engaged in mutual fighting is
5
United States v. Lewis, No. 07-5002/AR
not required to withdraw in good faith to assert the right to
self-defense, when the situation escalates to the point that the
combatant is in fear of death or grievous bodily harm. The
military judge disagreed, saying she did not believe the law on
self-defense changed when a mutual fight escalates. She said
“It’s mutual combat or it’s not mutual combat.” Without the
benefit of the defense-requested instruction, the members
convicted Appellee of aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon
for stabbing Private Harvey, a lesser included charge of the
attempted murder with which he was originally charged. The
members acquitted Appellee of stabbing Mr. Bryant.
The Army Court of Criminal Appeals found that the military
judge erred and set aside the findings and sentence. Lewis, No.
ARMY 20030835, slip op. at 7. The Judge Advocate General of the
Army certified the issue to this Court.
II.
A military judge is required to instruct the members on
special (affirmative) defenses “in issue.” R.C.M. 920(e)(3). A
matter is considered “in issue” when “some evidence, without
regard to its source or credibility, has been admitted upon
which members might rely if they choose.” R.C.M. 920(e)
Discussion; United States v. Gillenwater, 43 M.J. 10, 13
(C.A.A.F. 1995). Self-defense is considered a special defense,
because “although not denying that the accused committed the
6
United States v. Lewis, No. 07-5002/AR
objective acts constituting the offense charged, [self-defense]
denies, wholly or partially, criminal responsibility for those
acts.” R.C.M. 916(a).
If an instruction is mandatory, as here, this Court will
review allegations of error under a de novo standard of review.
United States v. Bean, 62 M.J. 264, 266 (C.A.A.F. 2005); United
States v. Forbes, 61 M.J. 354, 357 (C.A.A.F. 2005). When the
instructional error raises constitutional implications, the
error is tested for prejudice using a “harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard. United States v. Wolford, 62 M.J.
418, 420 (C.A.A.F. 2006). “The inquiry for determining whether
constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is
‘whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error did not
contribute to the defendant’s conviction or sentence.’” United
States v. Kreutzer, 61 M.J. 293, 298 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Kaiser, 58 M.J. 146, 149 (C.A.A.F. 2003)).
The Government challenges the Court of Criminal Appeals’
conclusion that the military judge improperly instructed the
members on the issue of self-defense. It argues that R.C.M.
916(e)(4) precludes the use of self-defense in any situation
where the accused was an aggressor or provoked the attack, and
did not first withdraw in good faith after the aggression,
fight, or provocation. It further argued that R.C.M. 916(e)(4)
directly conflicts with this Court’s precedents, United States
7
United States v. Lewis, No. 07-5002/AR
v. Cardwell, 15 M.J. 124 (C.M.A. 1983), and Dearing, 63 M.J. at
478. Appellant argues that the Rule is not substantive criminal
law and because the President has the power under Article 36,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000), to promulgate rules establishing
court-martial procedure and evidence, both Cardwell and Dearing
must be overruled. See United States v. Czeschin, 56 M.J. 346,
348 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (an unambiguous presidential rule granting
greater rights than a higher source governs, unless it
contradicts express statutory language); cf. Ellis v. Jacob, 26
M.J. 90, 92 (C.M.A. 1988) (President’s rulemaking authority does
not extend to substantive military criminal law).
In Cardwell, a case decided prior to the promulgation of
the Rules for Courts-Martial, we applied common law principles
of self-defense to an aggressor, holding that he had the right
to use self-defense when the opposing party escalated the level
of the conflict. 15 M.J. at 126. In Dearing, we held,
consistent with Cardwell, that it was error for the military
judge to refuse to instruct that if a conflict escalates, the
initial aggressor is entitled to defend himself. 63 M.J. at
482-84. The Government essentially recognizes Dearing as
controlling in the instant case, because, as noted above, it
argues that the decision is in conflict with R.C.M. 916(e)(4)
and should be overruled.
8
United States v. Lewis, No. 07-5002/AR
We need not reach the issue of the extent of the
President’s power to promulgate R.C.M. 916(e)(4), because we
find no conflict between the Rule and either Cardwell or
Dearing.
We use well-established principles of statutory
construction to construe provisions in the Manual for Courts-
Martial. United States v. McNutt, 62 M.J. 16, 20 n.27 (C.A.A.F.
2005); United States v. Lucas, 1 C.M.A. 19, 22, 1 C.M.R. 19, 22
(1951). Statutory construction begins with a look at the plain
language of a rule. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises,
Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989). The plain language will
control, unless use of the plain language would lead to an
absurd result. United States v. Martinelli, 62 M.J. 52, 81 n.24
(C.A.A.F. 2005) (Crawford, J., dissenting) (“‘When the statute’s
language is plain, the sole function of the courts -- at least
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd -- is
to enforce it according to its terms.’” (quoting Hartford
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U.S. 1,
6 (2000))); see also Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S.
526, 534 (2004) (bankruptcy statute, although grammatically
awkward, is not ambiguous and should be enforced according to
its plain meaning, as long as that result is not absurd).
9
United States v. Lewis, No. 07-5002/AR
R.C.M. 916(e)(4) provides:
The right to self-defense is lost and the
defenses described in subsections (e)(1), (2),
and (3) of this rule shall not apply if the
accused was an aggressor, engaged in mutual
combat, or provoked the attack which gave rise to
the apprehension [that the accused was about to
suffer death or grievous bodily harm], unless the
accused had withdrawn in good faith after the
aggression, combat, or provocation and before the
offense alleged occurred.
While R.C.M. 916(e)(4) sets out a duty to withdraw under
certain circumstances in order to avail oneself of the defense
of self-defense, it does not address either escalation in
general or the specific situation in which the original
aggressor or someone engaged in mutual combat is not able to
“withdraw[] in good faith.” The Rule’s silence regarding an
inability to withdraw creates an ambiguity similar to those we
resolved in Cardwell and Dearing through an application of
common law self-defense principles.
As we said in Cardwell, “The principles of law applicable
to self-defense are well settled. Even a person who starts an
affray is entitled to use self-defense when the opposing party
escalates the level of the conflict.” 15 M.J. at 126.
In this case, there was evidence that Private Harvey was on
top of Appellee, punching him to the point that it looked to a
witness that Private Harvey was “winning the fight.” Here, the
members could have found that Appellee could not withdraw, even
10
United States v. Lewis, No. 07-5002/AR
if he wanted to. When Mr. Bryant, a competitive powerlifter,
entered the fray and delivered kicks to Appellee’s head and face
the members could have found that Appellee was unable to
withdraw, even if he wanted to. He was on the ground,
underneath Private Harvey. Once Mr. Bryant escalated the fight
to the level that Appellee could reasonably apprehend he would
suffer death or grievous bodily injury from kicks to his head
and punches to his body, Appellee was entitled, under our
decision in Dearing, to defend himself even if he was the
original aggressor or was engaged in mutual combat, as long as
he responded in a manner proportionate to the threat he faced.
United States v. Acosta-Vargas, 13.C.M.A. 388, 393, 32 C.M.R.
388, 393 (1962). The fact that Appellee was placed in a
situation in which it was physically impossible for him to
withdraw, even if he had wanted to, is, as noted above, not
addressed in R.C.M. 916(e)(4). We do not believe that the
President, in promulgating this Rule, intended the absurd result
of requiring a mutual combatant or even an initial aggressor, to
withdraw when he is physically incapable of doing so. See
United States v. Leonard, 21 M.J. 67, 69 (C.M.A. 1985) (Rules
for Courts-Martial, like statutes, are to be construed
reasonably, to effectuate the purposes of the particular rule.)
The self-defense instruction given in this case was
therefore incomplete. The military judge erred in not
11
United States v. Lewis, No. 07-5002/AR
instructing the members that a mutual combatant could regain the
right to self-defense when the conflict is escalated or, as
here, when he is unable to withdraw in good faith.
Having found instructional error, we test for prejudice.
In Dearing, we concluded that the military judge’s failure to
give a complete and correct self-defense instruction created a
constitutional error, requiring us to determine whether the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 63 M.J. at 484.
In assessing prejudice under this standard, the Government must
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the instructional error
did not contribute to the members’ guilty findings. Id. (citing
United States v. McDonald, 57 M.J. 18, 20 (C.A.A.F. 2002)).
We conclude that the error was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. The incomplete instruction essentially
undercut the defense theory and could very well have contributed
to the finding of guilty. The members in this case were told
that if they found Appellee was engaged in mutual combat or
provoked the fight, he could not assert self-defense, if he did
not first withdraw from the original fight. This incomplete
instruction prevented Appellee from fully asserting that he
rightfully defended himself (1) after an escalation of violence;
and (2) when he was incapable of withdrawing in good faith.
12
United States v. Lewis, No. 07-5002/AR
III.
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed. The record of trial is returned to the
Judge Advocate General of the Army. A rehearing is authorized.
13