United States v. Zarbatany

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Daniel A. ZARBATANY Jr., Airman First Class
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 11-0165
Crim. App. No. 37448
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued April 21, 2011
Decided July 6, 2011
BAKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON, C.J.,
and ERDMANN, J., joined. STUCKY, J., filed a separate dissenting
opinion, in which RYAN, J., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Major Reggie D. Yager (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Gail E. Crawford (on brief).
For Appellee: Captain Scott C. Jansen (argued); Captain Michael
T. Rakowski and Gerald R. Bruce, Esq. (on brief); Major Charles
G. Warren.
Military Judge: Don M. Christensen
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Zarbatany, No. 11-0165/AF
Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant entered mixed pleas at a general court-martial
with members convened at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. He
was convicted pursuant to his pleas of two specifications of
unauthorized absence, two specifications of wrongful use of
cocaine, and two specifications of wrongful use of marijuana, in
violation of Articles 86 and 112a, Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 886, 912a (2006).1 The adjudged
sentence consisted of a bad-conduct discharge, six months of
confinement, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction
to E-1. The convening authority disapproved the forfeitures and
approved the remaining sentence.
On review, the United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the findings and sentence as approved. United
States v. Zarbatany, No. ACM 37448, 2010 CCA LEXIS 354, at *6,
2010 WL 3981672, at *3 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 4, 2010) (per
curiam).
We granted review of the following assigned issues:
WHETHER THE AFCCA ERRED IN FINDING THAT ILLEGAL
CONFINEMENT CREDIT, AWARDED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 13,
UCMJ, CANNOT BE APPLIED TOWARDS A PUNITIVE DISCHARGE.
WHETHER THE AFCCA ERRED BY FAILING TO GIVE MEANINGFUL
RELIEF WHERE APPELLANT HAD 445 DAYS OF ILLEGAL
PRETRIAL CONFINEMENT CREDIT IN EXCESS OF HIS APPROVED
SENTENCE TO CONFINEMENT.
1
The members returned a finding of not guilty to a distribution
offense charged under Article 112a, UCMJ.
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United States v. Zarbatany, No. 11-0165/AF
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that to the
extent its opinion is read to restrict the application of credit
for illegal pretrial confinement to the forms of punishment
listed in Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 305(k), the Court of
Criminal Appeals erred. Conversion of confinement credit to
forms of punishment other than those found in R.C.M. 305(k) is
generally inapt. This is especially true in the case of
punitive discharges, where the qualitative differences between
punitive discharges and confinement are pronounced. However,
Article 13, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 813 (2006), does not preclude
forms of relief other than confinement credit. Nor has this
Court’s case law interpreted R.C.M. 305(k) as exclusively
delimiting the form of relief lawfully available for violations
of Article 13, UCMJ.
To reiterate prior case law interpreting the Constitution,
the UCMJ, and the R.C.M.: Article 13, UCMJ, relief can range
from dismissal of the charges, to confinement credit or to the
setting aside of a punitive discharge. Where relief is
available, meaningful relief must be given for violations of
Article 13, UCMJ. However, relief is not warranted or required
where it would be disproportionate to the harm suffered or the
nature of the offense.
In this case, the Court of Criminal Appeals applied an
erroneous view of the law in concluding that the only remedy
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available to address the Article 13, UCMJ, violations in
Appellant’s case was to apply Appellant’s Article 13, UCMJ,
confinement credit against the forms of punishment listed in
R.C.M. 305(k). At the same time, the lower court used its
sentence appropriateness power to expressly determine that in
light of the record as a whole, including Appellant’s pretrial
confinement, Appellant’s sentence was not inappropriately
severe. A judgment regarding sentence appropriateness should
necessarily encompass a judgment that any additional Article 13,
UCMJ, relief would be disproportionate in the context presented.
However, because the Court of Criminal Appeals did not appear to
determine whether such relief was disproportionate, we remand
this case for a new Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c)
(2006), review.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 8, 2008, while stationed at Elmendorf, Air Force
Base (Elmendorf), Appellant was ordered into pretrial
confinement by the commander of the 3rd Civil Engineer Squadron.
Because Elmendorf does not have its own pretrial confinement
facility, the 3rd Wing, pursuant to Dep’t of the Air Force,
Instr. 31-205, The Air Force Corrections System para. 1.2.2.2.
(Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter AFI 31-205], entered into an
agreement with the Anchorage Correction Complex (ACC), a
civilian confinement facility, to house both pretrial and post-
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trial confinees from Elmendorf. The Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) between ACC and Elmendorf outlined the responsibilities of
both parties. Specifically, Elmendorf would bear the cost of
treatment at ACC, ensure monthly visits from the accused’s unit
commander or designated representative, help arrange visits from
the accused’s family, and monitor the accused’s health, morale,
and welfare through visits by a military confinement officer.
The ACC would provide the means for Air Force inmates to comply
with dress and appearance standards.
By the terms of the agreement, both parties were also
required to comply with the Department of Defense (DOD)
confinement standards set forth in AFI 31-205. See AFI 31-205,
para. 1.2.2. These standards include housing pretrial inmates
in separate cells or sleeping areas from post-trial inmates,
though they may share common areas, id. at para. 5.8.1.2;
prohibiting demeaning, degrading, or humiliating treatment, as
well as hazing and “laying hands upon inmates” except for the
minimum use of force necessary for the protection of persons or
property, id. at para. 1.3.13.4; providing physical contact
visits in the absence of substantiated risk, id. at para. 6.4.4;
providing the same medical and dental care as active duty
persons, id. at para. 6.5.2; and providing barber and beautician
services, id. at para. 6.5.7.
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The military judge found, and both parties agree, that
Appellant’s pretrial confinement conditions did not comply with
the MOA or AFI 31-205. The military judge’s undisputed findings
of fact are as follows:
• Appellant was in pretrial confinement at ACC for 119
days in “virtual lockdown status.”
• He was confined to his cell “for an average of 23 hours
a day except when he was brought on the base.”
• He was only allowed out of his cell “to take a shower, .
. . [to] visit[] with his wife by television,” or for
recreation.
• Any recreation Appellant was granted consisted of
walking around an empty outdoor courtyard “not much
bigger than [his] cell.”
• With few exceptions, he was not allowed to converse with
other inmates.
• He twice shared his cell with civilian post-trial
inmates for a total of six days, one of whom was a
convicted sex offender.
• In most instances, he was shackled or handcuffed when
taken from his cell or receiving visits from his wife,
attorney, or a member of his unit. None of the visits
with his wife were contact visits, even though other
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convicted inmates were allowed contact visits with their
families.
• For no apparent reason, he was locked in the shower
between four and eight times, each time for thirty
minutes to an hour. On one such occasion, this was
brought to the attention of Correction Officer (CO)
Zimmerman, who responded, “Airman Zarbatany can wait, or
he can piss in the shower.”
• On one occasion he was inadvertently hit with pepper
spray directed at another inmate, and he did not receive
the medical attention required within twenty-four hours
of a chemical spray.
• He was improperly grabbed by a corrections officer and
taken to be weighed after his complaints about his
conditions were shown to members of ACC.
• He was denied appropriate hygienic services, including
hair cuts and clean underwear, and required to wear an
“insufficient” shoe for two weeks.
• Neither the commander nor a designee visited Appellant
or his wife during the 119-day pretrial confinement.
When the commander was present at ACC and invited to
speak to Appellant, he declined because he “had nothing
to say to him productively.” When discussing
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Appellant’s twenty-three-hour daily confinement, the
commander responded, “It is appropriate because of what
he has done.”
• He was not given access to a common area.
• He was denied mental health counseling despite repeated
requests to his commander and officials at both
Elmendorf and ACC, notifying them not only of his
confinement conditions but also of his ongoing
relationship with a mental health care provider prior to
his confinement. The military judge found this
“particularly shocking” in light of the suicide of the
3rd Wing commander in July 2008.
• Appellant had access to other medical care, but he was
required to bear the cost.
• Appellant was a “model prisoner with no disciplinary
infractions” who presented no security risks.
Despite these deficiencies, the military judge found that
neither the commander nor confinement officials at either
Elmendorf or ACC intended to punish Appellant. However, the
military judge found that “when given specific complaints that
should have put the commander on notice that Airman Zarbatany
was being illegally punished, he didn’t care because he thought
the punishment was appropriate for the crimes he had done -–
overcoming Airman Zarbatany’s presumption of innocence.”
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The military judge concluded his findings of fact by
stating:
[T]he court is specifically ordering four-for-one
credit for the entire time [Appellant] has been in
confinement. This is due to the continuing nature of
the issues at ACC, including housing post-trial and
serious offenders of a civilian nature with the
accused and, very importantly, ignoring his claims and
his requests for mental health care.
The court specifically finds the conduct of his unit
appalling, that his commander has abdicated his role
as a commander in ensuring his troop is taken care of
and that troop’s family is taken care of.
The court is very tempted to provide ten-for-one
credit solely on the mental health issue considering
this installation’s notice of the seriousness of
mental health issues.
The military judge then clarified that the four-for-one credit
was in addition to one-for-one credit for the pretrial
confinement. Thus, the military judge awarded Appellant 119
days credit for pretrial confinement plus an additional 476 days
of credit (4 x 119) for the violation of Article 13, UCMJ,
totaling 595 days of confinement credit.
The military judge later noted two prior cases involving
illegal pretrial confinement conditions at ACC, and stated:
[T]his installation [Elmendorf] has been aware of the
deficiencies of using local confinement since at least 8
December 2005, at the time Airman Junior was court-
martialed. Three years.
So my guidance to this installation, the NAF, and MAJCOM is
that they fix this.
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At the conclusion of trial, the military judge made a
clemency recommendation to the convening authority on the record
that he disapprove the forfeitures, stating:
I’ll make a clemency [recommendation] that the
forfeitures not be adjudged in this case. That would
punish no one except Mrs. Zarbatany, who has done
nothing wrong. In fact, unlike many cases that this
court has dealt with where a spouse is sometimes
complicit or hostile to the government, . . . Mrs.
Zarbatany is the exact opposite of that and should not
suffer as a result of this.
Trial counsel concurred with the military judge’s assessment of
Mrs. Zarbatany.
The confinement credits were applied against the adjudged
confinement of six months (180 days), and Appellant was released
from confinement at the conclusion of trial with 415 days of
excess confinement credit.2
Following trial, the defense counsel requested that the
convening authority defer the forfeitures of all pay and
allowances and reduction portions of the sentence until the
2
Appellant argues that his excess confinement credits totaled
445 days based on the assumption that thirty days good conduct
time would also have applied. We decline to apply this
assumption here, as Appellant did not serve his adjudged
sentence, making good conduct time mere speculation. Nor would
the difference affect our analysis. The excess credit is
calculated as follows:
119 days credit for pretrial confinement
+ 476 days credit for violations of Article 13, UCMJ
595 days credit total
- 180 days adjudged confinement
415 days excess confinement credit
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United States v. Zarbatany, No. 11-0165/AF
convening authority’s action in order to allow Appellant to
continue to provide for his wife, who according to the written
request:
initially contacted [Appellant]’s chain of command
[sic] to notify them that her husband had a drug
problem. . . . gave AFOSI [Air Force Office of Special
Investigations] the evidence that was later used to
convict her husband at trial. . . . consented to a
search of their home in order to aid the investigation
against her husband. . . . [and] contacted AFOSI a
second time to again report that her husband was
engaged in possible drug use.
The convening authority denied the request regarding reduction
in grade, but granted the request regarding forfeitures. In his
later clemency petition, Appellant also requested disapproval of
his bad-conduct discharge in light of the actions taken by
Appellant’s wife, the “onerous” nature of his pretrial
confinement, and the military judge’s recommendation to
disapprove forfeitures. The staff judge advocate recommended
disapproval of forfeiture of all pay and allowances and approval
of the bad-conduct discharge. The convening authority approved
this recommendation in his action. Although the clemency
petition mentioned Appellant’s pretrial confinement conditions
and that the members were not made aware of such conditions in
sentencing, neither the staff judge advocate’s recommendation
nor the convening authority’s action reference them.
On appeal to the court below, Appellant “assert[ed] . . .
that his sentence [was] inappropriately severe, particularly
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United States v. Zarbatany, No. 11-0165/AF
arguing that the punitive discharge should be disapproved to
provide meaningful relief because the pretrial confinement
credit exceeded the adjudged confinement to which the credit
applied.” Zarbatany, 2010 CCA LEXIS 354, at *2, 2010 WL
3981672, at *1. In a per curiam decision, the lower court,
relying on R.C.M. 305(k), held that “the convening authority
credited the appellant with the days awarded by the military
judge and disapproved the adjudged forfeitures, leaving no other
form of punishment to which the credit could properly apply,”
and that “the military judge properly awarded additional
administrative credit for unduly harsh conditions of pretrial
confinement and the convening authority properly applied the
credit to the adjudged sentence.” Id. at *2-*4, 2010 WL
3981672, at *1-*2. “Turning to the appellant’s more general
argument concerning sentence appropriateness,” the Court of
Criminal Appeals concluded that “Having given individualized
consideration to this particular appellant, the nature of the
offenses, and all other matters in the record of trial to
include the appellant’s pretrial confinement, we hold that the
approved sentence is not inappropriately severe.” Id. at *6,
2010 WL 3981672, at *2.
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II. DISCUSSION
“The proper application[] of credit for illegal pretrial
punishment . . . [is a] question[] of law, reviewed de novo.”
United States v. Spaustat, 57 M.J. 256, 260 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
Appellant argues that the court below erred in holding that
R.C.M. 305(k) precludes the application of excess confinement
credit against a punitive discharge in the context of an Article
13, UCMJ, violation and that its holding deprived Appellant of
meaningful relief. The Government responds that the lower court
properly followed the plain language of R.C.M. 305(k), which
expressly limits the application of confinement credits to
punishments enumerated in that subsection. Thus, the parties,
like the court below, frame this case as a credit-conversion
issue under R.C.M. 305(k). However, we believe the parties and
the lower court too narrowly defined the questions presented by
Appellant’s case. There are at least two threshold questions
before one gets to the application of R.C.M. 305(k): (1) What
relief is available as a matter of law for violations of Article
13, UCMJ, as occurred here; and (2) is meaningful relief legally
required to be awarded, and if so, in what circumstances?
A. Relief Under Article 13, UCMJ
Article 13, UCMJ, provides:
No person, while being held for trial, may be subjected to
punishment or penalty other than arrest or confinement upon
the charges pending against him, nor shall the arrest or
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United States v. Zarbatany, No. 11-0165/AF
confinement imposed upon him be any more rigorous than the
circumstances required to insure his presence, but he may
be subjected to minor punishment during that period for
infractions of discipline.
In United States v. King, we addressed the contours of Article
13, UCMJ, stating:
Article 13, UCMJ, prohibits two things: (1) the
imposition of punishment prior to trial, and (2) conditions
of arrest or pretrial confinement that are more rigorous
than necessary to ensure the accused’s presence for trial.
The first prohibition of Article 13 involves a purpose or
intent to punish, determined by examining the intent of
detention officials or by examining the purposes served by
the restriction or condition, and whether such purposes are
“reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
objective.” Bell [v. Wolfish], 441 U.S. [520,] 539
[(1979)]; [United States v.] McCarthy, 47 M.J. [162,] 165,
167 [(C.A.A.F. 1997)].
The second prohibition of Article 13 prevents imposing
unduly rigorous circumstances during pretrial detention.
Conditions that are sufficiently egregious may give rise to
a permissive inference that an accused is being punished,
or the conditions may be so excessive as to constitute
punishment. McCarthy, 47 M.J. at 165; United States v.
James, 28 M.J. 214, 216 (C.M.A. 1989) (conditions that are
“arbitrary or purposeless” can be considered to raise an
inference of punishment).
61 M.J. 225, 227 (C.A.A.F. 2005); see also United States v.
Harris, 66 M.J. 166, 167-68 (C.A.A.F. 2008). In King, we held
that although merely classifying a pretrial inmate as “maximum”
custody or comingling an inmate with post-trial inmates are not
per se violations of Article 13, UCMJ, arbitrarily segregating a
pretrial inmate for two weeks in a “six-by-six, windowless cell”
did violate Article 13, UCMJ, and merited relief in the form of
confinement credit under R.C.M. 305(k). 61 M.J. at 228-29.
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As in King, the primary mechanism for addressing violations
of Article 13, UCMJ, has been confinement credit. This Court
initially awarded such credit in United States v. Larner, 1 M.J.
371 (C.M.A. 1976), and United States v. Suzuki, 14 M.J. 491, 493
(C.M.A. 1983), to provide an effective remedy for illegal
pretrial confinement. The drafters of the R.C.M. subsequently
“explicitly recognized” this practice with the adoption of
R.C.M. 305(k) in the 1984 Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States (MCM). See MCM, Analysis of the Rules for Courts-Martial
app. 21 at A21-20 (2008 ed.) [hereinafter Drafters’ Analysis];
Spaustat, 57 M.J. at 261.
R.C.M. 305(k) provides in relevant part:
The military judge may order additional credit for
each day of pretrial confinement that involves an
abuse of discretion or unusually harsh circumstances.
This credit is to be applied in addition to any other
credit the accused may be entitled as a result of
pretrial confinement served. This credit shall be
applied first against any confinement adjudged. If no
confinement is adjudged, or if the confinement
adjudged is insufficient to offset all the credit to
which the accused is entitled, the credit shall be
applied against hard labor without confinement,
restriction, fine, and forfeiture of pay, in that
order . . . . The credit shall not be applied against
any other form of punishment.
As discussed by the court below, the plain language of
R.C.M. 305(k) requires that after the convening authority has
applied confinement credit to the adjudged confinement, the
convening authority may then apply any excess confinement credit
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United States v. Zarbatany, No. 11-0165/AF
against (1) hard labor without confinement, (2) restriction, (3)
fine, and (4) forfeiture, in that order, and credit “shall not
be applied against any other form of punishment.” Therefore,
the lower court was correct in stating that R.C.M. 305(k)’s
plain language excludes a punitive discharge from permissible
applications of illegal confinement credit under the rule. See
also United States v. Josey, 58 M.J. 105, 108 (C.A.A.F. 2003);
United States v. Rosendahl, 53 M.J. 344, 347 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
As noted by the Court of Criminal Appeals, the Drafters’
Analysis, and this Court’s prior decisions, the reason for
excluding a punitive discharge from the application of
confinement credit is that a punitive discharge is “so
qualitatively different” from the other punishments to which
R.C.M. 305(k) credit can apply “that the fact that an accused
has served confinement which was technically illegal should not
automatically affect” a punitive discharge. Drafters’ Analysis
app. 21 at A21-21; Josey, 58 M.J. at 108 (“Although a punitive
separation potentially involves monetary consequences,
particularly with respect to veterans’ benefits, the primary
impact involves severance of military status”); Rosendahl, 53
M.J. at 348 (describing punitive discharges as “personnel-
related punishments”).
Our inquiry does not end there, however. As previously
noted, R.C.M. 305(k) does not limit the availability of other
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United States v. Zarbatany, No. 11-0165/AF
remedies under Article 13, UCMJ. It is axiomatic, for example,
that a court with appropriate jurisdiction may remedy an ongoing
Article 13, UCMJ, violation through the writ of habeas corpus.
No doubt, additional credit under R.C.M. 305(k) is a remedy for
violations of Article 13, UCMJ. See, e.g., Harris, 66 M.J. at
167; United States v. Adcock, 65 M.J. 18, 21 (C.A.A.F. 2007);
United States v. Crawford, 62 M.J. 411, 414 (C.A.A.F. 2006);
King, 61 M.J. at 227. Indeed, it is a normative remedy and one
that has been expressly endorsed in the rules. But this Court
has never held that R.C.M. 305(k) is the exclusive remedy for
Article 13, UCMJ, violations. To the contrary, our case law
explicitly recognizes that certain circumstances may warrant
other relief. In Crawford, for example, we said that “[w]here
we find that maximum custody was arbitrary and unnecessary to
ensure an accused’s presence for trial, or unrelated to the
security needs of the institution, we will consider appropriate
credit or other relief to remedy this type of violation of
Article 13, UCMJ.” 62 M.J. at 416 (emphasis added). Prior case
law has recognized that “other relief” for Article 13, UCMJ,
violations may range from disapproval of a bad-conduct
discharge, see United States v. Nelson, 18 C.M.A. 177, 181, 39
C.M.R. 177, 181 (1969), to complete dismissal of the charges,
depending on the circumstances. See United States v. Fulton, 55
M.J. 88, 89 (C.A.A.F. 2001). It follows that if a court can
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dismiss a charge in response to violations of Article 13, UCMJ,
as in Nelson, a court can do something less by setting aside a
discharge.
Therefore, we reiterate this Court’s prior holdings, that
although R.C.M. 305(k) is the principal remedy for Article 13,
UCMJ, violations, courts must consider other relief for
violations of Article 13, UCMJ, where the context warrants.
B. Meaningful Relief As A Legal Requirement
Having determined that R.C.M. 305(k) is not the sole remedy
for Article 13, UCMJ, violations, we now consider the second
threshold question presented: Is meaningful relief required in
response to every Article 13, UCMJ, violation? In specific
terms, if Appellant’s Article 13, UCMJ, violations warranted 595
days of relief, and he only received 180 days of actual relief,
was there an additional form of relief available to make him
whole? Thus, the immediate question is not whether the court
below erred in not applying excess confinement credit to a
punitive discharge, but rather whether it erred by excluding the
possibility that additional forms of relief might be available
in response to Appellant’s Article 13, UCMJ, violations and
whether such relief was required in this context?
Appellant argues that meaningful relief is required in
response to a violation of Article 13, UCMJ, and since he did
not receive the full benefit of the military judge’s confinement
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credit, the law requires additional relief addressed to
alternative portions of the sentence. The Government
essentially argues that the issue of meaningful relief is
subsumed within the lower court’s exercise of its
appropriateness power. The court below having determined that
Appellant’s sentence is appropriate in light of the confinement
he received, it follows that Appellant has received all the
credit that is appropriate under the circumstances for the
violations of Article 13, UCMJ, that occurred.
This Court first addressed the question of whether
meaningful relief is required for violations of Article 13,
UCMJ, in Nelson, 18 C.M.A. at 181, 39 C.M.R. at 181. In Nelson,
the appellant pled guilty to various violations of the UCMJ,
including unauthorized absence, violating a lawful general
order, possession of marijuana, and breach of restriction, and
was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay
and allowances, confinement at hard labor for six months, and
reduction to E-1. Id. at 178, 39 C.M.R. at 178. The appellant
was placed in pretrial confinement under circumstances
indistinguishable from those of adjudged and sentenced inmates
including identical indoctrination, dress, living, eating, and
labor requirements. Id. at 178-79, 39 C.M.R. at 178-79. This
Court reversed the board of review, holding that the appellant’s
pretrial confinement conditions constituted pretrial punishment
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in violation of Article 13, UCMJ, and due process. Id. at 181,
39 C.M.R. at 181 (“‘Congress has decreed that, until convicted,
one charged with a crime shall not be subjected to punishment,
and we must enforce that edict.’” (quoting United States v.
Bayhand, 6 C.M.A. 762, 773, 21 C.M.R. 84, 95 (1956))). The
appellant having already served his sentence, the only
unexecuted portion of the sentence was the punitive discharge.
Id. The appellant requested relief in the form of dismissal of
the charges and specifications. Id. Although the court
recognized that the board of review was the proper authority for
reassessing the appropriateness of the sentence, the Court
nonetheless concluded that “modification of the sentence is in
order.” Id. Specifically, the Court held:
Under these circumstances, were we simply to return
the case to the board of review for reassessment of
the sentence, we would thereby imply that the bad-
conduct discharge may be affirmed. Such a course
would deprive the accused of all meaningful relief,
and would rightly suggest that this Court is prepared
to wink at such grossly illegal treatment of men in
pretrial confinement. The disastrous effects of such
a situation upon the system of military justice itself
are so manifest as to require us to eliminate that
possibility.
Id. at 181-82, 39 C.M.R. at 181-82.
Since Nelson, this Court has sought to “ensure meaningful
relief in all future cases” involving violations of Article 13,
UCMJ. See Spaustat, 57 M.J. at 263-64; Suzuki, 14 M.J. at 493.
However, as in the context of appellate due process delay, the
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question of what relief is due to remedy a violation, if any,
requires a contextual judgment, rather than the pro forma
application of formulaic rules. Whether meaningful relief has
been granted and should be granted will depend on factors such
as the nature of the Article 13, UCMJ, violations, the harm
suffered by the appellant, and whether the relief sought is
disproportionate to the harm suffered or in light of the
offenses for which the appellant was convicted. See Harris, 66
M.J. at 169 (declining to set aside the punitive discharge “[i]n
light of the offenses of which Appellant was convicted,” because
“such relief would be disproportionate to any harm he may have
suffered”).
In light of these cases, we conclude that meaningful relief
for violations of Article 13, UCMJ, is required, provided such
relief is not disproportionate in the context of the case,
including the harm an appellant may have suffered and the
seriousness of the offenses of which he was convicted. We
further conclude that the issue of meaningful relief must be
reviewed independent of the lower court’s appropriateness
review.
C. Meaningful Relief In This Case
Given this understanding of meaningful relief, we proceed
to review whether the Court of Criminal Appeals denied Appellant
meaningful relief in this case. “Whether the action taken by
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the lower court provided meaningful relief is a question of law
that we consider under a de novo standard of review.” United
States v. Pflueger, 65 M.J. 127, 128 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
In this case, Appellant was convicted of unauthorized
absence, two specifications of wrongful use of cocaine, and two
specifications of wrongful use of marijuana. Appellant’s
sentence included a bad-conduct discharge, six months of
confinement, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction
to E-1. As in Nelson, and unlike Harris, the pretrial
confinement conditions in this case violated Article 13, UCMJ,
and constituted pretrial punishment. We view the repeated
denials of mental treatment by both Elmendorf and ACC as
particularly egregious. In response, the military judge awarded
four-to-one additional confinement credit. As noted above, this
credit of 595 days more than satisfied the adjudged confinement
of 180 days, leaving 415 days of excess confinement credit. The
convening authority disapproved the forfeiture of all pay and
allowances. As a result, only the bad-conduct discharge and the
reduction to E-1 remained as sentencing elements against which
meaningful relief might apply after the convening authority’s
action. At this point, the only meaningful relief that could be
provided to Appellant would have to be addressed to his punitive
discharge.
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Appellant argues that this Court should follow Nelson and
set aside his bad-conduct discharge. However, unlike Nelson,
this case is complicated by the fact that it is not clear
whether the lower court operated under a correct view of the law
in reviewing Appellant’s sentence and in exercising its
appropriateness power. In particular, we do not know if the
court below considered such relief unwarranted, unavailable, or
available but disproportionate. Neither is it clear whether the
court operated on the belief that meaningful relief was required
where proportionate under the circumstances. Instead, the court
appears to have subsumed the issue of meaningful relief into a
question of credit conversion under R.C.M. 305(k) alone, and
then as a question of sentence-appropriateness review under
Article 66(c), UCMJ, where it operates at its broadest
discretion. Therefore, we remand this case to the Court of
Criminal Appeals for a new Article 66(c), UCMJ, review to
determine whether the circumstances of Appellant’s case warrant
additional relief as a matter of law, or whether such relief
would be disproportionate.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the United
States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is set aside, and the
record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the
Air Force for remand to that court for a new Article 66(c),
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UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2006), review consistent with this
opinion.
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STUCKY, Judge, with whom RYAN, Judge, joins (dissenting):
The majority remands this case to the United States Air
Force Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) to determine whether
Appellant received meaningful relief for a violation of Article
13, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 813(2006). Whether Appellant has received meaningful relief is a
question of law, which this Court is as well suited to decide as
the CCA. By simply addressing the crucial issue in this case of
whether Appellant received meaningful relief, this Court need
not reach other issues, namely, whether Rule for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M.) 305(k) limits the remedies available for an Article 13
violation. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I.
An Article 13 violation does not directly impugn the
results of a trial by court-martial, which is why the error has
been traditionally cured by providing the accused with sentence
relief. See R.C.M. 305(k) (recognizing several sentence relief
options as the remedies for a variety of errors that result in
confinement credit). For Article 13 violations, sentence relief
is calculated in terms of confinement credit, which is then
applied against an appellant’s sentence. See United States v.
Rock, 52 M.J. 154, 156-57 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
Of course, every error does not demand the same degree of
relief. Rather, our precedents indicate that this Court
United States v. Zarbatany, No. 11-0165/AF
balances the error complained of, the harm suffered, and the
surrounding circumstances to determine whether the accused
received meaningful relief. See United States v. Harris, 66
M.J. 166, 169 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (holding that “granting Appellant
[the requested] relief would [have been] disproportionate to any
harm he may have suffered”). The balancing of these factors is
a question of law that we review de novo. See United States v.
Pflueger, 65 M.J. 127, 128 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (“Whether the action
taken by the lower court provided meaningful relief is a
question of law that we consider under a de novo standard of
review.”).
Review for meaningful relief may be contrasted with
reviewing for sentence appropriateness. The latter focuses on
whether the sentence resulted in disparate treatment between
individuals or was otherwise inappropriately severe under the
facts of the case. See United States v. Baier, 60 M.J. 382,
384-85 (C.A.A.F. 2005). Although the review for meaningful
relief and sentence appropriateness is not the same, substantial
overlap exists between them. A lower court, in reviewing the
sentence for appropriateness, may resolve the issue of whether
the accused received meaningful relief by taking into account
errors that would require sentence relief. See United States v.
Suzuki, 20 M.J. 248, 249 (C.M.A. 1985) (“Indeed, had we believed
that this credit already had been taken into account in the
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United States v. Zarbatany, No. 11-0165/AF
reduction of sentence originally ordered by the Court of
Military Review, there would have been no occasion for further
action by that court.”).
In this case, the CCA stated that, “[h]aving given
individualized consideration to this particular appellant, the
nature of the offenses, and all other matters in the record of
trial to include the appellant’s pretrial confinement, we hold
that the approved sentence is not inappropriately severe.”
United States v. Zarbatany, No. 37448, 2010 CCA LEXIS 354, at
*6, 2010 WL 3981672, at *2 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 4, 2010)
(unpublished) (emphasis added). The CCA’s discussion indicates
that it determined the extent of sentence relief necessary in
determining the appropriateness of the sentence. Under these
circumstances, the CCA exercised its broad power over sentences,
and its decision should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion
or a miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Lacy, 50 M.J.
286, 288 (C.A.A.F. 1999). The sentence the CCA affirmed clearly
passes muster under this deferential standard of review.
But even if the majority is correct that the CCA did not
properly understand the effect of R.C.M. 305(k), United States
v. Zarbatany, __ M.J. __ (22-23) (C.A.A.F. 2011), we should not
remand the case for further review, but conduct a de novo review
of whether Appellant received meaningful relief.
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United States v. Zarbatany, No. 11-0165/AF
II.
Both this Court and the Drafters’ Analysis recognize that
confinement credit and punitive discharges are qualitatively
different. See United States v. Rosendahl, 53 M.J. 344, 348
(C.A.A.F. 2000); see also United States v. Spaustat, 57 M.J.
256, 263 (C.A.A.F. 2002). Under R.C.M. 305(k), confinement
credit applies to more traditional punishments, such as hard
labor without confinement, restriction, fine, and forfeiture of
pay. United States v. Josey, 58 M.J. 105, 107-08 (C.A.A.F.
2003). Punitive discharges and reductions in rank, although
punitive, are different in that they are decisions based on the
perceived ability of a particular person to continue to function
in the military at a particular position of respect and
responsibility. Id. The extent of this Court’s power to set
aside a punitive discharge on the basis of unapplied confinement
credit awarded for Article 13 violations has been a legitimate
question since the promulgation of R.C.M. 305(k). The general
policy against doing so, however, is a sound one, which is
evidenced by the fact that cases like United States v. Nelson,
18 C.M.A. 177, 39 C.M.R. 177 (1969), a case in which this
Court’s predecessor set aside the punitive discharge, are
exceedingly rare in our jurisprudence. Appellant argues that
this case is like Nelson. The reliance of both the majority
and Appellant on Nelson is undermined by the fact that the
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United States v. Zarbatany, No. 11-0165/AF
decision in Nelson preceded the enactment of R.C.M. 305(k),
which is contrary to the holding in Nelson. Even aside from the
timing issue, this case is not like Nelson.
In that case, we concluded that Nelson’s treatment in
pretrial confinement violated Article 13 because he had been
treated as though he had already been convicted of a crime.
Nelson, 18 C.M.A. at 178, 39 C.M.R. at 178. Importantly, the
Court of Military Appeals (CMA) concluded that the accused was
subjected to punishment in violation of Article 13. Id. at 181,
39 C.M.R. at 181. Because the rest of Nelson’s sentence had
already been executed, the CMA determined that the punitive
discharge had to be set aside to avoid the potentially serious
effects of not taking action, even though Nelson only had forty-
two days of unapplied pretrial confinement credit. Id. at 181-
82, 39 C.M.R. at 181-82.
By contrast, in this case, the military and prison
officials violated a number of service regulations that, when
aggregated, violated Article 13. The military judge, however,
found that the military and prison officials never intended to
punish Appellant. Moreover, Appellant’s pretrial confinement
credit was actually applied to reduce his sentence, such that he
served no post-trial confinement. In addition, the convening
authority deferred forfeitures until action and, ultimately, did
not approve any forfeitures. For these reasons, the facts of
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United States v. Zarbatany, No. 11-0165/AF
this case stand in stark contrast to those of Nelson, in which
Nelson was actually punished and had no other potential remedies
remaining except to set aside his punitive discharge. See id.
Under the circumstances of this case, Appellant received
meaningful relief in that he served no post-trial confinement
and his forfeitures were set aside. Setting aside the punitive
discharge would be disproportionate to the harm Appellant
suffered and inconsistent with the Court’s treatments of such
relief. Unlike the majority, I need not and would not decide
whether R.C.M. 305(k) limits the remedies available to a court
to cure a violation of Article 13, because I am able to
determine that Appellant received meaningful relief without
resolving that issue. Considering the majority’s discussion of
the issue, I would be remiss, however, if I said nothing about
the current status of R.C.M. 305(k).
III.
Before R.C.M. 305(k), this Court’s predecessor recognized
that it could adjust the entirety of the sentence, including
punitive discharges, as necessary to provide meaningful relief
for violations of Article 13. See Nelson, 18 C.M.A. at 181, 39
C.M.R. at 181; cf. United States v. Heard, 3 M.J. 14, 23 (C.M.A.
1977) (noting that it was inappropriate to modify other aspects
of the sentence, including setting aside the punitive discharge,
as requested by the appellant, given the circumstances of the
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United States v. Zarbatany, No. 11-0165/AF
case). R.C.M. 305(k) changed the legal landscape by stating
that pretrial confinement:
shall be applied first against any confinement
adjudged. If no confinement is adjudged, or if the
confinement adjudged is insufficient to offset all the
credit to which the accused is entitled, the credit
shall be applied against hard labor without
confinement, restriction, fine, and forfeiture of pay,
in that order . . . .
R.C.M. 305(k). Significantly, the final sentence of R.C.M.
305(k) states that “[t]he credit shall not be applied against
any other form of punishment.” Id.In enacting Article 13, Congress was entirely silent on
what remedies are available for violations of that article. But
by promulgating R.C.M. 305(k), the President clearly attempted
to limit the remedies available for a violation of Article 13.
In particular, the President attempted to prohibit the
application of confinement credit to a punitive discharge. This
Court has never determined whether the President has such power,
but our precedent has generally followed the guidance provided
by R.C.M. 305(k). The majority fails to clearly explain why we
should or can avoid our precedent and the rule’s plain
direction.
Indeed, we have used R.C.M. 305(k) and its underlying
reasoning, as reflected in the Drafters’ Analysis, as a guide in
determining what constitutes meaningful relief. See Rosendahl,
53 M.J. at 348 (accepting the Drafters’ Analysis for why this
7
United States v. Zarbatany, No. 11-0165/AF
Court should not automatically apply confinement credit to a
punitive discharge). I see no reason to depart from that
precedent in this case and decide an issue that is unnecessary
to the outcome in this case. Under our precedents, it is clear
that Appellant received meaningful relief. Disapproval of his
punitive discharge would grant him a windfall. Whether R.C.M.
305(k) controls sentence relief for violations of Article 13 is
a question that can be left for another day.
IV.
For the above reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the
United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals.
8