United States v. Von Bergen

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
David J. VON BERGEN, Airman First Class
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 03-0629/AF
Crim. App. No. 34817
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued November 17, 2008
Decided April 2, 2009
BAKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and ERDMANN and STUCKY, JJ., joined. RYAN, J., filed a
separate opinion concurring in the judgment.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Phillip T. Korman (argued); Major Lance
J. Wood and Captain Vicki A. Belleau (on brief); Lieutenant
Colonel Mark R. Strickland and Major Shannon A. Bennett.
For Appellee: Major Brendon K. Tukey (argued); Colonel Gerald
R. Bruce and Major Jeremy S. Weber (on brief); Major Matthew S.
Ward and Major Nicole P. Wishart.
Military Judge: Gary M. Jackson
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Von Bergen, No. 03-0629/AF
Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant pleaded guilty in 2001 to violating a provision
of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(A) (2000). Pursuant to his pretrial
agreement, he waived his right to a hearing under Article 32,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2000).
However, this Court reversed his conviction on the basis of
United States v. Martinelli, 62 M.J. 52 (C.A.A.F. 2005). United
States v. Von Bergen, 62 M.J. 370 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (order). On
remand from this Court, Appellant received a rehearing in 2006
on an amended specification of possessing child pornography
charged as a violation of clauses 1 and 2 of Article 134, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000). Appellant pleaded not guilty, withdrew
from his 2001 pretrial agreement, and moved for an Article 32,
UCMJ, investigation on the ground that his previous Article 32,
UCMJ, waiver was conditioned on the pretrial agreement from
which he had withdrawn. The military judge denied the motion on
the grounds that Appellant’s earlier Article 32, UCMJ, waiver
remained in effect and Appellant had not shown good cause for
relief from his waiver. The United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings and sentence. United
States v. Von Bergen, No. ACM 34817 (f rev), 2008 CCA LEXIS 17,
at *13, 2008 WL 179271, at *5 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 9, 2008)
(unpublished).
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We granted review of the following issue:
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED WHEN HE HELD
APPELLANT’S WAIVER OF HIS ARTICLE 32 RIGHTS FOR HIS 20
SEPTEMBER 2001 COURT-MARTIAL APPLIED TO HIS 23 OCTOBER
2006 REHEARING.
We hold that the military judge erred in denying Appellant an
Article 32, UCMJ, investigation. Finding no material prejudice
to Appellant’s substantial rights, however, we affirm the
findings and approve the sentence.
BACKGROUND
At his first court-martial, consistent with his pretrial
agreement of September 10, 2001, and his pleas, Appellant was
convicted of one specification of knowingly possessing a
computer disk containing images of child pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(A) and one specification of
knowingly and wrongfully distributing child pornography in
interstate or foreign commerce by means of a computer in
violation of Article 134, UCMJ.1 Appellant’s pretrial agreement
included an offer to “waive a hearing under Article 32.” It
also included a withdrawal provision stating, among other
things, that:
This agreement will also be canceled and of no effect,
if any of the following occurs:
1
According to the specifications, Appellant committed the
charged acts “at or near Building 210, Royal Air Force Base
Mildenhall, United Kingdom.”
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a. Refusal of the court to accept my plea of
guilty, as set forth above, or modification of the
plea by anyone during the trial to not guilty or to
a lesser degree of guilt.
b. Withdrawal by either party to the agreement
before the trial.
The military judge engaged in the following colloquy with
Appellant and his counsel regarding the waiver:
MJ: Defense counsel, if the accused’s plea of guilty
is determined to be improvident will the accused be
afforded an Article 32 investigation or is it
permanently waived?
DC: It’s not permanently waived, ma’am.
MJ: So it was contingent on the Offer for Pretrial
Agreement as well?
DC: Yes, ma’am.
MJ: And trial counsel, do you agree?
ATC: Yes, ma’am.
MJ: So you understand Airman Von Bergen, that, again,
if for any reason I’m not able to accept your plea or
you’re not able to complete your Offer for Pretrial
Agreement and the convening authority’s not bound by
it for some reason, that you would then be afforded
you [sic] right to an Article 32?
ACC: Yes, ma’am.
The military judge subsequently accepted Appellant’s guilty
pleas and sentenced Appellant to a dishonorable discharge,
confinement for twenty-eight months, and reduction to the grade
of E-1. The convening authority approved the sentence as
adjudged.
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On appeal, this Court affirmed the finding of guilty on the
specification of distributing child pornography, but reversed
the finding on the specification of possessing child pornography
and set aside the sentence. Von Bergen, 62 M.J. at 370. This
Court returned the record of trial to the Judge Advocate General
of the Air Force for further action consistent with Martinelli,
62 M.J. at 52. Von Bergen, 62 M.J. at 370. Accordingly, the
convening authority authorized a rehearing and amended the
specification related to possession of child pornography,
eliminating reference to 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(A) and
inserting language derived from clauses 1 and 2 of Article 134,
UCMJ: “which conduct was prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces or of a nature to bring discredit
upon the armed forces.”
At his rehearing in 2006, Appellant pleaded not guilty to
the amended specification. Appellant withdrew from the pretrial
agreement that he had entered at the original court–martial and
moved for an Article 32, UCMJ, investigation. Appellant argued
that he was entitled to relief from his earlier Article 32,
UCMJ, waiver because it was conditioned on the pretrial
agreement from which he had since withdrawn. In response, the
Government argued that no remedy was required because “the
accused clearly waived his right to an Article 32 hearing” and
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“the Defense has offered no evidence of ‘good cause’ for relief
of the accused’s waiver of an Article 32 hearing.”
At the rehearing, the military judge denied the motion for
relief, concluding that Appellant “had made a knowing and
voluntary waiver of his Article 32 hearing” and Appellant failed
to show good cause for relief from the waiver. The military
judge found Appellant guilty under the amended specification and
sentenced Appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for
three years, reduction to grade E-1, and forfeiture of all pay
and allowances. Consistent with Rule for Court-Martial (R.C.M.)
810(d)(1), the convening authority approved a sentence of a
dishonorable discharge, confinement for twenty-eight months, and
reduction to grade E-1.
The United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed the approved findings and sentence. Von Bergen, 2008
CCA LEXIS 17, at *13, 2008 WL 179271, at *5. The Court of
Criminal Appeals found that “[o]nce a pretrial investigation has
been waived, relief from that waiver can be obtained only for
good cause shown.” Id. at *4, 2008 WL 179271, at *2 (quotation
marks omitted). The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected
Appellant’s argument that “under Nickerson, if the decision to
waive the Article 32 investigation was in some way connected to
the appellant’s decision to plead guilty, good cause to receive
relief from the waiver exists.” Id. at *5, 2008 WL 179271, at
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*2 (citing United States v. Nickerson, 27 M.J. 30, 31-32 (C.M.A.
1988)). As withdrawal from a pretrial agreement does not
“automatically establish[] good cause” and “[A]ppellant
presented no other reason as a basis,” the Court of Criminal
Appeals concluded that “he did not show good cause.” Id.
Appellant also argued on appeal that good cause for relief
existed under R.C.M. 405(k) because the Government destroyed
certain evidence before the rehearing and the specification was
changed. Id. at *5-*6, 2008 WL 179271, at *2. The Court of
Criminal Appeals found that “[t]hese arguments were waived by
the trial defense counsel’s failure to raise them at trial, and
the appellant is entitled to relief only if his case at trial
was harmed by this waiver.” Id. at *6, 2008 WL 179271, at *2.
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the destroyed
evidence did not entitle Appellant to relief because
“appellant’s confession, which was corroborated by eyewitness
testimony, was more than sufficient to sustain a conviction at
trial.” Id. at *6-*7, 2008 WL 179271, at *2. The Court of
Criminal Appeals further concluded that the amendment to the
specification did not entitle Appellant to relief because
“[c]hanging the allegation from an Article 134, UCMJ, Clause 3
specification to one containing elements under Clauses 1 and 2
does not amount to a significant change to the specification.”
Id. at *7, 2008 WL 179271, at *3 (quotation marks omitted).
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Additionally, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that, “in
a sense, appellant has already received the benefit of his
[pretrial agreement] from the first trial” because the convening
authority fulfilled his obligation of approving a reduced
sentence, and “the sentence of that trial forms the basis of the
maximum sentence that the convening authority can approve in
this trial.” Id. at *8, 2008 WL 179271, at *3. The Court of
Criminal Appeals thus decided that “the military judge did not
err when he determined the appellant failed to establish good
cause, and the appellant was not harmed by trial defense
counsel’s failure to raise any of the matters the appellant
raises on appeal.” Id.
Appellant renews his arguments before this Court. He
argues that he was entitled to an Article 32, UCMJ,
investigation because the 2006 specification was a “major”
change from the 2001 specification. See R.C.M. 603. The
Government responds, inter alia, that the pretrial agreement was
conditioned on the military judge accepting Appellant’s 2001
plea. The military judge having done so and the convening
authority having fulfilled its sentencing commitment, the
Government argues that the terms of the pretrial agreement were
met and Appellant remains bound on rehearing by his 2001 waiver.
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DISCUSSION
This Court reviews a military judge’s decision whether to
order relief from a waiver of an Article 32, UCMJ,
investigation for an abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Siroky, 44 M.J. 394, 398 n.1 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (“On discretionary
decisions, [the reviewing court] usually asks whether the
decision is legal in the sense of being within the prescribed
boundaries which define the area of discretion.”) (quoting
Martha S. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review,
33 S.D. L. Rev. 468, 472-73 (1988) (footnote omitted)). “We
review a military judge’s conclusions of law under the de novo
standard. If a military judge’s ruling is based on an
erroneous view of the law, he has abused his discretion.”
United States v. Mobley, 44 M.J. 453, 454 (C.A.A.F. 1996)
(quotation marks omitted). Based on the following analysis, we
conclude that the military judge abused his discretion in
denying Appellant an Article 32, UCMJ, investigation on
rehearing. Two related arguments are persuasive. First and
foremost, Appellant’s 2001 plea was improvident as a matter of
law, which had the effect of canceling the pretrial agreement
according to its terms. Alternatively, whether the 2006
Article 134(1) and (2), UCMJ, specification represented a major
change to the 2001 Article 134(3), UCMJ, specification or not,
the effect of the rehearing and Appellant’s subsequent
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withdrawal from the agreement was to place the parties in their
pretrial status quo ante. See R.C.M. 705(d)(4).
As noted above, when this case came before this Court the
first time, we reversed the finding on the specification of
possessing child pornography based on Martinelli. Von Bergen,
62 M.J. at 370; see Martinelli, 62 M.J. at 62 (concluding that
the CPPA does not apply extraterritorially, thus the CPPA as
incorporated into Article 134(3), UCMJ, does not apply
extraterritorially). As in Martinelli itself, Appellant’s plea
was improvident with respect to the Article 134(3), UCMJ,
specification. Further, and also as in Martinelli, the
specification did not reference prejudice to good order and
discipline or service discredit, and the military judge during
the providence inquiry did not sufficiently inquire into whether
Appellant was willing to admit that his conduct was prejudicial
to good order and discipline or service discrediting.
Martinelli, 62 M.J. at 670. Thus, we cannot uphold an offense
under Article 134(1) or (2), UCMJ, which, as explained in United
States v. Medina, 66 M.J. 21, 26 (C.A.A.F. 2008), do not
necessarily constitute lesser included offenses of Article
134(3), UCMJ. As a result, Appellant’s plea was improvident.
Although improvidence of the plea upon appellate review was
not an express basis for cancellation in the pretrial agreement,
this Court’s decision had the same effect as if the military
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judge had not accepted Appellant’s plea, which was an express
basis for cancellation. As a matter of law, the plea could not
have been accepted by the military judge. As the military judge
could not have accepted an improvident plea, the pretrial
agreement was subject to the first cancellation term.
Thus, a condition precedent to the Article 32, UCMJ,
waiver, acceptance of the pleas, never occurred. Therefore, the
waiver was not in effect at the rehearing. This point is
reinforced by the military judge’s explanation to Appellant at
the 2001 court-martial that Appellant would be afforded an
Article 32, UCMJ, investigation should the military judge not
accept Appellant’s pleas for any reason. Moreover, during the
same colloquy, the parties agreed that the Article 32, UCMJ,
waiver would not apply if Appellant’s pleas were “determined to
be improvident.”
Even if the pretrial agreement were still in effect -- and
we are convinced that it was not -- when this Court set aside
Appellant’s plea and the amended specification was referred for
rehearing, Appellant’s subsequent withdrawal from the agreement
meant that the court-martial process should have begun anew.
R.C.M. 810(a)(1) provides that: “[rehearing] procedure shall be
the same as in an original trial.” Therefore, “the effect of
ordering a rehearing is . . . to place the United States and the
accused in the same position as they were at the beginning of
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the original trial.” United States v. Staten, 21 C.M.A. 493,
495, 45 C.M.R. 267, 269 (1972). As one of the first steps in a
general court-martial proceeding is an Article 32, UCMJ,
investigation, unless the accused waives it, one of the first
steps at the rehearing in this general court-martial proceeding
should likewise have been an Article 32, UCMJ, investigation if
not previously afforded to the accused. See Article 32, UCMJ;
see generally United States v. Beatty, 25 M.J. 311, 315 (C.M.A.
1987) (asserting that “there is no necessity for conducting a
new Article 32, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 832, investigation”) (emphasis
added). Accordingly, when this Court reversed and remanded this
case, Appellant should have been afforded an Article 32, UCMJ,
investigation prior to the rehearing, unless Appellant waived it
at that time.
As a result, the military judge erred by relying on an
Article 32, UCMJ, waiver that was no longer effective at the
rehearing. Because Appellant did not knowingly and voluntarily
waive his Article 32, UCMJ, rights at the rehearing, we do not
need to inquire further into whether Appellant has shown good
cause for relief. See R.C.M. 405(k). It is enough that
Appellant’s Article 32, UCMJ, waiver was conditioned on a
pretrial agreement that was not in effect at the rehearing, or,
in the alternative, that referring the amended specification for
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rehearing started the court-martial process anew. However, our
analysis does not stop with a finding of error.
Prejudice
Article 32, UCMJ, errors are tested on direct review for
prejudice as defined by Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a)
(2000). United States v. Davis, 64 M.J. 445, 449 (C.A.A.F.
2007); see also United States v. Mickel, 9 C.M.A. 324, 327, 26
C.M.R. 104, 107 (1958) (“Once the case comes to trial on the
merits, the pretrial proceedings are superseded by the
procedures at the trial; the rights accorded to the accused in
the pretrial stage merge into his rights at trial.”).
Appellant argues that he was prejudiced by the absence of
an Article 32, UCMJ, hearing due to the passage of time between
his first and second courts-martial, during which time witness
memories may have faded and original documentary evidence was
destroyed. Appellant also argues that an Article 32, UCMJ,
investigation would have afforded him the opportunity to prepare
his defense to the changed specification and test the strength
of the Government’s case based on the evidence available at the
rehearing.
We disagree.
First, while the specification was indeed amended to change
the underlying offense from a violation of the CPPA to a
violation of Article 134(1) and (2), UCMJ, Appellant was on fair
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notice regarding how the specification would be amended after
remand from this Court based on this Court’s precedents in
Martinelli and other cases that have addressed the CPPA. See,
e.g., United States v. O’Connor, 58 M.J. 450, 454-55 (C.A.A.F.
2003); United States v. Mason, 60 M.J. 15, 18, 20 (C.A.A.F.
2004). Second, the new specification addressed the same conduct
as the original specification. Third, the Government relied on
much of the same evidence as at Appellant’s original court-
martial, such as Appellant’s statement and testimony of
witnesses who had statements or stipulations of expected
testimony admitted as evidence at the 2001 court-martial.
Finally, the witnesses testified about the destroyed evidence,
including what the images portrayed, how they were found, and
how they were traced to Appellant. In a different context, the
destruction of the original evidence and passage of time might
well be prejudicial; however, under these circumstances,
Appellant was not prejudiced by the military judge’s error in
not ordering an Article 32, UCMJ, investigation.
DECISION
Accordingly, subject to the foregoing discussion, the
decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.
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RYAN, J. (concurring in the judgment):
I concur in the judgment because I agree with the
majority’s conclusion that the pretrial agreement (PTA) in this
case did not waive Appellant’s right to a pretrial
investigation, pursuant to Article 32, Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2000), on the amended and
rereferred charge. I also agree that while Appellant was
entitled to an Article 32, UCMJ, investigation on the amended
charge, he was not prejudiced by the lack of such an
investigation. United States v. Von Bergen, __ M.J. __ (13-14)
(C.A.A.F. 2009).
The granted issue can be resolved on a simple basis:
Whether or not Appellant’s original waiver via the PTA in this
case was canceled by our order of the rehearing, Von Bergen, __
M.J. at __ (10-11), and whether or not the rehearing itself
permitted Appellant to withdraw from the PTA,1 id.  at __ (11),
1
Although the majority opinion finds that the PTA was not in
effect at the rehearing, a portion of the opinion assumes,
arguendo, that the PTA did remain in effect. Von Bergen, __
M.J. at __ (9, 11-12). Even so, the majority holds that
Appellant subsequently withdrew from the PTA and was therefore
entitled to an Article 32, UCMJ, investigation. Despite the
Government’s argument that Appellant’s right to withdraw from
the PTA no longer existed, the majority posits, without
explanation, a connection between the order of rehearing and
Appellant’s right to withdraw. Brief of Appellee at 7, United
States v. Von Bergen, No. 03-0629 (C.A.A.F. Sept. 5, 2008). We
have previously stated that the effect of a rehearing is
generally to “place the United States and the accused in the
United States v. Von Bergen, No. 03-0629/AF
it is certain that the agreement between Appellant and the
Government to waive Appellant’s right to an Article 32, UCMJ,
investigation referred only to the original charges and
specifications, and not to the new charge and specification
referred at the rehearing. Offer for Pretrial Agreement, at 1,
United States v. Von Bergen, No. FR358-76-6491 (USAF Trial
Judiciary Sept. 10, 2001) (“I have read the charges and
specifications alleged against me and they have been explained
to me . . . . Understanding the above and under the conditions
set forth below, . . . I offer . . . to waive a hearing under
Article 32, UCMJ.”).
The specification at issue in this appeal was originally
charged and pleaded to as a violation of clause 3 of Article
134, UCMJ. A rehearing was ordered because that specification
same position as they were at the beginning of the original
trial.” United States v. Staten, 21 C.M.A. 493, 495, 45 C.M.R.
267, 269 (1972). But we have also acknowledged that rehearings
“have long been treated as a continuation of the first trial.”
Id. Rehearings are ordered for many different reasons, and our
prior treatment of this issue suggests that some agreements made
before or during the original trial may continue in effect
during a subsequent rehearing, while others may not. Id.
(“There are exceptions to the rule” that a “rehearing of the
case generally leaves the proceedings in the same position as
before trial.”) (quoting United States v. Cox, 12 C.M.A. 168,
169, 30 C.M.R. 168, 169 (1961)) (quotation marks omitted). The
issue granted did not cover this tension and the parties’
briefing did not seek to resolve it; I do not fault the majority
for declining to address the tension between these cases. But
it seems an imprudent path to proceed to decide the case, albeit
on an alternate ground, as if the tension does not exist.
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of the charge relied on extraterritorial application of the
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), 18 U.S.C. §
2252A (2000). United States v. Von Bergen, 62 M.J. 370
(C.A.A.F. 2005) (summary disposition); United States v.
Martinelli, 62 M.J. 52, 62 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (holding that the
CPPA does not have exterritorial application). On rehearing,
the convening authority amended the original specification from
alleging a violation of clause 3 of Article 134, UCMJ, to
alleging a violation of clauses 1 or 2 of Article 134, UCMJ, and
referred this new specification to a general court-martial.
Absent specific pleadings and proof, clauses 1 and 2 of
Article 134, UCMJ, are not lesser included offenses of clause 3,
Article 134, UCMJ. See, e.g., United States v. Medina, 66 M.J.
21, 26 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (holding that clauses 1 and 2 are not
necessarily lesser included offenses of clause 3). Appellant’s
waiver of an Article 32, UCMJ, pretrial investigation pursuant
to the PTA could not constitute a waiver for an offense the PTA
did not address. Appellant was entitled to a new Article 32,
UCMJ, pretrial investigation prior to referral of the new
specification to trial by general court-martial, and it was
error for the military judge to deny his request. See R.C.M.
405(a) (“[N]o charge or specification may be referred to a
general court-martial for trial until a thorough and impartial
investigation . . . has been made . . . .”).
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I also take exception to the majority’s statement that our
prior remand of this case was partially due to the fact that the
original providence inquiry did not reveal sufficient evidence
to affirm a conviction under clauses 1 or 2 of Article 134,
UCMJ. Von Bergen, __ M.J. at __ (9-10). I continue to doubt
that affirming a conviction to a failed charge and specification
of clause 3, Article 134, UCMJ, under clauses 1 or 2 of Article
134, UCMJ, as a lesser included offense based on the contents of
the providency inquiry alone passes constitutional muster. See
Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 718 (1989) (allowing
lesser included offense instructions “only in those cases where
the indictment contains the elements of both offenses and
thereby gives notice to the defendant that he may be convicted
on either charge”); Medina, 66 M.J. at 26 (emphasizing an
accused’s “right to know to what offense and under what legal
theory he or she is pleading guilty”); Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227, 232 (1999) (“Much turns on the determination that
a fact is an element of an offense . . . given that elements
must be charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
I concur in the judgment.
4