United States v. Bradford

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Rachel K. Bradford, Staff Sergeant
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 10-6003
Crim. App. Misc. Dkt. No. 2009-07
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Decided February 26, 2010
PER CURIAM
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Michael S. Kerr and Dwight H. Sullivan,
Esq.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy S. Weber.
Military Judge: William M. Burd
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Bradford, No. 10-6003/AF
PER CURIAM:
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a interlocutory Government appeal
under Article 62, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10
U.S.C. § 862 (2006), in a pending special court-martial.
Appellant, who has been charged with one specification of
wrongful use of cocaine in violation of Article 112a, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 912a (2006), entered a plea of not guilty at her
arraignment. At this stage of the proceedings, the parties have
not made opening statements, and no evidence has been offered on
the merits.
During consideration of preliminary matters, the military
judge addressed a number of motions, including the motion at
issue in the present appeal -- the prosecution’s request that
the military judge “preadmit” a document from the Air Force Drug
Testing Laboratory. The drug testing report at issue contained
the results of urinalysis tests on a specimen attributed to
Appellant. In pertinent part, the report stated that the
“specimen was determined to be presumptive positive” by two
initial screening procedures and that the specimen “was then
confirmed positive” in a subsequent test. Other than the
document, the prosecution did not present any evidence in
support of the motion.
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United States v. Bradford, No. 10-6003/AF
In the hearing on the motion, trial counsel stated that the
prosecution would “call an expert who’s familiar with the
procedures of the lab” as part of the prosecution’s case-in-
chief during trial on the merits. According to trial counsel,
the witness, who would review the chain of custody and the test
results, would “be able to testify live based on [the witness’s]
own personal analysis of the Drug Testing Report and the
analysis from this case [that] the sample tested positive for
cocaine.” Arguing that admission of the report without the in-
court testimony of the individuals who made certifying
statements in the report violated the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment, the defense opposed the motion, citing
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
The military judge denied the prosecution’s motion to
“preadmit” the document. In the course of his ruling, the
military judge focused on portions of the document that he
viewed as containing “testimonial” evidence that would trigger
the requirement for confrontation under Melendez-Diaz:
If there’s any part of the drug testing process
that would not be testimonial . . . it would be
the initial screen; the collection, the chain of
custody leading up to and including the initial
screening test. . . . [B]ut once a sample test is
presumptively positive, everything changes
because then the lab personnel know what they’re
doing is confirming or invalidating that initial
screen. At that point it becomes testimonial and
that’s when confrontation attaches to the
documents.
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United States v. Bradford, No. 10-6003/AF
In that context, the military judge indicated that portions
of the report might receive different treatment with respect to
the prosecution’s motion to preadmit the document:
So, if the government can pull out portions if
this report or any records that pertain to the
initial screen that would be something I would
consider in the Motion to Preadmit. But the lab
report, as it now stands, as contained in
Appellate Exhibit VII, will not be preadmitted.
Trial counsel asked for further clarification from the
military judge with regard to the witnesses the Government would
need to call in order to introduce the report in its entirety.
The military judge explained that the Government would be
required to provide “the testimony of anyone involved at any
stage in the testing after the initial screening.” Trial
counsel then asked, “So any witness involved in any capacity
with this particular sample, after the first positive or first
immunoassay, would be required to introduce any portion of the
[drug testing report] that goes beyond that first immunoassay?”
The military judge responded, “Yes.” The prosecution did not
identify specific witnesses in that regard by name or specific
position.
After a brief recess, trial counsel informed the military
judge that the Government was “strongly considering” filing an
interlocutory government appeal under Article 62(a)(1)(B), UCMJ,
which permits such appeals when a ruling by the military judge
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United States v. Bradford, No. 10-6003/AF
“excludes evidence that is substantial proof of a fact material
in the proceeding.” The military judge observed that his ruling
on “the Government’s Motion to Preadmit the Drug Testing Report
. . . . does not constitute a ruling that excludes evidence . .
. . [and] there is no basis at this point to appeal my decision
under Article 62.” When trial counsel asked for a further
explanation, the military judge stated: “I haven’t excluded any
evidence. I’ve just said I’m not going to preadmit it and I’ve
explained why.”
The Government subsequently filed an interlocutory appeal
with the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals under
Article 62, UCMJ, asking the Court to overturn the military
judge’s ruling. Appellant moved to dismiss the appeal on the
grounds that the decision of the military judge to not preadmit
evidence was not appealable under Article 62, UCMJ, because it
did not amount to a ruling excluding evidence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that it had
jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal, stating that
“[t]he military judge’s ruling had the effect of excluding
evidence that is substantial proof of a fact material for the
government’s case.” United States v. Bradford, No. 2009-07,
slip op. at 4 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2009). The court
then held that the military judge erred in denying the
Government’s motion to preadmit the drug testing report. Id. at
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United States v. Bradford, No. 10-6003/AF
12. The lower court granted the Article 62, UCMJ, appeal,
vacated the military judge’s ruling, and remanded the case for
further proceedings. Id. at 13. Appellant then sought review
in this Court, contending that the lower court erred both with
respect to the jurisdictional issue and on the merits of the
appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Prosecution appeals are disfavored and are permitted only
upon specific statutory authorization. See United States v.
Wuterich, 67 M.J. 63, 70 (C.A.A.F. 2008). The statute at issue
in the present appeal authorizes the Government to pursue an
interlocutory appeal of “[a]n order or ruling which excludes
evidence that is substantial proof of a fact material in the
proceeding.” Article 62(a)(1)(B), UCMJ.
The present appeal concerns the military judge’s denial of
the Government’s motion to “preadmit” a document. Trial on the
merits has not begun. The Government has not moved to admit the
document at trial. The Government has not demonstrated at trial
that it cannot establish a proper foundation for the
admissibility of the evidence.1 The procedural posture of the
case underscores the observation by the military judge that, at
1
The circumstances of the present case, at this stage in the
proceedings, do not raise the question of whether foundational
requirements might be such that they rise to a level of
excluding evidence.
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United States v. Bradford, No. 10-6003/AF
this stage of the proceedings, there has not been a ruling
excluding any evidence.
The case before us is distinguishable from United States v.
Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2005), cited by the court
below. In Hendricks, the district court denied the
prosecution’s motion in limine to admit specific statements made
by specific persons unless the person who made the statement
testified at the trial. Id. at 175-76. On appeal, the court
treated the lower court’s decision as a definitive ruling
excluding specific evidence of particular statements by specific
persons, id. at 181, and the opinion does not reflect any
controversy about the court’s jurisdiction. By contrast, the
military judge in the present case has set forth foundational
criteria for the admissibility of a document, but has not
excluded specific evidence of particular statements by specific
persons. In that context, the military judge’s decision to not
“preadmit” the document did not constitute “[a]n order or ruling
which excludes evidence that is substantial proof of a fact
material in the proceeding” under Article 62, UCMJ. As such,
the lower court did not have jurisdiction to review the
substance of the decision by the military judge at this stage in
the proceedings. Under these circumstances, we take no position
on the validity of the military judge’s decision to deny the
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motion to preadmit the document.2 Likewise, we take no position
regarding the propriety of the criteria for admission set forth
by the military judge.
III. DECISION
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the United States
Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals. We remand the record of
trial to the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force for return
to the military judge for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
2
In a separate case on direct review, United States v. Blazier,
68 M.J. 240 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (order granting petition for
review), we have under consideration the Sixth Amendment
implications of a laboratory report of a drug test relied upon
by the prosecution in its case-in-chief.
8