United States v. Mack

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Malcolm M. MACK, Aviation Machinist’s Mate Airman
U.S. Navy, Appellant
No. 06-0943
Crim. App. No. 200400133
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued March 13, 2007
Decided June 19, 2007
EFFRON, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BAKER, ERDMANN, STUCKY, and RYAN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Brian L. Mizer, JAGC, USN (argued).
For Appellee: Captain Roger E. Mattioli, USMC (argued);
Commander Paul C. LeBlanc, JAGC, USN (on brief).
Military Judge: J. S. Brady
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Mack, No. 06-0943/NA
Chief Judge EFFRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted
members convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of
conspiracy to obstruct justice, breaking restriction (seven
specifications), and wrongfully attempting to influence the
testimony of a witness (three specifications), in violation of
Articles 81 and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10
U.S.C. §§ 881, 934 (2000). The sentence adjudged by the court-
martial and approved by the convening authority included a
dishonorable discharge, confinement for six months, hard labor
without confinement for three months, and reduction to pay grade
E-1. The United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the findings of guilty, reduced the
dishonorable discharge to a bad-conduct discharge, and approved
the balance of the sentence. United States v. Mack, No. NMCCA
200400133, 2006 CCA LEXIS 223 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 28,
2006) (unpublished).
On Appellant’s petition, we granted review of the following
issues:
I. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY HOLDING
THAT THE MILITARY JUDGE’S DECISION TO SUBMIT
THE ISSUE OF THE LAWFULNESS OF APPELLANT’S
RESTRICTION ORDER TO THE MEMBERS WAS
HARMLESS.
II. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT
TO PROVE THAT APPELLANT CONSPIRED WITH JOHN
DOE TO OBSTRUCT JUSTICE WHERE THERE IS NO
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EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT JOHN DOE EVER
EXISTED.
III. WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF
LAW WHERE THE LOWER COURT DECIDED
APPELLANT’S CASE 1,830 DAYS AFTER HIS COURT-
MARTIAL.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. PRETRIAL RESTRICTION (ISSUE I)
A. BACKGROUND
1. The pretrial restriction order
A servicemember facing criminal charges may be subjected to
various forms of pretrial restraint pending court-martial,
including confinement, arrest, restriction, or conditions on
liberty. Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 304(a). A pretrial
restriction order generally includes specific conditions
designed to prevent additional criminal misconduct and maintain
accountability of the accused. R.C.M. 304(c) Discussion.
Various conditions may be ordered if they are “reasonably
necessary to protect the morale, welfare, and safety of the unit
(or the accused); to protect victims or potential witnesses; or
to ensure the accused’s presence at the court-martial or
pretrial hearings.” United States v. Blye, 37 M.J. 92, 94
(C.M.A. 1993). For example, the commander may order the
servicemember to remain within specified limits, to report
periodically to a specified official, and not to associate with
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specified persons. R.C.M. 304(a)(2); R.C.M. 304(b); R.C.M.
304(a) Discussion.
Appellant, who was under investigation for selling illegal
drugs during an undercover operation, was placed in pretrial
confinement for thirty-four days. Subsequently, he was released
after a reviewing officer determined that less restrictive forms
of restraint would suffice. Following his release from
confinement, Appellant’s commanding officer immediately placed
him on restriction because of information that Appellant was
dealing drugs on the military installation, both at his
workplace and from his car. The period of pretrial restriction
lasted for 143 days.
The pretrial restriction order restricted Appellant to
Marine Corps Air Station, New River, North Carolina. The order
also contained the following conditions: (1) a requirement to
muster at specified times during work days and at other
specified times on non-work days; (2) a requirement to carry a
log at all times that recorded his musters; (3) a prohibition on
use of the telephone except for monitored calls with his wife
and legal representative; (4) a limitation to supervised visits
with his wife; (5) a prohibition on operating or riding in an
automobile; (6) restriction to his barracks room during non-duty
hours, with limited exceptions; (7) a prohibition on going to
specified shopping, recreational, and entertainment venues on
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the base, with limited exceptions for supervised visits; (8) a
limitation on exercise to battalion activities; (9) a
prohibition on wearing civilian clothing; (10) a prohibition on
consumption of alcoholic beverages; and (11) a limitation to
eating in the base mess hall, with a requirement that he check
in and out with the staff duty officer.
2. Charges based upon violations of the pretrial restriction
conditions
A servicemember who violates one or more of the conditions
of pretrial restriction may be charged with an offense under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. See Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States pt. IV, paras. 16, 102 (2005 ed.) (MCM).
Appellant was charged with violating three of the conditions of
restriction: (1) failure to muster; (2) riding in or driving a
car; and (3) making phone calls to individuals other than his
wife and lawyer. As noted in section I.A.4., infra, Appellant
ultimately was convicted of violating two of the conditions:
failure to muster and riding in or driving a car.
3. Sentence credit based upon the conditions of pretrial
restriction
Pretrial restriction is not punishment and may not be used
as such. R.C.M. 304(f). A person accused of a crime retains
the presumption of innocence and may not be punished pending
trial. Article 13, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 813 (2000). If conditions
of pretrial restraint are more rigorous than necessary to ensure
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the presence of an accused at trial or to prevent additional
misconduct, the accused may receive credit against the adjudged
sentence. United States v. King, 61 M.J. 225, 227 (C.A.A.F.
2005); United States v. Stringer, 55 M.J. 92, 94 (C.A.A.F.
2001); see also Michael G. Seidel, Giving Service Members the
Credit They Deserve: A Review of Sentencing Credit and Its
Application, Army Law., Aug. 1999, at 10-14 (discussing credit
for violations of Article 13).
In a pretrial motion, Appellant asserted that the
conditions of his restriction order did not fulfill a legitimate
military purpose and imposed illegal pretrial punishment in
violation of Article 13. After conducting a hearing on the
motion, the military judge provided a detailed ruling. The
military judge found that the command had placed Appellant in
pretrial confinement because of “the risk of flight of the
accused, the detriment to the safety of the training command
with drug distribution to students, and the potential for
retribution against the confidential witness in the undercover
operation.” After reciting the circumstances involving
Appellant’s release from pretrial confinement and the ensuing
order into pretrial restriction, the military judge concluded
that the command “did not inten[d] to punish him by placing him
in pretrial restriction upon his release from pretrial
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confinement. The concerns elicited in evidence were for
legitimate nonpunitive government purposes.”
Although he did not rule that the decision to place
Appellant on pretrial restriction constituted an illegal order,
the military judge determined that “the facts also bear out
unduly rigorous circumstances during this period of pretrial
restraint.” The military judge identified three aspects of the
pretrial restriction order that supported his conclusion that
the restriction involved “unduly rigorous circumstances.”
First, after noting that Appellant’s wife was not a suspect, he
concluded that the limitation of Appellant and his wife to
supervised visitations was “not directly linked to a valid,
governmental purpose and intruded on the sanctity of his
marriage, a right which is often protected under a number of
rights in the Constitution of the United States.”
Second, the military judge concluded that the monitoring of
Appellant’s phone calls to his counsel “chilled his ability and
freedom to speak in a protected environment under the
attorney/client relationship, intruding upon [Appellant’s] . . .
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel.”
Third, the military judge concluded that “the terms of
[Appellant’s] restriction, particularly requirements which did
not directly serve the purpose of ensuring his presence at
trial, were unnecessary and unduly onerous.” The military judge
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stated that the command “placed him in an area with persons
serving punishment and persons stigmatized with pending
discharges for misconduct.” In addition, “[o]ver [Appellant’s]
objections, and while other reasonable accommodations likely
became available, he was restrained from the freedom of
movements [sic] and unduly restricted from activities which
serve no legitimate governmental purpose.” The military judge
did not address specifically the two conditions of restriction
that Appellant was convicted of disobeying -- the muster
requirement and the prohibition on riding in or driving an
automobile.
Based upon his conclusion that conditions more rigorous
than necessary had been imposed on Appellant during his period
of pretrial restriction, the military judge granted Appellant
day-for-day credit for the 143 days that he spent on pretrial
restriction. See Stringer, 55 M.J. at 93 (credit given for
onerous pretrial conditions). In addition, the military judge
awarded Appellant thirty-four days of sentence credit for the
earlier time that he spent in pretrial confinement. See United
States v. Allen, 17 M.J. 126, 128 (C.M.A. 1984) (credit given
for time spent in pretrial confinement).
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4. The defense motion to dismiss the charge of breaking
restriction
After the military judge granted sentence credit for the
Article 13 violation, and again at the close of the Government’s
case-in-chief, Appellant moved to dismiss the charge of breaking
restriction and its specifications, contending that the
conditions of Appellant’s restriction were unlawful. As noted
in section I.A.2., supra, Appellant was charged with violating
three conditions of his restriction: the requirement to muster,
the prohibition on riding in or driving a car, and the
limitation on making phone calls to individuals other than his
wife and lawyer.
The military judge denied the motion on the grounds that
the legality of Appellant’s restriction presented a “mixed
question of law and fact” that he would submit for decision by
the members of the court-martial panel. Prior to the panel’s
deliberation on findings, the military judge instructed the
panel members on the elements of breaking restriction, see MCM
pt. IV, para. 102.b., and on the factors bearing on the legality
of the restriction, see R.C.M. 304. The members acquitted
Appellant of breaking restriction by making telephone calls (two
specifications), but convicted him of breaking restriction by
failing to muster on specific occasions (five specifications)
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and by riding in or driving a car during the period of
restriction (two specifications).
B. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY JUDGE IN DETERMINING THE LEGALITY
OF AN ORDER
When the legality of an order is at issue, the issue must
be decided by the military judge, not the court-martial panel.
See United States v. Deisher, 61 M.J. 313, 317 (C.A.A.F. 2005)
(citing Article 51(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 851(b)(2000)); United
States v. New, 55 M.J. 95, 105 (C.A.A.F. 2001). As we noted in
Deisher, when the defense moves to dismiss a charge on the
grounds that the charged order was not lawful, “the military
judge must determine whether there is an adequate factual basis
for the allegation that the order was lawful.” 61 M.J. at 318.
We emphasized that if the military judge rules “that a specific
set of words would constitute a lawful order under a specific
set of circumstances, that is a preliminary ruling . . . [that]
does not relieve the prosecution of its responsibility during
its case-in-chief of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the facts
necessary to establish the elements of the offense.” Id.
On appeal, we consider the legality of an order under a de
novo standard of review. Id. at 317. If the military judge
erroneously submits the issue of legality to the members, we
consider on appeal whether a record has been established that
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permits us to resolve the question of legality without further
proceedings. Id. at 319.
C. DISCUSSION
In the present case, the military judge erred by treating
the legality of the restriction order as a mixed question of
fact and law to be resolved by the members. As a matter of law,
the presence of factual questions did not relieve the military
judge of his responsibility to decide, as a preliminary matter,
whether the order in the charged offenses was lawful. Id. at
318; see R.C.M. 905(d).
Appellant contends that the issue of legality was resolved
at trial adverse to the prosecution when the military judge
granted sentence credit on the grounds that the pretrial
restriction violated the requirements of Article 13. According
to Appellant, the military judge’s Article 13 ruling, which was
not appealed, constitutes the law of the case, and should
preclude de novo review of the legality of the order.
The record, however, does not support the defense
contention that the military judge determined the pretrial
restriction order to be void in its entirety. The pretrial
restriction order consisted of at least eleven separate
conditions. See section I.A.1., supra. In the course of ruling
on the defense motion for sentence credit under Article 13, the
military judge commented on a number of specific conditions but
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did not conclude that the order as a whole was invalid. See
section I.A.3., supra. His act of submitting the issue of
lawfulness to the members, while erroneous, underscores that he
did not conclude as a matter of law that the order was unlawful
in its entirety. Under these circumstances, the law of the case
doctrine does not require us to treat the military judge’s
decision to provide sentencing credit under Article 13 as a
determination that every aspect of the pretrial restriction
order was unlawful.
The restriction order in the present case does not involve
conditions that are so closely integrated that they must stand
or fall together. Here, the conditions are sufficiently
distinct that they may be evaluated separately for purposes of
our de novo review of legality. See Blye, 37 M.J. at 94-95
(considering legality of a condition of restriction under
standards applicable to consideration of the lawfulness of an
order). Furthermore, the record does not involve the type of
factual disputes that might give us pause about conducting a de
novo review. See Deisher, 61 M.J. at 318-19.
Only two of the pretrial restriction conditions resulted in
convictions that are at issue in the present appeal -- the
requirement to muster and the prohibition on riding in or
driving a car. Neither condition was relied upon expressly by
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the military judge as a basis for providing sentence credit
under Article 13.
The essential attributes of a lawful order include: (1)
issuance by competent authority; (2) communication of words that
express a specific mandate to do or not do a specific act; and
(3) relationship of the order to a military duty. Id. at 317;
MCM pt. IV, para. 14.c.(2)(a). “An order is presumed lawful,
and the accused bears the burden of rebutting the presumption.”
Deisher, 61 M.J. at 317.
In the present case, the first two attributes -- issuance
by a competent authority and the specificity of the
communication -- are not at issue. Our focus is on the
relationship between the condition at issue and a military duty.
Muster requirements are often imposed as a condition of
pretrial restriction. See United States v. Hudson, 59 M.J. 357,
360 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (addressing a pretrial restriction order
that included a muster provision); United States v. McCarthy, 47
M.J. 162, 163 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (addressing a pretrial restriction
order that required twice-daily muster); United States v.
Cherok, 22 M.J. 438, 439 (C.M.A. 1986) (holding that a pretrial
restriction with hourly muster requirement was not so onerous as
to constitute confinement). Muster serves the military’s need
for accountability of personnel and allows detainees to continue
to work, attend appointments, participate in physical training,
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and attend meals without the burden of constant supervision.
Appellant has not rebutted the presumption of lawfulness by
demonstrating that the muster requirement in the present case
did not fulfill a military duty or that it was otherwise
unlawful.
The prohibition against riding in or driving a car also was
imposed because Appellant was suspected of selling drugs from
cars and meeting potential drug customers in cars. His
commander sought to prevent him from continuing to engage in
drug sales from vehicles. This condition was imposed to ensure
that Appellant remained on the installation, was available for
trial, and did not engage in additional misconduct. Appellant
has not rebutted the presumption of lawfulness by demonstrating
that this condition did not fulfill a military duty or that it
was otherwise unlawful.
In light of the foregoing considerations, we conclude under
the circumstances of this case that the military judge’s error
in submitting the question of lawfulness of the conditions of
restriction to the panel members was harmless. See United
States v. Alameda, 57 M.J. 190, 199-200 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
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II. CONSPIRACY TO OBSTRUCT JUSTICE (ISSUE II)
A. BACKGROUND
Appellant was charged with selling cocaine to Mr. D, a
known drug dealer who was cooperating with Naval Criminal
Investigative Service. In addition, Appellant was charged with
a number of related offenses concerning his interaction with Mr.
D, including communicating three separate threats to kill Mr. D
or his family if Mr. D testified at Appellant’s court-martial,
and conspiring with “John Doe” to obstruct justice by
threatening to kill Mr. D.
At trial, the prosecution introduced the following
evidence with respect to the charged conspiracy and related
threats. Mr. D, the cooperating witness, lived with his mother.
During the two months before Appellant’s court-martial, Mr. D’s
mother received three telephone calls and a package threatening
violence if Mr. D testified at Appellant’s court-martial. The
first two telephone calls were traced to Appellant’s home phone
number. The package was addressed to Mr. D and contained two
9mm bullets with Mr. D’s name attached. The package included
the following note:
Don’t be stupid! They can’t and won’t protect you.
Especially with people like [various names] . . .
after you. We hear they’ve got about $10,000 for your
head. But, that’s the least of your worries. If you
show to F[. . .] over my partner, I promise that ten-
grand will be collected ASAP. We’ll also see to it
that your address and number be well known. So be
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smart . . . live and let live, or BE A DEAD HERO!!!!
They’ve used you, don’t let them get you KILLED!!!!!.
Subsequently, Mr. D’s mother received a third telephone
call, which she recorded on her answering machine. She
testified that a male voice asked “Did you get my mail?” The
male voice also said “don’t be brave” and used the word “dead.”
Then she heard what appeared to be the sound of a person taking
the phone away from the male caller, and a female voice saying
“Not on the phone . . . Don’t say that.” The female voice then
spoke into the phone, saying “Bitch don’t call. My number is
404-***-*****.” Mr. D testified that he listened to the
recorded message and identified the male caller as Appellant.
Mr. D stated that the threats made him feel “uneasy” about
testifying at Appellant’s court-martial.
The prosecution argued that the conspiracy charge was
supported by the evidence that someone mailed the threatening
package to Mr. D’s mother on Appellant’s behalf, and by the
evidence that the third telephone call was made by Appellant and
an unknown female asking whether the mail was received,
accompanied by further threats.
With respect to the conspiracy charge, the military judge
instructed the members that they must be convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that: (1) Appellant entered into an agreement
with an unknown person to commit an obstruction of justice; and
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(2) while the agreement continued to exist, Appellant, the
unknown person, or both threatened to kill Mr. D or his family
if he testified against Appellant at the court-martial. See MCM
pt. IV, para. 5.b. (elements of conspiracy); MCM pt. IV, para.
96.b. (elements of obstruction of justice).
The panel members convicted Appellant of conspiring with
“John Doe” to obstruct justice by threatening Mr. D. The
members also convicted Appellant of three specifications of
communicating a threat, based on the two telephone calls traced
to Appellant’s phone and the package containing the note and
bullets.
B. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient as a
matter of law to show that he conspired with another person to
commit the offense of obstruction of justice. Appellant points
out that the evidence did not show that any person other than
Appellant mailed the package with the threatening note. In that
regard, the findings indicated that Appellant mailed the package
and made the first two threatening phone calls.
Appellant further contends that the existence of a
conspiracy with another person could not be established by the
third telephone call to Mr. D’s mother, which featured the
voices of both Appellant and an unknown female. Appellant
asserts that this evidence is insufficient because he was
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charged with conspiring with “John Doe,” not a female, and
because the content of the third telephone call did not
demonstrate a prior conspiracy.
The standard for determining the legal sufficiency of
evidence supporting a guilty verdict is “whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); see United States v. Turner, 25
M.J. 324, 324-25 (C.M.A. 1987).
The prosecution is not required to establish the identity
of co-conspirators or their particular connection with the
criminal purpose. MCM pt. IV, para. 5.c.(1). The agreement in
a conspiracy need not be in any particular form or manifested in
any formal words. MCM pt. IV, para. 5.c.(2); United States v.
Cobb, 45 M.J. 82, 84 (C.A.A.F. 1996). It is sufficient if the
agreement is “merely a mutual understanding among the parties.”
Cobb, 45 M.J. at 85 (citing United States v. Barnes, 38 M.J. 72,
75 (C.M.A. 1993)) (quotation marks omitted). The existence of a
conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence,
including reasonable inferences derived from the conduct of the
parties themselves. Id.; MCM pt. IV, para. 5.c.(2).
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, a rational factfinder could have found beyond a
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reasonable doubt that Appellant and the female caller had an
agreement to threaten Mr. D with violence and intimidate him
from testifying at Appellant’s court-martial. The members could
have concluded that the woman recorded on the third telephone
call was coaching Appellant in an attempt to make their threats
credible. She was heard instructing him not to mention the
package. The members could have determined that the female
listed a nonexistent telephone number to confuse Mr. D’s mother
or to obscure the caller’s identity. Moreover, the woman
threatened Mr. D’s mother directly by saying, “Bitch, don’t call
me.” This evidence, taken together, could have led a rational
factfinder to the conclusion that Appellant and the unknown
female were working together to frighten Mr. D from testifying
against Appellant at his court-martial. The fact that the co-
conspirator in this case was not a male “John Doe” as alleged in
the specification to Charge I, but instead was a female, carries
no legal significance.
We conclude that the third threatening telephone call to
Mr. D’s mother -- in light of the package and the threatening
note mailed to her -- provided sufficient evidence for a
rational factfinder to determine that Appellant conspired with
an unknown female to obstruct justice by threatening harm to Mr.
D or his family. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. In view of our
conclusion, we need not determine whether any of the other
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evidence of threatening actions provided legally sufficient
evidence of a conspiracy.
III. POST-TRIAL AND APPELLATE DELAY
We review de novo Appellant’s claim that he was denied his
due process right to a speedy post-trial review and appeal.
United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 135 (C.A.A.F. 2006). The
court below noted that the post-trial processing of the case
involved unreasonable and unexplained delay, and provided relief
under the court’s sentence appropriateness authority by reducing
the dishonorable discharge to a bad-conduct discharge. See
United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219, 223-24 (C.A.A.F. 2002);
Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2000).
With respect to the overall post-trial and appellate
period, we review a claim of a due process violation under the
test set forth in Moreno, 63 M.J. at 135-36. Assuming an
unreasonable length of time and a timely assertion of the right
to speedy appellate review, Appellant has not established either
that he was denied timely review of a meritorious appellate
issue or that he otherwise suffered cognizable prejudice. Under
these circumstances, we decline to provide relief beyond that
granted at the court below under Tardif. See United States v.
Allison, 63 M.J. 365, 370 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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