United States v. Lundy

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
William T. LUNDY, Staff Sergeant
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 03-0620
Crim. App. No. 20000069
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued March 21, 2006
Decided July 18, 2006
BAKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GIERKE,
C.J., and CRAWFORD and ERDMANN, JJ., joined. EFFRON, J., filed
a separate opinion concurring in part and in the result.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Seth A. Director (argued); Colonel John
T. Phelps II, Colonel Mark Cremin, Lieutenant Colonel Kirsten V.
C. Brunson, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Tellitocci, Major Charles A.
Kuhfahl Jr., Captain Charles L. Pritchard Jr., and Captain
Jeremy W. Robinson (on brief); Major Sean S. Park.
For Appellee: Major William J. Nelson (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Theresa A. Gallagher (on brief); Colonel Steven T.
Salata and Captain Flor M. Suarez.
Military Judge: William T. Barto
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
On January 27, 2000, Appellant was convicted in accordance
with his pleas of forcible sodomy with a child under the age of
twelve, forcible sodomy with a child under the age of sixteen,
and six specifications of indecent acts with a child under the
age of sixteen in violation of Articles 125 and 134, Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 925, 934 (2000).
He was convicted contrary to his pleas of attempted carnal
knowledge with a child under the age of twelve and attempted
indecent acts with a child over the age of sixteen in violation
of Article 80, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 880 (2000). The adjudged
sentence included a dishonorable discharge, confinement for
twenty-three years and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade
(E-1). The sentence approved by the convening authority
included a dishonorable discharge and confinement for eighteen
years. He also approved the reduction to E-1, but waived the
mandatory forfeitures under Article 58b, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 858b
(2000). This case is on appeal to this Court a second time.1
Appellant’s pretrial agreement included a commitment from
the convening authority on behalf of the United States to “defer
1
See United States v. Lundy (Lundy II), 60 M.J. 52 (C.A.A.F.
2004) (this Court reversing and remanding); United States v.
Lundy (Lundy III), 60 M.J. 941 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2005)(on
remand, lower court affirming findings of guilty and sentence);
United States v. Lundy (Lundy I), 58 M.J. 802 (A. Ct. Crim. App.
2003) (lower court affirming findings of guilty and sentence).
2
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
any and all reductions and forfeitures, until sentence is
approved, suspend any and all adjudged and waive any and all
automatic reductions and forfeitures and pay them to
[Appellant’s] wife to the full extent of the law.” The question
presented on this appeal is whether the timing of the
Government’s execution of this term was material to the
agreement and therefore to Appellant’s decision to plead guilty.
If so, Appellant argues that under United States v. Perron, 58
M.J. 78 (C.A.A.F. 2003), he is entitled to withdraw his plea as
improvident.
BACKGROUND
After the trial, the convening authority deferred the
adjudged reduction in grade and the mandatory forfeitures that
would have taken effect under Article 58b, UCMJ. However, the
convening authority did not suspend or waive “any and all
adjudged . . . [and] automatic reductions and forfeitures.” In
light of an Army regulation that precluded suspending a
mandatory reduction in grade unless a convening authority also
suspended any related confinement or punitive discharge, the
convening authority did not suspend Appellant’s mandatory
reduction. Dep’t of the Army, Reg. 600-8-19, Personnel-General:
Enlisted Promotions and Reductions para 7-1d (May 1, 2000).
Consequently, upon the convening authority’s action, Appellant
was automatically reduced from grade E-6 to E-1. In turn,
3
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
Appellant’s wife received payments based on the rate of pay of
an E-1 rather than that of an E-6. Thus, Appellant’s wife
received some of what was bargained for on her behalf, but not
all.
In Lundy II, because the United States Army Court of
Criminal Appeals in Lundy I determined that the provision at
issue here was a material term, we remanded to that court to
determine: (a) whether specific performance was possible; and
if not (b) whether there were viable options for alternative
relief under Perron. 60 M.J. at 60. However, in light of our
conclusion in Perron that the government cannot impose
alternative relief on an unwilling appellant to satisfy a
material term in a pretrial agreement, we also ordered the lower
court to determine whether the timing of any payments was
material to the pretrial agreement. Id. at 60-61.
In Lundy III, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined on
remand that specific performance was available. 60 M.J. at 944.
It further concluded that “[a]lthough appellant argues that
specific performance at this late date is, in actuality, a form
of alternative relief because the timing of payments is a
material provision of his pretrial agreement, he has failed to
demonstrate such materiality.” Id. The lower court noted that
following Lundy II, the Secretary of the Army’s designee
authorized the convening authority to suspend Appellant’s
4
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
automatic reduction without the requirement of also suspending
the related confinement and punitive discharge. Id. at 943.
Further, after the lower court’s determination in Lundy III, the
Defense Finance and Accounting Service made payment to
Appellant’s wife in October 2005 in the amount of the difference
between the E-1 rate and the E-6 rate of pay for six months with
interest. At this point, Appellant received the monetary
benefit of his bargain. However, Appellant now renews his claim
that the timing of payments at the E-6 rate for the six-month
period following the convening authority’s action “played a
large part in his decision to enter into the pretrial
agreement,” and thus his plea was improvident.
DISCUSSION
A pretrial agreement is a contract between the accused and
the convening authority. See United States v. Acevedo, 50 M.J.
169, 172 (C.A.A.F. 1999). Therefore, “we look to the basic
principles of contract law when interpreting pretrial
agreements.” Id. However, a pretrial agreement is a
constitutional rather than a commercial contract. Typically, an
accused foregoes his or her constitutional rights, including the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to
trial by members, and the right to confront witnesses against
him in exchange for a reduction in sentence or other benefit.
Perron, 58 M.J. at 81. As a result, when interpreting pretrial
5
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
agreements, “contract principles are outweighed by the
Constitution’s Due Process Clause protections for an accused.”
Acevedo, 50 M.J. at 172. In a criminal context, the government
is bound to keep its constitutional promises, whereas in a
commercial context it might accept the financial consequences of
breach. Thus, financial remedies are not necessarily an
appropriate or available remedy for breach of a plea agreement.
The right to confrontation, for example, is not redeemable for
interest.
Interpretation of a pretrial agreement is a question of
law, which we review de novo. Id. Whether the government has
complied with the material terms and conditions of an agreement
presents a mixed question of law and fact. Hometown Financial,
Inc. v. United States, 409 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Gilbert v. Dep’t of Justice, 334 F.3d 1065, 1071 (Fed. Cir.
2003). Generally courts look to all of the facts and
circumstances for this determination, and the inquiry is
generally considered a question of fact. Singer v. West Publ’g
Corp., 310 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1253 (S.D. Fla. 2004). In the
context of pretrial agreements involving the constitutional
rights of a military accused, we look not only to the terms of
the agreement, or contract, but to the accused’s understanding
of the terms of an agreement as reflected in the record as a
whole. Where, as here, the relevant facts are undisputed, the
6
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
materiality determination necessarily reduces to a question of
law. Gilbert, 334 F.3d at 1072; United States v. Green, 1 M.J.
453, 456 (C.M.A. 1976).
An appellant bears the burden of establishing that there is
a significant basis in law or fact to overturn a guilty plea.
United States v. Prater, 32 M.J. 433, 436 (C.M.A. 1991); United
States v. Jordan, 57 M.J. 236, 238 (C.A.A.F. 2002). Thus, in
this context, Appellant bears the burden of establishing that a
term or condition of the agreement was material to his decision
to plead guilty, that the Government failed to comply with that
term or condition, and therefore, that his plea was improvident.
The term in dispute obligated the convening authority to
“suspend any and all adjudged and waive any and all automatic
reductions and forfeitures, and pay them to [Appellant’s] wife
to the full extent of the law.” The agreement is silent as to
the timing of performance. However, by law this event could not
occur sooner than the convening authority’s action. As a matter
of practice, and in the absence of a contrary agreement, such
waivers of forfeitures and suspensions are ordinarily executed
at the time of the convening authority’s action. Article 57,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 857 (2000).
The record reflects the following additional facts:
Appellant was sentenced on January 27, 2000.
7
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
The convening authority deferred enforcement of
automatic forfeitures until he could act on the
sentence.
The convening authority took action on May 26, 2000, but
did not waive or suspend the automatic reduction because
of provisions contained in a departmental regulation.
For the six-month period following the convening
authority’s action, Appellant’s wife received the
benefit of the waived forfeitures at the E-1 rate. She
also received $6,845 of transitional compensation for
this same period of time.
In March of 2001, Appellant became aware of the fact
that his wife had only received the reduced benefit.
On June 19, 2003, the Court of Criminal Appeals issued
its first opinion in this case upholding the convening
authority’s action in not waiving or suspending the
automatic reduction. (Lundy I.)
On June 24, 2004, this Court issued its opinion
remanding to the lower court for a determination on the
issue of specific performance. (Lundy II.)
On January 3, 2005, the convening authority received an
exception to the departmental regulation, which allowed
him to suspend the automatic reduction previously
approved in his prior action.
On March 10, 2005, the Army Court of Criminal Appeals
issued its second opinion in the case. (Lundy III.)
On October 7, 2005, Appellant’s wife received the
remainder of the benefit due her under the pretrial
agreement, i.e., the difference between the E-1 and E-6
rate of pay for six months with interest.
This is a difficult case, in part, because there is an
absence of information as to the relevance of timing at the time
the agreement was concluded. In the abstract, the absence of
any discussion during the plea inquiry regarding timing would
8
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
seem to support a conclusion that the timing of the payments was
not a material condition to the agreement. However, as noted
above, in the ordinary course of military practice the
suspension or waiver of “any and all reductions and forfeitures”
would ordinarily occur at the time of the convening authority’s
action. Thus, absent language to the contrary, we think it fair
to imply as a term of Appellant’s agreement that it was
contemplated that the waived forfeiture of pay at the E-6 rate
was to accrue to Appellant’s wife at the time the convening
authority acted and that he could expect that this would happen
at the time he pled guilty.
In our view, this is Appellant’s strongest argument that
the term was material to his decision to plead guilty. The
purpose behind the waiver of forfeitures is to provide for an
accused’s dependents. The law requires that dependents receive
such waived forfeitures. Article 58b, UCMJ. It is intuitive
that military members would want their dependents to benefit
from the present value of any waiver of forfeitures. However,
the law also provides, in context, for transitional assistance
to the abused dependents of a servicemember convicted at court-
martial. Dep’t of Defense, Instr. 1342.24, Transitional
Compensation for Abused Dependents para. 2.2.3. (May 23, 1995,
Administrative Reissuance Incorporating Change 1, Jan. 16,
1997). As a result, it is not necessarily the case that an
9
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
accused’s agreement to plead guilty in exchange for a waiver of
forfeitures and suspension of reductions is intended to provide
for the immediate financial needs of a member’s dependents as
opposed to contributing to the dependents’ intermediate or
longer term financial needs. More to the point, timing would
always be a material condition to an agreement to waive
forfeitures and reductions, absent contrary language. This was
neither the lower court’s conclusion in this case, nor this
Court’s conclusion in Perron.
In Perron, we looked beyond the terms of the agreement, to
the record as a whole, for evidence that the timing of execution
of the agreement’s financial terms was material to the accused’s
decision to plead guilty. 58 M.J. 85. Thus, in Perron, we drew
from defense counsel’s colloquy with the military judge stating
that the appellant’s specific understanding was that the
suspension of forfeitures would provide financial support during
his sixty-day period of confinement. See id. When this did not
occur, Perron went into a no-pay status and his family received
no money. See id. Defense counsel then sent a clemency request
to the convening authority stating “Please consider BM2
[Boatswain’s Mate Second Class] Perron’s family in this matter.
The family cannot survive financially without the aid of BM2
Perron.” Id. at 79. Further, defense counsel then requested
that the convening authority grant relief from the pay
10
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
provisions or immediately release Perron from jail in order to
gain immediate employment and provide financial relief for his
family. Id.Appellant has not met his burden of establishing similar
evidence that timing was material in this case. The following
factors while not determinative, inform this conclusion.
First, the pivotal clause in the plea agreement contained
the phrase “to the full extent of the law.” This suggests
emphasis on the amount of payment and not necessarily the speed
or timing of payment. “To the full extent of the law” is a term
of art designed to maximize payment, but not necessarily
expedite process. The term implicitly concedes that the parties
are not in agreement, or have yet to conclude, the specific
parameters of the agreed-upon benefit.
This conclusion is supported by the military judge’s
inquiry into this term during the providence inquiry:
MJ: What does “To the full extent as allowed by law” mean,
[defense counsel]?
DC: Sir, as I understand the state of the law right now,
that would be six months from the approval. However, sir,
I wanted it to be to the full extent of the law because it
may change, sir.
MJ: The law may change.
DC: But I believe it’s six months.
MJ: Government concur?
11
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
TC: Sir, the government’s belief is that it’s six months.
That’s correct.
Defense counsel’s response emphasizes the duration of payment,
rather than the immediacy or timing of payment, and both counsel
reflect uncertainty as to the scope of the law.
In Lundy II, we observed that the regulatory impediment
precluding the convening authority from suspending the reduction
resulted from a departmental action rather than a statutory
mandate. 60 M.J. at 58. As such, the Army was free to modify
the regulation, create an exception, or grant a waiver. Id.But such steps, even if immediately pursued, could take
substantial bureaucratic time. This undercuts Appellant’s
argument that the immediacy of the payments was material to his
decision to plead guilty.
Second, the waiver of forfeitures in Appellant’s agreement
accrued to the benefit of a third party, in this case,
Appellant’s wife. Regarding this third-party benefit, the
convening authority began performance when he deferred the
forfeitures and reduction immediately after the trial. Since
the convening authority’s ultimate action failed to suspend any
reduction, the result was an incomplete or partial performance
of the promises that would complete the benefit to Appellant’s
wife.
12
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
However, Appellant has not demonstrated that the third-
party beneficiary complained. More importantly, because the
constitutional bargain was with Appellant and not his wife, the
record reflects that Appellant was not aware until March 2001,
that his wife did not receive the full benefit of his bargain.
Thus, unlike the situation in Perron, here Appellant did not
complain about the convening authority’s failure to act until
some thirteen months after the fact. Perron, 58 M.J. 79-80.
This negates Appellant’s assertion that the timing of the
payments was material to his decision to plead guilty because
Appellant appears not to have been concerned whether or not his
wife had received the benefit of the agreement at the time it
was due.
During the appellate process, Appellant submitted several
affidavits, which were considered by the court below. See Lundy
I, 58 M.J. at 807 n.12; Lundy III, 60 M.J. at 942-43. In the
affidavit of October 22, 2004, Appellant suggests that the
belated payment to his wife of the difference between E-1 and E-
6 pay is no longer of value to his family. He claims that his
wife has left him for another man and attributes this, in part,
to “the need for additional support which had been denied them
by the actions taken in regards to my pay.” He further
indicates that his daughter (the victim of his offenses) intends
on moving out of the household with his wife to live with
13
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
Appellant’s mother. Appellant’s logic is that any benefit
provided his wife at this point would not benefit his daughter.
This may be the case. However, the appellate question is not
whether circumstances have changed such that Appellant’s family
might benefit less from the terms of the agreement, but whether
at the time of the agreement, the condition now in dispute was
material to his decision to plead guilty.
To return to where we began our analysis, these factors do
not demonstrate that timing was necessarily irrelevant to
Appellant’s decision to plead guilty. But in light of these
facts, Appellant has not met his burden of demonstrating that
the timing of the payment to his wife of the difference between
the two pay grades with interest was material to his agreement
to plead guilty. Therefore, we agree with the Court of Criminal
Appeals that the belated payment to Appellant’s wife is not
alternative relief, but constitutes specific performance of the
original pretrial agreement.
DECISION
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.
14
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
EFFRON, Judge (concurring in part and in the result):
I agree with the majority that Appellant has failed to
carry the burden of demonstrating that there is a significant
basis in law to overturn his plea. I write separately to focus
on the Government’s offer to provide full payment plus interest
to cover the delay in the payment that is the subject of the
present appeal. Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the
Government’s offer does not constitute an adequate remedy under
the circumstances of this case.
As the majority notes, it is “fair to imply as a term of
Appellant’s agreement that it was contemplated that the waived
forfeiture of pay at the E-6 rate was to accrue to Appellant’s
wife at the time the convening authority acted and that
Appellant could expect that this would happen at the time he
pled guilty.” United States v. Lundy, 63 M.J. __, __ (9)
(C.A.A.F. 2006). “It is intuitive that military members would
want their dependents to benefit from the present value of any
waiver of forfeitures.” Id. at __ (9).
In that context, factors such as the availability of
transitional compensation and the request for payments “to the
full extent of the law,” see id. at __ (9–11), do not
demonstrate that Appellant contemplated that the agreement would
permit delayed payments at the E-6 level. Such factors
underscore that financial assistance to the family was a
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
significant factor in the decision to plead guilty, but do not
reflect that the parties contemplated a significant delay in the
timing of the agreed-upon payments. While there may be cases in
which the availability of transitional compensation and
possibility of changes in the law would permit us to discount
the importance of timing, the record here does not demonstrate
that this is such a case.
By its actions, the Government has recognized that timing
was an important component of the agreement. The Government has
agreed not only to provide the full payment at the E-6 level,
but it has also agreed to pay interest to remedy the untimely
payment. Interest payments are a classic means of compensating
one party for the other party’s delay in making payments.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 354(1) (1981). In that
light, we may proceed on the basis that immediate payments were
contemplated by Appellant, but that does not resolve the
question of whether the delay requires nullification of the
agreement.
There are a number of ways to address the government’s
failure to perform its responsibilities under a plea agreement:
(1) Require specific performance by the government or
permit withdrawal from the agreement. See United States v.
Perron, 58 M.J. 78, 84 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (citing Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971)).
2
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
(2) Provide for alternative relief, with the consent of the
Appellant. See id. at 86 (holding that an alternative remedy
may not be imposed on an unwilling defendant).
(3) Provide an adequate remedy to cure the material breach
of the agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 698 F.2d
31, 37 (1st Cir. 1983) (resentencing defendant to time already
served where other remedies would be meaningless or infeasible);
Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 20-21 (4th Cir. 1979)
(ordering specific enforcement “to the extent possible” of a
plea proposal withdrawn by the government, where the lapse of
time and intervening circumstances compelled the court to
disregard some obligations of the government and defendant).
The term “specific performance” does not require the
government to comply with each literal detail of the agreement
when there is an adequate remedy. As we noted in Perron,
“[w]here the failed term in the agreement involves pure economic
concerns, finding relief of equal value is possible.” 58 M.J.
at 85. Even when the term of an agreement involves a non-
economic benefit, literal performance is not necessarily
required if the level of performance possible at a later date
constitutes an adequate remedy. See, e.g., Garcia, 698 F.2d at
37; Cooper, 594 F.2d at 20-21. In that regard, there is a
distinction between: (1) alternative relief, which involves
creation of a new agreement requiring the consent of the
3
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
parties; and (2) an adequate remedy, which does not require any
further agreement.
When the issue on appeal involves delayed timing of
performance by the government, the question of whether belated
performance constitutes an adequate remedy must be assessed on a
case-by-case basis. The common law of contracts provides an
important source of authority in this regard. The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, states that among the factors to be
considered in assessing the adequacy of a remedy proposed to
cure a contractual breach are the extent to which the breach may
deprive a party of an expected benefit, whether a party can be
adequately compensated for the lost benefit, the likelihood that
the breaching party will perform a remedy, the breaching party’s
adherence to standards of good faith and fair dealing, and
whether delay precludes reasonable substitute arrangements.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §§ 241, 242 (1981). Contract
law, however, is helpful but not determinative. The ultimate
assessment must also reflect due process considerations. See
Perron, 58 M.J. at 85-86 (stating that the remedy for a material
breach of a pretrial agreement must corroborate the
voluntariness of the guilty plea).
In Perron, the lower court concluded that the timing of the
payments was addressed on the face of the agreement. 58 M.J. at
85. In that context, with the breach of the agreement as to
4
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
timing at issue, we concluded that the government’s offer of
belated payments plus interest could not be treated as specific
performance, but instead amounted to alternative relief, which
could be substituted only with the consent of the appellant.
See id. at 85-86.
In the present case, the agreement on its face does not
address timing. Our prior decision in this case expressly left
open the question of whether a belated payment could constitute
specific performance. United States v. Lundy, 60 M.J. 52, 60-61
(C.A.A.F. 2004) (remanding to determine whether a delayed
implementation of a suspension would be considered specific
performance). Here, the agreement focused on the provision of
financial benefits to his dependents. In this context,
Appellant must not only show the adverse effects of belated
payments -- a matter addressed in his filings with our Court --
but he must also demonstrate that full payments plus interest
would not provide an adequate remedy.
Appellant’s dependents can now receive a substantial sum of
money from the Government, including interest covering the time
during which payments were delayed. Appellant has failed to
demonstrate that the payment of substantial sums to his
dependents, at this time, would not constitute an adequate
remedy for the Government’s breach. Accordingly, he has not met
5
United States v. Lundy, No. 03-0620/AR
his burden of showing that there is a significant basis in law
for overturning his plea.
6