United States v. Altier

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Dominic P. ALTIER, Gas Turbine System Mechanical Technician
First Class
U.S. Navy, Appellant
No. 12-0496
Crim. App. No. 201000361
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued November 13, 2012
Decided December 19, 2012
PER CURIAM1
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant David C. Dziengowski, JAGC, USN,
(argued); Lieutenant Toren G. Mushovic, JAGC, USN (on brief);
Lieutenant Commander Michael R. Torrisi, JAGC, USN.
For Appellee: Colonel Stephen C. Newman, USMC (argued); Brian
K. Keller, Esq. (on brief); Colonel Kurt J. Brubaker, USMC,
Captain Sam C. Moore, USMC, and Lieutenant Ian McClean, JAGC,
USN.
Military Judge: Ross Leuning
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication.
1
See United States v. Altier, __ M.J. ___ (Daily Journal, Oct.
12, 2012).
United States v. Altier, No. 12-0496/NA
PER CURIAM:
At Appellant’s first trial, a special court-martial
composed of officer and enlisted members convicted Appellant,
contrary to his pleas, of fraternization (one specification) and
creating a hostile work environment (one specification), in
violation of Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2006). The sentence, as adjudged by
the court-martial and approved by the convening authority,
consisted of a bad-conduct discharge. On appeal, the Navy-
Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings and
returned the case to the Judge Advocate General for a possible
rehearing on the sentence. United States v. Altier, No. NMCCA
201000361, 2011 CCA LEXIS 102, at *19-*20, 2011 WL 2044807, at
*6 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. May 26, 2011).
At a rehearing on the sentence before a special court-
martial composed of a military judge sitting alone, defense
counsel urged the military judge to impose “no further
punishment.” Defense counsel added that if the military judge
determined that a “message” was necessary, then he should impose
a sentence no greater than the punishment “that could be imposed
at NJP.”2 The military judge sentenced Appellant to thirty days
of confinement, forty-five days of restriction with hard labor,
2
The term “NJP” refers to nonjudicial punishment under Article
15, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (2006).
2
United States v. Altier, No. 12-0496/NA
reduction to the pay-grade of E-5, and forfeitures of $1,500.00
per month for three months. The convening authority approved
the sentence, but stayed its execution, and the Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed, also staying the execution of the
sentence. United States v. Altier, No. NMCCA 201000361, 2012
CCA LEXIS 156, at * 9, 2012 WL 1514767, at *2 (N-M. Ct. Crim.
App. Apr. 30, 2012).
On Appellant’s petition, we granted review of the following
issue:
WHETHER APPELLANT’S SENTENCE VIOLATES ARTICLE 63,
UCMJ, AND R.C.M. 810(d) BECAUSE IT IS IN EXCESS OF AND
MORE SEVERE THAN HIS ORIGINAL APPROVED COURT-MARTIAL
SENTENCE.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
Article 63 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 863 (2006), states:
Upon a rehearing the accused may not be
tried for any offense of which he was found
not guilty by the first-court-martial, and
no sentence in excess of or more severe than
the original sentence may be approved,
unless the sentence is based upon a finding
of guilty of an offense not considered upon
the merits in the original proceedings, or
unless the sentence prescribed for the
offense is mandatory.3
3
Article 63 further states:
If the sentence approved after the first court-martial
was in accordance with a pretrial agreement and the
accused at the rehearing changes his plea with respect
to the charges or specifications upon which the
pretrial agreement was based, or otherwise does not
3
United States v. Altier, No. 12-0496/NA
Under Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 810(d), the limitation in
Article 63 applies only when the convening authority acts upon
the result of the rehearing, and does not apply during the
adjudication of the sentence at the rehearing. See id.Our cases regarding Article 63 reflect both the obligation
to give meaning and effect to the statutory limitation against a
sentence that is “in excess of or more severe” than the original
sentence, and an understanding that the application of the
Article 63 limitation in any case cannot be reduced to a
specific formula. See, e.g., United States v. Kelley, 5 C.M.A.
259, 262-63, 17 C.M.R. 259, 262-63 (1954); United States v.
Darusin, 20 C.M.A. 354, 356, 43 C.M.R. 194, 196 (1971); United
States v. Mitchell, 58 M.J. 446, 448-49 (C.A.A.F. 2003). We
have further determined that our opinions interpreting the
relationship between discharges and other forms of punishment
with respect to other areas of law, such as sentencing credits,
are instructive but not conclusive in the application of Article
63. See Mitchell, 58 M.J. at 448.
II.
A punitive discharge adds to the stigma of a federal
conviction and severely limits the opportunity of a former
comply with the pretrial agreement, the approved
sentence as to those charges or specifications may
include any punishment not in excess of that lawfully
adjudged at the first court-martial.
4
United States v. Altier, No. 12-0496/NA
servicemember to receive important federal benefits, such as
those administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs. See
United States v. Rasnick, 58 M.J. 9, 10 (C.A.A.F. 2003). In
Mitchell, we stated that “for the purposes of Article 63, a
dishonorable discharge is more severe than a bad-conduct
discharge.” 58 M.J. at 449. We held in Mitchell that the
increase in severity of the discharge at the rehearing, from a
bad-conduct discharge to a dishonorable discharge, could not be
offset by a decrease in severity of the confinement and
forfeitures at the rehearing. Id. In contrast to the sentence
at issue in Mitchell, Appellant in the present case did not
receive a punitive discharge at the rehearing. Instead,
Appellant received a sentence containing terms similar in
effect, although not identical to, the types of punishment that
could be imposed in a non-judicial setting under Article 15,
UCMJ. Under the specific circumstances of this case, we
conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err under
Article 63 in affirming a sentence adjudged by the court-martial
and approved by the convening authority.4
4
The present case highlights the somewhat unusual situation
under current court-martial practice in which the court-martial
has the responsibility of adjudicating a sentence upon
rehearing, but must do so without transparent knowledge of the
lawful maximum punishment. The Discussion accompanying R.C.M.
810(d) states that the members “should not be advised of the
sentence limitation under this rule.” The Analysis accompanying
the Discussion emphasizes that the suggested restriction on
5
United States v. Altier, No. 12-0496/NA
III. DECISION
The decision of the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.5
advising the members of the sentence limitation was placed in
the non-binding Discussion, and is not phrased in mandatory
terms, in order to leave the matter open for further
development. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Analysis
of the Rules for Courts-Martial app. 21 at A21-51 (2012 ed.).
Under current procedures, courts-martial are placed in the
position of adjudicating sentences without knowledge of the
lawful maximum punishments with regard to cases subject to the
limitations in Article 63. The President, acting under the
rulemaking authority of Article 36, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 836(2006), may wish to consider whether transparency in the
sentencing process could be improved by providing a process in
the Rules for the military judge to determine the maximum
permissible punishment in light of Article 63 after receiving
input from the parties.
5
The stay in execution of the sentence that was ordered in the
grant of review is lifted.
6