United States v. Stevenson

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Walter S. STEVENSON, Hospital Corpsman Third Class
U.S. Navy, Appellant
No. 06-0934
Crim. App. No. 200301272
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 24, 2007
Decided February 14, 2008
BAKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ERDMANN,
STUCKY, and RYAN, JJ., joined. EFFRON, C.J., filed a separate
opinion concurring in part and in the result.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Commander M. Eric Eversole, JAGC, USN
(argued); Lieutenant A. M. Cooper, JAGC, USN.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Derek D. Butler, JAGC, USN (argued);
Major Brian K. Keller, USMC (on brief); Commander Paul C.
LeBlanc, JAGC, USN, and Major Wilbur Lee, USMC.
Amicus Curiae for Appellant: Christopher J. Eckhart (law
student) (argued); Joel M. Schumm, Esq. (supervising attorney)
(on brief) -- for the Indiana University School of Law,
Indianapolis.
Military Judge: Raymond Kreichelt
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Stevenson, No. 06-0934/NA
Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant was tried by a general court-martial convened
with members at Naval Station Great Lakes, Illinois. Contrary
to his pleas, he was convicted of rape, in violation of Article
120, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920(2000). The court members sentenced him to confinement for
three years, and a dishonorable discharge. The sentence was
approved by the convening authority, and affirmed by the United
States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals. United
States v. Stevenson (Stevenson I), 52 M.J. 504, 510 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. 1999). On Appellant’s petition we granted review of
the following questions:
I. WHETHER NCIS AND VA HOSPITAL PERSONNEL VIOLATED THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT BY SEIZING APPELLANT’S BLOOD AND SEARCHING IT FOR
DNA EVIDENCE WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE OR A SEARCH WARRANT
ISSUED ON PROBABLE CAUSE?
II. IF THIS COURT SUPPRESSES THE EVIDENCE FROM THE WARRANTLESS
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, SUPRA, DID THE LOWER COURT ERR BY
FAILING TO ADDRESS OR SUPPRESS BLOOD AND DNA EVIDENCE
GAINED BY A SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED ON TAINTED EVIDENCE AND
MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS?
Based on the reasoning below, we hold that the actions of
the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and the
Department of Veterans’ Affairs (VA) violated Appellant’s Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure, and we
2
United States v. Stevenson, No. 06-0934/NA
remand the second issue to the court below for further factual
determination.1
I.
This case involves several blood draws. In November 1997,
NCIS investigators determined that Appellant was a possible
suspect in a November 1992 rape of a military dependent in
Hawaii, where Appellant had been stationed. At the time of the
investigation, Appellant was assigned to the temporary
disability retired list (TDRL), and was being treated for
diabetes at the VA hospital in Memphis, Tennessee. As part of
his treatment, Appellant routinely had his blood drawn by VA
medical personnel for the purpose of treatment. Appellant was
aware of the purpose of the draws and consented to them.
During the course of their investigation, NCIS agents
learned of the treatment that Appellant was receiving from the
VA, including the periodic blood draws. As a result, NCIS
requested that VA medical personnel draw an additional vial so
that law enforcement authorities might have that blood tested to
identify Appellant’s DNA. This request was vetted by lawyers at
the VA, who concluded that the blood could be drawn for and
searched by NCIS. As a result, at Appellant’s routine,
consensual blood draw on June 3, 1998, the VA staff drew an
1
Oral argument in this case was held at the Indiana University
School of Law, Indianapolis, as a part of Project Outreach.
3
United States v. Stevenson, No. 06-0934/NA
additional vial without informing Appellant of the purpose for
doing so. This sample was sent to the United States Criminal
Investigations Laboratory and tested to determine the DNA
composition of the blood for law enforcement purposes. It is
this blood draw that is implicated by the first assigned issue.
At trial, the military judge excluded from evidence the
vial of blood drawn and tested without Appellant’s permission.
NCIS agents then sought and obtained a warrant from a United
States federal magistrate in Tennessee, permitting NCIS agents
to obtain an additional vial of Appellant’s blood. It is this
request and warrant that are at the root of Appellant’s second
assigned issue.
This is the second time this Court has considered
Appellant’s case. In United States v. Stevenson (Stevenson II),
53 M.J. 257 (C.A.A.F. 2000), we held that Military Rule of
Evidence (M.R.E.) 312(f) applied to persons on the TDRL, and
remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether,
in light of United States v. Fitten, 42 M.J. 179 (C.M.A. 1995),
“the prolonged intrusion of the needle in [Appellant’s] arm
while a second vial was placed on the vacuum needle, and then
for some additional period while the blood was extracted into
the vial, was a de minimis intrusion with respect to the Fourth
Amendment and Mil. R. Evid. 312(f).” Stevenson II, 53 M.J. at
260-61.
4
United States v. Stevenson, No. 06-0934/NA
On remand the military judge found as a matter of fact and
law that: (1) Appellant’s blood draw was motivated by medical
personnel concerned with Appellant’s diabetic condition; (2) the
blood draw was not directed by law enforcement officials, but
rather was part of his medical treatment by the VA; (3) the
blood draw was conducted by medical personnel in a VA hospital
environment; (4) the NCIS request for a blood sample had no
impact on the initial needle intrusion and did not cause any
additional intrusion; (5) the NCIS request for a blood sample
resulted in a de minimis impact by prolonging the time the
needle was in Appellant’s arm only by a few seconds; and (6) the
initial blood draw was for a valid medical purpose and necessary
to preserve the health of a servicemember. The military judge
also found that, since the blood was drawn for a valid medical
purpose, M.R.E. 312 did not “limit the purposes to which the
seized evidence may be put or used.” The United States Navy-
Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the military
judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. United States
v. Stevenson (Stevenson III), 65 M.J. 639, 645 (N-M Ct. Crim.
App. 2006).
“We review the denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse
of discretion.” United States v. Rader, 65 M.J. 30, 32
(C.A.A.F. 2007) (citing United States v. Khamsouk, 57 M.J. 282,
286 (C.A.A.F. 2002)). Findings of fact are affirmed unless they
5
United States v. Stevenson, No. 06-0934/NA
are clearly erroneous; conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.
United States v. Flores, 64 M.J. 451, 454 (C.A.A.F. 2007)
(citing Khamsouk, 57 M.J. at 286).
II.
On appeal, Appellant argues that the Government did not
possess a special health care need under M.R.E. 312 sufficient
to permit the violation of his Fourth Amendment right through
the warrantless seizure and search of his blood for DNA testing.
To hold otherwise, Appellant argues, would be to eliminate any
distinction between the military’s interest in the provision of
health care, and a general law enforcement interest. The
Government responds that the drawing of Appellant’s blood at the
VA hospital represented a de minimis intrusion justified by the
Government’s necessary interest in the health of its
servicemembers in order to determine their fitness for duty, and
therefore did not violate Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
The threshold question is whether Appellant had an
expectation of privacy in his blood that required the Government
to obtain a warrant prior to seizing and searching that blood
for law enforcement purposes. Ordinarily, as the Supreme Court
has held, a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his blood. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489
U.S. 602, 616 (1989). Furthermore, while military service
necessitates a reduced expectation of privacy in bodily fluids
6
United States v. Stevenson, No. 06-0934/NA
with respect to drug testing, servicemembers otherwise generally
retain their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search
and seizure. See Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74, 81 (C.M.A.
1983); Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 476
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
Of course, within the context of bodily fluids, there are a
number of exceptions to the warrant requirement as well as
circumstances that would negate the need for a warrant. These
include situations where there exists both probable cause and
the need to prevent the loss of evidence, see Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966), where the search is
necessary to save someone’s life and the evidence is in plain
view, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978), and
where the government demonstrates “‘special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement,’” see Chandler v. Miller, 520
U.S. 305, 313-14 (1997) (citation omitted). In addition, M.R.E.
312(f), rather than being an exception to the warrant
requirement, authorizes the admission of evidence that was
developed incident to a valid medical purpose.
M.R.E. 312(f) states:
Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to interfere with the
lawful authority of the armed forces to take whatever
action may be necessary to preserve the health of a
service-member. Evidence or contraband obtained from an
examination or intrusion conducted for a valid medical
purpose may be seized and is not evidence obtained from an
7
United States v. Stevenson, No. 06-0934/NA
unlawful search or seizure within the meaning of Mil. R.
Evid. 311.
The specific question raised by this case is whether Appellant
had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his
bodily integrity (i.e., DNA), in light of M.R.E. 312(f). But
for this Court’s application of Fitten in Stevenson II, the
answer would be straightforward.
The Drafters’ Analysis of the Military Rules of Evidence
states that M.R.E. 312(f) was intended to make “it clear that
the Armed Forces retain their power to ensure the health of
their members.” Manual for Courts-Martial, United States,
Analysis of the Military Rules of Evidence app. 22 at A22-20
(2005 ed.) [hereinafter Drafters’ Analysis]. The Drafters’
Analysis continues, “[a] procedure conducted for valid medical
purposes may yield admissible evidence. Similarly, Rule 312
does not affect in any way any procedure necessary for
diagnostic or treatment purposes.” Id. Thus, M.R.E. 312(f)
permits the admission of evidence discovered during the regular
course of medical treatment.
M.R.E. 312(f) is intended to ensure the provision of
essential medical care when necessary to preserve the health of
servicemembers. The rule permits that evidence found or seized
in the course of medical treatment, which is to say, that is
incidental to medical treatment, is not subject to suppression.
8
United States v. Stevenson, No. 06-0934/NA
In this way, the rule orients the government to the provision of
medical assistance to the servicemember, without consideration
of the legal requirements (and potential delays) that might
pertain to the law enforcement collection of evidence. However,
the rule is not intended to serve as cover and concealment for
law enforcement inquiries or as an exception to otherwise
applicable Fourth Amendment requirements. Therefore, the rule
does not serve to permit additional searches and seizures that
are not incident to treatment. Whether such additional searches
are admissible is a question of Fourth Amendment analysis.
Nor is there any indication that either Congress, through
delegated authority to the President under Article 36, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 836 (2000), or the President through promulgation of
M.R.E. 312 and M.R.E. 313 intended to abolish servicemembers’
expectation of privacy in blood drawn in furtherance of military
preparedness. To the contrary, 10 U.S.C. § 1565a (2000)
(governing the use of DNA collected for casualty identification)
reflects considerable concern about the handling of DNA. In
this case, for these reasons, M.R.E. 312(f) is not applicable to
the second vial of blood drawn at the VA hospital, and does not
otherwise obviate Appellant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
The ruling of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Criminal Appeals with respect to the exclusion of the vial of
blood drawn at the VA hospital is therefore reversed.
9
United States v. Stevenson, No. 06-0934/NA
In fairness to the military judge, the lower court and the
parties, the clarity of this conclusion was not forecast by this
Court’s discussion of Fitten in Stevenson II. In Fitten, the
appellant -- admitted to the emergency room because of erratic
behavior apparently due to drug use -- underwent an involuntary
catheterization in order to determine the cause of his
condition, so as to inform subsequent treatment. 42 M.J. at
180. The appellant’s command requested that, during the
procedure, an additional sample of the urine be collected, and
given to the command. Id. This Court upheld the admission of
the urine test under M.R.E. 312, finding among other things that
the catheterization caused only a de minimis intrusion, which
did not “shock the conscience.” Id. at 182. The de minimis
nature of the search was one of a totality of circumstances
relied on by the Court. Id. However, in Stevenson II the de
minimis nature of the search was referenced as the conclusion of
the Court. 53 M.J. at 260. In turn, the Court of Criminal
Appeals on remand referred to this conclusion as the holding in
Fitten. Stevenson II, 65 M.J. at 644-45.
However, while the degree of an intrusion may inform
whether an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy exists,
the Supreme Court has not adopted a de minimis exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. To the contrary, the
Supreme Court has held that the need for a warrant is not
10
United States v. Stevenson, No. 06-0934/NA
relieved by the use of advanced search methods that are
imperceptible to the subject of the search. See, e.g., Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34, 40 (2001) (the use of infrared
cameras to determine the heat of a house where federal agents
suspected marijuana was being grown). Thus, to the extent that
Fitten and Stevenson II stand for the proposition that there is
a de minimis exception to the Fourth Amendment or to M.R.E. 312,
they are overruled.
The Fourth Amendment problem in this case was that the vial
of blood taken from Appellant and provided to NCIS represented a
distinct search and seizure from that undertaken incident to
Appellant’s treatment for diabetes.2 Whatever might be said of
Appellant’s expectation of privacy with regard to the blood draw
itself, a search for DNA was not incident to his treatment for
diabetes and was not otherwise authorized by warrant or warrant
exception.
2
The facts of this case do not require us to reconsider the
extent, if any, to which M.R.E. 312(f) applies where, after
valid medical testing, some of the remaining blood from the same
vial was made available to the NCIS for its investigative
purposes. See Stevenson II, 53 M.J. at 260.
11
United States v. Stevenson, No. 06-0934/NA
III.
If the military judge erred with respect to the blood drawn
at the VA hospital, analytic emphasis turns to the second issue.
Were the DNA test results obtained from the blood draw conducted
pursuant to the search warrant admissible? Appellant argues
that the military judge erred in upholding the magistrate’s
determination of probable cause, despite misleading statements
made to the magistrate by NCIS agents, and the withholding from
the magistrate facts relating to the exclusion of the original
blood sample. The Government counters that, despite these
omissions and misstatements, probable cause existed for the
issuance of the warrant, and that the basis for the probable
cause was independent of the initial DNA search. These issues
were not fully adjudicated by the lower court in light of its
determination of Issue I.
As is often the case in the Fourth Amendment context, the
law is set but the facts are harder to fix. The question
presented at this point is whether the third blood draw was a
product of a warrant predicated on information independent from
the evidence adduced from the blood draw at the VA hospital.
The answer necessarily entails a factual determination informed
by the sometimes competing factual recitations of the parties.
Therefore, we will remand to the lower court, for consideration
of two related questions in light of our resolution of Issue I:
12
United States v. Stevenson, No. 06-0934/NA
first, to determine whether the warrant was derivative from a
source of information independent from the seizure and search of
Appellant’s blood at the VA hospital; and second, to consider
whether the warrant was valid in light of Appellant’s argument
that statements and omissions to the magistrate were not made in
good faith.
DECISION
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals is set aside. The record of trial is
returned to the Judge Advocate General for remand to that court
for consideration of granted Issue II in light of our resolution
of Issue I.
13
United States v. Stevenson, 06-0934/NA
EFFRON, Chief Judge (concurring in part and in the
result):
I agree with the majority that a remand is appropriate
in this case. I would distinguish rather than overrule
United States v. Fitten, 42 M.J. 179 (C.M.A. 1995),
however. In Fitten, the catheterization for a valid
medical purpose under Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.)
312(f) was prolonged to obtain a second bottle of urine for
disciplinary purposes. 42 M.J. at 180. Once the medical
purpose under M.R.E. 312 was fulfilled, the non-probable
cause warrantless search could be continued if it was
otherwise reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See
M.R.E. 314(a); M.R.E. 314(k). The Court in Fitten
concluded that the search was reasonable under the specific
circumstances of the case. 42 M.J. at 182.
Although Fitten considered the de minimis nature of
the intrusion a factor in its Fourth Amendment
reasonableness analysis, it did not establish a general
principle of law that all de minimis additional extractions
are inherently reasonable. Fitten did not relieve the
government of its burden under M.R.E. 311(e) to demonstrate
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment when a search,
initiated under M.R.E. 312(f), extends beyond the point
when the medical purpose has been fulfilled.
United States v. Stevenson, 06-0934/NA
In the present case, the search extended beyond the
period required to fulfill a medical purpose under M.R.E.
312(f). Therefore, even if the extension was de minimis,
the evidence obtained during the extension could be
admitted at trial only if the extended search was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Here, the object of the law enforcement search was
DNA, a matter not involving time sensitivity or other
circumstances that might make it reasonable to extend the
search beyond the purpose of M.R.E. 312(f) without a search
authorization. There was no risk of rapid dissipation or
loss of evidence. The law enforcement officials in the
present case could take whatever time was necessary to
obtain a search authorization, and Appellant’s DNA would be
the same as it was on the date of his visit to the hospital
for the initial blood draw in this case. Under these
circumstances, the extension of the search to draw the
second vial was unreasonable, and the evidence derived from
the search was inadmissible. Under other circumstances, a
de minimis extension of an otherwise lawful intrusion might
well be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and the
Military Rules of Evidence. M.R.E. 311; M.R.E. 314.
2