United States v. James

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Daniel G. JAMES, Airman Basic
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 05-0374
Crim. App. No. 35275
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued December 7, 2005
Decided June 20, 2006
GIERKE, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
CRAWFORD, EFFRON, BAKER, and ERDMANN, JJ., joined
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain John S. Fredland (argued); Colonel
Carlos L. McDade, Lieutenant Colonel Mark R. Strickland, Major
L. Martin Powell, Major Sandra K. Whittington, and Captain
Christopher S. Morgan (on brief).
For Appellee: Major Matthew S. Ward (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Robert V. Combs, Lieutenant Colonel Gary F. Spencer, and
Major Heather L. Mazzeno (on brief).
Military Judge: Gregory E. Pavlik
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication.
United States v. James, No. 05-0374/AF
Chief Judge GIERKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Here we unanimously decide a question that was left
unresolved in United States v. Wright,1 namely whether there is a
temporal limitation on the admissibility of specific uncharged
sexual misconduct.2 More specifically, in the present case we
address whether Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 414
authorizes admission of Appellant’s child molestation offenses
committed after the charged offenses of child molestation. We
conclude that the propensity evidence addressed in M.R.E. 414 is
admissible for offenses committed both before and after the
charged offenses, if it is otherwise relevant and admissible
under M.R.E. 401, M.R.E. 402, and M.R.E. 403.
Appellant, at the time of the offenses charged, was a
twenty-year-old airman basic assigned to Offutt Air Force Base,
Nebraska. He was serving as an advisor to a church youth group
and met MC, a fifteen-year-old female member of the youth group.
1
53 M.J. 476 (2000) (addressing this issue in the context of
M.R.E. 413).
2
This Court granted review of the following issue:
I. WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE WHEN HE ADMITTED
EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT ENGAGED IN SEXUAL ACTS
WITH ANOTHER FEMALE UNDER THE AGE OF 16 WHERE (A)
THE ALLEGED ACTS OCCURRED SUBSEQUENT TO THE
CHARGED ACTS, AND (B) THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED WAS
OF SUCH AN UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL NATURE AS TO
CONTRIBUTE TO THE MEMBERS ARRIVING AT A VERDICT
ON AN IMPROPER BASIS.
United States v. James, 61 M.J. 480 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
2
United States v. James, No. 05-0374/AF
The original casual friendship between Appellant and MC
developed into a dating relationship where they hugged, held
hands, and kissed. On June 17, 2001, the hugging and kissing
developed further. They were in a bedroom at a friend’s house
and began to kiss. At some point, MC removed her shirt and bra,
and Appellant kissed and touched her breasts. At Appellant’s
suggestion, they then engaged in “clothes sex” whereby they
rubbed their genital areas against each other while their
clothes remained on. The “clothes sex” lasted for about two
minutes. On July 7, 2001, a virtually identical encounter
occurred at a different friend’s house. These two incidents
resulted in the referral of two charges of engaging in indecent
acts with a female under the age of sixteen.
At trial, over defense objection, the Government sought to
introduce evidence of a civilian conviction for attempted first
degree sexual assault of a child, a class III felony in the
state of Nebraska. The defense objection was based on the fact
that the conduct that was the subject of the Nebraska conviction
occurred between July 15, 2001, and August 4, 2001, after the
conduct charged at Appellant’s court-martial. The defense
contended that M.R.E. 414, which permitted the admission of
sexual misconduct with a child, in a prosecution for sexual
misconduct with a child, dealt only with the admission of prior
acts.
3
United States v. James, No. 05-0374/AF
The Government argued that the plain language of the rule
places no time restrictions on the admission of similar acts of
misconduct and that the conviction in question was particularly
relevant because it involved another minor female who met
Appellant as a result of his work with the church youth group.
A comprehensive discussion of the issue consumes sixty
pages of the record. The military judge ruled that he would not
allow the Government to introduce evidence of the conviction
because of the balancing he did pursuant to M.R.E. 403. But the
military judge did allow the testimony of SB, the victim in that
case, provided her testimony about Appellant’s sexual misconduct
did not mention any lack of consent on her part. Again, the
military judge’s ruling was rooted in a M.R.E. 403 analysis. He
concluded that lack of consent was not alleged in the present
case and that evidence regarding lack of consent with regard to
the other offenses would be more prejudicial than probative.
The trial proceeded on the merits, and the Government did
call SB, the victim in the civilian case. The trial counsel
limited direct examination to the traditional introductory
questions and the fact that she met Appellant through the youth
group. The trial counsel, complying with the limitations placed
by the military judge on SB’s testimony, restricted his
questioning regarding Appellant’s behavior to the following:
4
United States v. James, No. 05-0374/AF
Q. [SB], was there ever a time when the accused’s
penis touched your vagina?
A. Yes.
Q. When was that?
A. That was last summer.
Q. How many times?
A. Three.
TC: No further questions . . . .
The defense did not cross-examine her, but the military
judge asked her two questions presented by the members. Her
first response explained the three dates of Appellant’s sexual
misconduct as being July 16, July 23, and August 2. In her
second response, she explained that her clothes were on and his
shorts were “halfway.”
During his instructions on findings, the military judge
informed the members regarding the testimony of SB:
In this case there’s been evidence presented regarding
improper sexual contact between the accused and [SB]. This
does not mean that the accused is guilty of the charges of
indecent acts with [MC] to which he had pled not guilty.
You may give such evidence no weight or such weight as you
think it is entitled to receive. This evidence is being
received for a limited purpose only.
The general court-martial panel of officers convicted
Appellant as charged and sentenced him to confinement for four
months and a bad-conduct discharge. The convening authority and
5
United States v. James, No. 05-0374/AF
the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals approved the findings
and sentence.3
We now examine the question of the admissibility of
Appellant’s sexual misconduct with SB in his trial alleging
similar behavior with MC.
I. Adoption of M.R.E. 413 and M.R.E. 414
The admissibility of uncharged misconduct has been one of
the most litigated issues in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Prior to 1996, the admissibility of evidence of uncharged
misconduct in the military justice system was severely
restricted by M.R.E. 404(b) and the judicial application of the
rule. The general rule was that, “Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”4 The
rule allowed evidence of bad acts to be admitted for limited
purposes,5 but the basic evidentiary rule excluded bad acts
solely to show bad character and a propensity to act in
conformance with that bad character.
In 1996, this rule against the admissibility of bad acts to
prove a propensity to commit similar acts was turned upside down
in cases involving violent sexual behavior or sexual offenses
3
United States v. James, 60 M.J. 870, 873 (A.F. Ct. Crim App.
2005).
4
M.R.E. 404(b).
5
For example, the rule permits the admission of specific acts to
show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id.6
United States v. James, No. 05-0374/AF
involving minors. Congress, as a part of the Violent Crime
Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, enacted Fed. R. Evid. 413
and Fed. R. Evid. 414.6 These rules became applicable to
military practice in 1996, and were formally adopted as M.R.E.
413 and M.R.E. 414 in a 1998 amendment to the Manual for Courts-
Martial (MCM).7
These rules stated that in cases of sexual assault or
sexual misconduct with a child, evidence of the commission of
similar offenses, “is admissible and may be considered for its
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.”8 No exceptions
are listed in the rules. So, the law of evidence entered
uncharted territory. We moved from a body of law that generally
prohibited the admissibility of uncharged misconduct to prove a
propensity to act in a similar fashion to a body of law which,
in the case of certain sex offenses, allowed the admissibility
of similar sexual misconduct to show propensity. Consequently,
we went from a relatively strong preference against
admissibility of uncharged misconduct generally in M.R.E. 404(a)
to an exceptionally strong preference in favor of admitting
6
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, § 320935, 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37.
7
Fed. R. Evid. 413 and Fed. R. Evid. 414 became a part of the
M.R.E. eighteen months after they were enacted. See M.R.E.
1102(a). They were formally included in the MCM in a 1998
amendment to the M.R.E. See MCM, Historical Executive Orders
app. 25 at A25-40 to A25-42 (2005 ed.).
8
M.R.E. 413(a); M.R.E. 414(a).
7
United States v. James, No. 05-0374/AF
propensity evidence in the cases involving specific sexual
misconduct in M.R.E. 413 and M.R.E. 414.
Although evidentiary scholars and experts were not
unanimously enthusiastic in their support of the changes,9 the
clear intent of Congress was to create rules that the courts
“must liberally construe” so that factfinders could accurately
assess a defendant’s criminal propensities and probabilities.10
In Wright, we addressed the constitutional concerns regarding
the rules and upheld the admissibility of this type of
propensity evidence.11 Our conclusion in Wright is consistent
with the decisions of other appellate courts addressing the
constitutionality of Fed. R. Evid. 413 and Fed. R. Evid. 414.12
In light of the common history and similar purpose of
M.R.E. 413 and M.R.E. 414, there is no need to distinguish the
two rules for the purpose of our discussion of the granted
issue.
II. The Application of the Rules to Subsequent Acts
Although the constitutionality of M.R.E. 413 and M.R.E. 414
is resolved, Appellant raises a less settled question: Does the
new preference in favor of the admissibility of bad acts in
9
See 1 Steven A. Saltzburg, Lee D. Schinasi & David A.
Schlueter, Military Rules of Evidence Manual § 414.02, at 4-212
n.240 (5th ed. 2003).
10
Id. at 4-212-13 (quoting the floor statement of Rep. Susan
Molinari).
11
53 M.J. at 481-82.
12
See id. at 482 (providing a list of cases from the federal
circuits upholding Fed. R. Evid. 413 and/or Fed. R. Evid. 414).
8
United States v. James, No. 05-0374/AF
cases alleging sexual assault or child molestation apply only to
behavior taking place prior to the misconduct alleged in the
case being tried? The court-martial charges against Appellant
related to alleged misconduct on June 17, 2001, and July 7,
2001. The prosecution evidence offered under M.R.E. 414 took
place between July 15, 2001, and August 4, 2001, after the
charged offenses. Appellant asserts that his misconduct after
the charged offenses is not admissible under M.R.E. 414.
Although the issue confronting this Court is not
specifically addressed in the legislative history, the
historical discussion regarding Fed. R. Evid. 413 and Fed. R.
Evid. 414 speaks in terms of “past similar transgressions” or
“past sexual offenses.”13 Indeed, a Senate cosponsor of the
legislation spoke on the floor of the Senate about the rules
“establishing a general presumption that evidence of past
similar offenses . . . is admissible at trial.”14 A similar
statement by the primary House of Representatives sponsor of the
legislation focuses on prior crimes.15 The Drafters’ Analysis to
the 1998 amendment to the MCM states that M.R.E. 413 and M.R.E.
414 are “intended to provide for more liberal admissibility of
character evidence in criminal cases” involving child
13
Wright, 53 M.J. at 486 (Gierke, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
14
140 Cong. Rec. S12990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994) (statement of
Sen. Robert Dole).
15
140 Cong. Rec. H8968, at 8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Molinari).
9
United States v. James, No. 05-0374/AF
molestation and sexual assault “where the accused has committed
a prior act” of sexual assault or child molestation.16 Although
the historical discussion speaks in terms of past acts it does
not expressly exclude any acts occurring prior to trial. There
is therefore no express conflict between the legislation and the
legislative history. The actual language of the rules does not
use the “prior” or “past” language, but talks instead of
“evidence of the accused’s commission of one or more offenses.”17
In Wright, the majority of the Court did not expressly
address the question of the admissibility of prior versus
subsequent misconduct. Appellant’s case has provided this Court
with the opportunity to look at the developments in the law in
the intervening five years, and today we unanimously conclude
that, as long as appropriate safeguards are applied, M.R.E. 413
and M.R.E. 414 are not limited to evidence of behavior taking
place prior to that charged. We reach that conclusion for
several reasons: (a) the plain language of the rules, (b) a
logical application of long-standing principles of relevance,
(c) a persuasive opinion by the only federal circuit court to
have addressed the issue, and (d) the existence of the
protections of M.R.E. 403 that were meticulously applied by the
military judge in this case.
16
MCM, Analysis of the Military Rules of Evidence app. 22 at
A22-36 to A22-37 (2005 ed.).
17
M.R.E. 413; M.R.E. 414.
10
United States v. James, No. 05-0374/AF
A. The Language of the Rules
A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that
“courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what
it means and means in a statute what it says there.”18
Accordingly, the plain language of M.R.E. 413 and M.R.E. 414
regarding any temporal limitation on the admissibility of
evidence is the most probative method of interpreting those
rules. The rules simply discuss “one or more offenses” with
absolutely no mention of when the offense(s) might have
occurred.
B. Logical Relevance
Relevant evidence is that which has a tendency to make a
fact more or less probable.19 Relevancy has two components: (1)
probative value, the relationship between the evidence and the
proposition it is offered to prove; and (2) materiality, the
relationship between the proposition the evidence is offered to
prove and the facts at issue in the case.20
Congress, in enacting Fed. R. Evid. 413 and Fed. R. Evid.
414, and the President in adopting similar military rules, have
decided that evidence of other acts of sexual misconduct is
admissible to show a propensity to engage in that type of sexual
18
Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54
(1992).
19
M.R.E. 401.
20
See id. See also Military Rules of Evidence Manual §
401.02[2].
11
United States v. James, No. 05-0374/AF
misconduct. So-called “propensity” evidence is therefore
relevant in cases of sexual assault or child sexual molestation.
We can find no reason to conclude that prior misconduct is
probative and subsequent misconduct is not. It is the fact of
the other act that makes it probative, not whether it happened
before or after the act now charged. The rules of relevance
therefore do not require a temporal limitation on the
application of M.R.E. 413 and M.R.E. 414. In the application of
the M.R.E. 403 balancing discussed in subsection D, infra,
temporal factors may be important. People certainly do change
over time and the fact that someone acts in a particular manner
does not mean that they have always acted in that manner, or for
that matter that they always will. The acts in this case took
place within a matter of days, were similar in their sexual
nature, were similar in the fact that the girls were the same
age, and were similar in the fact that they met Appellant in the
same church group where he was a counselor. Accordingly, we
hold that the relevance questions are easily answered in favor
of the Government.
C. Other Federal Case Law
In United States v. Sioux,21 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit became the first and, so far, only
federal circuit to examine this issue. The logic and reasoning
21
362 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2004).
12
United States v. James, No. 05-0374/AF
of that opinion is sound and is consistent with our conclusions
in this case. In addition to concluding that the plain meaning
of the rule places no temporal restrictions on the admissibility
of other offenses, the Ninth Circuit opinion looks to a rather
large body of law interpreting very similar language contained
in Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) that discusses “evidence of other
crimes.”22 The opinion provides a list of federal circuits that
have held that Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) applies to prior and
subsequent bad acts and also points out that reference to these
other crimes as “priors” is more a matter of customary usage
than a term of art.23 In United States v. Young, a case
involving Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), we joined the “prevailing
federal practice,” which did not limit “other” acts to “prior”
acts.24 We now continue down that road and conclude that the
“one or more offenses” language of M.R.E. 413 and M.R.E. 414 is
no more temporally restrictive than the “other crimes” language
of M.R.E. 404(b).
D. The Safeguards of M.R.E. 403
We remain mindful of the dangers inherent in admitting
propensity evidence: “‘When jurors hear that a defendant has on
[another] occasion[] committed essentially the same crime as
22
Id. at 1246-47.
23
Id. at 1246 (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged
Misconduct Evidence 2:12, at 2-75 (2003)).
24
United States v. Young, 55 M.J. 193, 196 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
13
United States v. James, No. 05-0374/AF
that for which he is on trial, the information unquestionably
has a powerful and prejudicial impact . . . .’”25
M.R.E. 403 is designed specifically to address the unduly
prejudicial impact of otherwise admissible evidence and gives
military judges broad discretionary powers to ensure that the
probative value of evidence is not outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.26 The lead opinion and one of the separate
opinions in Wright specifically noted that a careful M.R.E. 403
balancing was an essential ingredient of a constitutional
application of the rule.27 The importance of a careful balancing
arises from the potential for undue prejudice that is inevitably
present when dealing with propensity evidence.
In this case, the military judge was concerned about undue
prejudice, was meticulous in his application of the balancing
required by M.R.E. 403, and limited the scope of the admissible
propensity evidence. Accordingly, SB’s testimony about
Appellant’s behavior with her was very brief, and Appellant’s
conviction for that misconduct was not admitted. Because of the
military judge’s sensitivity to the potential for unfair
prejudice, the attention of the members was properly focused on
25
Id. at 196 n.2 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d
1186, 1193 (6th Cir. 1994)) (brackets in Young).
26
United States v. Phillips, 52 M.J. 268, 272 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
27
53 M.J. at 482; see also 53 M.J. at 486 (Effron, J.,
concurring in part and in the result) (agreeing that the
constitutionality of M.R.E. 413 may be sustained by applying the
safeguards embodied in M.R.E. 403).
14
United States v. James, No. 05-0374/AF
what Appellant allegedly did with MC. The trial did not become
sidetracked by a consideration of what Appellant might or might
not have done, with SB. We strongly suggest that military
judges dealing with objections to propensity evidence proffered
under M.R.E. 413 or M.R.E. 414 make a record of their
application of M.R.E. 403.28
Conclusion
We conclude that M.R.E. 414 is not limited to prior
instances of child molestation. We hold that the military judge
did not abuse his discretion in ruling that the propensity
evidence relating to Appellant’s subsequent misconduct was
admissible and not unfairly prejudicial. We therefore affirm
the decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals.
28
See United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1331 (10th Cir.
1998).
15