United States v. Czeschin

IN THE CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Daniel F. CZESCHIN, Fireman Apprentice
U.S. Coast Guard, Appellant
No. 01-0222
Crim. App. No. 1125
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 23, 2001
Decided March 14, 2002
EFFRON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
CRAWFORD, C.J., and GIERKE and BAKER, JJ., joined. SULLIVAN,
S.J., filed an opinion concurring in the result.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Junior Grade Loren A. Friedel (argued).
For Appellee: Lieutenant Daniel J. Goettle (argued); Lieutenant Mark A.
Cunningham (on brief); Commander C.P. Reilly.
Military Judge: Robert Bruce
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Czeschin, No. 01-0222/CG
Judge EFFRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
A general court-martial composed of a military judge sitting
alone convicted appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of
false official statement, wrongful use of marijuana, wrongful
use of marijuana while on board a vessel used by the armed
forces, wrongful introduction of marijuana onto a vessel used by
the armed forces with intent to distribute, wrongful
introduction of cocaine onto a vessel used by the armed forces,
wrongful distribution of marijuana while on board a vessel used
by the armed forces, wrongfully importing marijuana into the
customs territory of the United States while on board a vessel
used by the armed forces, wrongfully importing cocaine into the
customs territory of the United States while on board a vessel
used by the armed forces, and impeding an investigation, in
violation of Articles 107, 112a, and 134, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 USC §§ 907, 912a and 934,
respectively. He was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge,
confinement for two years, total forfeitures, and reduction to
E-1. The convening authority approved the sentence but
suspended confinement in excess of fifteen months for a period
of twelve months, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
54 M.J. 656 (2000).
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United States v. Czeschin, No. 01-0222/CG
On appellant’s petition, we granted review of the following
issue:
WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR
SENTENCING HEARING WHEN THE MILITARY
JUDGE DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AND CONSIDERED APPELLANT'S
DISHONEST STATEMENT TO INVESTIGATIVE
AGENTS AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT IN
VIOLATION OF UCMJ, ARTICLE 107, WHEN
M.C.M., PART IV, PARAGRAPH 31c(6),
EXPRESSLY EXCLUDES STATEMENTS MADE BY
AN ACCUSED TO INVESTIGATIVE AGENTS FROM
THE DEFINITION OF OFFICIAL STATEMENTS.
We affirm, for the reasons set forth below.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Setting
Appellant, who was suspected of drug-related offenses, was
interviewed by agents of the Coast Guard Investigative Service
(CGIS) on June 19, 1998, as part of an official investigation.
After waiving his statutory rights against self-incrimination
under Article 31(b), UCMJ, 10 USC § 831(b), appellant provided a
sworn, written statement which included the following
statements: “I do not smoke marijuana at all,” and “I do not
know of anyone who currently smokes marijuana.” His involvement
with drugs and his subsequent statement to the CGIS led to the
charges detailed at the outset of this opinion.
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United States v. Czeschin, No. 01-0222/CG
At trial, appellant moved unsuccessfully to dismiss the
false official statement charge under RCM 907(b)(1)(B), Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States (2000 ed.),∗ on the ground
that it did not state an offense. Appellant contended that a
statement made to an investigator is not an “official statement”
for purposes of a prosecution under Article 107 if the person
making the statement did not have an independent duty to speak,
citing the explanation of Article 107 in paragraph 31c(6)(a) of
Part IV of the Manual.
B. False Official Statements under Article 107
Article 107 provides that a person subject to the UCMJ
“who, with intent to deceive, . . . makes any . . . false
official statement knowing it to be false, shall be punished as
a court-martial may direct.” In United States v. Solis, 46 M.J.
31 (1997), we held that statements to investigators could be
prosecuted as false official statements. Solis also rejected
the so-called "exculpatory no" doctrine, thereby making it clear
that a person may be prosecuted under Article 107 for a
statement that consists solely of a negative response to a
question from a law enforcement agent. Id. at 34; see Brogan v.
∗
Cited provisions of the current Manual are identical to the
ones in effect at the time of appellant's court-martial.
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United States v. Czeschin, No. 01-0222/CG
United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (rejecting application of the
exculpatory-no doctrine to prosecutions for false statements
under 18 USC § 1001).
C. Explanatory Material in the Manual for Courts-Martial
In Solis, we took note of paragraph 31c(6)(a) of Part IV of
the Manual, supra, which states:
A statement made by an accused or suspect
during an interrogation is not an official
statement within the meaning of the article
if that person did not have an independent
duty or obligation to speak.
We observed that
[b]ecause this guidance [in paragraph
31c(6)] is not based upon the statutory
elements of the offense [under Article 107],
it does not impose upon the prosecution an
affirmative obligation to prove such an
independent duty or obligation.
46 M.J. at 35. We also noted that the Manual’s guidance could be
interpreted as serving at least three different purposes:
First, it could be seen as nothing more than
an expansive description of dicta from this
Court’s decisions that predate the 1984
revision of the Manual, with no intent to
limit prosecutions. Second, it could be
viewed as protecting an accused against
overcharging. Third, it could be viewed as
guidance for the conduct of investigations .
. . .
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United States v. Czeschin, No. 01-0222/CG
Id. In view of the fact that the accused in Solis did not rely
on the Manual's provision at trial, we held that he could not
assert it on appeal. We reserved judgement as to whether the
applicable Manual provisions were "intended to establish a
procedural right that can be invoked by an accused or whether
they constitute internal guidelines intended only to regulate
government conduct." Id. at 35-36, citing United States v.
Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979)(violation of Internal Revenue
Service rule regarding recording conversations with taxpayers,
which is required neither by the Constitution nor by statute,
does not require exclusion of evidence).
D. Hierarchical Sources of Rights
in the Military Justice System
Our Court has observed that there are "hierarchical sources
of rights" in the military justice system, including the
Constitution, federal statutes, Executive Orders, Department of
Defense Directives, service directives, and federal common law.
United States v. Lopez, 35 M.J. 35, 39 (CMA 1992). "Normal rules
of statutory construction provide that the highest source
authority will be paramount, unless a lower source creates rules
that are constitutional and provide greater rights for the
individual.” Id.
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United States v. Czeschin, No. 01-0222/CG
In United States v. Davis, 47 M.J. 484 (1998), we discussed
the related question of the relationship between the Manual’s
provisions and individual rights. We noted that the President
has express authority under Article 36(a), UCMJ, 10 USC
§ 836(a), to promulgate the rules of procedure and evidence set
forth in Parts II and III of the Manual for Courts-Martial. We
also observed that, by contrast, the President’s interpretations
of substantive offenses in Part IV of the Manual -- the Part at
issue in the present case -- are not binding on the judiciary,
which has the responsibility to interpret substantive offenses
under the Code. Id. at 486, citing United States v. Mance, 26
M.J. 244 (1988). We emphasized, however, the difference between
Presidential interpretation of substantive offenses and
Presidential issuance of rules in Part IV protecting the rights
of servicemembers, making it clear that the President has the
authority to grant greater rights under Part IV than might be
provided by statute. As a result, when a Presidential rule is
unambiguous in terms of granting greater rights than provided by
a higher source, the rule governs, unless it clearly contradicts
the express language of the UCMJ. Id. at 486.
In Davis, we held the rule at issue -- paragraph
54(c)(4)(a)(ii) of Part IV of the Manual -- was unambiguous,
with no indication on the face of the rule that it served any
purpose other than establishment of a limitation. In that
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United States v. Czeschin, No. 01-0222/CG
context, we concluded that the rule constituted “an appropriate
Executive branch limitation on the conduct subject to
prosecution” under Article 128, UCMJ, 10 USC § 928 (assault).
Id. at 486-87. Our decision in Davis reflected the fundamental
relationship between the Manual’s provisions and the role of the
judiciary, as emphasized in the Drafters’ Analysis of the Rules
for Courts-Martial:
[A]mendment of the Manual is the province of
the President. Developments in the civilian
sector that affect the underlying rationale
for a rule do not affect the validity of the
rule except to the extent otherwise required
as a matter of statutory or constitutional
law. The same is true with respect to rules
derived from the decisions of military
tribunals. Once incorporated into the
Executive Order, such matters have an
independent source of authority and are not
dependent upon continuing support from the
judiciary.
Manual, supra at A21-3.
II. DISCUSSION
In Solis, we left open the question as to whether paragraph
31c(6)(a) establishes a binding limitation or merely reflects a
non-binding interpretation of case law. Our suggestion in Solis
that the provision could be viewed either as a binding
limitation or non-binding guidance reflects the fact that
paragraph 31c(6)(a) -- unlike the provision at issue in Davis --
contains a facial ambiguity with respect to its purpose.
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United States v. Czeschin, No. 01-0222/CG
Paragraph 31c(6)(a) expressly provides that a statement is “not
an official statement within the meaning of the article” in the
absence of an independent duty or obligation to speak, which
suggests that it may serve simply as a reflection of case law
under Article 107 rather than as a rule of limitation. Although
the phrase “within the meaning of the article” does not
demonstrate, by itself, that the rule is not a binding
limitation, the facial ambiguity as to purpose requires us to
examine other sources of interpretation, including the drafting
history.
In that regard, we note the 1951 Manual, promulgated in
conjunction with implementation of the UCMJ, provided no such
limitation. See para. 186, Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, 1951. Subsequently, our Court issued several opinions
indicating that statements to investigators were not “official
statements” under Article 107. See United States v. Aronson, 8
USCMA 525, 25 CMR 29 (1957); United States v. Washington, 9
USCMA 131, 25 CMR 393 (1958). The 1969 Manual was amended to
include language similar to the present version. See para. 186,
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Rev. ed.). The
Drafters’ Analysis simply cited the case law as the basis for
the change. Analysis of Contents, Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States, 1969, Revised Edition, Dept. of the Army Pamphlet
27-2 at 28-10 (July 1970). The Drafters’ Analysis of the 1984
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United States v. Czeschin, No. 01-0222/CG
Manual, which is the source of the present version, cited the
previous version, as well as Aronson, Washington, and a later
case, United States v. Davenport, 9 M.J. 264 (CMA 1980). Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, at A21-92.
Neither the drafting history, nor any other source cited to
us by the parties, demonstrates that the pertinent language in
paragraph 31c(6)(a) was included in the Manual for any purpose
other than as an attempt to reflect an interpretation of Article
107 under then-existing case law -- an interpretation that is no
longer valid. See Solis, supra at 33-34. In light of the fact
that paragraph 31c(6)(a), on its face, raises a question as to
whether it is a binding rule or non-binding guidance, and in
light of the drafting history, we conclude that it does not
establish a right that may be asserted by an accused who is
charged with violating Article 107.
III. CONCLUSION
The decision of the United States Coast Guard Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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United States v. Czeschin, No. 01-0222/CG
SULLIVAN, Senior Judge (concurring in the result):
Appellant, who gave a false, sworn, written statement to
criminal investigators after he waived his statutory rights
against self-incrimination, can be prosecuted for making a false
official statement in violation of Article 107, Uniform Code of
Military Justice. United States v. Prater, 32 M.J. 433, 438 (CMA
1991); see United States v. Solis, 46 M.J. 31, 36 (1997) (Sullivan,
J., concurring in the result).
One need not speculate on the “drafting history” of the
Manual for Courts-Martial to reach this position. In United
States v. Prater, supra, this Court clearly stated,
“[S]tatements to military criminal investigators can now be
considered official for purposes of Article 107. Finally, where
warnings under Article 31 are given to the criminal suspect, as
in the present case, his duty to respond truthfully to criminal
investigators, if he responds at all, is now sufficient to impute
officiality to his statements for purposes of Article 107.”
In my view, there is an independent duty not to lie to
investigators once one has waived his or her self-incrimination
rights. The Constitution and Article 31 provide rights and
protect the serviceperson until those rights are waived. In
issuing paragraph 31c(6)(a), Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States (1998 ed.), the President did not intend to create a “safe
harbor” for a serviceperson to lie to investigators without
punishment.
United States v. Czeschin, 01-0222/CG
Once a suspect has waived his self-incrimination rights, the
suspect on active duty has attendant duties and responsibilities.
See United States v. Medley, 33 M.J. 75, 77 (CMA 1991) (“The policy
basis for reporting misconduct in the military is more than
powerful; it is axiomatic.”); see, e.g., U.S. Navy General
Regulation 1137 (Sept. 14, 1990) (duty to report offenses under
Code unless criminally involved). The military suspect, if he
waives his rights and chooses to talk to investigators, cannot
mislead or thwart an investigator with lies, especially, as in
this case, where a sworn, false, written statement was given to
the investigators. See also United States v. Arriaga, 49 M.J. 9
(1998) (holding that military accused can be prosecuted for
obstruction of justice in similar circumstances). Logic and our
case law will not allow appellant to escape prosecution under
Article 107. See, e.g., United States v. Prater, 32 M.J. at 438;
United States v. Dorsey, 38 M.J. 244, 248 (CMA 1993); United States
v. Frazier, 34 M.J. 135 (CMA 1992); United States v. Gay, 24 M.J.
304, 306 n.3 (CMA 1987).
2