United States v. Sills

IN THE CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
James A. SILLS, Colonel
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 02-0048
Crim. App. No. 34323
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Decided January 15, 2002
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Beverly B. Knott, Lieutenant Colonel
Timothy W. Murphy, and Captain Karen L. Hecker (on brief).
For Appellee: Colonel Anthony P. Dattilo and Major Lance B. Sigmon (on
brief).
Military Judge: Bruce T. Brown
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE PUBLICATION.
United States v. Sills, No. 02-0048/AF
PER CURIAM:
In its review of appellant's case under Article 66, Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 866, the Court of Criminal
Appeals set aside one of the specifications of which appellant
was convicted. United States v. Sills, 56 M.J. 556, 563, 572
(A.F.Ct.Crim.App. 2001). The court then turned to consider
whether it "may reassess the sentence, or whether it must order
a rehearing on the sentence." Id. at 568. Citing Jackson v.
Taylor, 353 U.S. 569 (1957), the court concluded that it lacked
the authority to order a rehearing on sentence. Id. at 571.
The court, however, did not take into account this Court's
contrary, controlling interpretation of Jackson.
Shortly after the Jackson decision was issued, the Judge
Advocate General of the Army certified to our Court the question
of whether the intermediate courts were authorized under Article
66 to order a sentence-only rehearing. United States v. Miller,
10 USCMA 296, 297, 27 CMR 370, 371 (1959). We held that the
intermediate courts are authorized to order sentence-only
rehearings, concluding that Jackson was not to the contrary.
Regarding Jackson, we said:
[T]he Supreme Court was merely pointing out
some of the difficulties which prompted
Congress to authorize reassessment of the
sentence by a board of review [as the Courts
of Criminal Appeals then were denominated]
and that it was not intending to say the
power to order the limited rehearing was not
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impliedly granted by Articles 66 and 67 of
the Code. Accordingly, we reaffirm our
previous holdings that a case may be
returned to a court-martial for rehearing on
sentence only.
Id. at 299, 27 CMR at 373.
For over forty years since that decision was issued, the
intermediate courts routinely have ordered rehearings on
sentence. As noted in the Drafters’ Analysis of the 1969
Manual, the rules were revised at that time to provide specific
procedures for the various types of rehearings, including
rehearings on sentence, “because rehearings on the sentence have
been frequent since the publication of the former Manual in
1951.” Para. 81b, Analysis of Contents, Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States, 1969, Revised Edition, Dept. of the Army
Pamphlet 27-2 at 15-1 (July 1970). The President has continued
to set forth rules governing rehearings on sentence in the
Manual, including the power of the Courts of Criminal Appeals to
order such rehearings. See RCM 810(a)(2) and 1203(c)(2), Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States (2000 ed.). Our decisions on
sentence rehearings have reaffirmed the power of the Courts of
Criminal Appeals to order rehearings on sentence, taking into
account both Jackson and Miller. See, e.g., United States v.
Boone, 49 M.J. 187, 195 (1998) (opinion by Ripple, Circuit Judge,
sitting by designation).
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Although not necessary to our decision here, we note that
Congress revised the statutory authority for rehearings
subsequent to Miller, but it did not seek to limit the authority
of the intermediate courts to order sentence-only rehearings.
See Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, § 5(d), 97
Stat. 1393, 1398 (art. 63, UCMJ); see also id. at § 7(e), 97
Stat. at 1402 (art. 69, UCMJ) (extending the power to order
rehearings to the Judge Advocates General); S. Rep. No. 98-53,
at 8, 29 (1983) (describing the power of the Judge Advocates
General under the legislation as similar to the powers exercised
by the intermediate courts).
The court below also addressed the issue of factual
sufficiency under Article 66. 56 M.J. at 562-64. The court cited
the standard set forth for factual-sufficiency review in United
States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 325 (CMA 1987) (proof beyond a
reasonable doubt), but it also took note of the decision of
another panel of the Air Force court in United States v.
Washington, 54 M.J. 936, 941 (A.F.Ct.Crim.App. 2001), which
concluded that factual sufficiency should be considered under a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. 56 M.J. at 562; see also
United States v. Nazario, 56 M.J. 572 (A.F.Ct.Crim.App. 2001).
Although the Courts of Criminal Appeals, and their predecessor
courts (the Boards of Review and Courts of Military Review),
historically have conducted their Article 66 de novo review of
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the facts under the traditional criminal law standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, the lower court in Washington and
Nazario has asserted that an excerpt from Article 66's
legislative history compels a different result.
The court in Nazario relied on the commentary submitted by
the Department of Defense during the congressional hearings on
the UCMJ, which was adopted in the committee reports. 56 M.J. at
573-74. The commentary and committee reports used identical
language to note that an intermediate court “shall affirm a
finding of guilty . . . if it determines that the finding
conforms to the weight of the evidence . . . .” Hearings on
H.R. 2498 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Armed Services, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1187 (1949) [hereafter cited as House
Hearings]; S. Rep. No. 81-486, at 28 (1949); H.R. Rep. No. 81-
491, at 31-32 (1949). The court in Nazario concluded that the
term “weight of the evidence” should be interpreted to mean
“preponderance of the evidence,” and that the Boards of Review
that had applied the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard after
the UCMJ was enacted had cast the legislative history “into the
dustbin of history.” 56 M.J. at 574. The court erroneously cited
the discussion in the House Hearings at 609, 611, and 612
pertaining to the Judicial Council, which would not have had the
power to conduct a de novo review for factual sufficiency
because it was limited to questions of law.
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In Washington, 54 M.J. at 940-41, the lower court reached a
similar conclusion concerning the meaning of “weight of the
evidence” by citing a civil case decided in 1974, see Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. United States, 61 C.C.P.A. 101, 499 F.2d 1283
(C.C.P.A. 1974), and a definition in Black’s Law Dictionary at
1594 (6th ed. 1990). Each of these sources reflects use of the
term “weight of the evidence” in the context of a non-criminal
proceeding. Neither demonstrates that Congress sought to
supplant the traditional criminal law standard with a civil law
standard when it enacted Article 66 in 1950. There is nothing
in the legislative history cited by the court below
demonstrating that Congress rejected the trial-level standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt for purposes of Article 66 de
novo review.
The Boards of Review and their successors did not cast
aside the legislative history but, rather, applied the
traditional criminal law standard to fulfill congressional
intent that the intermediate courts conduct de novo review of
factual sufficiency. In considering whether to overrule our
decision in Turner that embodied these precedents, we are
mindful of the Supreme Court’s guidance in Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991), regarding the doctrine of stare
decisis: adherence to precedent “is the preferred course
because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
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development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity
of the judicial process.” It is a principle of decisionmaking,
not a rule, and need not be followed when the precedent at issue
is “unworkable or . . . badly reasoned.” Id.
The court below has not demonstrated that Turner is
unworkable, nor does the excerpt from the legislative history
cited by the court demonstrate that it is badly reasoned.
Accordingly, we decline to overturn Turner. Although the
opinion of the court below in the present case appears to rely
on Turner, its decision is not free from ambiguity, and it
should be clarified on remand.
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is set aside. The record of trial is returned
to the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force for remand to
that court for further review consistent with this opinion and
our order granting the petition for review. ___ MJ ___ (Daily
Journal Jan. 15, 2002). Thereafter, Article 67, UCMJ, 10 USC
§ 867, shall apply.
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