United States v. Brown

IN THE CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Kevin E. BROWN, Private E2
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 99-0983
Crim. App. No. 9701539
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 4, 2000
Decided December 19, 2000
EFFRON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
CRAWFORD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, GIERKE, and BAKER, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Steven P. Haight (argued); Colonel Adele H. Odegard,
Major Jonathon F. Potter, and Captain David S. Hurt (on brief);
Lieutenant Colonel David A. Mayfield and Major Scott R. Morris.
For Appellee: Captain William J. Nelson (argued); Colonel Russell S. Estey,
Major Patricia A. Ham, and Captain Kelly D. Haywood (on brief);
Lieutenant Colonel Edith M. Rob.
Military Judge: Robert F. Holland
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE PUBLICATION.
United States v. Brown, No. 99-0983/AR
Judge EFFRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
A general court-martial composed of a military judge
sitting alone convicted appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of
assault consummated by a battery (3 specifications) and
aggravated assault (5 specifications) on a child under the age
of 16 years, in violation of Article 128, Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 USC § 928. He was sentenced to a
dishonorable discharge, confinement for 8 years, forfeiture of
all pay and allowances, and reduction to the grade of E-1. The
convening authority approved these results, and the Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed in an unpublished, memorandum opinion.
On appellant’s petition, we granted review of the following
issue:
WHETHER THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE ERRED TO
THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY
SUBMITTING A RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONVENING
AUTHORITY REGARDING APPELLANT’S REQUEST THAT
FORFEITURES BE DEFERRED WHICH CONTAINED
MATTERS NOT MENTIONED IN THE RECORD OF
TRIAL, SPECIFICALLY MENTIONING THAT
APPELLANT’S WIFE WAS UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR
THE SAME FACTS THAT GAVE RISE TO APPELLANT’S
COURT-MARTIAL, AND NOT ALLOWING APPELLANT
THE OPPORTUNITY TO REBUT THIS NEW MATTER BY
NEVER SERVING APPELLANT WITH THE
RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONVENING AUTHORITY
RELATING TO THE REQUEST FOR DEFERMENT OF
FORFEITURES.
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United States v. Brown, No. 99-0983/AR
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. Appellant has
not made a colorable showing of possible prejudice flowing from
the alleged error. See Art. 59(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 859(a).
I. BACKGROUND: FACTUAL SETTING
Twelve days after appellant's trial ended, he asked the
convening authority to defer the adjudged forfeitures pending
the convening authority's final action in the case. See Art.
57(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2), UCMJ, 10 USC § 857(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2).
The written submission by defense counsel noted: (1) appellant
had a moral and financial obligation to his two children, both
of whom were in foster care; (2) appellant's wife, who was
expecting their third child, was unemployed and planned to
relocate to her home in Maryland; and (3) deferment of the
forfeitures was necessary to provide Mrs. Brown with “some
financial security while she seeks secure employment," and
without the deferment, "the family will have no means of
support."
On the following day, the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)
provided the convening authority with a written recommendation
on the request, which noted in part that
PV2 Brown's two children are presently in
foster care and are unlikely ever to be
returned to him. He is not under any court
ordered obligation to provide them financial
support. In addition, his wife is expecting
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United States v. Brown, No. 99-0983/AR
their third child, however, this child is
due after the six month waiver period will
expire.[1] Thus, his wife is the only
dependent who will directly benefit during
the period of the waiver/deferral, and she
is currently under investigation for
criminal abuse regarding the same facts and
circumstances as in the present case.
On the following day, the convening authority disapproved the
request. The defense was not served with the SJA's written
recommendation.
Approximately 6 months after denial of the deferment
request, the SJA provided the convening authority with a
recommendation to approve the findings and sentence under
Article 60(d), UCMJ, 10 USC § 860(d). The SJA included a
reference to appellant’s deferment request, reminding the
convening authority that he had denied the request. The SJA’s
recommendation was served on appellant’s newly assigned
substitute defense counsel.
After receiving a copy of the SJA’s recommendation, defense
counsel submitted matters for consideration by the convening
authority under RCM 1105 and 1006, Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States (2000 ed.). These submissions challenged the
1
The SJA misspoke. There is no 6-month waiver period with respect to
deferment of adjudged forfeitures. Adjudged forfeitures may be deferred
until the convening authority takes formal action on the sentence. See Art.
57(a)(2), UCMJ, 10 USC § 857(a)(2). The SJA apparently was referring to a
statutory provision not at issue in this case, the authority under Article
58b(b), UCMJ, 10 USC § 858b(b), to waive automatic forfeitures for certain
persons in confinement for a period of up to 6 months. Compare Art. 57(a)(2)
(deferment of adjudged forfeitures) with Art. 58b(b)(waiver of automatic
forfeitures).
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United States v. Brown, No. 99-0983/AR
legal sufficiency of the pleas and effectiveness of trial
defense counsel, but they did not address the decision to deny
deferment of forfeitures or otherwise specifically request that
the convening authority mitigate the forfeitures when taking
action on the sentence. The defense submission included a
letter from appellant's wife in which she wrote that she, not
appellant, had hurt the children, describing what she had done
and how she had done it. Approximately 3 weeks later, the
convening authority approved the adjudged sentence.
II. BACKGROUND: LEGAL CONTEXT
A. Recommendations to the Convening Authority:
Notice and Comment
The requirement for a written submission to the convening
authority from the SJA under Article 60(d) is a longstanding
feature of military law. See Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41
Stat. 796 (Article of War 46); Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S.
Army, 1921, para. 370. In United States v. Goode, 1 M.J. 3, 6
(CMA 1975), we held that the written recommendation must be
served on counsel for the accused in order to provide the
accused "with an opportunity to correct or challenge any matter
he deems erroneous, inadequate or misleading, or on which he
otherwise wishes to comment." Goode drew upon earlier cases
that required notice and an opportunity to comment on adverse
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United States v. Brown, No. 99-0983/AR
matter in a post-trial review. See, e.g., United States v.
Vara, 8 USCMA 651, 25 CMR 155 (1958); United States v. Griffin,
8 USCMA 206, 24 CMR 16 (1957). Subsequent to Goode, we held in
United States v. Narine, 14 M.J. 55 (CMA 1982), that if the SJA
supplements the original recommendation by providing the
convening authority with new matter, the new matter must be
served on counsel in order to ensure compliance with the
opportunity for comment required by our precedents.
Congress incorporated the notice and response requirements
of Goode into Article 60(d) as part of the Military Justice Act
of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, §5(a)(1), 97 Stat. 1395-97. See S.
Rep. No. 98-53 at 21 (1982). The President has incorporated
this requirement and treatment of new matters under Narine into
the Manual for Courts-Martial through RCM 1106(f)(7).
At the time the Military Justice Act of 1983 was debated,
and for many years thereafter, forfeitures adjudged by a court-
martial did not take effect until the convening authority acted
on the findings and sentence. In the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110
Stat. 462-63, Congress amended the Code to provide that: (1)
forfeitures adjudged by a court-martial would become effective
in most cases prior to the convening authority's action, and (2)
the convening authority could defer such forfeitures. Art.
57(a), supra. The 1996 legislation also amended the Code to
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United States v. Brown, No. 99-0983/AR
require automatic forfeiture of pay in certain cases involving
confinement, regardless of whether forfeitures were adjudged at
trial, and to permit the convening authority to waive such
forfeitures for a limited period of time, not to exceed 6
months. Art. 58b, UCMJ, 10 USC § 858b. Neither the statute nor
the subsequent amendments to the Manual addressed the issue of
whether the convening authority was required to receive an SJA's
recommendation before acting on a deferment or waiver request.
Likewise, neither addressed the issue of whether the accused
should be provided with notice of and an opportunity to respond
to any written submission from the SJA to the convening
authority with respect to deferment or waiver.
B. Post-Trial Processing: Prejudicial Error
In United States v. Chatman, 46 M.J. 321 (1997), we set forth
the following guidance to determine whether an erroneous failure
to serve new matter on the defense constitutes prejudicial
error:
[W]e will require appellant to demonstrate
prejudice by stating what, if anything,
would have been submitted to "deny, counter,
or explain" the new matter. . . . We believe
that the threshold should be low, and if an
appellant makes some colorable showing of
possible prejudice, we will give that
appellant the benefit of the doubt and "we
will not speculate on what the convening
authority might have done" if defense
counsel had been given an opportunity to
comment.
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United States v. Brown, No. 99-0983/AR
Id. 323-24 (citations omitted); see Art. 59(a), supra; see also
United States v. Wheelus, 49 M.J. 283 (1998); United States v.
Catalani, 46 M.J. 325 (1997).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Post-Trial Action on Forfeitures
Appellant relies on the views of the Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals in United States v. Spears, 48 M.J. 768
(A.F.Ct.Crim.App. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds,
United States v. Owens, 50 M.J. 629 (A.F.Ct.Crim.App. 1998). In
Spears, the court noted that although the literal requirements
for the SJA’s post-trial recommendation under RCM 1106 did not
extend to waiver of automatic forfeitures under Article 58b(b),
"concepts of basic fairness and procedural due process" were
violated by not providing the servicemember with a copy of the
recommendation and an opportunity to “comment before sending it
to the convening authority for his action on the waiver
request." Id. at 775-76. Drawing an analogy to the notice and
comment provisions of RCM 1106, the court stated:
The clear purpose behind the rule was to
give the defense an opportunity to respond
to the SJA's position in post-trial legal
advice provided to the convening authority.
The rule on new matter obviously prevents
the SJA from bringing up new issues from
outside the record to the convening
authority and getting the last say without
the defense even knowing about it. When the
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United States v. Brown, No. 99-0983/AR
rule was written, Articles 57(a) and 58b,
UCMJ, did not exist and the issue presently
before us could not be foreseen.
Id. at 775.
We note that Congress has recognized the serious impact
that such forfeitures would have on the family of the accused by
providing the authority for deferment and waiver. The issue
before us raises questions involving constitutional due process
and statutory interpretation. Because appellant has not met the
applicable standards for finding prejudicial error, as discussed
in Part III.B., infra, we need not decide at this time whether
the requirements of notice and an opportunity to comment apply
to requests for deferment of adjudged forfeitures or waiver of
automatic forfeitures.
It is likely, however, that these questions will recur in
the near future. Rather than attempt to resolve them in the
present case, we believe the most prudent course of action is
for the Executive Branch to consider whether, as a matter of law
or policy, and consistent with due process considerations, such
requests to the convening authority should be followed by a
recommendation from the SJA and service on the accused with an
opportunity to respond. In addition, given congressional focus
on the interests of the family, consideration should be given as
to whether there might be circumstances in which the family
could have interests separate from the accused which might be
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United States v. Brown, No. 99-0983/AR
brought to the attention of the convening authority directly by
the family rather than through the accused.
B. Evaluation of Prejudice
Even if we were to hold that notice and an opportunity to
comment were required in the present case, appellant would not
be entitled to relief. Under Chatman, supra, an accused who
seeks appellate relief from such a post-trial processing error
has the burden of making a colorable showing of possible
prejudice. Appellant has not met this burden because he has not
demonstrated what he would have said in response to the SJA’s
recommendation regarding deferment of forfeitures.
The SJA, for example, stated that appellant was not under
any court-ordered obligation to provide financial support for
his children in foster care. This is the type of assertion
which, if incorrect or misleading, can readily be corrected. In
order to make the requisite showing of prejudice, appellant
would have to demonstrate on appeal how he would have challenged
the SJA’s assertion, and he has not done so.
Likewise, appellant has not demonstrated prejudice with
respect to the SJA’s statements that the deferment would not
benefit the third, as yet unborn child, who was not due until
more than 6 months after the request. Although the SJA erred in
suggesting that there was a 6-month maximum period for
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United States v. Brown, No. 99-0983/AR
deferment, appellant has failed to address the fact that any
deferment would have ended as a matter of law well within the 6
month period when the convening authority acted on appellant’s
case. Appellant has not indicated what he might have said about
the SJA’s error that could have produced a different result.
Appellant also has not demonstrated prejudice with respect
to the SJA's assertion that appellant's wife was unworthy of
favorable consideration because she then was "under
investigation for criminal abuse regarding the same facts and
circumstances as in the present case." Appellant has argued
that he could have investigated that assertion and responded to
it if inaccurate. He has had ample time to do so and has not
demonstrated either that the statement was inaccurate or that
there were circumstances that precluded him from obtaining the
requisite information. Although the standard for prejudicial
error under Chatman is low -- a "colorable showing of possible
prejudice" –- it does not include sheer speculation about
factual matters that are within the normal investigative
capabilities of counsel.
IV. DECISION
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.
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