United States v. Kaiser

IN THE CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
David J. KAISER, Sergeant
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 02-0609/AR
Crim. App. No. ARMY 9900485
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued December 15, 2002
Decided March 14, 2003
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
GIERKE, EFFRON, and BAKER, JJ., joined. CRAWFORD, C.J., filed a
separate dissenting opinion.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Terri J. Erisman (argued); Colonel
Robert T. Teetsel, Lieutenant Colonel E. Allen Chandler,
Jr. and Major Imogene M. Jamison (on brief); Colonel
Adele H. Odegard.
For Appellee: Captain Janine P. Felsman (argued);
Lieutenant Colonel Margaret B. Baines, Lieutenant
Colonel Lauren B. Leeker and Major Jennifer H. McGee (on
brief); Major Paul T. Cygnarowicz.
Military Judges: Stephen V. Saynisch and Nancy A. Higgins
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION
United States v. Kaiser, 02-0609/AR
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to his pleas, Appellant was convicted of two
specifications of violating a lawful order and two
specifications of adultery in violation of Articles 92 and 134,
Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter UCMJ], 10 U.S.C.
§§ 892, 934 (2002). Contrary to his pleas, a general court-
martial composed of officer and enlisted members convicted
Appellant of an additional specification of violating a lawful
order and an additional specification of adultery. The adjudged
and approved sentence provided for a bad-conduct discharge,
confinement for forty-five (45) days, forfeiture of all pay and
allowances, and reduction to Private E1. With the exception of
certain modifications to the forfeiture not relevant to this
appeal, the Army Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings
and sentence in a memorandum opinion.
On Appellant’s petition, we granted review of the following
issue:
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY INFORMING THE PANEL
MEMBERS THAT APPELLANT HAD PLEADED GUILTY TO SOME OFFENSES
BUT NOT OTHERS
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the military
judge erred and reverse.
FACTS
Appellant was a twenty-four year-old married sergeant with
approximately six years of service and, at all times relevant to
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United States v. Kaiser, 02-0609/AR
the charges and specifications in this case, was assigned to the
Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center at the
Presidio of Monterey, California. In his capacity as a training
noncommissioned officer, Appellant was tasked with establishing
training schedules and events for students.
In June of 1996, the Commander of the Defense Language
Institute issued a policy memorandum on relationships with
students, prohibiting staff members involved in training or
evaluation from forming nonprofessional relationships with
students. Nonprofessional relationships with students were
defined as including, but not being limited to, dating,
drinking, gambling, borrowing or loaning money and engaging in
sexual activities.
Appellant was tried in May 1999 for alleged violations of:
Article 92 (four specifications) for violating the above-
referenced command policy by engaging in nonprofessional
relationships with Private First Class (PFC) AC, Private (PVT)
SG, PFC MB and Private E-2 (PV2) CA; Article 93, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 893 (2002) (three specifications) for making offensive and
sexual overtures to PFC AC and PFC NW; Article 125, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 925 (2002) (two specifications) for consensual sodomy
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United States v. Kaiser, 02-0609/AR
with PV2 CA;1 and Article 134 (four specifications) for indecent
assault upon PFC AC and adultery with PFC AC, PVT E-2 CA and
Specialist CB.
At the commencement of his trial, Appellant entered mixed
pleas with respect to the charges. He pleaded guilty to two of
the four Article 92 specifications (PFC AC and PFC CB) and two
of the three adultery specifications under Article 134 (PFC AC
and PFC CB). He pleaded not guilty to the remaining charges and
specifications.
Following her providence inquiry and entry of the guilty
findings, the military judge engaged in the following exchange
with counsel:
MJ: Please be seated [The accused and his counsel did as
directed.] Captain Bogie, I believe that we have the
members called for at 0915?
TC: That is correct, Your Honor.
MJ: Okay. Let's take up some administrative matters right
now. Do we have an extra copy of the flyer that we can
have marked as an appellate exhibit and has a copy of that
been provided to the defense?
DC: No, Your Honor. The defense doesn't even have a copy
of the flyer.
MJ: Why don't we just go ahead and use my copy here.
Captain Salerno, please approach. [The defense counsel did
as directed.] Take a moment to review that. [The military
judge hands the defense counsel a copy of the flyer.]
1
Private E-2 CA is identified as "PVT E-2 [CA]" under Specification 4 of
Charge I (Violation of Order) and Specification 3 of Charge IV (Adultery),
but is also identified as "PFC [CA]" in Specifications 1 and 2 of Charge III
(Sodomy).
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United States v. Kaiser, 02-0609/AR
DC: Your Honor, the copy of the flyer that you just
provided to me still contains a list of the specifications
to which Sergeant Kaiser just pled guilty. Is it your --
is it that --
MJ: If you take a look at Page 46 of DA Pam 27-9, you'll
note that the members are informed that that has occurred.
That's why those specifications remain on it. Okay?
DC: That's fine.
MJ: Captain Salerno, any objection?
DC: No objection, Your Honor.
MJ: Okay. Let's go ahead and have a copy of that marked
as an appellate exhibit. We can do that on the break.
Just make sure that goes into the record. . . .
Following preliminary instructions and voir dire of the panel,
the military judge advised the members as follows:
MJ: Please be seated. Court members, at an earlier
session, the accused pled guilty to several specifications.
I'd like you to take out your flyer, so that you can just
place a mark next to those. He pled guilty to
Specification 2 of Charge I and Specification -- I'm sorry,
Specification 1 of Charge I and Specification 3 of Charge
I; if you'd just place a small mark next to those. And
then if you'd go down to Charge IV, he pled guilty to
Specification 2 of that Charge and guilty to Specification
4 of that Charge. And he pled not guilty to all other
specifications and charges. You are advised that findings
by the court members will not be required on those
specifications to which the accused has already been found
guilty pursuant to his plea. I inquired into the
providence of his plea of guilty to those specifications
and found his plea to be provident, accepted it, and
entered findings of guilty on those specifications that I
have just gone over with you. Findings will be required,
however, as to the charges and specifications to which the
accused has pled not guilty. Does any member have a
question?
[The members indicated a negative response.]
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United States v. Kaiser, 02-0609/AR
Are both sides ready to proceed?
TC: Yes, Your Honor.
DC: Yes, Your Honor.
The court-martial proceeded from that point, with Appellant
electing to testify in his defense. The members found Appellant
guilty of an Article 92 violation and an Article 134 violation
with PVT E-2 CA. He was found not guilty of an Article 92
violation with respect to PVT SG, not guilty of the Article 93
specifications involving PFC AC and PFC NW, not guilty of the
Article 125 specifications involving PVT E-2 CA and not guilty of
the Article 134 indecent assault specification involving PFC AC.
DISCUSSION
The military judge openly advised the court members at the
commencement of the trial that Appellant had pleaded guilty to
some of the charges, but not guilty to others. When defense
counsel raised a question about the inclusion on the flyer of
the specifications to which Appellant had pleaded guilty, the
military judge advised him that those specifications remained
because the Military Judges’ Benchbook required that the members
be informed of the guilty pleas. See Military Judges’
Benchbook: Legal Services, Dep’t of the Army, Pamphlet 27-9,
Military Judges’ Benchbook 28, 46 (1996) [hereinafter
Benchbook]2.
2
Republished as Military Judges’ Benchbook: Legal Services, Dep’t of the
Army, Pamphlet 27-9, Military Judges’ Benchbook 29, 47 (2001) [hereinafter
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United States v. Kaiser, 02-0609/AR
The Benchbook does not contain such a requirement. The
Benchbook provides the following instruction after a plea is
accepted:
The MJ should not inform the court members of plea and
findings of guilty prior to presentation of the
evidence on another specification to which the accused
pled not guilty, unless the accused requests it or the
guilty plea was to an LIO [Lessor Included Offense]
and the prosecution intends to prove the greater
offense. Unless one of these two exceptions exist,
the flyer should not have any specifications/charges
which reflect provident guilty pleas if other offenses
are being contested.
See Benchbook at 29.
Contrary to the military judge’s statement that the
Benchbook directs notification of the court members of guilty
pleas as a matter of course, such notification is directed only
when specifically requested by the accused. In the absence of a
specific request by the accused or circumstances involving an
LIO, "the flyer should not have any specifications/charges which
reflect provident guilty pleas if other offenses are being
contested." Id.The provisions of the Benchbook are consistent with and
reflect the requirements of Rule for Courts-Martial 913(a)
[hereinafter R.C.M.]:
(a) Preliminary Instructions. The military judge may give
such preliminary instructions as may be appropriate. If
mixed pleas have been entered, the military judge should
ordinarily defer informing the members of the offenses to
Benchbook]. The referenced provisions are identical to those in effect at
the time of trial.
7
United States v. Kaiser, 02-0609/AR
which the accused pleaded guilty until after the findings
on the remaining contested offenses have been entered.
This same directive to ordinarily defer informing members of
guilty pleas in mixed plea cases is also found in the discussion
under R.C.M. 910(g), which relates to the entry of findings.
Finally, the discussion under R.C.M. 913(a) makes it clear that
"[e]xceptions to the rule requiring the military judge to defer
informing the members of an accused's prior pleas of guilty
include cases in which the accused has specifically requested,
on the record, that the military judge instruct the members of
the prior pleas of guilty" and cases involving guilty pleas to
an LIO.
The current rule is based in part on this Court’s decision
in United States v. Rivera, 23 M.J. 89 (C.M.A. 1986), where we
held that the military judge erred in advising the members at
the outset of the trial that the accused had earlier pleaded
guilty to certain of the charged offenses. See also United
States v. Smith, 23 M.J. 118 (C.M.A. 1986)(in the usual case, no
lawful purpose is served by informing members prior to findings
about any charges to which an accused has pleaded guilty);
United States v. Davis, 26 M.J. 445 (C.M.A. 1988)
(the practice of informing members of guilty pleas provides a
fertile area for assertion of error on appeal and can serve no
useful purpose).
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United States v. Kaiser, 02-0609/AR
The law in this area is clear -- in a mixed plea case, in
the absence of a specific request made by the accused on the
record, members of a court-martial should not be informed of any
prior pleas of guilty until after findings on the remaining
contested offenses are made. This rule is long-standing and
embodied in the Benchbook, R.C.M. 910(g), R.C.M. 913(a) and our
decisions in Smith, Rivera, and Davis.
The military judge therefore erred in the present case by
providing a flyer to the panel that contained the specifications
to which Appellant had pleaded guilty. There was no specific
request made by Appellant that such advance notification be
given to the members.3
As noted in Davis, such an error does not always mandate a
reversal:
Where, however, admission of evidence does not violate the
accused’s constitutional rights, reversal is not required
if we determine that the error was not prejudicial, i.e.,
if the finder of fact was not influenced by it or if it had
only a slight effect on resolution of the case. United
States v. Barnes, 8 M.J. 115 (C.M.A. 1979).
26 M.J. at 449-50 (footnote omitted). As we further
acknowledged in Davis: “Error of constitutional dimensions
requires either automatic reversal or an inquiry into whether,
3
The defense counsel did point out to the military judge that the flyer
contained the guilty pleas, but he was cut off with a firm but clearly
erroneous assertion that such a disclosure was required by the Benchbook.
Given those circumstances and the nature of the military judge's error (i.e.,
failure to secure an affirmative request from the accused, on the record, for
her actions), we conclude that the error is preserved for our review.
9
United States v. Kaiser, 02-0609/AR
beyond a reasonable doubt, the error did not contribute to the
defendant’s conviction or sentence.” 26 M.J. at 449 n.4 (citing
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); United States V.
Moore, 1 M.J. 390 (C.M.A. 1976)).
The error here directly implicates the presumption of
innocence and specifically the effect that advance notification
to members of guilty pleas in a mixed plea case has on that
presumption. The presumption of innocence is a longstanding
feature of both military and civilian law. It is a critical
part of our tradition of justice and deeply imbedded in our
culture as well as our systems of justice. United States v.
Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 402 (C.A.A.F. 2002)(Baker, J.,
concurring).
In strict legal terms, the presumption of innocence flows
from the fundamental right to a fair trial: “The right to a
fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). The
presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the
Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our
system of criminal justice.” Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,
503 (1976). As reflected in the language of Article 51(c)(1),
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 851(c)(1) (2002), the presumption of innocence
is directly related to the requirement that guilt be established
by legal and competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Put
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United States v. Kaiser, 02-0609/AR
another way, the presumption of innocence embodies the principle
that “one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or
innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence
introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion,
indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not
adduced as proof at trial.” Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478,
485 (1978).
Appellant was entitled to a presumption of innocence
throughout his trial. He had a right to have his guilt or
innocence of the contested specifications determined by the
members solely on the basis of legal and competent evidence
introduced at trial and not on other grounds, i.e., his pleas of
guilty to other similar specifications. Id.; Article 51(c)(1).
In this case, the panel was handed a flyer indicating that
Appellant had been charged with thirteen separate specifications
of criminal conduct and was then told that Appellant had already
pleaded guilty to some of the specifications. They were not
advised at that time of the legal effect of those guilty pleas,
but instead heard trial counsel intimate that they might serve
as a basis for "inferring" something.4
4
Trial counsel made reference to the guilty pleas in his opening statement,
initially asking the members to “separate that from [their] mind[s]” and
indicating that the government was “proving different charges.” However,
trial counsel went on to state: “[you] may be able to make some inferences,
but the fact that [Appellant] pled guilty to those does not alone prove the
remainder of the charges.”
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United States v. Kaiser, 02-0609/AR
The circumstances under which the members were advised of
Appellant's guilty pleas formed a part of the "filter" through
which they viewed the evidence presented at trial and posed a
heightened risk that the members felt invited, consciously or
subconsciously, to draw an impermissible inference from
Appellant's guilty pleas. Cf. United States v. Riley, 47 M.J.
276, 280 (C.A.A.F. 1997)(discussing effect of impermissible
comments at outset of trial on right to remain silent).
Finally, we note that Appellant was found not guilty of all
of the "dissimilar" offenses (i.e., the maltreatment, indecent
assault and consensual sodomy specifications), but guilty of the
"similar" specifications (i.e., violation of a lawful order and
adultery).
The Government has suggested that any error here is
harmless, as the rules of evidence would have permitted
introduction of evidence of the misconduct underlying the guilty
pleas, independent of any notification to the members of the
12
United States v. Kaiser, 02-0609/AR
actual pleas themselves. See Rivera, 23 M.J. at 96 (discussing
potential admissibility of such evidence under Military Rule of
Evidence 404(b) and under cross-examination). While the rules
of evidence may well allow for that possibility, we decline to
speculate as whether or in what manner such evidence might have
been brought to the attention of the members.
Based on our review of the record and circumstances present
in this case, we conclude that the military judge's decision to
advise the members that Appellant had pleaded guilty to some
offenses but not others, in the absence of any specific request
to that effect made by Appellant on the record, was not harmless
error.5
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the decision of the Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is reversed and the findings of guilty on Charge I,
Specification 4 and Charge IV, Specification 3 are set aside.
The sentence is set aside. The record of trial is returned to
the Judge Advocate General for remand to the Court of Criminal
Appeals. That court may dismiss the specifications and reassess
the sentence or it may order a rehearing.
5
We make no determination as to whether the error here is constitutional or
non-constitutional in nature. We hold simply that the error was not harmless
under either standard. See United States v. Alameda, 57 M.J. 190, 199-200
(C.A.A.F. 2002) (comparing standards).
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United States v. Kaiser, No. 02-0609/AR
CRAWFORD, Chief Judge (dissenting):
Rule for Courts-Martial 913(a) [hereinafter R.C.M.]
provides the following guidance regarding preliminary
instructions: “The military judge may give such preliminary
instructions as may be appropriate. If mixed pleas have
been entered, the military judge should ordinarily defer
informing the members of the offenses to which the accused
pleaded guilty until after the findings on the remaining
contested offenses have been entered.” The nonbinding
Discussion following the Rule adds:
Exceptions to the rule requiring the military
judge to defer informing the members of an
accused’s prior pleas of guilty include cases in
which the accused has specifically requested, on
the record, that the military judge instruct the
members of the prior pleas of guilty and cases in
which a plea of guilty was to a lesser included
offense within the contested offense charged in
the specification.
R.C.M. 913(a) discussion. The Majority is correct that the
Benchbook reflects the content of the discussion, and that
the military judge misinformed counsel regarding the
guidance contained in the Benchbook’s advice. See Military
Judges’ Benchbook: Legal Services, Dep’t of the Army,
Pamphlet 27-9, Military Judges’ Benchbook, 29, 47
(2001)[hereinafter Benchbook]
Nevertheless, the language of R.C.M. 913(a) is clear
that to “defer informing the members of the offenses to
which the accused pleaded guilty” is what the judge
“ordinarily” should do; hence, the Discussion’s mention of
two situations “include[d]” among exceptions to the rule.
The case at hand is precisely one more exception. In
short, the judge’s authorization of the flyer permitted the
members to consider what was otherwise admissible evidence
under Military Rule of Evidence 803(22) and 404(b)
[hereinafter M.R.E.].
Furthermore, in failing to object to the flyer’s
content when the opportunity arose at trial, Appellant
waived any post-trial objection to the flyer. Even
assuming that the military judge erred, the error was not
“plain” to the extent that this Court should reverse the
decision below.
For these reasons, discussed at length below, I would
affirm the decision of the lower court.
The Guilty Pleas Were Admissible Evidence
First, Appellant’s guilty pleas were admissible under
M.R.E. 803(22). M.R.E. 803 lists the exceptions to the
hearsay rule that are not contingent upon a declarant’s
availability. Included among this list is M.R.E. 803(22),
pertaining to judgments of prior convictions: “Evidence of
a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of
guilty . . . adjudging a person guilty of a crime
2
punishable by death, dishonorable discharge, or
imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact
essential to sustain the judgment . . . ” is admissible.
R.C.M. 910(g) allows that “[f]indings based on a plea of
guilty may be entered immediately upon acceptance of the
plea at an Article 39(a) session.” Pursuant to this rule,
the military judge noted to Appellant that “[o]n your plea
alone and without receiving any evidence, this court can
find you guilty of the offenses to which you have pled
guilty.” After extensive questioning the judge determined
Appellant’s pleas to be provident. The guilty pleas listed
on the flyer were therefore admissible under this rule, as
evidence of a final judgment entered upon a plea of guilty.
Second, Appellant’s admissions during the providency
inquiry rendered the guilty pleas admissible under M.R.E.
404(b). This rule addresses the potential prejudice that
could result from members’ knowledge of other crimes
committed, or allegedly committed, by the accused. M.R.E.
404(b) reads: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show action in conformity therewith.” The motive behind
this rule is the same motive that generates the military’s
efforts “to assure that [in trials by courts-martial] an
accused will not be found guilty of one offense merely
3
because he is guilty of other crimes.” United States v.
Rivera, 23 M.J. 89, 95 (C.M.A. 1986). This is precisely
why Appellant claims that he has been prejudiced by the
members’ consideration of his guilty pleas.
Yet, M.R.E. 404(b) provides a significant exception:
Such otherwise inadmissible evidence may be admissible “for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident.” Appellant’s admissions during the
providency inquiry concerning the four uncontested
specifications were so closely factually intertwined with
all of the specifications that each admission and
corresponding guilty plea was illustrative of Appellant’s
motive, opportunity, and intent regarding the contested
specifications.
During the providency inquiry in this case the
military judge meticulously narrated the facts related to
each uncontested offense and then asked Appellant to
confirm that the elements of each offense accurately
described what Appellant had done. In replying to the
judge, Appellant described having consensual sex in his
barracks room with Private First Class (PFC) AC, a woman
who was in training at the Presidio, allowing another
woman, PFC M.B., to remain in his bed unconscious from
4
extreme intoxication, and having sex with a Specialist
(SP4) CB, a Presidio student, in her barracks room after
meeting her at a local bar.
The information gleaned from these admissions tracked
the essential elements of all of the specifications. The
plea admissions involved the same type of women (trainees),
the same type of acts, and the same general sexual behavior
as the contested charges alleged. The specifications
concerned a total of six women who had contact with
Appellant between December 1997 and July 1998, and included
charges of fraternization, maltreatment, sodomy, indecent
acts, and adultery. The fraternization charge under
Article 92 addresses the failure to obey an order or
regulation, in this case a regulation prohibiting
nonprofessional relationships with trainees. See Article
92, Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter UCMJ], 10
U.S.C. § 892 (2002). The Article 93 maltreatment charge in
pertinent part punishes sexual harassment, which includes
“deliberate or repeated offensive comments or gestures of a
sexual nature.” Article 93, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 893 (2002).
The sodomy charge under Article 125 prohibits “unnatural
carnal copulation.” Article 125, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 925(2002). Finally, the Article 134 charge of indecent acts
and adultery alleges appellant’s behavior to have been
5
contrary to good order and discipline. See Article 134,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2002). The essential elements of
these charges, the type of behavior they punish, were
clearly the essential elements of Appellant’s guilty pleas
and corresponding providency admissions. The guilty pleas
were therefore indicative of Appellant’s motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, and/or plan regarding the
contested specifications, and as such were admissible under
M.R.E. 404(b).1
In sum, although the judge may have misconstrued the
Benchbook, she did so in the context of circumstances
exceptional to the “ordinary” parameters of R.C.M. 913(a),
rightly permitting the members to consider what would
otherwise have been admissible evidence under M.R.E.
803(22) and 404(b).
Appellant Waived Objection to the Flyer
R.C.M. 905(e) states that “objections . . . must be
raised before the court-martial is adjourned for that case
and . . . failure to do so shall constitute waiver.” The
purpose of this rule is “to eliminate the expense to the
1
In the same vein, this Court applied the underlying principle
of Military Rule of Evidence 404(b) to its analysis of whether a
military judge committed prejudicial error by informing the
members prior to a contested trial of the offenses to which the
accused pleaded guilty. United States v. Smith, 23 M.J. 118, 121
(C.M.A. 1986).
6
parties and the public of rehearing an issue that could
have been dealt with by a timely objection or motion at
trial.” United States v. Huffman, 40 M.J. 225, 229 (C.M.A.
1994)(Crawford, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
the result). In the present case, defense counsel waived
any objection to informing the members about the previous
guilty pleas when he stated “that’s fine” and “no
objection” after the military judge’s erroneous summary of
the Benchbook. The judge gave defense counsel the
opportunity to debate the legality of the flyer’s content,
yet counsel had nothing to say. This failure to argue,
coupled with counsel’s explicit assertion that he had “no
objection,” constitutes waiver, pure and simple. Absent
plain error, the issue is therefore not suited for appeal.
Furthermore, throughout the court-martial, defense
counsel actively put Appellant’s guilty pleas before the
members. During his opening statement, defense counsel
remarked:
[The Accused] has an absolute right not to
say anything. That’s not the kind of
soldier [he] is. He came forward this
morning and said, “I’ve done wrong, Your
Honor. I’m guilty of these offenses. I’m
going to tell you about it.” And he did.
But, I can’t tell you about these other
things for one simple reason: because they
did not happen. I can’t tell you about
something that did not happen.
7
In addition, defense counsel repeatedly asked witnesses
whether Appellant’s guilty pleas had any bearing on the
witnesses’ opinion of Appellant. Finally, in his closing
argument defense counsel characterized Appellant’s guilty
pleas as acts which “happened off duty hours in the privacy
of his barracks room” and, in so doing, reiterated
Appellant’s guilty pleas. Thus, not only did defense
counsel fail to dispute the flyer’s inclusion of all
charges when the opportunity was presented to him, but he
also highlighted Appellant’s guilty pleas throughout the
court-martial.
In sum, by failing to formally object to the flyer
when given the opportunity at trial, and in repeatedly
addressing the guilty pleas on his own initiative during
the court-martial, defense counsel waived any post-trial
objection to the flyer.
There was no Plain Error
“If an error is waived, further consideration of its
effect is simply estopped unless it qualifies as ‘plain
error’ . . . .” United States v. Deachin, 22 M.J. 611, 614
(A.C.M.R. 1986)(citing United States v. Tyler, 17 M.J. 381,
385-86 (C.M.A. 1984)); see also United States v. Causey, 37
M.J. 308, 311 (C.M.A. 1993). The Supreme Court in United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), and Johnson v. United
8
States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997), established a four-prong test
to detect plain error. To remedy an error not raised at
trial an appellate court must find (1) error, (2) that is
plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and that (4)
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson, 520 U.S. at
466-67 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732; United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).
The Court has defined “error” as a “deviation from a
legal rule.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-33; Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). An error is “plain” when it is
“obvious” or “clear under current law,” Olano, 507 U.S. at
734, or “’so egregious and obvious’ that a trial judge and
prosecutor would be ‘derelict’ in permitting it in a trial
held today,” United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 667 (2d
Cir. 2001)(citing United States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 43
(2d Cir. 1998)). An error may become “plain” at the time
of appellate consideration even if it was not “plain” at
the time of the court-martial. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468.
An error that affects substantial rights is one that is
materially prejudicial, United States v. Chapa, 57 M.J.
140, 143 (C.A.A.F. 2002); one that effects the outcome or
judgment of the court-martial proceeding; Olano, 507 U.S.
at 734. Appellant has the burden of demonstrating that
9
these first three prongs of the plain error test are met.
United States v. Kho, 54 M.J. 63, 65 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
Assuming under the first prong of the test that the
judge erred, it is nonetheless clear that under the second
prong the alleged error was not “plain.” The flyer’s
errancy was neither “obvious” nor “clear under current
law,” as the guilty pleas included on the flyer were
admissible under M.R.E. 803(22) and 404(b). See Olano, 507
U.S. at 734. Furthermore, even if the error were plain, it
certainly was not materially prejudicial, and therefore
does not satisfy the third prong of the plain error test.
Three facets of the case mitigate any materially
prejudicial effect of the error.
First, defense counsel’s recurrent explicit references
to the guilty pleas -- in the opening statement, during the
questioning of witnesses, and then again during closing
argument -- provided the same information to the panel that
was contained in the flyer and to which Appellant now
objects. Given counsel’s own repeated disclosure of the
guilty pleas, it is extremely unlikely that the flyer
itself effected the trial’s outcome, and therefore clear
that any error was not materially prejudicial.
Moreover, the Government did not rely on Appellant’s
guilty pleas to prove its case. By contrast, it plainly
10
distinguished the specifications to which Appellant pleaded
guilty from those specifications the Government had yet to
prove at trial. During the opening statement, trial
counsel told the members:
Now, [the Accused] has pled guilty to an
adulterous affair and nonprofessional
conduct with Private First Class [AC].
Please separate that from your mind. We are
proving different charges. Now, you’ll
[sic] may be able to make some inferences,
but the fact that he pled guilty to [some
charges] does not alone prove the remainder
of the charges.
The Government’s efforts to differentiate the guilty pleas
from the charges addressed at trial undoubtedly diminished
the flyer’s influence on the findings and, in so doing,
abated any materially prejudicial effect of the error.
Third, and most strikingly, Appellant was charged with
13 specifications, and pleaded guilty to only four.
Appellant now argues that the flyer’s inclusion of the
guilty pleas tainted the outcome of the trial by inclining
the members to find him guilty of other substantially
similar offenses. However, the charge and findings chart
reproduced below tells a different story.
CHARGE ARTICLE DATES PLEA FINDING
I. 92 - Fraternization
1. PFC AC Apr-Jul 98 G G
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2. PVT SG Apr 98 NG NG
3. PFC MB Jul 98 G G
4. PVT E-2 CA Apr-Jun 98 NG G
(PV2)
II. 93 - Maltreatment
1. PFC CA Jul 98 NG NG
2. PFC NW Feb-Apr 98 NG NG
3. PFC AC Dec 97 NG NG
III. 125 - Sodomy
1. PV2 CA Apr 98 NG NG
2. PV2 CA Jun 98 NG NG
IV. 134 - Indecent Acts, Adultery
1. PFC AC Dec 97 NG NG
2. PFC AC Apr-Jul 98 G G
3. PV2 CA Apr, Jun 98 NG G
4. SP4 CB Mar-Jul 98 G G
Of the 13 total specifications, Appellant was found guilty
of only six. Of the nine contested specifications,
Appellant was found guilty of only two (emphasized above).
Far from being detrimental, the judge’s alleged error, if
significant at all, actually allowed defense counsel
successfully to employ the guilty pleas throughout the
proceeding to Appellant’s advantage.
Finally, the fourth prong of the test requires the
court to consider both the quality and quantity of
evidence, as well as to determine whether “a timely
objection in the trial court could have eliminated, or
substantially ameliorated, any error by means well short of
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the drastic relief -- ordering a new trial -- necessary to
remedy the error on appeal.” United States v. Promise, 255
F.3d 150, 194 (4th Cir. 2001)(Motz, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part and dissenting in the judgment)
(citing Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466; United States v. Young,
470 U.S. 1, 15, 16 n.13 (1985); United States v. Frady, 456
U.S. 152, 163 (1982); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 238-39 (1940)). Even assuming that any
error survived the first three prongs of the plain error
test, the judge’s error certainly failed to jump this final
hurdle. Reviewing the quantity and quality of the evidence
reveals that defense counsel could have formally objected
at trial when given the opportunity, and that such an
objection “could have eliminated, or substantially
ameliorated, any error by means well short of the drastic
relief -- ordering a new trial -- necessary to remedy the
error on appeal.” See id. Pursuant to the fourth prong of
the plain error analysis, any error in this case did not
seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.
In sum, the military judge’s authorization for the
flyer’s inclusion of the uncontested charges may have
exceeded the “ordinary” instruction advised in R.C.M.
913(a). However, the judge’s authorization of the flyer
13
permitted the members to consider what was otherwise
admissible evidence under M.R.E. 803(22) and 404(b).
Furthermore, in failing to object to the flyer’s content
when the opportunity arose at trial, appellant waived any
post-trial objection to the flyer. Finally, even assuming
that the military judge did err, the error was not “plain”
to the extent that this Court should reverse the decision
below.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
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