United States v. Augspurger

IN THE CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Wayne G. AUGSPURGER, Airman Basic
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 04-0563
Crim. App. No. S30222
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued February 8, 2005
Decided June 27, 2005
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
GIERKE, C.J., and EFFRON and BAKER, JJ., joined. CRAWFORD, J.,
filed a separate opinion, dissenting in part and concurring in
the result.
Counsel
For Appellant: Major Andrew S. Williams (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Carlos L. McDade and Major Terry L. McElyea (on brief).
For Appellee: Major Michelle M. Lindo (argued); Colonel LeEllen
Coacher, Lieutenant Colonel Robert V. Combs, Lieutenant Colonel
Gary F. Spencer, Major James K. Floyd, and Major M. Leeann
Summer (on brief).
Military Judge: Ann D. Shane
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication .
United States v. Augspurger, No. 04-0563/AF
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court.
Airman Basic (AB) Wayne G. Augspurger was charged with
wrongfully using marijuana “on divers occasions,” wrongfully
distributing marijuana, being drunk and disorderly and
wrongfully communicating a threat in violation of Articles 112a
and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10
U.S.C. §§ 912a, 934 (2000), respectively. He pleaded guilty to
the drunk and disorderly specification and not guilty to the
remaining specifications. The members found him not guilty of
wrongfully distributing marijuana and wrongfully communicating a
threat. He was found guilty of wrongfully using marijuana,
except for the words “on divers occasions.” Augspurger was
sentenced to confinement for three months and a bad-conduct
discharge. The convening authority approved the sentence and
the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings
and sentence by unpublished order on May 18, 2004. United
States v. Augspurger, No. ACM S30222, 2004 CCA LEXIS 128, 2004
WL 1238970 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. May 18, 2004).
When a servicemember is charged with illegal conduct “on
divers occasions” and the members find the accused guilty of
charged conduct but strike out the “on divers occasions”
language, the effect of the findings is that the accused has
been found guilty of misconduct on a single occasion and not
guilty of the remaining occasions. Where the findings do not
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disclose the single occasion on which the conviction is based,
the Court of Criminal Appeals cannot conduct a factual
sufficiency review or affirm the findings because it cannot
determine which occasion the servicemember was convicted of and
which occasion the servicemember was acquitted of. We granted
review in this case to determine whether the Air Force court
erred in reviewing the findings for factual sufficiency and
independently determining which act of marijuana use Augspurger
was convicted of. We hold that the Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals erred. That court could not conduct a factual
sufficiency review of Augspurger’s conviction because the
military judge failed to clarify the factual bases upon which
the members’ findings of guilty and not guilty were based.
BACKGROUND
At Augspurger’s court-martial the Government presented
evidence of three separate occasions during which Augspurger
allegedly used marijuana. The allegation of one occasion of use
was based on a positive urinalysis result after Augspurger’s
urine was tested for marijuana when he submitted a sample for a
medical test. Following this positive test Augspurger admitted
to an investigator that he had smoked marijuana at an off-base
apartment with some friends on December 1, 2001. Allegations of
two additional uses of marijuana were presented through the
testimony of AB Todd A. Coleman who previously had been
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convicted of drug use and who testified that he had seen
Augspurger smoke marijuana on two separate occasions in January
and February 2002.
The “use” specification alleged that Augspurger had used
marijuana “on divers occasions” between October 15, 2001 and
February 20, 2002. After hearing evidence of the three alleged
occasions of use described above, the members found him guilty
of the specification except the words “on divers occasions,” and
found him not guilty of the excepted words. The members did not
indicate which of the three alleged uses formed the basis of
their finding.
Confusion over which occurrence Augspurger had been
convicted of was evident following the announcement of the
verdict. In a session pursuant to Article 39(a), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 839 (a) (2000), the defense counsel asked the military
judge to have the members clarify the findings. The military
judge declined to do so but did discuss her concern over how she
should instruct the members regarding Augspurger’s prior
nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 815(2000), for the drug use described in his confession. She noted
that “at this point, we don’t even know if that’s one of the
specifications.” The military judge ultimately decided to
conditionally instruct the members that they could consider the
Article 15 punishment as evidence in mitigation if they had
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convicted him for the same drug use. The trial counsel objected
to that instruction noting that “[t]here is no way of knowing
what the members actually convicted him on or which particular
use.”
Without knowing which use Augspurger had been convicted of,
neither the parties nor the military judge knew whether the
Article 15 punishment should be admitted as a matter in
mitigation or a matter in aggravation. If Augspurger was
convicted of the same “use” for which he received the Article 15
punishment, the members needed to be instructed to take into
consideration as a matter in mitigation that he had already been
punished for that offense. On the other hand, if Augspurger was
convicted of use on one of the other two occasions, the
Government could introduce the Article 15 punishment in
aggravation as evidence of a separate use.
In the sentencing arguments the trial counsel referred to
the Article 15 punishment as a matter in aggravation, taking the
position that Augspurger had been acquitted of the marijuana use
that was referenced in his confession and that was the basis for
the Article 15 punishment. The defense counsel referred to it
as a matter in mitigation, taking the position that Augspurger
had been convicted of the marijuana use that was referenced in
his confession. The military judge instructed the members as
follows:
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United States v. Augspurger, No. 04-0563/AF
In regard to Specification 2 of the Charge, the court
found the accused guilty of a single use of marijuana.
If the basis for that finding was the incident
described in the accused’s confession, Prosecution
Exhibit 3, then the court is advised that when you
decide upon a sentence in this case, you must consider
that punishment has already been imposed upon the
accused under Article 15, UCMJ, for that offense.
Specifically, he was reduced in rank. His prior
punishment is a matter in mitigation which you must
consider. Again, this only applies if, in fact, the
court’s finding of guilt was based upon the incident
contained in Prosecution Exhibit 3.
In giving this instruction the military judge demonstrated that
she did not know which use the members found Augspurger guilty
of.
Before the Air Force court Augspurger argued “that the
finding of guilty as to use of marijuana was ambiguous in that
it failed to specify which of the three alleged divers uses
formed the basis of the conviction.” Augspurger, 2004 CCA LEXIS
128, at *1-*2, 2004 WL 1238970, at *1. That court concluded
that the military judge erred in not requiring the members to
specify which of the three instances presented by the Government
formed the basis of their finding; however it found that it was
able to “determine in this case which of the three alleged uses
the appellant was convicted of, and thus we conclude the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Augspurger, 2004 CCA
LEXIS 128, at *4, 2004 WL 123870, at *2. After reviewing the
evidence the court satisfied itself beyond a reasonable doubt
that the members convicted Augspurger of the December 1, 2001
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United States v. Augspurger, No. 04-0563/AF
use, and modified the findings in an effort to resolve the
ambiguity. Id.Before this court, Augspurger argues that the military
judge erred because she did not ask the members to clarify their
verdict before it was announced. He argues that the Court of
Criminal Appeals also erred because it nonetheless affirmed
Augspurger’s conviction and stated that it could determine which
instance of use the members relied on by exercising its fact-
finding powers under Article 66, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (2000).
He contends that our opinions in United States v. Walters, 58
M.J. 391 (C.A.A.F. 2003), and United States v. Seider, 60 M.J.
36 (C.A.A.F. 2004), necessitate reversal of his conviction based
on these errors.
The Government argues that there is sufficient evidence in
the record to ascertain which use of marijuana formed the basis
for Augspurger’s conviction, and that the lower court properly
asserted its fact-finding authority in reaching its conclusion.
It contends that it is a separate inquiry for the court to
determine beyond a reasonable doubt which incident the fact-
finder used as a basis to convict the accused. The Government
argues that so long as a lower court reasonably could have
determined the fact-finder’s intent from the record beyond a
reasonable doubt, then that court could thereafter conduct a
factual sufficiency review of that finding. The Government
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United States v. Augspurger, No. 04-0563/AF
urges this court to uphold those determinations as a proper
application of the lower court’s Article 66 fact-finding power.
The Government also argues that even if the lower court did not
have the power to review these findings, this court has the
power to order a post-trial proceeding in revision to clarify
the findings and should do so in lieu of outright dismissal.
DISCUSSION
In Walters, the defendant was charged with drug use “on
divers occasions” and the Government presented evidence of a
number of instances of drug use. 58 M.J. at 392-93. The
members found the defendant guilty of only a single use, and not
guilty of use “on divers occasions.” Id. at 393. This court
held that it was error for the military judge to fail to obtain
clarification of the members’ findings prior to announcement of
those findings. Id. at 396-97. We also found that the
ambiguity in the findings precluded review by the Court of
Criminal Appeals because “[a] Court of Criminal Appeals cannot
find as fact any allegation in a specification for which the
fact-finder below has found the accused not guilty.” Id. at
395, 397.
Subsequently, we decided Seider, which differed from
Walters in that there were only two instances of drug use
alleged by the Government. Again the members excepted the words
“on divers occasions” and found the defendant guilty of use on
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United States v. Augspurger, No. 04-0563/AF
only one occasion. 60 M.J. at 37. The Court of Criminal
Appeals in Seider reviewed the two alleged instances for legal
and factual sufficiency and found that it was “convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt that appellant used and distributed cocaine
during a card game at the appellant’s off base apartment. We
are similarly convinced that this was the basis for the court
members’ finding of guilt for this specification.” United
States v. Seider, No. ACM 35154 2003, CCA LEXIS 197, at *2, 2003
WL 22048406, at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 11, 2003).
In reviewing the lower court’s decision, this court found
that it was not possible to determine the factual basis for the
members’ findings, and concluded that “where we cannot determine
whether the Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed and affirmed an
offense of which Seider was acquitted, we cannot affirm that
finding.” 60 M.J. at 38. We noted that:
The fact that this case involved only
two incidents while Walters involved six
incidents does not impact upon the inability
of the Court of Criminal Appeals to conduct
a factual sufficiency review of the
conviction. The defect is neither a
question of the legal or factual sufficiency
of the evidence of one alleged use versus
the other, nor is it a question to be
resolved by weighing evidence and concluding
that evidence of one use is quantitatively
or qualitatively inferior.
Id. at 38 n.*.
This case is not distinguishable from the rationale of
Walters and Seider. As in those cases, there is simply no
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indication by the members as to the factual basis for their
findings of guilty and not guilty. In fact, the inability to
determine the basis for the findings is reflected in this
record. After the findings were announced, each party held a
different view of the basis for the findings. The military
judge was also uncertain as reflected by her conditional
instruction on how the members were to consider the Article 15
punishment. Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Criminal
Appeals did not have the authority to review and affirm
Augspurger’s conviction by selecting the occasion that formed
the basis for the conviction and then reviewing that conclusion
for factual sufficiency.
The military judge had two opportunities to ensure that the
members’ findings, as announced, were clear as to the factual
basis for the offense. First, she should have properly
instructed the members that if they excepted the “divers
occasion” language they would need to make clear which
allegation was the basis for their guilty finding. Second,
after she examined the findings worksheet but prior to
announcement, the military judge should have asked the members
to clarify their findings. Once the findings of a court-martial
have been announced, any finding that amounts to a finding of
not guilty is not subject to reconsideration or a post-trial
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United States v. Augspurger, No. 04-0563/AF
session such as a proceeding in revision. See Rule for Courts-
Martial 924(a), 1102(c)(1).
It is the responsibility of military judges to ensure that
these ambiguities are clarified before the findings are
announced and if they fail to do so the appellate courts cannot
rectify that error. See Walters, 58 M.J. at 397 (noting that
“the inability to identify and segregate those instances of
alleged use of which Appellant was acquitted from the ‘one
occasion’ that served as the basis for the guilty finding
effectively prevents any rehearing”).
DECISION
The decision of the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is
reversed. The finding of guilty of Specification 2 of the
Charge and the sentence are set aside, and Specification 2 is
dismissed. The record is returned to the Judge Advocate General
of the Air Force for remand to the Court of Criminal Appeals.
That court may either reassess the sentence based on the
affirmed guilty findings or order a rehearing on the sentence.
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CRAWFORD, Judge (dissenting in part and concurring in the
result):
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s application of
United States v. Walters, 58 M.J. 391 (C.A.A.F. 2003), to the
facts of this case. I concur, however, in the result because
this case can and should be decided on the basis of judicial
estoppel. If it were not for the prosecutor’s argument at trial
that the members’ findings pertained not to Appellant’s December
2001 use of marijuana but rather to his use on another occasion,
this case could be affirmed, because the facts are easily
distinguishable from those of Walters.
In the military justice system, administrative and
nonjudicial action may be taken against a servicemember for a
violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), with
regard to, such as in this case, the wrongful use of a
controlled substance. Administrative punishment may be imposed
under the provisions of Article 15, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 815(2000). In this case, Appellant was given punishment under
Article 15 for the wrongful use of a controlled substance in
December 2001. While we have held that the prior punishment
does not constitute double jeopardy and preclude a court-
martial, we have also held that “an accused must be given
complete credit for any and all non-judicial punishment.”
United States v. Pierce, 27 M.J. 367, 369 (C.M.A. 1989).
United States v. Augspurger, No. 04-0563/AF
Because of the potential overlap, the military judge informed
the parties that she planned to instruct the members that
Appellant was entitled to credit for the Article 15 punishment
because the underlying facts for the finding of guilty and the
Article 15 punishment may have been the same. The prosecutor
objected to this instruction.
Judicial estoppel precludes a party from successfully
asserting a position in a proceeding and then asserting an
inconsistent position later. See Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d
219, 223 (4th Cir. 1996) (approving courts’ use of the doctrine
to preclude such changes in position); United States v.
McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1993) (identifying one of
the policies underlying judicial estoppel doctrine as
“preventing internal inconsistency”). It is an effective tool
for discouraging or preventing the prosecutorial inconsistency
that occurred in this case. Judicial estoppel would bar the
prosecution in this case from advocating at this Court a
position inconsistent with that of the trial prosecutor, who had
a chance to hear all the evidence and observe the demeanor of
the members and the witnesses.
As noted above, the prosecutor’s argument in this case
renders futile any attempt to distinguish the cases cited by
Appellant, although they are otherwise distinguishable. In
Walters, the accused was charged with using ecstasy on divers
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occasions. 58 M.J. 392. Walters pleaded not guilty and the
Government presented credible evidence of as many as six
instances of drug use. The members found Walters guilty of one
single use of ecstasy by excepting the words, “on divers
occasions,” but they did not specify which of the six instances
formed the basis for their finding. Id. at 392-94. In contrast
here, while Appellant was charged with using marijuana on divers
occasions, the evidence introduced by the Government at trial,
which included a positive urinalysis and Appellant’s confession
to marijuana use in December, clearly formed the basis for the
members’ finding. Although two witnesses testified as to other
alleged uses, this case is factually distinguishable from
Walters. Appellant confessed and, while trial counsel moved to
suppress Appellant’s confession once it was admitted, the
confession was not discredited. In both defense counsel’s
opening statement and closing argument on the findings, he
practically invited the members to find Appellant guilty of the
instance reflected in the confession. In his opening statement,
he said: “[T]here’s evidence of one single use, but there’s not
evidence of divers uses on different occasions.” In his
findings argument, he told the members that Appellant “admits
that he wrongfully used marijuana in his 1 December statement.
That’s not in dispute. In fact, his statement is corroborated
by the fact that his drug screen came back positive for
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marijuana when he checked into the hospital.” The defense did
not try to cross-examine Government witnesses as to this
evidence or contradict Appellant’s confession.
The prosecutor, in his misguided zeal, tried to prevent the
panel from giving Appellant any credit for the prior Article 15
punishment relating to the same use that defense counsel
mentioned in his opening and closing statements. The prosecutor
wanted the Article 15 punishment to be considered a matter in
aggravation that would not serve to reduce the sentence. In
this instance, I would apply the logic of Military Rule of
Evidence (M.R.E.) 801(d)(2)(C), (D) to resolve the question of
whether the prosecutor’s statement at trial as to his beliefs is
binding on the Government. At least, the argument to the
military judge shows there is more than one incident that may
have been subject to the Article 15 punishment, thus raising the
issue of whether the Court of Criminal Appeals could affirm the
conviction for one of the several incidents set forth in the
Government’s case. United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 811-
12 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Bakshinian, 65 F.
Supp. 2d 1104, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (requiring the state to
abide by promises made by prosecutors). The statements of the
prosecutor bind the Government, or at least result in judicial
estoppel. See, e.g., United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118,
130-31 (1st Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Johnson, 28
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United States v. Augspurger, No. 04-0563/AF
F.3d 1487, 1496 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that the Government’s
original bill of particulars would have been admissible if
inconsistent with the charge later before the court).
M.R.E. 801(d)(2) is the same as its counterpart in the
Federal Rules of Evidence with regard to party admissions,
including adopted statements, statements by authorized agents,
and those made by principals. M.R.E. 801(d)(2) provides that
certain statements are not hearsay. Those statements include
“(C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a
statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the
party’s agent . . . concerning a matter within the scope of the
agency or employment of the agent . . . made during the
existence of the relationship.” M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(C), (D). The
courts are divided on the treatment of prosecutors’ statements.
Some follow the common law principle that “no individual should
be able to bind the sovereign.” See, e.g., United States v.
Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1351 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997). Bakshinian, in
contrast, held that prosecutors can bind the sovereign. 65
F.Supp. 2d at 1106. It is not necessary to decide among these
divergent views because, in this instance, at least, the trial
counsel’s argument underscores the different possibilities
concerning the findings.
The majority imposes an unnecessary per se rule on cases in
which “divers occasions” are alleged, rather than examining the
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individual facts to “identify and segregate those instances of
alleged use of which Appellant was acquitted,” __ M.J. __, (11)
(citation omitted), when the facts of record make that process
crystal clear. They fail to apply judicial estoppel to the
divergent positions of the Government, and they fail to
distinguish this case factually from Walters. But for the
prosecutor’s argument, this case would be factually
distinguishable from both Walters and Seider, but because the
prosecutor’s arguments bind the Government, I concur in the
result.
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