Phillip Montoya v. United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico

FILED
U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
of the Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
February 5, 2019
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
Blaine F. Bates
OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk
_________________________________
In re PEDRO MENDOZA and SANDY M. BAP No. NM-18-019
ARMIJO,
Debtors.
________________________________
Bankr. No. 16-10951
PEDRO MENDOZA and SANDY M. Chapter 7
ARMIJO,
Appellants,
v.
PHILIP J. MONTOYA, Chapter 7 Trustee,
Appellee.
_________________________________
In re STEVEN BRIAN DOLLMAN and BAP No. NM-18-030
DARLA SUE DOLLMAN,
DEBTORS.
__________________________________
Bankr. No. 13-13057
STEVEN BRIAN DOLLMAN and Chapter 7
DARLA SUE DOLLMAN,
Appellants,
OPINION
v.
PHILIP J. MONTOYA, Chapter 7 Trustee,
Appellee.
_________________________________
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of New Mexico
_________________________________
Michael E. Lash of Christopher L. Trammell, P.A., Albuquerque, New Mexico for
Appellants Pedro Mendoza and Sandy M. Armijo.
Deborah M. DeMack of the Law Offices of Deborah M. DeMack, Albuquerque, New
Mexico for Appellants Steven Brian Dollman and Darla Sue Dollman.
Bonnie Bassan of Askew & Mazel, LLC, Albuquerque, New Mexico for Appellee Philip
J. Montoya, Chapter 7 Trustee.
_________________________________
Before MICHAEL, ROMERO, and SOMERS, Bankruptcy Judges.
_________________________________
ROMERO, Bankruptcy Judge.
We address the appeals of Pedro Mendoza and Sandy Armijo and Steven and
Darla Sue Dollman together as both appeals raise an identical legal issue: whether the
New Mexico bankruptcy courts properly sustained a Chapter 7 trustee’s objections to the
amendment of the debtors’ bankruptcy schedules.
In both cases, the bankruptcy courts concluded the general right to amend
schedules provided by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1009(a) sets the date the
case is closed as the specified period in which the debtors must file amendments to their
schedules.1 As the debtors in these appeals had closed and then reopened their bankruptcy
cases, the bankruptcy courts concluded the specified period for amendment as a matter of
1
All future references to “Code,” “Section,” and “§” are to the Bankruptcy Code,
Title 11 of the United States Code, unless otherwise indicated. All references to “Rule” or
“Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
2
course had expired and both courts required the debtors to show excusable neglect
existed to allow the amendments pursuant to Rule 9006(b). Because we do not read Rule
1009(a)’s language to create a specified period of time as set forth in Rule 9006(b), we
REVERSE and REMAND both cases for consideration of whether the debtors properly
claimed exemptions through the amended schedules.
I. Facts
Although these appeals are taken from two separate bankruptcy cases, the factual
background of each is similar. In both cases, the Chapter 7 debtors received a discharge
and their cases were closed. Both sets of debtors unknowingly failed to disclose personal
injury claims in their schedules and both sets of debtors sought to reopen their cases in
order to amend their schedules. Following reopenings, the Chapter 7 trustee objected to
the debtors’ amended schedules in both cases. Both bankruptcy courts sustained the
Chapter 7 trustee’s objections on the basis neither set of debtors could show excusable
neglect for failing to amend their schedules prior to the closing of the cases.
a. In re Dollman
Darla Sue Dollman suffered a personal injury in a Wal-Mart store parking lot
when she tripped over a mangled shopping cart corral on December 18, 2012. Mrs.
Dollman experienced physical and cognitive injuries as a result of her fall. Mrs. Dollman
and her husband, Steven Dollman, filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on September
18, 2013. The Dollmans did not disclose Mrs. Dollman’s injury or any potential cause of
action against Wal-Mart in their bankruptcy schedules. The Dollmans received a Chapter
7 discharge on December 30, 2013.
3
Two years later, Mrs. Dollman filed a complaint against Wal-Mart in state court
on account of her personal injury. In the course of litigation, Wal-Mart’s counsel became
aware of the bankruptcy case and sought dismissal on the basis Mrs. Dollman was not the
valid holder of the personal injury claim. Upon conferring with bankruptcy counsel, the
Dollmans filed a motion to reopen their bankruptcy case to amend their claimed
exemptions to exempt the personal injury claim. The bankruptcy court granted the motion
to reopen on January 24, 2017. The Dollmans immediately amended Schedules A, B, and
C to disclose a “Personal injury legal claim”2 and exempt the personal injury claim
pursuant to § 522(d)(11)(D) and (E).3
Philip Montoya was appointed as the Chapter 7 trustee (the “Trustee”) in the
reopened case on January 25, 2017. The Trustee objected to the Dollmans’ amendments
to Schedules A, B, and C. The parties waived an evidentiary hearing on the issue and the
bankruptcy court issued its memorandum opinion on September 29, 2017.4 In the
opinion, the bankruptcy court concluded Rule 9006(b) required the Dollmans to file a
motion to extend the time to amend the schedules and meet the excusable neglect
standard before they would be allowed to amend their claimed exemptions. Accordingly,
the bankruptcy court struck the amended Schedules A, B, and C and set a deadline for the
Dollmans to file a motion to extend the deadline to amend the schedules.
2
Schedule B at 6, in Dollman App. at 29.
3
Schedule C at 2-3, in Dollman App. at 32-33.
4
In re Dollman, 583 B.R. 268, 273 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2017).
4
The Dollmans filed a timely request for an extension of time to amend their
schedules pursuant to Rule 9006(b)(1), asserting they acted in good faith and any delay in
amending the schedules was excusable based on their attorney’s failure to act. The
Trustee objected to the request for an extension, arguing the Dollmans could not meet the
excusable neglect standard.
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court entered its
Memorandum Opinion on March 5, 2018.5 The bankruptcy court concluded that while
neglect may have occurred, the Dollmans did not meet Rule 9006(b)’s excusable neglect
standard to amend schedules in a reopened bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy court
evaluated the factors provided by the Supreme Court decision Pioneer Investment
Services Company. v. Brunswick Associates,6 concluding that although the Trustee
suffered minimal prejudice, the court could not excuse the Dollmans’ more than three-
year delay in disclosing the personal injury claim. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court
denied the motion to extend time to amend Schedules A, B, and C. The Dollmans filed a
timely appeal of the order striking their amended schedules and the order denying their
request for an extension of time to amend the schedules.
b. In re Mendoza
Sandy Armijo suffered a personal injury in an automobile accident when she was
rear-ended at a stoplight on August 13, 2014. The at fault driver’s automobile insurance
5
Dollman App. at 174.
6
507 U.S. 380 (1993).
5
company, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”),
reimbursed Armijo for the cost of repairing her vehicle on October 30, 2014. Armijo
sought chiropractic treatment for the personal injuries caused by the accident. Between
September 17, 2014 and June 22, 2017, Armijo received a total of ninety-five
chiropractic treatments. Armijo paid for forty-five of the treatments out of her own
pocket. The chiropractor billed State Farm for the rest.
On April 20, 2016, Armijo and her then husband, Pedro Mendoza, filed a Chapter
7 bankruptcy petition.7 Armijo and Mendoza did not list the car accident, injuries, or any
potential claims against State Farm in their bankruptcy schedules. The Chapter 7 trustee
appointed in the case conducted a § 341 meeting of creditors and filed a report of no
distribution to creditors.
Having received no payment from State Farm, Armijo’s chiropractor contacted her
regarding its $6,250.71 bill in May or June 2016. The chiropractor also contacted State
Farm regarding the bill on June 1, 2016. After that, State Farm wrote Armijo a letter
asking her to contact the company about settlement of her claims.8 Armijo and Mendoza
7
Ms. Armijo and Mr. Mendoza were married on the petition date but have since
divorced.
8
Once on July 5, 2016 and again on September 6, 2016. This letter is not in the
record but was referenced in cross-examination of Ms. Armijo. Tr. at 34-35, in Mendoza
App. at 111-12. The bankruptcy court included the text of the July 5, 2016 letter in its
opinion. In re Mendoza, 584 B.R. 355, 359 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2018).
6
received a Chapter 7 discharge on July 25, 2016, and the bankruptcy court closed their
case on the same day.
On October 14, 2016, State Farm sent Armijo a settlement agreement and check
for $14,250.71 in settlement of all her claims resulting from the August 13, 2014
accident. Armijo signed the settlement agreement on October 18, 2016. State Farm paid
Armijo $8,000.00 on October 25, 2016, and paid her chiropractor $6,250.71 directly on
October 26, 2016. State Farm sent Armijo and Mendoza’s bankruptcy counsel a copy of
the settlement agreement and other communications on November 22, 2016.9
After conferring with their bankruptcy counsel, Armijo and Mendoza moved to
reopen their bankruptcy case to schedule and exempt the personal injury award for the
automobile accident on April 3, 2017. The bankruptcy court granted the motion to reopen
and Armijo and Mendoza filed amended Schedules A, B, and C on April 12, 2017.
Schedule B lists “$14,250.71 for accident 8/13/14 caused by Dawn Davis/ State Farm
Insurance; subject to chiropractor lien of $6250.71 Net to Sandy Armijo $8000.00 on
10/14/16.”10 Schedule C exempts the $14,250.71 pursuant to § 522(d)(11)(D). Philip
Montoya was also appointed as Chapter 7 trustee in the reopened Mendoza bankruptcy
9
Exhibit N, in Mendoza App. at 200. It is unclear from the record how State Farm
learned about the bankruptcy case.
10
Schedule A/B at 6, in Mendoza App. at 26.
7
case. The Trustee filed an objection to the amended claim of exemption, arguing the
amendment was untimely pursuant to Rule 1009(a).
The bankruptcy court held a hearing on November 16, 2017, and issued its
Opinion and Order Sustaining Trustee’s Objection to Debtors’ Claim of Exemption on
January 31, 2018.11 The bankruptcy court concluded Rule 9006(b)(1) required Armijo
and Mendoza to show excusable neglect in order to amend their schedules in the
reopened bankruptcy case. Applying Pioneer, the bankruptcy court concluded Armijo
and Mendoza could not show excusable neglect because numerous events in the
bankruptcy case should have prompted them to disclose the personal injury claims. As a
result, the bankruptcy court sustained the Trustee’s objection to Armijo and Mendoza’s
amended claim of exemption. Armijo and Mendoza filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
“With the consent of the parties, this Court has jurisdiction to hear timely-filed
appeals from ‘final judgments, orders, and decrees’ of bankruptcy courts within the Tenth
Circuit.”12 A bankruptcy court’s order applying the excusable neglect standard to justify
an extension of time is a final order for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 158.13 No party in either
11
In re Mendoza, 584 B.R. at 355; Mendoza App. at 55.
12
Straight v. Wyo. Dep’t of Trans. (In re Straight), 248 B.R. 403, 409 (10th Cir.
BAP 2000) (first quoting 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), and then citing 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1),
(c)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002).
13
See Lang v. Lang (In re Lang), 305 B.R. 905, 908 (10th Cir. BAP 2004), aff’d 414
F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2005).
8
case elected for these appeals to be heard by the United States District Court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 158(c). Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal.
The bankruptcy courts’ determinations the debtors in these two cases failed to
justify the amendments to their schedules rested on the adoption of the excusable neglect
standard pursuant to Rule 9006(b) and application of Pioneer to weigh factors on
excusable neglect.14 “The ‘issue of whether the [trial] court relied on the correct legal
standard . . . is a matter of law which we review de novo.’”15 “De novo review requires an
independent determination of the issues, giving no special weight to the bankruptcy
court’s decision.”16 “When de novo review is compelled, no form of appellate deference
is acceptable.”17
III. Analysis
Our analysis begins with the text of the Rules applicable to the amendment of the
debtors’ schedules. Rule 1009 provides,
A voluntary petition, list, schedule, or statement may be amended by the
debtor as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed. The
debtor shall give notice of the amendment to the trustee and to any entity
affected thereby. On motion of a party in interest, after notice and a
hearing, the court may order any voluntary petition, list, schedule, or
14
507 U.S. 380 (1993).
15
Arnold v. Arnold (In re Arnold), No. CO-15-031, 2016 WL 1022350, at *4 (10th
Cir. BAP Mar. 15, 2016) (quoting Hadden v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 1266, 1268 (10th Cir.
1988)).
16
Morris v. St. John Nat’l Bank (In re Haberman), 347 B.R. 411, 414 (10th Cir.
BAP 2006) (citing Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991)).
17
Salve Regina Coll., 499 U.S. at 238.
9
statement to be amended and the clerk shall give notice of the amendment
to entities designated by the court.18
In both cases, the bankruptcy courts read Rule 1009 in conjunction with Rule
9006(b)(1).19 Following the most basic canon of statutory construction requiring the
words of statutes to be read in context of the overall statutory scheme,20 the bankruptcy
courts concluded Rule 1009(a) created a specified period for the debtors to act and, upon
failure to act, Rule 9006(b)(1) required the debtors to show excusable neglect to amend
after the cases closed. We agree the canons of statutory construction apply to procedural
rules.21 However, we cannot conclude Rule 9006(b)(1) applies to Rule 1009(b).
Rule 9006(b)(1) provides,
when an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified period
by these rules . . . the court for cause shown may at any time in its
18
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1009(a) (emphasis added).
19
In re Dollman, 583 B.R. 268, 273 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2017) (“Rule 9006(b)(1) places
the burden of proof on the debtor to show why the failure to amend the schedules as a
matter of course before the case was closed, as permitted by Rule 1009(a), was the result
of excusable neglect.”); In re Mendoza, 584 B.R. 355, 361 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2018) (“The
late filing must be disallowed unless Debtors can show excusable neglect.”).
20
See In re Woods, 743 F.3d 689, 694 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Davis v. Mich.
Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)).
21
See Briseno v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We
employ the ‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ to interpret the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.”) (quoting Republic of Ecuador v. Mackay, 742 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir.
2014)); United States v. Roibal-Bradley, No. 15-3253, 2017 WL 3052523, at *8 (D.N.M.
June 20, 2017) (“[T]he rules of statutory construction apply to the Federal Rules.”)
(quoting In re Kubler, No. 11-0048, 2012 WL 394680, at *11 (D.N.M. Jan. 25, 2012));
Robinson v. G D C, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 577, 579 (E.D. Va. 2016) (“Interpreting a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is no different from interpreting a statute[.]”) (citing
Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 376 (2013) (interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(d)(1))).
10
discretion . . . [and] on motion made after the expiration of the specified
period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect.22
Resolution of these appeals rests on whether Rule 1009(a)’s “any time before the case is
closed” language creates a “specified period” during which an act must be done. If Rule
1009(a) creates a “specified period” for a debtor to amend schedules, then a debtor must
show the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. If Rule 1009(a) does not create
a “specified period” for a debtor to amend schedules, then amendment may occur as a
matter of course at any point while the case is open.23
The Tenth Circuit concludes “[t]he time-computation and extension provisions of
Rule 9006, like those of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6, are generally applicable to
any time requirement found elsewhere in the rules unless expressly excepted.”24 This
general rule is premised on rules creating time requirements that expressly set forth a
“specified period” for a debtor to act. Rule 1009(a)’s only temporal requirement states an
amendment to schedules must occur “any time before the case is closed.”25 Applying a
22
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1) (emphasis added).
23
The Court recognizes a third approach may apply whereby a debtor may not
amend schedules in a reopened case. See e.g., In re Bartlett, 326 B.R. 436, 439 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 2005).
24
Jones v. Arross, 9 F.3d 79, 80-81 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co.
v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 389 n.4 (1993)).
25
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1009(a).
11
plain meaning analysis,26 the phrase “any time before the case is closed” does not create a
“specified period.” Until the case is closed, it is impossible to determine the date of the
case closing, suggesting Rule 1009 references an indeterminate timeframe.27
Section 350 further complicates application of Rule 1009 by allowing a case to be
reopened “to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.”28 This
Court previously recognized a bankruptcy case is reopened “to continue the bankruptcy
proceeding. The word ‘reopened’ used in Section 350(b) obviously relates to the word
‘closed’ used in the same section.”29 Other courts suggest reopening a closed bankruptcy
case is an administrative act that “merely provides an opportunity to request substantive
26
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (explaining the first step
in statutory construction “is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and
unambiguous meaning”) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)).
27
See In re Muscato, 582 B.R. 599, 603 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2018) (“By its language,
Rule 9006(b) speaks to a specific period, and not to an indeterminate span of time whose
length is not precisely set.”). We find support for this interpretation of Rule 9006(b) in
the advisory committee’s notes, which explain Rule 9006(b)(2) prevents extension of the
period created by certain rules, all of which state the time in ascertainable periods. Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 9006 advisory committee’s note to subdivision (b) (referencing Rule
1007(d)’s 2-day period; Rule 1017(b)(3)’s 30-day period; Rule 1019(2)’s 20-day period;
Rule 2003(a)’s 40-day period; Rule 2003(d)’s 10-day period; Rule 3014’s deadline
tracking the date to object to a disclosure statement; Rule 4001(b)’s 30-day period; Rule
7052(b)’s 10-day period; Rule 9015(f)’s 20-day period; Rule 9023’s 10-day period; and
Rule 9024’s 1-year period).
28
11 U.S.C. § 350(b); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5010.
29
In re Flores, No. NM-00-069, 2001 WL 543677, at *3 (10th Cir. BAP May 23,
2001) (quoting Armel Laminates, Inc. v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Income Property
Builders, Inc.), 699 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam)).
12
relief” and has “no substantive effect in itself.”30 Section 350(b) places the decision to
reopen a case in the bankruptcy court’s discretion; however, “the bankruptcy court has a
duty to reopen a case whenever there is prima facie proof that a case has not been fully
administered.”31
Since the reopening of a case is purely administrative, we cannot read Rule
1009(a)’s language to impose a substantive limitation on the debtors’ ability to amend
their schedules as a matter of course. A reopening renders a case open. Rule 1009(a)
contains no distinction between an original case and a case closed and then reopened. Nor
does the Rule limit amending schedules to any time prior to the first closing of the case.
As previously stated, Rule 1009(a)’s plain language does not create an ascertainable and
specific period during which a debtor may amend his or her schedules.32 With this
conclusion, we join a number of courts in holding “the debtor, under Rule 1009, may
30
In re Cook, No. 7-04-17704, 2012 WL 5408905, at *6 (Bankr. D.N.M. Nov. 6,
2012) (citing Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2001)); accord In re Apex Oil Co.,
406 F.3d 538, 543 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The act of reopening a closed bankruptcy case is
typically ministerial. . . .”); In re Lopez, 283 B.R. 22, 26 (9th Cir. BAP 2002) (same).
31
In re Cook, 2012 WL 5408905, at *6 (citing In re Mullendore, 741 F.2d 306, 308
(10th Cir. 1984)).
32
In re Muscato, 582 B.R. at 603 (“[T]here is no justification for applying Rule 9006
in this case. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure do not require that exemption
schedules be amended ‘within a specified period.’”) (quoting In re Goswami, 304 B.R.
386, 393 (9th Cir. BAP 2003)).
13
amend schedules without limitation of whether the case is open or reopened after
closing.”33
In both cases, the bankruptcy courts contemplated the interaction between Rules
1009(a) and 9006(b) in reaching their decisions.34 However, by denying the debtors the
right to amend as a matter of course and requiring them to show excusable neglect, the
bankruptcy courts effectively shifted the burden of proving an exemption is properly
claimed to the debtors.35 Rule 4003(c) provides “the objecting party has the burden of
proving that the exemptions are not properly claimed.”36 As we are tasked to read Rule
1009(a) in context of other Rules and “fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious
33
Id. at 602 (quoting In re Martin, 157 B.R. 268, 274 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1993));
accord Towers v. Boyd (In re Boyd), 243 B.R. 756, 766 (N.D. Cal. 2000); In re Goswami,
304 B.R. at 391-93; Equitable Life Assurance Co. v. Union Planters Bank (In re Jordan),
276 B.R. 434, 438 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2000).
34
The bankruptcy courts analyzed three approaches to allowing the amendment of
schedules in a reopened bankruptcy case, both courts concluded the third approach,
requiring debtors to show excusable neglect, “best harmonize[d] the Code and Rule.” In
re Mendoza, 584 B.R. 355, 361 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2018); In re Dollman, 583 B.R. 268, 273
(Bankr. D.N.M. 2017) (applying Rule 9006(b) to Rule 1009 “terminates the liberal right
to amend.”) (citing cases adopting the same approach).
35
In re Dollman, 583 B.R. at 273 (“Rule 9006(b)(1) places the burden of proof on
the debtor to show why the failure to amend the schedules as a matter of course before
the case was closed, as permitted by Rule 1009(a), was the result of excusable neglect.”);
In re Mendoza, 584 B.R. at 361 (“The late filing must be disallowed unless Debtors can
show excusable neglect.”).
36
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(c).
14
whole,”37 we cannot agree with the bankruptcy courts’ conclusions, which required the
debtors to bear the burden of showing excusable neglect in order to claim an exemption.
Accordingly, on application of de novo review, we conclude both bankruptcy
courts erred in applying Rule 9006(b) and requiring the debtors to show excusable
neglect existed to amend their schedules. Our decision does not preclude an objection to
claimed exemptions on the merits or prevent the bankruptcy courts from denying the
exemptions should the objector meet his or her burden of showing the exemptions are not
properly claimed. We only conclude Rule 9006(b) should not be applied to prevent the
debtors from amending their schedules in the reopened cases. Furthermore, we decline to
consider whether the Supreme Court decision in Law v. Siegel38 limits a bankruptcy
court’s ability to deny a debtor’s claimed exemptions.
IV. Conclusion
The bankruptcy courts’ conclusions that Rule 1009(a) creates a “specified period”
in which the debtors must amend their schedules—despite the lack of an ascertainable
date upon which amendments must be made—misapplies the Rule. Simply put, Rule
9006(b)(1) does not apply to Rule 1009(a) and the bankruptcy courts’ orders improperly
burden the debtors’ ability to claim an exemption by requiring them to show excusable
neglect. Accordingly, the bankruptcy courts’ decisions are REVERSED and
37
Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133
(2000) (quoting FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959)).
38
571 U.S. 415 (2014).
15
REMANDED to consider the merits of the Trustee’s objections to the debtors’ claims of
exemptions.
16