In re: Isha Deen

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 7 2022
SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: BAP No. SC-21-1035-BSF
ISHA DEEN,
Debtor. Bk. No. 19-05815-CL13
ISHA DEEN; KEVIN KHWAJA, Adv. No. 19-90151-CL
Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM∗
CHODRY DEEN; SANA DEEN; SIDRAH
DEEN,
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of California
Christopher B. Latham, Chief Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
Before: BRAND, SPRAKER, and FARIS, Bankruptcy Judges.
INTRODUCTION
Isha Deen ("Isha") 1 and Kevin Khwaja appeal an order granting appellees'
motion to reopen an adversary proceeding and remand what was a removed
action to the state court. During Isha's bankruptcy, she and Khwaja removed a
pending state court action to the bankruptcy court. After Isha dismissed her
∗ This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for
whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value,
see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
1 Because Ms. Deen and appellees share the same surname, we refer to each of the
Deens by his or her first name to avoid any confusion. No disrespect is intended.
1
bankruptcy case, and after no one timely requested a continuance of the
adversary proceeding, the clerk administratively closed the removed and
undecided adversary proceeding, essentially leaving the state court action in
limbo. Months later, appellees moved to reopen the adversary proceeding and
asked that the state court action be remanded to the state court for decision.
Over Isha and Khwaja's objection, the bankruptcy court granted both requests.
Seeing no reversible error, we AFFIRM.
FACTS
A. The state court action
The facts pertinent to this appeal are undisputed. Isha, Sana, and Sidrah
are sisters. Chodry, now deceased, was their father. Khwaja is Isha's husband.
The six-year dispute between the parties centers on ownership interests in a
residence known as the El Brazo property, where the parties reside together, or
at least did at one time. On one side of the dispute is Isha and Khwaja, on the
other is Sana and Sidrah (and perhaps Chodry's estate).
In 2016, Isha and Khwaja filed suit against Chodry, Sana, and Sidrah
(collectively, the "Deen Family") in the state court alleging various claims
concerning the El Brazo property, including quiet title. The Deen Family
responded with a cross-complaint which included, among other things, a
competing claim for quiet title (the "State Court Action"). The state court
bifurcated the State Court Action, setting for trial only the cross-claim for quiet
title. After a bench trial, the state court issued a decision regarding quiet title,
which the parties appealed. The cross-appeal of the quiet title order was
dismissed as interlocutory. A civil jury trial for the remaining claims in the State
2
Court Action was to begin in November 2019 but did not go forward due to
Isha's bankruptcy filing.
B. The bankruptcy filing and removal of the State Court Action
Isha filed a chapter 132 bankruptcy case on September 28, 2019. She and
Khwaja filed a notice of removal of the State Court Action, thereby commencing
Adv. No. 19-90151. The Deen Family filed a Statement of Nonconsent in
response to the removal and stated their intent to also file a motion to remand.
Prior to the deadline for the Deen Family to file a remand motion, Isha
moved to dismiss her bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy court granted her
request and entered an order dismissing the case on April 9, 2020. The main
case was closed on June 8, 2020.
On April 10, 2020, the day after Isha's bankruptcy case was dismissed, the
clerk issued a Notice to Parties under Local Rule 7041-2 in the adversary
proceeding:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Bankruptcy Case No. 19-
5815-CL13 has been dismissed and no further proceedings are to
be taken in connection therewith. Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy
Rule 7041-2(a), this adversary proceeding will likewise be closed
unless a party files a motion seeking continuation of the
adversary proceedings within seven (7) days of the entry of this
notice.
(Emphasis added). No one sought a continuation of the adversary proceeding
by the deadline. The clerk closed the adversary proceeding on May 18, 2020.
2
Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, all "Rule" references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, and all "Civil Rule" references are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3
Several months later, Isha allegedly filed a document in the state court
claiming that she had unilaterally dismissed the State Court Action in her
bankruptcy, and therefore the state court lacked jurisdiction. This prompted the
chain of events which led to this appeal.
C. The motion to reopen and remand the State Court Action
The Deen Family then filed a Request for Remand to State Court and
Order for Remand. The next day, the bankruptcy court clerk issued a notice of
error stating that the "case" was closed and instructing the Deen Family to file a
motion under Rule 5010 to reopen it.
The Deen Family then filed a Motion to Reopen Case under Rule 5010 and
a Request for Remand to State Court and Order for Remand ("Motion to Reopen
and Remand"). They argued that, due to an "administrative error" by the clerk,
the adversary proceeding was closed before a remand motion could be heard.
The Deen Family argued that they thought the State Court Action automatically
resumed at the state court upon the dismissal of Isha's bankruptcy case, so with
that understanding, they argued, they had no reason to continue the adversary
proceeding as instructed in the Notice to Parties.
The Deen Family argued that the adversary proceeding needed to be
reopened for the purpose of obtaining a remand order, and that several factors
weighed in favor of remand: (1) the removal was based solely on Isha's
bankruptcy filing and was done for the purpose of forum shopping; (2) the
claims at issue were state-law claims and the state court had expertise in those
matters; (3) the State Court Action was a non-core, related-to proceeding; and
4
(4) the state court had spent years with the case and issued numerous related
decisions, orders, and judgments.
Isha and Khwaja opposed the Motion to Reopen and Remand and
requested a hearing. They argued that the Deen Family failed to provide any
basis for the bankruptcy court to reopen the "dismissed" adversary proceeding
months after the court-ordered deadline in the Notice to Parties had passed and
no one had appealed the dismissal. Isha and Khwaja argued that the
bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to reopen the dismissed adversary and that
Rule 5010 was not a proper basis for reopening it. Isha and Khwaja additionally
argued that reopening the adversary would cause them extreme prejudice
because they had moved on with their lives and would now have to retain a
new attorney to continue with the litigation. Despite their prejudice argument,
however, Isha and Khwaja contended that the Deen Family could simply file a
new complaint in the state court.
In reply, the Deen Family maintained that the adversary proceeding was
administratively closed, not dismissed; no order of dismissal had been entered,
and the clerk's Notice to Parties did not serve as one. The Deen Family argued
that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to at least clarify that the State Court
Action had automatically been remanded upon dismissal of the bankruptcy
case, or to reopen the adversary and remand the State Court Action under Civil
Rule 60.
At the hearing, the bankruptcy court noted that the adversary proceeding
had been administratively closed, not decided or dismissed. Disregarding that
statement, Isha continued to argue that it had been dismissed and that the
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bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to grant any relief. The court then entered
its oral ruling, and later its written order, granting the Motion to Reopen and
Remand. First, the court determined that it had the discretion to reopen the
adversary proceeding because no final order or judgment had been entered. It
then proceeded to make findings supporting remand under Citigroup, Inc. v.
Pacific Investment Management Co. (In re Enron Corp.), 296 B.R. 505, 508 n.2 (C.D.
Cal. 2003). The court determined that, under the circumstances, the Deen
Family's delay in filing the remand request was not unreasonable. This timely
appeal followed.
JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and
157(b)(1). We address our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158 below.
ISSUES
1. Do we have jurisdiction over this appeal?
2. Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion in reopening the closed
adversary proceeding?
3. Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion in granting remand?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review jurisdictional issues de novo. Menk v. LaPaglia (In re Menk), 241
B.R. 896, 903 (9th Cir. BAP 1999). We review de novo questions of subject matter
jurisdiction. Wilshire Courtyard v. Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Wilshire Courtyard),
729 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2013). "De novo review requires that we consider a
matter anew, as if no decision had been made previously." Francis v. Wallace (In
re Francis), 505 B.R. 914, 917 (9th Cir. BAP 2014).
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A bankruptcy court's decision whether to reopen an adversary proceeding
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Elias v. U.S. Tr. (In re Elias), 188 F.3d
1160, 1161 (9th Cir. 1999) (reopening bankruptcy case). Decisions to remand
under 28 U.S.C. § 1452 are also reviewed for abuse of discretion. McCarthy v.
Prince (In re McCarthy), 230 B.R. 414, 416 (9th Cir. BAP 1999). A bankruptcy
court's application of its local rules is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See
United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009). A bankruptcy court
abuses its discretion if it applies the wrong legal standard, or misapplies the
correct legal standard, or if its factual findings are clearly erroneous. United
States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
DISCUSSION
A. Threshold issues
The Deen Family raises several jurisdictional issues, including mootness,
standing, and our purported statutory lack of authority to review the remand
order.3 First, they argue that the appeal is constitutionally and equitably moot.
Other than saying this is so and citing a string of cases, the Deen Family fails to
articulate a cogent argument for why the appeal is moot. They begin by arguing
that remand of the State Court Action was automatic when Isha dismissed her
bankruptcy case, and therefore this Panel is unable provide Isha and Khwaja
with any effective relief. To begin, there is no "automatic" remand of removed
state court actions. Further, if the Deen Family's argument were correct, there
was no need for them to seek remand, and the bankruptcy court's efforts to
3
A motions panel denied the Deen Family's previous motion to dismiss on these
issues but permitted the parties to address them in their response and reply briefs.
7
grant remand were futile. To the extent they rely on amended Local Rule 7041-
2(b)4 to argue that the adversary proceeding was automatically remanded upon
dismissal of the bankruptcy case, their reliance is misplaced. That rule was not
in effect when Isha dismissed her bankruptcy case in April 2020, and the Deen
Family has not articulated why the new rule should, or could, apply
retroactively. The Deen Family has not met their burden to show that the appeal
is moot. Ederel Sport, Inc. v. Gotcha Int’l L.P. (In re Gotcha Int’l L.P.), 311 B.R. 250,
254 (9th Cir. BAP 2004) (party asserting mootness has a "heavy burden" to
establish that the court is unable to grant any effective relief).
Next, the Deen Family argues that Isha and Khwaja lack standing to
appeal. Standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order is limited to "persons
aggrieved" by the order. Harkey v. Grobstein (In re Point Ctr. Fin., Inc.), 890 F.3d
1188, 1191 (9th Cir. 2018). A "person aggrieved" is one who is "directly and
adversely affected pecuniarily" by the order. Id.; see also Fondiller v. Robertson (In
re Fondiller), 707 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983). The Deen Family argues that Isha
and Khwaja were not adversely affected by the bankruptcy court's order,
because reopening the adversary proceeding had no legal effect and was only
an administrative step to clarify the remand that was already effectuated once
4 Local Rule 7041-2(a) & (b), effective December 1, 2021, provides:
(a) Except as provided in the following subsection, whenever a bankruptcy case is
dismissed, any pending related adversary proceeding which a final judgment has
not been entered will be closed unless a party files a motion seeking continuation of
the adversary proceeding within 21 days of case dismissal.
(b) If the pending related adversary proceeding was removed from another court,
it will be remanded to that court upon dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case
unless a party files a motion seeking continuation of the adversary proceeding in this
Court within 21 days of case dismissal.
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Isha dismissed her bankruptcy case. Again, the Deen Family is wrong about the
purported automatic remand. Had the reopening not been granted, there would
have been no remand order. And as parties to the State Court Action, Isha and
Khwaja were clearly affected by the remand order. Thus, because Isha and
Khwaja were affected by the reopening and the remand order, they have
standing to appeal.
The Deen Family also challenges our authority to review the remand
order. They argue that the statutory standard for remand under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1452(b) is "any equitable ground" and that a bankruptcy court's decision to
remand under that provision is not reviewable by the court of appeals. But we
are not the court of appeals. As a bankruptcy appellate panel, we may review a
bankruptcy court's remand order under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(d) and 1452(b). It is
further appellate review that is precluded. See Things Remembered, Inc. v.
Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 129 (1995); In re McCarthy, 230 B.R. at 417.
Finally, and not raised by the parties, we note that orders granting a
motion to reopen are interlocutory and not appealable as of right. Wilborn v.
Gallagher (In re Wilborn), 205 B.R. 202, 206 (9th Cir. BAP 1996) (ruling that order
granting reopening is interlocutory but treating notice of appeal as a motion for
leave to appeal); see also Vylene Enters., Inc. v. Naugles, Inc. (In re Vylene Enters.,
Inc.), 968 F.2d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1992) (we have a duty to determine our
jurisdiction sua sponte). However, since the bankruptcy court also ordered
remand of the State Court Action in the same order, which is a final decision,
we have jurisdiction over this appeal.
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B. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the
adversary proceeding.
Isha and Khwaja raise a variety of arguments on appeal which largely fall
away because of their misguided belief that the adversary proceeding was
"dismissed." To the contrary, the adversary proceeding was "administratively
closed" – as the bankruptcy court pointed out.
Local Rule 7041-2(a) that was in effect at the time provided:
Whenever a case is dismissed, any pending related adversary
proceeding within which a final judgment has not been entered
may be dismissed without prejudice and without further order of
the Court, unless a party files a motion seeking continuation of the
adversary proceeding within 7 days of case dismissal.
Contrary to Isha and Khwaja's argument, the prior Local Rule 7041-2(a) was not
self-executing. It states that an adversary proceeding may be dismissed, not
shall. Further, the Notice to Parties under Local Rule 7041-2 issued by the clerk
after Isha's bankruptcy case was dismissed cautioned that the adversary
proceeding would be closed, not dismissed, if no one sought a continuation
within seven days of entry of the notice. The adversary proceeding was
administratively closed on May 18, 2020.
While one can understand the confusion since Rule 7041 and Local Rule
7041 govern "dismissals" of adversary proceedings, the simple fact is the
adversary proceeding here was administratively closed, not dismissed. There is
no dismissal order on the docket. Thus, Isha and Khwaja's primary argument
that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to reopen a dismissed adversary
proceeding misses the point.
10
Focusing entirely on dismissal, Isha and Khwaja do not address whether
the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to reopen an adversary proceeding that
lacked a final judgment and was administratively closed. In any event, we
conclude that it did. The Ninth Circuit has held that an administrative closing
has no legal consequence other than to remove the case from the court's active
docket. It is an administrative convenience; it is not a dismissal or a final
decision and has no jurisdictional significance. Dees v. Billy, 394 F.3d 1290, 1294
(9th Cir. 2005) (discussing cases). Both the parties and the court have the power
to reopen an administratively closed case. Penn W. Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 371
F.3d 118, 127 (3d Cir. 2004); Lehman v. Revolution Portfolio LLC, 166 F.3d 389, 392
(1st Cir. 1999).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over any
state court action that is "related to" a bankruptcy case. A state court action is
related to a bankruptcy case if the outcome of that action could conceivably
have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy. Great W. Sav. v.
Gordon (In re Fietz), 852 F.2d 455, 457 (9th Cir. 1988). The prepetition claims Isha
held against the Deen Family were property of the estate, and the outcome of
that litigation, had she been successful, could have affected the administration
of the estate. Thus, the State Court Action was "related to" the bankruptcy case.
The bankruptcy court still had related-to jurisdiction over the adversary
proceeding after Isha's bankruptcy case was dismissed. The dismissal of an
underlying bankruptcy case does not automatically terminate a bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction over a removed state court action that was pending at the
time of dismissal. Carraher v. Morgan Elecs., Inc. (In re Carraher), 971 F.2d 327, 328
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(9th Cir. 1992). Isha and Khwaja's reliance on Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Alaska (In
re Valdez Fisheries Development Ass'n, Inc.), 439 F.3d 545, 548-49 (9th Cir. 2006), is
misplaced. Sea Hawk held that a bankruptcy court may not assert jurisdiction
over a related-to proceeding initiated after dismissal of the bankruptcy case.
That is not the case here. The prepetition State Court Action was removed to the
bankruptcy court while Isha's bankruptcy case was still pending. Consequently,
the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to consider and to grant the Deen
Family's request to reopen the adversary proceeding.
Isha and Khwaja next argue that their due process rights were violated
because the Deen Family cited only Rule 5010 as their basis for reopening the
adversary proceeding, which the bankruptcy court agreed was not the correct
rule. Unfortunately, the clerk's error notice incorrectly instructed the Deen
Family to proceed with their reopening request under Rule 5010, but that rule
applies to reopening bankruptcy cases, not adversary proceedings. However,
that procedural irregularity has no consequence in this case.
Isha and Khwaja argue that they were not given notice of any other
statute to which to tailor their reopening argument and this violated their due
process rights. They are wrong for two reasons. First, there is no statute or rule
for reopening an administratively closed adversary proceeding. Neither the
Code nor the Rules provide any guidance. To the extent they argue it would be
Civil Rule 60(b), which is incorporated by Rule 9024, they are incorrect. That
rule applies only to final, appealable orders. United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d
1042, 1048 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000). As noted above, an administrative closing is not a
final, appealable order. Second, Isha and Khwaja adequately challenged the
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reopening of the adversary proceeding in their 328-page opposition and at the
hearing, regardless of the cited rule error. As such, they were not denied due
process. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
(fundamental question for due process is whether appellant received any type
of notice that was reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to apprise
it of the pendency of the action and afford it an opportunity to present an
objection).
Accordingly, we conclude that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion in reopening the adversary proceeding.
C. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in granting remand.
A bankruptcy court may remand a claim or cause of action related to a
bankruptcy case on any equitable ground under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b). The statute
gives the bankruptcy court a broad grant of authority to remand a previously
removed claim or cause of action "on any equitable ground."
A bankruptcy court may consider any of the following 14 factors in
determining whether to remand to the state court the claim or cause of action
concerned:
(1) the effect or lack thereof on the efficient administration of the
estate if the Court recommends [remand or] abstention;
(2) extent to which state law issues predominate over bankruptcy
issues;
(3) difficult or unsettled nature of applicable law;
(4) presence of related proceeding commenced in state court or other
nonbankruptcy proceeding;
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(5) jurisdictional basis, if any, other than 28 U.S.C. § 1334;
(6) degree of relatedness or remoteness of proceeding to main
bankruptcy case;
(7) the substance rather than the form of an asserted core proceeding;
(8) the feasibility of severing state law claims from core bankruptcy
matters to allow judgments to be entered in the state court with
enforcement left to the bankruptcy court;
(9) the burden on the bankruptcy court's docket;
(10) the likelihood that the commencement of the proceeding in
bankruptcy court involves forum shopping by one of the parties;
(11) the existence of a right to a jury trial;
(12) the presence in the proceeding of nondebtor parties;
(13) comity; and
(14) the possibility of prejudice to other parties in the action.
Nilsen v. Neilson (In re Cedar Funding, Inc.), 419 B.R. 807, 820-21 & n.18 (9th Cir.
BAP 2009) (citing In re Enron Corp., 296 B.R. at 508 n.2). 5 The bankruptcy court
determined that several of these factors supported remand of the State Court
Action: (1) state law issues predominated; (2) there was no other basis for
5 The first 12 of these factors are found in the Ninth Circuit case Christiansen v. Tucson
Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates, Inc.), 912 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1990), applying them to
permissive abstention. The bankruptcy court stated that it was also applying permissive
abstention in its decision to remand. However, neither mandatory nor permissive abstention
was applicable here, as those provisions do not apply when a state court action has been
removed to federal court. This is because abstention requires the existence of a parallel state
court proceeding. Sec. Farms v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen & Helpers, 124
F.3d 999, 1009 (9th Cir. 1997). Upon removal, the state court proceeding has been
extinguished. Id. at 1010. The parties do not raise this issue. However, we conclude that the
14
jurisdiction other than the bankruptcy filing; (3) there were several nondebtor
parties; (4) the State Court Action lacked relatedness to the main bankruptcy
case; and (5) the Deen Family could be prejudiced if their claims were not
remanded and they had to file a new complaint, because the statute of
limitations could have run on some or all of their claims. The bankruptcy court
also observed that the State Court Action would have gone to final judgment
had it not been removed.
Other than erroneously arguing that the bankruptcy court lacked
jurisdiction to remand the State Court Action because the adversary proceeding
was dismissed, Isha and Khwaja offer little argument for how the bankruptcy
court abused its discretion in granting remand. They do not challenge the
court's overall factual findings supporting remand under Cedar Funding/Enron
or argue that that the court applied an incorrect legal standard. At best, they
claim that the bankruptcy court failed to consider the prejudice that would
result to them by remanding the State Court Action and considered only the
resulting prejudice to the Deen Family if the State Court Action was not
remanded. We disagree. The court did consider prejudice to both parties but
decided the prejudice to the Deen Family outweighed any potential prejudice to
Isha and Khwaja.6
court's error here was harmless because it also considered the appropriate factors for remand.
6 Isha and Khwaja argue that remanding the State Court Action without also
remanding the removed and "intertwined" legal malpractice claim that was the subject of
another adversary proceeding was prejudicial. To the contrary, since no final judgment was
entered in that matter either, they are free to request a reopening and remand of it too.
15
Further, their argument that they would suffer "extreme prejudice" if the
State Court Action was remanded is undermined by Isha's statement at the
hearing that, rather than remand, she wants the Deen Family to refile their
cross-claims. We, as did the bankruptcy court, fail to see how remanding the
State Court Action as opposed to the Deen Family refiling the same claims in
the state court would result in prejudice to Isha and Khwaja. Either way, they
are defending themselves against a lawsuit. If the statute of limitations has run
on the Deen Family's cross-claims, the prejudice would be to the Deen Family,
not Isha and Khwaja.
Lastly, Isha and Khwaja argue that their due process rights were violated
because they did not receive adequate notice that a request for remand would
be at issue at the hearing and were denied any further briefing regarding
remand. We disagree. The Deen Family's notice and brief in support clearly
stated that remand was at issue, and the motion itself was titled "Defendants'
Request for Remand to State Court and Order for Remand." Isha and Khwaja's
opposition expressly argued against remand and asked the court to deny the
request. Their hearing notice also acknowledged that a request to remand
would be the subject of the hearing. And Isha argued against remand at the
hearing. Consequently, Isha and Khwaja received sufficient due process.
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
While the bankruptcy court must generally refrain from considering the
merits of the underlying dispute on a motion to reopen, In re Menk, 241 B.R. at
916, it is not prohibited from doing so when a motion to reopen is combined
with another substantive motion that is briefed and argued by the parties, see
16
ITT Fin. Servs. v. Ricks (In re Ricks), 89 B.R. 73, 75 (9th Cir. BAP 1988) (panel
reviewing bankruptcy court order granting both a motion to reopen the
bankruptcy case and a motion to avoid liens). Further, the bankruptcy court did
not finally determine the parties' claims or rights; it simply remanded all
matters to the state court for decision. Even if it was improper for the
bankruptcy court to consider remand at this point, it is not clear what
arguments Isha and Khwaja could have raised in further briefing that would
have changed the outcome.
In summary, we see no abuse of discretion by the bankruptcy court in
reopening the adversary proceeding. It also applied the correct law regarding
remand, and its findings for remand are not clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM.
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