In re: Peter Szanto

FILED
MAR 22 2022
SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
NOT FOR PUBLICATION U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: BAP No. OR-21-1118-GBS
PETER SZANTO,
Debtor. Bk. No. 3:16-bk-33185-PCM
PETER SZANTO,
Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
CANDACE AMBORN, Chapter 7 Trustee;
LANE POWEL PC,
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Oregon
Peter C. McKittrick, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
Before: GAN, BRAND, and SPRAKER, Bankruptcy Judges.
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 71 debtor Peter Szanto (“Debtor”) appeals the bankruptcy
court’s order awarding final professional compensation to Lane Powell PC
(“Lane Powell”), in the amount of $14,551.88, for services rendered to the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for
whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential
value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532.
estate in connection with litigation in Singapore. The bankruptcy court did
not abuse its discretion. We AFFIRM.
FACTS 2
In 2016, Debtor filed a voluntary chapter 11 petition. In 2017, the
bankruptcy court converted the case to one under chapter 7 and appointed
Stephen P. Arnot, later succeeded by Candace Amborn, as chapter 7 trustee
(collectively “Trustee”).
Around the time of conversion, Debtor made numerous transfers of
estate assets, including transfers of significant funds to banks in Singapore.
After an evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court issued an order holding
Debtor in contempt and requiring him to turn over the transferred assets
and to grant Trustee access to the Singapore accounts. Debtor refused to
comply, resulting in two additional contempt orders and, ultimately, a
denial of Debtor’s discharge.
Because Debtor continued to resist Trustee’s efforts to recover the
transferred funds, Trustee initiated a proceeding in Singapore to enforce
the bankruptcy court’s orders (the “Singapore Action”). The bankruptcy
court then authorized Trustee to employ David W. Criswell of Lane Powell
to serve as an expert witness in the Singapore Action.
Debtor sought to disqualify Mr. Criswell on the basis that he could
receive duplicate compensation and was not qualified to render an expert
2
We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of documents electronically
filed in Debtor’s bankruptcy case. See Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re
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opinion in the Singapore Action. The bankruptcy court disagreed, holding
that Mr. Criswell’s qualification was an issue for the Singapore court and
the danger of duplicate compensation could be addressed in the final
application for compensation.
Mr. Criswell prepared and filed his expert opinion in the Singapore
Action to address specific questions, posed by the Singapore court, about
United States bankruptcy law. In February 2021, Lane Powell filed an
application in the bankruptcy court for final compensation.
Debtor objected to the requested fees and argued that Lane Powell
was barred from seeking compensation in the bankruptcy court because
none of its work occurred in the bankruptcy case and any fees must be
awarded by the Singapore court. Debtor characterized the application as
“replete with non-existent garbage charges” but did not otherwise identify
objectionable fees.
The bankruptcy court issued a memorandum decision and order
approving Lane Powell’s fees and costs in the amount requested. The court
overruled Debtor’s objections and independently found that the fees were
reasonable and necessary under § 330(a). Debtor timely appealed.
JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and
157(b)(2)(A) and (B). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.
Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003).
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ISSUE
Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion in its award of fees and
costs to Lane Powell?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a bankruptcy court’s order awarding compensation to an
estate professional under § 330 for abuse of discretion. Hopkins v. Asset
Acceptance LLC (In re Salgado-Nava), 473 B.R. 911, 915 (9th Cir. BAP 2012). A
bankruptcy court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal
standard or its factual findings are illogical, implausible, or without
support in the record. TrafficSchool.com v. Edriver, Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 832 (9th
Cir. 2011).
DISCUSSION
A. Standards For Compensation Under § 330
Section 327 authorizes a trustee, with the court’s approval, to employ
professional persons “to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the
trustee’s duties” under the Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to § 330(a), the
bankruptcy court may award reasonable compensation to professionals
employed under § 327 after considering the nature, extent, and value of
such services and the factors listed in § 330(a)(3)(A)-(F). The court may not
award compensation for an unnecessary duplication of effort, or for
services which are not reasonably likely to benefit the estate or are
unnecessary for case administration. § 330(a)(4)(A).
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A party objecting to an application for compensation under § 330 has
the burden to show that fees are unreasonable or unnecessary and must do
more than express general dissatisfaction with the application; he must
specify what tasks are objectionable. See Koncicky v. Peterson (In re Koncicky),
BAP No. WW-07-1170-MkPaJ, 2007 WL 7540997 (9th Cir. BAP Oct. 19,
2007).
B. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Awarding
Compensation To Lane Powell.
Debtor does not object to the amount of fees or identify any work that
was unreasonable. Instead, he argues that Lane Powell is not entitled to
any compensation because: (1) the Singapore Action was barred by
Singapore law and Mr. Criswell’s services were useless; and (2) the
bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to award fees or costs because the
Singapore court had sole authority to compensate Mr. Criswell.
We agree with the bankruptcy court that the propriety of the
Singapore Action and Mr. Criswell’s qualifications to render an expert
opinion are questions for the Singapore court. It is immaterial that Mr.
Criswell’s services were not in connection with litigation in the bankruptcy
court. Trustees often must litigate in state or federal courts on behalf of the
estate, and professionals employed to assist in such litigation are
compensated under § 330(a). See Roberts, Sheridan & Kotel, P.C. v. Bergen
Brunswig Drug Co. (In re Mednet), 251 B.R. 103, 108 (9th Cir. BAP 2000)
(“[I]n order for the professional to be compensated . . . the applicant must
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demonstrate only that the services were ‘reasonably likely’ to benefit the
estate at the time the services were rendered.”).
The bankruptcy court correctly determined that Mr. Criswell’s efforts
were necessary and reasonably likely to benefit the estate. Trustee initiated
the Singapore Action because Debtor transferred estate assets to Singapore
and refused to comply with multiple court orders to return the funds. And
the court properly authorized Trustee to employ Lane Powell to assist in
recovering estate assets.
Debtor further argues that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction
to approve Lane Powell’s fees because Singapore law provides that
payment must be made by the Singapore court. We disagree.
The bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction to authorize Lane
Powell’s employment. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(2). Consequently, Lane Powell
could recover fees for its services to the estate only in accordance with the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen
v. Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Weibel, Inc.), 176 B.R. 209, 212 (9th
Cir. BAP 1994) (“Compensation to professionals acting on behalf of the
estate must be based on provisions of the Code.”). Lane Powell complied
with the procedural requirements for employment and compensation, and
pursuant to § 330, the court had authority to approve Lane Powell’s fees
and costs.
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Debtor’s only support for his jurisdiction argument is Order 40 of the
Singapore Rules of Court.3 But, the Singapore court specifically rejected the
applicability of that rule because Mr. Criswell was not a “court expert” and
his opinion was provided under Order 40A: Experts of Parties. See
Application for Interim Comp., March 8, 2021. Both the application to employ
Lane Powell and Mr. Criswell’s affidavit in the Singapore Action indicate
that he was an expert witness for Trustee, not a court expert.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s order
approving final professional compensation to Lane Powell.
3
Order 40 provides in pertinent part:
Appointment of expert to report on certain question (O. 40, r.1)
1. (1) In any cause or matter in which any question for an expert
witness arises, the Court may at any time, on its own motion or on the
application of any party, appoint an independent expert . . .
(1A) An expert appointed under this Order or under Order 32, Rule
12 shall be referred to as a court expert.
...
Remuneration of court expert (O. 40, r.5)
5. (1) The remuneration of the court expert shall be fixed by the Court
and shall include a fee for his report and a proper sum for each day
during which he is required to be present either in Court or before an
examiner.
Rules of Court, Order 40 rules 1, 5, available at Singapore Statutes Online,
https://sso.agc.gov.sg/SL/322-R5?ProvIds=PO40-pr1-,PO40-pr5- (last visited Mar. 22,
2022).
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