In re: Peter Szanto

FILED
MAY 31 2016
1 NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
2 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
4 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
5
6 In re: ) BAP No. NV-14-1517-FBD
)
7 PETER SZANTO, ) Bk. No. 3:13-51261-GWZ
)
8 Debtor. ) Adv. No. 3:13-05038-GWZ
_____________________________ )
9 )
PETER SZANTO, )
10 )
Appellant, )
11 )
v. ) MEMORANDUM*
12 )
VICTOR SZANTO; ANTHONY SZANTO,)
13 )
Appellees. )
14 ______________________________)
15
Argued and Submitted on May 19, 2016
16 at Las Vegas, Nevada
17 Filed – May 31, 2016
18 Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Nevada
19
Honorable Bruce T. Beesley, Chief Bankruptcy Judge, and
20 Honorable Gregg W. Zive, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
21
Appearances: Appellant Peter Szanto argued pro se; John S.
22 Bartlett argued for Appellees Victor Szanto and
Anthony Szanto.
23
24
25
26 *
This disposition is not appropriate for publication.
27 Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may
have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see
28 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
1 Before: FARIS, BARASH,** and DUNN, Bankruptcy Judges.
2 INTRODUCTION
3 Appellant/chapter 111 debtor Peter Szanto appeals from the
4 bankruptcy court’s order dismissing his complaint for failure to
5 state a claim. The bankruptcy court abused its discretion when
6 it denied leave to file an amended complaint. But this error was
7 harmless. The court dismissed the underlying bankruptcy case,
8 and it did not abuse its discretion when it declined to retain
9 jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding. Accordingly, we
10 AFFIRM.
11 FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
12 A. The adversary complaint
13 Mr. Szanto3 initiated his chapter 11 bankruptcy on June 25,
14 2013 and later commenced an adversary proceeding against his
15 brothers, the appellees in this appeal. Mr. Szanto claimed that
16
17 **
Hon. Martin R. Barash, United States Bankruptcy Judge for
18 the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
1
19 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section
references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, all
20 “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, Rules 1001-9037, and all “Civil Rule” references are
21
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 1-86.
22 2
Mr. Szanto presents us with a limited record. We have
23 exercised our discretion to review the bankruptcy court’s docket,
as appropriate. See Woods & Erickson, LLP v. Leonard (In re AVI,
24 Inc.), 389 B.R. 721, 725 n.2 (9th Cir. BAP 2008).
25 3
Mr. Szanto is a serial litigant. The bankruptcy court
26 noted that there are seventy-six cases nationwide involving a
party named Peter Szanto, and Mr. Szanto acknowledged that he was
27 a party to at least fifteen or twenty of those cases. At oral
argument, Mr. Szanto acknowledged that the California state court
28 found him to be a vexatious litigant.
2
1 Appellees are fraudulently concealing or withholding
2 approximately $3,200,000 in trust assets.
3 B. The motion to dismiss
4 Appellees moved to dismiss the adversary proceeding (“Motion
5 to Dismiss”). Appellees argued (among other things) that
6 Mr. Szanto failed to allege facts sufficient to meet the pleading
7 standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
8 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
9 The bankruptcy court held that the complaint did not satisfy
10 the standards of Twombly and Iqbal. Mr. Szanto does not
11 challenge this decision on appeal. He does challenge the
12 bankruptcy court’s denial of an opportunity to file an amended
13 complaint.
14 The court explained that he would have to file a new
15 complaint and pay a new filing fee: “I mean, this is not even
16 close to Iqbal and Twombly, so you need to re-file a complaint.
17 It’s not a first amended complaint. It is a new complaint. You
18 have to allege facts. You have to reserve it and we’ll go
19 forward from there.”
20 C. The motion for reconsideration
21 Mr. Szanto filed a motion for reconsideration (“Motion for
22 Reconsideration”), arguing that the court should have allowed him
23 leave to amend the complaint. The hearing on the Motion for
24 Reconsideration was delayed for fifteen months because Mr. Szanto
25 claimed he was too ill to appear.
26 D. Dismissal of the bankruptcy case
27 In the meantime, the bankruptcy court dismissed Mr. Szanto’s
28 bankruptcy case. The chapter 11 trustee moved to dismiss the
3
1 case or convert it to chapter 7 because Mr. Szanto failed timely
2 under § 1112(b)(4)(J) to file a disclosure statement. The court
3 granted the motion and dismissed the bankruptcy case with a six-
4 month bar on re-filing any bankruptcy petition.
5 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order of
6 dismissal. Mr. Szanto appealed the district court’s decision to
7 the Ninth Circuit, and that appeal is currently pending.
8 E. Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration
9 The bankruptcy court denied the Motion for Reconsideration
10 for two reasons. First, it determined that granting leave to
11 amend would be an excise in futility, since Mr. Szanto failed to
12 “propose any amendments to his complaint that would cure the
13 deficiencies to allege any facts upon which a claim can be stated
14 against defendants.”
15 Second, the bankruptcy court noted that, during the fifteen
16 months that the Motion for Reconsideration was pending, the court
17 had dismissed the underlying bankruptcy case, and Mr. Szanto had
18 neither requested nor received a stay of the order dismissing the
19 bankruptcy case. Applying Carraher v. Morgan Electronics, Inc.
20 (In re Carraher), 971 F.2d 327, 328 (9th Cir. 1992), the court
21 held that it would not retain jurisdiction over the adversary
22 proceeding.
23 JURISDICTION
24 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
25 §§ 1334 and 157(b)(1). Mr. Szanto’s notice of appeal was
26 premature because he filed it before the bankruptcy court decided
27 his Motion for Reconsideration. Now that the bankruptcy court
28 has denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the bankruptcy court’s
4
1 order has become final, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
2 § 158.
3 ISSUE
4 Whether the bankruptcy court erred in dismissing
5 Mr. Szanto’s adversary complaint without leave to amend.
6 STANDARDS OF REVIEW
7 We review de novo the bankruptcy court’s decision to dismiss
8 a complaint under Civil Rule 12(b)(6). See Movsesian v. Victoria
9 Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
10 In contrast, we review for abuse of discretion the
11 bankruptcy court’s decision whether to grant leave to amend the
12 complaint. See, e.g., Zadrozny v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 720 F.3d
13 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2013); Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc.,
14 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). Appellate courts should
15 “review strictly a . . . court’s exercise of discretion denying
16 leave to amend.” Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir.
17 1988), amended, 856 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1988).
18 Similarly, we review for abuse of discretion the court’s
19 decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction over an adversary
20 proceeding. In re Carraher, 971 F.2d at 328.
21 We also review for abuse of discretion the denial of a
22 motion for reconsideration. See N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Lujan,
23 961 F.2d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 1992).
24 To determine whether the bankruptcy court has abused its
25 discretion, we conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) we review de novo
26 whether the bankruptcy court “identified the correct legal rule
27 to apply to the relief requested” and (2) if it did, whether the
28 bankruptcy court’s application of the legal standard was
5
1 illogical, implausible, or “without support in inferences that
2 may be drawn from the facts in the record.” United States v.
3 Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262–63 & n.21 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
4 “If the bankruptcy court did not identify the correct legal rule,
5 or its application of the correct legal standard to the facts was
6 illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may
7 be drawn from the facts in the record, then the bankruptcy court
8 has abused its discretion.” USAA Fed. Sav. Bank v. Thacker
9 (In re Taylor), 599 F.3d 880, 887–88 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing
10 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1261–62).
11 We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Diener
12 v. McBeth (In re Diener), 483 B.R. 196, 202 (9th Cir. BAP 2012).
13 DISCUSSION
14 A. The propriety of dismissal is not before us.
15 As a preliminary matter, we note that Mr. Szanto is not
16 appealing the bankruptcy court’s decision to dismiss his
17 complaint. We only consider whether the court should have
18 allowed Mr. Szanto leave to amend his complaint.
19 B. The bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying
Mr. Szanto an opportunity to amend his adversary complaint.
20
21 Civil Rule 15(a), made applicable through Rule 7015,
22 provides that if an amendment is not allowed as a matter of
23 course, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing
24 party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should
25 freely give leave when justice so requires.” Civil
26 Rule 15(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit has “stressed Rule 15’s policy
27 of favoring amendments, and [it has] applied this policy with
28 liberality.” Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149,
6
1 1160 (9th Cir. 1989).
2 In determining whether to grant leave to amend, we follow
3 the United States Supreme Court’s dictate in Foman v. Davis,
4 371 U.S. 178 (1962), which instructed that:
5 In the absence of any apparent or declared reason -
such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on
6 the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
7 prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance
of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. - the
8 leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely
given.
9
10 Id. at 182; see Tracht Gut, LLC v. Cty. of L.A. Treasurer & Tax
11 Collector (In re Tracht Gut, LLC), 503 B.R. 804, 814 (9th Cir.
12 BAP 2014) (relying on the “Foman Factors”).
13 “[A] determination that any amendment would be futile
14 requires the trial court to dismiss the complaint with
15 prejudice.” In re Tracht Gut, LLC, 503 B.R. at 815 (citing
16 Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 985 (9th Cir. 2012);
17 Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 557 (9th Cir. 2010)).
18 “Amendment is futile when ‘allegation of other facts consistent
19 with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the
20 deficiency.’” Van Zandt v. Mbunda (In re Mbunda), 484 B.R. 344,
21 356 (9th Cir. BAP 2012), aff’d, 604 F. App’x 552 (9th Cir. 2015)
22 (quoting Albrecht, 845 F.2d at 195).
23 The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that “[d]ismissal without
24 leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon de novo
25 review, that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.”
26 Intri–Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056
27 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Sparling v. Daou (In re Daou Sys.,
28 Inc.), 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005)).
7
1 1. The bankruptcy court erroneously denied leave to amend
based on the insufficiency of the original complaint.
2
3 The court abused its discretion by not allowing Mr. Szanto
4 to amend his complaint. The court apparently denied leave to
5 amend because it thought the complaint was very far from meeting
6 the Twombly and Iqbal standards. This was an error. When
7 deciding whether to grant leave to amend, the degree of
8 insufficiency of the original complaint is irrelevant. Rather,
9 the primary question is whether the plaintiff could file an
10 adequate complaint.
11 Further, in its ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, the court
12 did not rely on any of the Foman factors in its decision to deny
13 leave to amend. Thus, the court applied the incorrect legal
14 standard.
15 2. The court erred in determining that any amendment would
be futile.
16
17 In ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration, the court
18 properly identified the Foman factors, but held that futility of
19 amendment justified denying leave to amend under Civil
20 Rule 15(a). It said that, because Mr. Szanto did not offer any
21 amendments to his complaint that would cure the deficiency,
22 “granting leave to plaintiff to file an amended complaint would
23 be an exercise in futility in the complete absence of any showing
24 by plaintiff he has a factual basis upon which a claim against
25 defendants can be stated.”
26 The record does not support the view that amendment would be
27 futile. For example, the court pointed out that Mr. Szanto did
28 not identify the “assets” referenced in the complaint; however,
8
1 Mr. Szanto said that the “assets” at issue are those listed in
2 his Schedule B.4 Mr. Szanto could solve that problem simply by
3 identifying and adequately describing those assets in his amended
4 complaint. Similarly, the court faulted Mr. Szanto for not
5 referencing the trusts at issue; in his Motion for
6 Reconsideration, he identified the three trusts. Mr. Szanto
7 could incorporate this information in an amended complaint. In
8 other words, it is not apparent to us “that the complaint could
9 not be saved by any amendment.” See Intri–Plex Techs., Inc.,
10 499 F.3d at 1056; see also In re Tracht Gut, LLC, 503 B.R. at
11 814; cf. In re Mbunda, 484 B.R. at 356-57 (concluding that
12 amendment would be futile because the appellant conceded he could
13 not present additional facts).
14 The court faulted Mr. Szanto for not describing the
15 amendments he would make to the complaint. But this puts the
16 cart before the horse. A plaintiff does not have to file an
17 amended complaint, or say what an amended complaint would allege,
18 until after the court has dismissed the original complaint. The
19 court cannot deny leave to amend because the plaintiff has failed
20 to describe the proposed amendments, as long as there is reason
21 to believe that the plaintiff could construct a viable complaint.
22 C. The bankruptcy court properly declined to retain
jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding, so its error in
23 refusing to grant leave to amend is harmless.
24 Even though the court erred in denying Mr. Szanto leave to
25 amend, such error was harmless. The bankruptcy court dismissed
26
27
4
Schedule B generally identifies a “[f]amily trust
28 entitlement” valued at $3,200,000.
9
1 the underlying bankruptcy case. It subsequently determined that
2 it would not exercise jurisdiction over the adversary complaint.
3 Mr. Szanto did not appeal this decision or otherwise address it
4 in his appellate briefs, and we find no error.
5 We follow the Ninth Circuit’s four-part test set forth in
6 Carraher to determine whether a court should retain jurisdiction
7 over an adversary proceeding after the underlying bankruptcy case
8 has been dismissed. The Ninth Circuit stated:
9 In considering what standards govern the
bankruptcy court’s discretion in determining whether to
10 retain a related case after dismissal of the underlying
bankruptcy case, we, like other courts, turn for
11 guidance to cases considering the authority of federal
district courts to retain pendent state claims after
12 the federal claims have been dismissed. The Supreme
Court has held that where a federal district court
13 dismisses federal claims, the court must consider
economy, convenience, fairness and comity in deciding
14 whether to retain jurisdiction over pendent state
claims.
15
16 In re Carraher, 971 F.2d at 328 (emphasis added) (internal
17 citations omitted); see also Linkway Investment Co., Inc. v.
18 Olsen (In re Casamont Investors, Ltd.), 196 B.R. 517, 523 (9th
19 Cir. BAP 1996) (“retention of jurisdiction was found to have been
20 improper when the initiation of the dispute was recent, no action
21 had been taken prior to the dismissal and the dispute concerned
22 issues of probate law, in which the state courts had more
23 expertise” (emphasis in original)); Zegzula v. JPMorgan Chase
24 Bank, N.A. (In re Zegzula), BAP No. WW-14-1119-JuKiF, 2015 WL
25 5786572 (9th Cir. BAP Oct. 2, 2015) (holding that the bankruptcy
26 court did not abuse its discretion in declining to retain
27 jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding when it had previously
28 dismissed the underlying bankruptcy case and found that
10
1 considerations of judicial economy and fairness did not support
2 the court’s retention of jurisdiction over the adversary
3 proceeding).
4 Mr. Szanto’s opening brief fails to discuss the bankruptcy
5 court’s decision not to retain jurisdiction of the adversary
6 proceeding. Nor did he address this issue in his reply brief,
7 even when specifically argued by Appellees in their answering
8 brief. We thus deem this issue waived for the purposes of
9 appeal.5 See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999)
10 (“on appeal, arguments not raised by a party in his opening brief
11 are deemed waived”).
12 Even if Mr. Szanto had not waived the issue, we would
13 conclude that the bankruptcy court did not err in dismissing the
14 adversary proceeding. The bankruptcy court properly identified
15 the Carraher test as the correct legal standard and applied that
16 test to the facts of the case. We find no error in the court’s
17 conclusions.
18 First, judicial economy does not favor retention of the
19 adversary proceeding. As the bankruptcy court properly noted,
20 the adversary proceeding had not progressed beyond the initial
21 pleading stage. Although the case had been pending for nearly
22 two years, the delay was largely caused by Mr. Szanto and his
23 failures to appear at the hearings on his Motion for
24
5
At oral argument, the Panel questioned Mr. Szanto about
25 the effect of the dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case.
26 Mr. Szanto failed to provide any substantive answer (or explain
why he did not raise that issue in this appeal) and only stated
27 that, because the dismissal order is currently on appeal to the
Ninth Circuit, the effect “remains to be seen” as he is “charting
28 new law.”
11
1 Reconsideration. Moreover, the issues raised by the adversary
2 complaint are state law issues that can be resolved expeditiously
3 in state court. See In re Carraher, 196 B.R. at 524. As such,
4 judicial economy does not support retention of the adversary
5 proceeding.
6 Second, none of the parties would be inconvenienced by the
7 dismissal of the case. The bankruptcy court stated that there is
8 ongoing litigation in California state court, which could
9 potentially involve the present parties, most of whom are
10 California residents.6 See id.
11 Third, it would not be unfair to require Mr. Szanto to
12 assert his claims in state court. Mr. Szanto fails to explain
13 why he could not assert his state law claims in state court.7
14 Finally, comity favors refusing jurisdiction over the
15 adversary complaint. We agree with the bankruptcy court that the
16 fraud-based claims are grounded in state law and should be
17 decided in state court.
18 Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not err in refusing to
19 retain jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding after the
20 underlying bankruptcy case had been dismissed.
21
22 6
Mr. Szanto says that, if his complaint is dismissed, the
23 statute of limitations would bar his claims. He offers no
explanation for this statement, so we cannot say that the
24 bankruptcy court’s refusal to retain jurisdiction would be unfair
to him.
25
7
26 At oral argument, Mr. Szanto stated that he cannot present
his claims in the California state courts because he has been
27 declared a vexatious litigant in California. The fact that a
party apparently has abused the state court system does not
28 require the federal courts to hold their doors open.
12
1 CONCLUSION
2 The bankruptcy court abused its discretion in dismissing the
3 complaint without leave to amend. However, the bankruptcy court
4 has dismissed the underlying bankruptcy case, and Mr. Szanto has
5 not appealed the court’s decision to decline to exercise
6 jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding. Moreover, the court
7 correctly declined jurisdiction under the Carraher analysis.
8 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court’s error was harmless, and we
9 AFFIRM.
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