In re: Enrique Reyes and Guadalupe Reyes

FILED
APR 19 2019
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: BAP No. EC-18-1229-BSL
ENRIQUE REYES and GUADALUPE Bk. No. 18-11357
REYES,
Debtors.
ENRIQUE REYES; GUADALUPE REYES,
Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MIGRAN KUTNERIAN, Deceased;
KUTNERIAN ENTERPRISES,
Appellees.
Argued and Submitted on January 24, 2019
at Sacramento, California
Filed – April 19, 2019
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Eastern District of California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited
for whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no
precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
Honorable Rene Lastreto, II, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
Appearances: James A. Michel argued for Appellants Enrique and
Guadalupe Reyes; David R. Jenkins argued for Appellees
Migran Kutnerian (Deceased) and Kutnerian Enterprises.
Before: BRAND, SPRAKER and LAFFERTY, Bankruptcy Judges.
INTRODUCTION
Appellants Enrique and Guadalupe Reyes appeal an order
dismissing their motion to vacate an unlawful detainer judgment as void
under Civil Rule 60(b)(4)1 and Rule 9024. The bankruptcy court dismissed
the motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of Rooker-
Feldman.2 The court further opined that the motion suffered procedural
infirmities and lacked merit. We AFFIRM on the basis that the bankruptcy
1
Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, all "Rule" references are to the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, and all "Civil Rule" references are to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
2
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Rooker held that
federal statutory jurisdiction over direct appeals from state courts lies exclusively in the
U.S. Supreme Court and is beyond the original jurisdiction of federal district courts. 263
U.S. at 415-16. Feldman held that this jurisdictional bar extends to particular claims that
are "inextricably intertwined" with those a state court has already decided. 460 U.S. at
486-87.
2
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the motion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Prior litigation between the parties
In or around March 2010, the Reyeses began renting land (known as
the Highland property) for their travel trailer3 from Kutnerian Enterprises
and Mr. Migran Kutnerian ("Kutnerian"). The property is about 7.5 acres
and was also occupied by another family, the Bernels, who lived there in a
mobile home. The parties initially operated under an oral lease, but in May
2013, Kutnerian presented the Reyeses with a written one-year lease —
Land Lease Agreement For Mobile Home ("Lease") — which Mr. Reyes
signed. After the Lease expired on April 30, 2014, the lease term was month
to month and could be terminated by either party with service of a written
30-day notice.
Kutnerian was not required under the Lease to provide electricity or
water, but electricity was provided to the property through a junction box
adjacent to the Bernels' mobile home. Instead of connecting to that source,
the Reyeses and Bernels agreed that the Bernels would supply electricity to
the Reyeses' home via an electrical cord for $20.00 per month.
Disputes arose between the Reyeses and the Bernels, which led to
Mr. Bernel unplugging the Reyeses' electrical service and the Reyeses
3
At times the Reyeses referred to their home as a "travel trailer" and at other
times they referred to it as a "mobile home."
3
seeking a restraining order against the Bernels. Ultimately, the parties
agreed to a "mutual stay away" order, which required them to remain at
least 10 yards away from each other's residence. Prior to the stay away
order, the Reyeses had attempted to get Kutnerian's assistance with the
electrical dispute. When that failed, they filed a small claims action against
the Bernels. At trial, the court ordered the Reyeses to amend their
complaint to include Kutnerian as a party and postponed the trial. When
Mr. Reyes informed Kutnerian of the court's directive, Kutnerian said he
wanted nothing to do with the suit and that he would rather evict the
Reyeses than go to court. When Mr. Reyes again contacted Kutnerian three
days later, Kutnerian said he had already started eviction proceedings. The
Reyeses' small claims action was eventually dismissed.
B. Unlawful Detainer action
While the issue of service was (and continues to be) disputed, on
January 23, 2015, Kutnerian caused to be served upon the Reyeses a 30-day
Notice of Termination of Tenancy ("30-day Notice"). The Reyeses were to
vacate the property by February 28, 2015.
When the Reyeses failed to vacate, Kutnerian filed an unlawful
detainer ("UD") complaint. The UD complaint stated that the Reyeses were
served with the 30-day Notice by mail and by posting a copy of it on the
premises. A proof of service was attached. In response, the Reyeses moved
to quash service of the summons. The motion to quash was denied, and the
4
Reyeses were ordered to file an answer by April 1, 2015. They instead filed
a demurrer on March 30, 2015. In their demurrer, the Reyeses alleged they
were not served with the 30-day Notice. But, in any case, they maintained
that they should have received a 60-day notice, because (1) they had lived
at the property for over one year, and (2) Cal. Civ. Code § 798.55 requires
60-day notices for mobile home park tenants. The Reyeses argued that the
Lease term allowing for a 30-day notice to terminate tenancy was void as
contrary to state law. After the Reyeses filed their demurrer, Kutnerian set
the UD trial for April 21, 2015. The Reyeses' attempts to vacate the trial date
were unsuccessful.
At the beginning of the UD trial, the court told the Reyeses that it had
reviewed their outstanding demurrer and that it would consider anything
they had raised in their papers as a defense to the UD action. The court also
told the Reyeses that once they made their "appearance" in the UD action
with their demurrer, Kutnerian could set the matter for trial; i.e., Kutnerian
did not have to wait for them to file an answer to set it, nor would the lack
of an answer prevent the UD trial from proceeding.
The process server testified at the UD trial that he served the 30-day
Notice on the Reyeses by posting a copy of it on their trailer door and by
placing a copy of it in the mail. Mr. Reyes maintained that they were never
served with the 30-day Notice. The process server testified that he also
served the Reyeses with the summons and UD complaint. In closing
5
argument, Mr. Reyes argued that he and Mrs. Reyes were entitled to a 60-
day notice to quit because they were mobile home park tenants. Counsel
for Kutnerian argued that the property was not a mobile home park and so
a 60-day notice was not required on that basis.
Following trial, the UD court issued an oral statement of decision. As
relevant here, the court ruled that the 30-day Notice was sufficient and that
the Reyeses were not entitled to a 60-day notice; the 60-day rule under Cal.
Civ. Code § 1946.1 did not apply because the Reyeses were renting only
land from Kutnerian, not a "residential dwelling." In addition, the Lease
provided for a 30-day notice of termination for a month-to-month tenancy.
The court did not opine on the mobile home park argument.
The UD court awarded possession of the property to Kutnerian and
entered a judgment in favor of Kutnerian and against the Reyeses for
$699.99. The Reyeses' demurrer was taken off calendar as moot. The
Reyeses were eventually evicted. In the meantime, they appealed the UD
judgment to the appellate division of the superior court.
C. Unlawful Detainer appeal
On appeal, the Reyeses reiterated their argument that, as residents of
a mobile home park, they were entitled to a 60-day notice of termination of
tenancy. They also contended that the UD court had violated their due
process rights by not ruling on the demurrer prior to trial, and because they
did not file an answer to the UD complaint.
6
The appellate division affirmed the UD judgment, finding that the
Reyeses had failed to cite to any evidence in the record supporting their
contention that the property was a mobile home park entitling them to 60
days notice to terminate tenancy. In any case, the appellate division found
that there was no error on the face of the UD complaint and that it
complied with statutory requirements in all respects. Hence, the UD court
had personal jurisdiction over the Reyeses.
As for the Reyeses' due process concerns, the appellate division
found that the UD court had not erred by holding the trial before hearing
the Reyeses' demurrer, since California's UD statutes provide for a trial
date within 20 days of the date of the defendant's appearance. The Reyeses
"appeared" by their demurrer and, therefore, the trial date was properly
set. The appellate division also found that the Reyeses were not prejudiced
by the case going to trial without an answer on file. An answer could
provide only affirmative defenses, which the Reyeses got to present.
D. Reyes v. Kutnerian
After the Reyeses had learned they were being evicted, but before
Kutnerian had filed the UD complaint, the Reyeses sued Kutnerian in the
California superior court. Among other claims, the Reyeses argued that
Kutnerian failed to give them proper notice to terminate the tenancy. After
a successful demurrer eliminated two causes of action, Kutnerian moved
for summary judgment on those causes remaining, arguing that the issues
7
the Reyeses raised had already been decided against them in the UD action.
The trial court granted the motion on collateral estoppel grounds and
dismissed the Reyeses' complaint. The Reyeses appealed, and the
California Court of Appeal affirmed.
E. The Reyeses' bankruptcy case
The Reyeses filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy case on April 8, 2018.
Kutnerian did not file a proof of claim. Instead, after the claim deadline had
passed, the Reyeses filed two claims on behalf of Kutnerian totaling
$869.99.
1. Motion to Vacate
In the bankruptcy court, the Reyeses moved to vacate the UD
judgment ("Motion to Vacate"), arguing that it was "void" because it was
obtained through Kutnerian's "extrinsic fraud" on the court. Specifically,
the Reyeses contended that Kutnerian defrauded them and the UD court
because Kutnerian knew the Reyeses were entitled to a 60-day notice of
termination of tenancy and not the 30-day Notice that was the basis for the
eviction. Because the 30-day Notice given by Kutnerian and submitted to
the UD court was insufficient, argued the Reyeses, the UD court either
lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment, or if it had jurisdiction, the
judgment was obtained as a result of the extrinsically fraudulent nature of
the notice. The Reyeses contended they were entitled to a lengthier notice
period for two reasons: (1) they resided on the property for more than one
8
year; and (2) their residence was subject to California's mobile home
tenancy law. Notwithstanding, the Reyeses maintained that they did not
receive the allegedly insufficient notice or the UD complaint and summons.
They argued that Kutnerian's false statements to the UD court regarding
service constituted another "extrinsic fraud" on the court and also deprived
it of jurisdiction over the UD action.
The Reyeses also contended that the UD judgment was void because
it was obtained through a denial of due process. The Reyeses argued that
the UD court violated their due process rights by proceeding to trial before
hearing their demurrer and by denying them an opportunity to file an
answer to the UD complaint. They maintained that the UD court was
required to wait five days to allow them to file an answer after ruling on
the demurrer, yet failed to do so. Because they had not yet filed an answer,
argued the Reyeses, the UD court had no power to act and proceed to trial.
Lastly, the Reyeses contended that Kutnerian's conduct violated the
RICO statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, which also supported a finding of
extrinsic fraud on the court. The Reyeses argued that Kutnerian engaged in
racketeering activity and mail fraud by (1) knowingly sending a lease
through the mail which contained provisions void under California law,4
4
The basis of this argument was that, because a 60-day notice was required, the
provision in the Lease allowing for a 30-day notice of termination of tenancy notice was
void under California law.
9
(2) mailing the allegedly fraudulent 30-day Notice, summons and UD
complaint, and (3) unlawfully collecting more monies from the Reyeses
than was due for rent and not accounting for those funds. The Reyeses
stated that their purpose in filing the Motion to Vacate was not to regain
possession of the property, but to restore their good name. They were
being denied housing as a result of a "void" UD judgment.
Kutnerian opposed the Motion to Vacate, arguing that the notice and
due process issues the Reyeses complained of had already been decided by
three levels of California state courts. In essence, argued Kutnerian, the
Reyeses were asking the bankruptcy court to exercise appellate review of a
final state court judgment and to make a finding that the state courts had
erred, which was barred by Rooker-Feldman.
In reply, the Reyeses argued that no court had ever considered or
ruled on the application of the mobile home tenancy law, whether the
Lease provision reducing the termination notice to 30 days was valid, or
whether the UD court had jurisdiction to grant the UD judgment. The
Reyeses argued that although the UD court may have had jurisdiction over
the subject matter generally and personal jurisdiction over them, the UD
court had no power to act or enter judgment because it failed to apply the
mandatory preconditions for entry of a UD judgment — i.e., proper notice
of termination of tenancy to the defendant.
The Reyeses contended they were not asserting error by any previous
10
court. Rather, this motion was the first instance in which they were asking
a court to find that the UD judgment was void as a result of Kutnerian's
fraud on the court; thus, it was not barred by Rooker-Feldman. In addition,
Rooker-Feldman did not apply because they were invoking substantive
rights under the Code — the validity of a creditor's proof of claim and the
breadth of a debtor's discharge — which constituted "core" matters.
2. The bankruptcy court's ruling on the Motion to Vacate
The bankruptcy court determined that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to vacate the UD judgment on the basis of Rooker-Feldman.
Ultimately, the court found that the Reyeses were asking the court to
review and void a state court judgment based on alleged legal errors made
by the state court, which Rooker-Feldman prohibits. The court further opined
that the Motion to Vacate was procedurally infirm and that it lacked merit.
This timely appeal followed.
II. JURISDICTION
As discussed below, the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the Motion to Vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 1334. However, we
have jurisdiction to review the court's order under 28 U.S.C. § 158.
III. ISSUE
Did the bankruptcy court err in determining that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to vacate the UD judgment?
11
IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review de novo questions of subject matter jurisdiction. Montana
v. Goldin (In re Pegasus Gold Corp.), 394 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2005); Davis
v. Courington (In re Davis), 177 B.R. 907, 910 (9th Cir. BAP 1995). A de novo
standard of review applies to the denial of a motion to vacate a judgment
as void under Civil Rule 60(b)(4). Wilmer v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 69 F.3d 406,
409 (10th Cir. 1995).
V. DISCUSSION
A. The bankruptcy court did not err in determining that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to vacate the UD judgment.
The bankruptcy court determined that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction on the basis of Rooker-Feldman, which the Reyeses contest. We
conclude that the court lacked jurisdiction for two reasons.
1. Civil Rule 60 did not confer subject matter jurisdiction over
the UD judgment.
Civil Rule 60(b)(4), applicable here by Rule 9024, provides for relief
from a judgment on the ground that "the judgment is void." A judgment is
void only if the court that rendered the judgment lacked jurisdiction of the
subject matter, or of the parties, or if the court acted in a manner
inconsistent with due process of law. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Ctr.
Wholesale, Inc. (In re Ctr. Wholesale, Inc.), 759 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1985).
The law is quite clear that Civil Rule 60(b) applies to relief from
judgment of a federal court; it does not provide a basis for subject matter
12
jurisdiction over a claim for relief from a state court judgment. Holder v.
Simon, 384 F. App'x 669 (9th Cir. June 21, 2010) (affirming district court's
dismissal of complaint seeking to vacate an alleged fraudulent state court
judgment under Civil Rule 60(b)); Bonilla v. Ervine, No. 2:18-1354, 2018 WL
4613150, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2018) (citing Holder); Bland v. Pfieffer, No.
3:17-02309, 2018 WL 2717783, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Cal. June 6, 2018) (state court
judgments are not subject to attack under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure) (citing Wash.-Baltimore News. Guild, Local 35 v. Wash. Post Co.,
442 F.2d 1234, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("Of course, neither [Civil] Rule 60(b)
per se nor, for that matter, any other of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
was ever designed to apply to proceedings in other than the United States
District Courts.")); Florimonte v. Borough of Dalton, No. 3:17-01063, 2017 WL
7542619, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2017) ("[Civil] Rule 60(b) only authorizes a
federal district court to set aside one of its own judgments or orders — it
does not authorize it to vacate a state court judgment or order.") (emphasis
in original), aff'd, 2018 WL 814004 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2018), aff'd, 735 F. App'x
53 (3d Cir. 2018); Thomason v. Moeller, No. 4:16-141, 2017 WL 241322, at *17
(D. Idaho Jan. 19, 2017) ("A state-court action is not subject to being
modified or set aside under the Federal Rules."); Scorpio Music (Black
Scorpio) S.A. v. Willis, No. 11-1557, 2016 WL 29620, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4,
2016) (citing Holder and De Mol v. Grand Canyon Title Agency, 2010 WL
4269534, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 25, 2010)); Mather v. First Hawaiian Bank, No. 14-
13
00091, 2014 WL 7334880, at *3 (D. Haw. Dec. 19, 2014) ("[Civil] Rule 60(b)(4)
does not allow this court to vacate state-court orders and judgments as
void."); Copeland v. Bank of Am. Servicing, No. 13-1578, 2014 WL 12707481, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2014) (citing Holder); Williams v. Apker, 774 F. Supp. 2d
124, 128 (D. D.C. 2011) ("[Civil] Rule 60(b) . . . only provides a federal
district court with subject matter jurisdiction over requests for
reconsideration of federal district court decisions; it does not give the court
jurisdiction to relieve a party from state court judgments[.]"); Burnett v.
Amrein, No. 06-00564, 2006 WL 2859625, at *11 (D. Colo. Oct. 3, 2006), aff'd,
243 F. App'x 393 (10th Cir. 2007) (federal district court has no jurisdiction
over Civil Rule 60(b)(4) motion alleging state court judgments are void).
Therefore, Civil Rule 60 did not confer jurisdiction on the bankruptcy
court to vacate the UD judgment.
2. The relief the Reyeses sought in the Motion to Vacate was
barred by Rooker-Feldman.
Rooker-Feldman provided another basis for dismissing the Motion to
Vacate. In short, all of the Reyeses' arguments supporting their contention
that the UD judgment is void have been decided against them, at least
twice, by the California courts.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a well-established jurisdictional rule
prohibiting federal courts from exercising appellate review over final state
court judgments. See Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir.
14
2007). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal courts from exercising
subject matter jurisdiction over suits "[b]rought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before
the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review
and rejection of those judgments." Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006)
(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005)).
The Reyeses contend the void ab initio exception to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine applies here, because (1) Kutnerian procured the UD judgment
through extrinsic fraud on the court, and (2) the UD court lacked
jurisdiction to enter the UD judgment. Under the void ab initio exception, a
federal court may review a decision entered by a state court if the state
court proceedings are a legal nullity and void ab initio. See James v. Draper
(In re James), 940 F.2d 46, 52 (3d Cir. 1991). The underlying concept is that
"[a] state court judgment is subject to collateral attack if the state court
lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, or the judgment
was procured through extrinsic fraud." Lake v. Capps (In re Lake), 202 B.R.
751, 758 (9th Cir. BAP 1996).
Extrinsic fraud on a court is, by definition, not an error by that
court. It is, rather, a wrongful act committed by the party or
parties who engaged in the fraud. Rooker–Feldman therefore does
not bar subject matter jurisdiction when a federal plaintiff alleges
a cause of action for extrinsic fraud on a state court and seeks to
set aside a state court judgment obtained by that fraud.
15
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2004).
In an attempt to establish extrinsic fraud, the Reyeses argue: (1) they
were never served with the 30-day Notice as Kutnerian told the UD court;
(2) they should have received a 60-day notice from Kutnerian under
California law; and (3) because they did not receive proper notice of the UD
summons and complaint, the UD court was without jurisdiction to hear the
action or award relief. None of the acts of which the Reyeses complain
constitutes "extrinsic fraud."
"The basic requirement for invoking the extrinsic fraud exception is
that there has been no fair adversary trial at law, either because the
aggrieved party was kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in
some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or
defense." In re Lake, 202 B.R. at 758 (citing United States v. Throckmorton, 98
U.S. 61, 65 (1878)); see Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1981)
("Extrinsic fraud is conduct which prevents a party from presenting his
claim in court."). In contrast, with respect to the UD action, the Reyeses:
(1) filed a motion to quash; (2) filed a demurrer; (3) appeared at the UD
trial, testified and cross-examined witnesses; and (4) appealed the UD
judgment to the appellate division. Clearly, they were not kept in
ignorance of the UD action, and in no way were they prevented from
presenting their claims or defenses.
Furthermore, and contrary to their argument, all of these issues were
16
litigated before, and rejected by, the California courts. Since the UD court
entered the judgment, it implicitly found against the Reyeses on their
argument that they failed to receive the 30-day Notice. The UD court
expressly ruled against them regarding the necessity for a 60-day notice to
quit; they were renting land from Kutnerian, not a residential dwelling. As
for the mobile home park issue, that was raised in the Reyeses' demurrer,
which the UD court reviewed, and Mr. Reyes raised it again in closing
argument at the UD trial. The UD court did not discuss this issue in its oral
statement of decision, but it apparently ruled against them on that. The
Reyeses raised all of these issues again on appeal, but the appellate division
affirmed, expressly finding that a 30-day notice was sufficient, that
Kutnerian provided such notice, and that the Reyeses had failed to
establish that the property was a mobile home park entitling them to a 60-
day notice to quit. That decision is final. The Reyeses also raised the notice
issue in their lawsuit against Kutnerian before the California superior
court, which ruled against them, and the California Court of Appeal
affirmed. That decision is also final.
Ultimately, the California courts ruled that only a 30-day notice was
required and that Kutnerian provided it. In turn, the 30-day notice of
termination of tenancy provision in the Lease was not unlawful as the
Reyeses contend. Since the 30-day Notice was proper and the Reyeses were
served with it, the UD court had jurisdiction, both over the subject matter
17
and over the Reyeses.
The Reyeses also argue that the UD judgment was void because it
was obtained through a denial of due process. For this argument, they
assert that the UD court violated their due process rights by entering a
judgment before they had filed an answer. The issue about the right to file
an answer and whether the UD judgment could be entered without one
was raised at the UD trial and rejected by the UD court. The Reyeses raised
this issue again on appeal and the appellate division affirmed, ruling that
the process that occurred in the UD action complied with California law. In
addition, the Reyeses had failed to show how they were prejudiced
without having filed an answer; they were able to litigate all issues at the
UD trial, including anything they raised in the demurrer or would have
raised in an answer.
In summary, all of the reasons why the Reyeses argue that the UD
judgment is void — i.e., improper notice, improper service, due process
errors by the UD court — were litigated before, and rejected by, the
California courts. The Motion to Vacate constituted nothing more than an
appeal of the UD judgment for alleged legal errors by those courts, which
Rooker-Feldman prohibits. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987)
("Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the
state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as,
in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court
18
judgment."); Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1139-40; Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,
525 F.3d 855, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2008). The fact the Reyeses have not brought
their motion before the UD court is telling.
Because the Motion to Vacate did not confer jurisdiction on the
bankruptcy court to vacate the UD judgment, and because the relief the
Reyeses were seeking in the Motion to Vacate was barred by Rooker-
Feldman, the bankruptcy court did not err in determining that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, dismissal of the Motion to Vacate was
proper.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM.
19