Rosales-Perez v. Holder

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-1377
OSCAR ORLANDO ROSALES PEREZ,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Souter,* Associate Justice,
and Selya, Circuit Judge.
Randy Olen for petitioner.
Kevin James Conway, with whom Brooke M. Maurer, Trial
Attorney, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Stuart F.
Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division, and Richard M. Evans, Assistant Director, were on brief,
for respondent.
January 15, 2014
*
Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
LYNCH, Chief Judge. Oscar Orlando Rosales Perez
(Rosales), a Guatemalan teacher who entered this country in 2003,
was ordered removed in 2011. He did not seek judicial review of
that order. Rather, he sought to reopen before the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) a few months later based on new evidence.
The BIA was unpersuaded. He now petitions for judicial review of
the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings. We
deny his petition for review, as the BIA did not abuse its
considerable discretion in this area.
I.
A. Original Removal Proceedings
On September 6, 2006, Rosales was charged as removable as
an alien in the United States who was not admitted or paroled. See
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Rosales conceded his removability and
applied for withholding of removal, protection under the Convention
Against Torture (CAT), and voluntary departure from the United
States. Specifically, Rosales said he sought relief from removal
because he feared being the victim of gang violence in Guatemala as
a result of his teaching and counseling students to avoid joining
gangs.
At a merits hearing before the Immigration Judge (IJ) on
February 22, 2010, Rosales testified that he grew up in Guatemala
City and had taught 14- to 18-year-old students at the Colegio Pan
Americano for about five years, starting in 1998. Because the IJ
-2-
found him credible, we tell his story as he did. At his
orientation classes, Rosales said, he told students not to get
involved in gangs and to stay away from bad influences, such as
alcohol and drugs. Some of his students were in the Maras gang;
they tried to "provoke" Rosales during these classes, but he
resisted any confrontation.
Rosales testified that about two years after he started
teaching, a student who was in the Maras gang failed a computer
test that Rosales had given and warned Rosales, "you will see how
you're going to die." Rosales reported the incident to the
principal, who expelled the student as a result.
Four days later, the student and other Maras members
followed Rosales around, insulting him. Later on, about four of
the student's friends in the Maras followed Rosales and his brother
onto a bus when Rosales was on his way home from work. One of the
gang members held a gun to Rosales's head and demanded money, while
the other members threatened Rosales and his brother with blades.
Rosales gave into their demand for money and later filed a police
report. The police did nothing.
Rosales was with his wife the second time that the Maras
attacked him, around February 2001, approximately two years after
he was robbed on the bus. The same Maras members again sought to
rob Rosales and his wife. When Rosales intervened when Maras
members pulled at his wife's purse, he was hit with a gun, thrown
-3-
to the floor, and stabbed with a knife. The Maras then took all of
the couple's belongings. Rosales received six stitches on his hand
and fourteen on his leg for his knife wounds. Rosales filed
another police report; the police again did nothing.
Rosales was also with his wife during the third attack,
which occurred approximately two years after the second attack.
Again, the same weapon-bearing Maras members robbed the couple,
telling Rosales that they would kill him if he went to the police
afterwards. Rosales did not go the police this time.
After the third attack, Rosales was convinced that the
gang members knew where he lived because they had called his house
asking for money. Fearful of the gang violence, Rosales fled
Guatemala on October 22, 2003 and illegally entered the United
States through the Texas border on November 5, 2003. His wife
later joined him in the United States after she had acquired a
visa.
Rosales also testified that his cousin was killed by a
gang in August 2005. He said that his cousin was not a teacher and
worked for the health ministry in Guatemala. He did not know why
his cousin was killed.
Rosales's sister-in-law, Lucy Rosales, also testified.
Ms. Rosales is a United States citizen who was visiting Guatemala
when gang members robbed Rosales and his brother on a bus. Although
she did not witness the attack, she said the experience made
-4-
Rosales scared for his life. She also testified that gang members
attacked Rosales because he had advised students to stay away from
gangs. All three attacks occurred only after the student was
expelled based on a confrontation he had with Rosales after failing
a computer test, not directly after the orientation classes.
Rosales claimed that he had been and would be persecuted
because of his political opinion and membership in a particular
social group: teachers who publicly oppose gang membership. In an
oral decision, the IJ denied Rosales's applications for withholding
of removal and CAT protection and granted him voluntary departure.
The IJ considered Rosales's documentary evidence, including letters
from former colleagues at the school where he worked, his
declaration, and the joint declaration of his brother and sister-
in-law. The IJ articulated four independent grounds for her
finding that Rosales had not established a clear probability that
his life or freedom would be threatened in Guatemala on account of
one of five protected grounds, making him ineligible for
withholding of removal. See Arevalo-Giron v. Holder, 667 F.3d 79,
82 (1st Cir. 2012).
The IJ found that: (1) the incidents described by
Rosales, taken cumulatively, did not rise to the level of
persecution; (2) even if those incidents constituted past
persecution, there was insufficient evidence to show that the
persecution was on account of a protected ground; (3) the proposed
-5-
social group lacked the requisite "social visibility" for
withholding purposes, given insufficient evidence that Guatemalan
society identified teachers that spoke out against gangs as
belonging to a particular group; and (4) Rosales had not shown it
was more likely than not that he would face future persecution in
Guatemala on account of a protected ground. The IJ noted that
Rosales's parents and two sisters in Guatemala remained unharmed.
She also found that Rosales's cousin who was killed was not a
teacher, nor did gangs target him because of his relationship to
Rosales. The IJ also noted that there was no evidence that the
principal who expelled the Maras member had suffered any harm or
threats from gangs in the years since. The IJ concluded that
Rosales's CAT claim failed because there was no evidence that he
feared a government official or any person acting in an official
capacity.
Rosales appealed to the BIA. On October 31, 2011, the
BIA dismissed Rosales's appeal and reinstated his grant of
voluntary departure. The BIA concluded that Rosales had not shown
a nexus between his prior harm and a protected ground, reasoning
that proof of the gang's criminal extortion did not amount to a
showing that the harm was motivated by his political opinion or
purported membership in a particular social group.
The BIA found that Rosales's past experiences did not
rise to the level of persecution and that his claim of future
-6-
persecution on account of his past activities as a teacher was
"highly speculative and not supported by the record." The BIA
observed that Rosales had "not . . . identified evidence that
similarly situated individuals are targeted for persecution in
Guatemala on account of a protected ground." (emphasis added). The
BIA also agreed that Rosales had no CAT claim, saying he had not
shown his past experiences amounted to torture nor had he shown
government consent or acquiescence to gang-perpetrated harms.
Rosales did not seek judicial review of the BIA's
dismissal.
B. Motion to Reopen
On December 30, 2011, Rosales moved to reopen removal
proceedings on the basis of new evidence he claimed showed the
"persecution of teachers and school administrators who publicly
oppose gang practices and values by expressly dissuading their
students from participating in gangs."
Rosales submitted a copy of an email, not an affidavit,
dated December 27, 2011, from Rodrigo Beltran, a math teacher from
the Fountain of Life Christian School in Guatemala. The school had
closed on September 23, 2010. Beltran said the closing was in
response to gang violence and that gang members had used death
threats to extort money from him and his immediate boss. He said
the gangs had shot at his house, had shot at the school, and had
also threatened to kill students. He also said that gang members
-7-
had killed Alfredo Osorio, also a teacher at this school, on March
15, 2011, when Osorio was leaving his house.
Rosales also submitted newspaper articles that described
the closing of this school due to "extortions from . . . gang
members" that demanded payments on a monthly basis, and the U.S.
State Department's 2010 Human Rights Report on Guatemala, which
Rosales said showed a drastic increase in violence in Guatemala
since the IJ's February 2010 decision.
On February 29, 2012, the BIA denied Rosales's motion to
reopen, saying that none of the documents that Rosales submitted
showed how the Fountain of Life Christian School or its teachers
publicly opposed gang practices, nor did they show how the gang
threats were related to any such opposition. The gang's criminal
extortion of money from schools and teachers did "not amount [to]
a showing that a central reason [for that extortion] was their
purported membership in a particular social group."
The BIA also rejected Rosales's claim that the 2010
Country Report he submitted showed that gang violence had
"drastically escalated" in Guatemala, noting that the report did
not indicate substantial changes in gang violence in the year since
Rosales's February 2010 hearing. The BIA concluded that the new
evidence was "similar to, and cumulative of, evidence already
submitted . . . and does not show that a different outcome is
-8-
warranted with respect to [Rosales's] claims for withholding of
removal or protection under the [CAT]."
II.
Motions to reopen removal proceedings are disfavored due
to the "strong public interest in bringing litigation [in these
proceedings] to a close . . . promptly." Jutus v. Holder, 723 F.3d
105, 109 (1st Cir. 2013) (omission in original) (quoting Fesseha v.
Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). As a result, the BIA enjoys considerable latitude
in deciding such motions, id., and we review the BIA's denial of a
motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, Haizem Liu v. Holder, 727
F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 2013). We uphold the BIA's decision "unless
the complaining party can show that the BIA committed an error of
law or exercised its judgment in an arbitrary, capricious, or
irrational way." Id. (quoting Le Bin Zhu v. Holder, 622 F.3d 87,
91 (1st Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
An applicant moving to reopen removal proceedings must
meet several requirements. First, he must introduce new, material
evidence that was not available at the original merits hearing.
Second, he must make out a "prima facie case of eligibility for the
relief sought." Jutus, 723 F.3d at 110.
Rosales makes two arguments. First he argues that the
BIA conflated the standard for making a prima facie case with the
standard for the underlying substantive relief when it denied his
-9-
motion because the new evidence did "not show that a different
outcome is warranted." He also argues the BIA did not consider the
original record evidence. He says that the new and old record
evidence, considered together, needed to show only a "reasonable
likelihood" that he is eligible for the relief he requests in order
to make out a prima facie case, not that a different outcome is
warranted. Larngar v. Holder, 562 F.3d 71, 78 (1st Cir. 2009)
(quoting Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2002))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
As to his second argument, it can be quickly disposed of
as without merit. The BIA said that it had reviewed the entire
record, not just the new evidence. And the logic of its ruling
required review of the original record.
As to both arguments, Rosales had to show that his
evidence was "new" and that it was "material" before reaching the
issue of a prima facie case. See Ratnasingam v. Holder, 556 F.3d
10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The problem for
Rosales is that the new evidence was not material to the question
of the nexus between his treatment and one of five protected
grounds. The new evidence said nothing on this issue at all. This
was a key gap in his original application, and the new evidence did
not even purport to fill that gap.
Evidence is not material unless it has some impact on the
outcome of a petitioner's underlying case. See In re Coelho, 20 I.
-10-
& N. Dec. 464, 473 (B.I.A. 1992); see also Xiu Xia Zheng v. Holder,
502 F. App'x. 13, 14 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (saying that new
evidence is material for motion to reopen purposes only if it
"would likely change the result in the case" (quoting Coelho, 20 I.
& N. Dec. at 473) (internal quotation marks omitted)). So, the BIA
did not misapply the materiality standard where it evaluated
whether the new evidence showed that a "different outcome is
warranted" in Rosales's case. Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion
in finding the new evidence was not material.
As the BIA explained:
[T]he evidence submitted at the time of
[Rosales's] hearing indicated that criminal
violence and extortion affected a wide range
of individuals and institutions in Guatemala,
not excluding educators. The evidence
submitted in [Rosales's] motion [to reopen] is
similar to, and cumulative of, evidence
already submitted in the respondent's
proceedings, and does not show that a
different outcome is warranted with respect to
his claims for withholding of removal or
protection under the [CAT]. Matter of Coelho,
20 I & N Dec. 464 (BIA 1992).1
1
Despite some poorly worded language in the respondent's
brief, we do not read the BIA's decision in this case nor in In re
Coelho as creating a rule that if new evidence is cumulative of the
original record evidence, then it is not material. For example, a
petitioner might produce only slim evidence that is insufficient to
show a nexus between persecution and membership in a particular
social group in removal proceedings. Later, in a motion to reopen,
if petitioner submits affidavits from ten individuals establishing
they were victims of persecution because of their membership in
this same social group, that evidence is cumulative of preexisting
record evidence, but it also may nonetheless be material to the
nexus requirement. However, that situation is not this case.
-11-
(record citations omitted). This finding as to the new evidence
was neither irrational nor arbitrary. The BIA correctly observed
that all of the new documents describing gang violence toward
teachers at a particular school were silent on whether any of those
teachers or school administrators publicly opposed gangs. The
State Department's 2010 Country Report on Guatemala similarly did
not provide evidence addressing whether teachers were targeted
because of their public opposition to gang membership. As a
result, the new evidence was not material where it did nothing to
fill a gap that existed in the original record evidence: proof that
persecution was on account of teachers' public teaching and
opposition to gangs.
The BIA did not reach the issue of whether Rosales had
made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief. Nor did it
need to, given its conclusion that Rosales had not introduced new,
material evidence. See Smith v. Holder, 627 F.3d 427, 433 (1st
Cir. 2010); Ratnasingam, 556 F.3d at 15 ("Prima facie eligibility
for relief is only one of the two threshold requirements for a
motion to reopen."). As a result, Rosales's reliance on Smith v.
Holder, 627 F.3d at 438, which held that a court should look at all
of the record evidence, not just newly submitted evidence, in
-12-
evaluating the prima facie case requirement for reopening, is
misplaced.2
Finally, Rosales requests that we issue an order
directing the respondent to state whether it will exercise
prosecutorial discretion and allow him to remain. We decline.
Rosales could have requested this relief from the government
himself at any time. It has been over two years since the Morton
Memo3 has issued, and there is no occasion for this court to make
a request which Rosales either has not made himself or which was
made and denied. Efforts to prolong these proceedings will not be
rewarded.
2
Rosales also criticizes the BIA's earlier decision that
Rosales had not established past persecution. However, Rosales
never sought judicial review of the BIA's October 31, 2011
decision. Nor did he raise the issue of past persecution in his
motion to reopen, which is the only proceeding before us. The time
limits for seeking review of BIA orders are "mandatory and
jurisdictional." Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995) (quoting
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 45 (1990)). Having long ago
missed the thirty-day window for seeking review of the BIA's 2011
decision, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), he cannot now attempt to
circumvent the statutory requirements for judicial review through
the backdoor of his motion to reopen. Lopez v. Holder, 723 F.3d
43, 47 (1st Cir. 2013).
3
Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil
Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011),
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf
/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.
-13-
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
denied.
-14-