United States v. Mills

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-2444
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
v.
RANDOLPH MILLS, a/k/a DASHE BECKFORD,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
John R. Gibson, Senior Circuit Judge*
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Dina Michael Chaitowitz, Assistant United States Attorney,
with whom Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, was on brief
for appellant.
John S. Ferrara, with whom Dalsey, Ferrara, & Albano, was on
brief for appellee.
August 30, 2007
*
Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge. Randolph Mills pleaded
guilty to one count of illegal reentry of a removed alien, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The presentence report computed a
total offense level of seventeen and a criminal history category of
I. The resulting guideline imprisonment range was twenty-four to
thirty months. The district court sentenced Mills to two years'
probation and a $100 special assessment. The government now
appeals. We vacate Mills's sentence and remand for resentencing.
Randolph Mills was born in Kingston, Jamaica. He entered
the United States legally and became a lawful permanent resident,
but the State of Connecticut sentenced him to a five year term of
imprisonment following a conviction on drug charges. The State
suspended Mills's term of imprisonment after one year. The
government placed Mills in removal proceedings following his
release and deported him to Jamaica on January 9, 1999. On July
29, 2004, Mills was arrested in Greenfield, Massachusetts, for
firearm and drug offenses under the name of "Dashe Andre Beckford."
The State released Mills on bail but he failed to appear for
subsequent court appearances, and the State issued a warrant for
his arrest. The State arrested Mills per the warrant on March 2,
2005, and determined that he was the same individual who had been
deported in 1999. After his arrest on March 2, the State retained
custody of Mills.
On April 14, 2005, the government charged Mills with
-2-
illegal reentry of a removed alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
Mills made an initial appearance before the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts on May 6, 2005, pursuant to
a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. The presiding magistrate
judge granted the government's motion for detention. Federal
authorities, however, did not detain Mills at that time, but
instead returned him to state custody pursuant to the state
charges. Mills pleaded guilty to the federal offense on May 11,
2006, and the district court sentenced him to probation on August
16, 2006. During the sentencing hearing, the district court
expressed particular concern with the amount of time Mills had
spent in custody and the possibility of Mills receiving credit for
that time. The district court noted that Mills had been in
detention for the seventeen months following his arrest on March 2,
2005. The government objected that the seventeen months was
irrelevant because it was on unrelated state charges. The district
court then decided to sentence Mills to probation instead of time
served so as to avoid "getting into whether time served is an
appropriate sentence or not."
On September 28, 2006, Mills pleaded guilty to the state
drug and weapon charges and was sentenced to 365 days'
imprisonment. He received a credit of 365 days for time served and
immediately entered the custody of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement where he currently remains. The government now appeals
-3-
the sentence given by the district court.
We review the district court's sentence under the now
advisory guidelines for reasonableness. Rita v. United States, __
U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 260-63 (2005). The government argues that the district
court erred in concluding that the State of Massachusetts was
holding Mills pursuant to the federal charges. We review for clear
error a district court's factual findings relevant to a sentencing
calculation. United States v. Goodhue, 486 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir.
2007). "[A] sentence will be vacated as unreasonable under Booker
if it is predicated on a clearly erroneous view of material facts."
United States v. Robinson, 433 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir. 2005).
In this case, it is apparent that the district court's
decision to sentence Mills to probation was predicated on an
erroneous finding that Mills had been imprisoned on federal charges
while in state custody before trial. Examining the sentencing
transcript and the statement of reasons, we observe that the
district court was under the impression that Mills was in custody
on the basis of the federal charge, illegal reentry of a removed
alien. First, Mills's counsel notified the district court during
the sentencing hearing that Mills had been held on the order of
detention since May 6, 2005. The district court then responded
with concern that Mills "has been in jail for fifteen months."
Later, the district court concluded that probation was appropriate
-4-
because Mills had "served enough on the charge before me" (emphasis
added). The district court then emphasized that everyone should
"understand the reason" for the sentence imposed, namely that "I
think he has served enough time on this charge" (emphasis added).
Finally, in its statement of reasons, the district court explained
that it was sentencing Mills outside the advisory guideline system
because Mills had "already served enough time in prison on these
charges, but in state custody" (emphasis added).
Contrary to the district court's assertions, however, it
is evident that the presentence report, to which neither party
objected, plainly states that Mills was being held pursuant to
unrelated state charges. The district court, moreover, gave no
indication why it was disregarding the presentence report. While
Mills did appear before the district court on several occasions,
those appearances did not change his custody status. See Sinito v.
Kindt, 954 F.2d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (holding that
"[t]he issuance of the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum did
not alter [the prisoner's] custody status"). Since credit for 365
days that Mills was in state custody was properly applied to the
eventual guilty plea on separate state charges, Mills is not
entitled to have that time also credited towards his federal
sentence. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992);
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)(2).
Mills argues that because the government obtained a
-5-
detainer against Mills while he was in state custody, the time
served should apply to the federal sentence.1 This argument is
unpersuasive. It is well-established that when a federal detainer
is irrelevant to custody in relation to a state offense, credit is
not available. See Bloomgren v. Belaski, 948 F.2d 688, 690 (10th
Cir. 1991) (noting that when a federal detainer is unrelated to a
state prisoner's continued custody, credit is not available for the
federal sentence). In this case, Mills offers no argument
contradicting the presentence report's statement regarding the
reason for Mills's state custody. We have no reason, therefore, to
conclude that the federal detainer was the sole reason for Mills's
continuing custody.
Finally, we have some concern regarding the district
court's decision to sentence Mills to probation in consideration of
his seventeen month detention with state authorities. The Supreme
Court has plainly stated that 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)(2) "does not
authorize a district court to compute the credit at sentencing."
Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334. The district court, therefore, should not
have taken into account Mills's custody in its sentencing decision,
1
Mills cites the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. Koray,
515 U.S. 50 (1995), in his argument that the federal detainer
qualifies him for credit towards his sentence. Mills's reliance is
misplaced. The Court in Koray held that time spent in a community
treatment center did not qualify as official detention for
crediting purposes. The decision does not address whether time
spent in detention on state charges can also qualify a prisoner for
credit on federal charges.
-6-
but should have instead left the determination of Mills's
eligibility for credit for time served to the Attorney General and
the Bureau of Prisons. The fact that the district court
technically refrained from sentencing Mills to "time served" is
insufficient to cure the district court's error under Wilson.
We conclude that the district court's consideration of
Mills's custody on unrelated state charges at the time of
sentencing was clearly erroneous.2 We therefore vacate the
sentence imposed and remand for resentencing consistent with this
opinion. In light of our holding, Mills's pending motions are
denied.
2
Because we determine that Mills's sentence must be remanded
due to the district court's consideration of an erroneous factual
conclusion, we express no opinion as to the government's argument
that a sentence of two years of probation would be substantively
unreasonable on the facts of this case.
-7-