Colon v. Black & Decker (PR) LLC

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION — NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-2483
JOSE JIMENEZ COLON ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
BLACK & DECKER (PR) LLC,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Héctor M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Lynch and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Peter Díaz Santiago, with whom Woods & Woods was on brief,
for appellants.
Carl Schuster, with whom María Santiago Ramos and Schuster,
Usera, Aguilló & Santiago LLP were on brief, for appellee.
June 13, 2001
Per Curiam. In this case, the principal plaintiff, a
former managerial employee who ostensibly lost his post with
Black & Decker (PR) as part of a reduction in force, claims that
his age was the real reason behind his ouster. The plaintiffs
— the former employee, his wife, and their conjugal partnership
— sued under, inter alia, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and in due course, the employer
moved for summary judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The
plaintiffs failed to file an opposition. The district court
nonetheless studied the matter, wrote a thoughtful opinion, and
granted the motion for brevis disposition. Jimenez Colon v.
Black & Decker (PR) LLC, Civ. No. 99-1871 (D.P.R. Aug. 9, 2000).
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
relief from judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), in which they
invoked subsection (1) of the rule and claimed that their
failure to oppose the summary judgment motion resulted from
excusable neglect. They averred that they (mistakenly) believed
that they had filed a motion to reopen discovery — the motion
had, in fact, been filed in a different case — and that this
motion would have assured deferral of any consideration of
summary judgment. The defendant objected to the Rule 60(b)
motion.
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The district court wrote a second opinion, finding
neglect, but also finding an absence of excusatory
circumstances. Jimenez Colon v. Black & Decker (PR) LLC, Civ.
No. 99-1871 (D.P.R. Oct. 3, 2000). For that reason, the court
refused to set aside its earlier judgment. See id. This appeal
ensued. In it, the plaintiffs challenge only the court's denial
of their Rule 60(b) motion.
We need not tarry. We previously have acknowledged
that when a trial judge adroitly takes the measure of a case,
applies correct legal standards, and formulates a convincing
rationale, "an appellate court should refrain from writing at
length to no other end than to hear its own words resonate."
Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 101 F.3d 218, 220 (1st
Cir. 1996); accord Cruz-Ramos v. Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co., 202
F.3d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 2000); Ayala v. Union de Tronquistas,
Local 901, 74 F.3d 344, 345 (1st Cir. 1996); Holders Capital
Corp. v. California Union Ins. Co. (In re San Juan Dupont Plaza
Hotel Fire Litig.), 989 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1993). This is
such an instance. The district court's lucid opinion refusing
to relieve the plaintiffs from the judgment is unimpugnable.
Consequently, we affirm the judgment below substantially on the
basis of that opinion.
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We add only a few brief comments. First, contrary to
the plaintiffs' importunings, the district court followed the
appropriate legal regime, see Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v.
Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'shp, 507 U.S. 380, 393-94 (1993);
Mirpuri v. ACT Mfg., Inc., 212 F.3d 624, 630-31 (1st Cir. 2000),
and, for aught that appears, applied that regime in a sensible
fashion. Second, given the many shortcomings in the plaintiffs'
position — they took a lackadaisical approach toward discovery;
sat for several weeks on the documents that they now say justify
further discovery; filed nothing within the allotted period for
responding to the defendant's summary judgment motion; and, when
they belatedly prepared the motion to reopen discovery, failed
to file it in the papers of this case — we scarcely can fault
the district court's conclusion that the plaintiffs' neglect was
inexcusable.
If more were needed — and we doubt that it is — the
standard of review applicable to the denial of a motion which
invokes Rule 60(b)(1) is for abuse of discretion. Lepore v.
Vidockler, 792 F.2d 272, 273-74 (1st Cir. 1986). In this area,
the scope of the court's discretion is considerable. Even if
one concedes, favorably to the plaintiffs, that a factfinder
might consider their neglect pardonable, there is nothing in the
record that either compels such a finding or that undermines the
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district court's contrary assessment. There was, therefore, no
abuse of the court's wide discretion.
We need go no further. The plaintiffs have not shown
an entitlement to relief from the judgment. The order appealed
from is, therefore, affirmed.
Affirmed.
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