Wilson v. HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-1298
TIMOTHY A. WILSON and CARRIE E. WILSON,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
HSBC MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Timothy S. Hillman, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Thompson, and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Helene Gerstle for appellants.
John S. McNicholas, with whom Lawson Williams and Korde &
Associates were on brief, for appellee.
February 14, 2014
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Husband and wife Timothy A.
Wilson and Carrie E. Wilson (collectively, "the Wilsons") appeal
the district court's dismissal of their eight-count complaint
alleging certain improprieties with respect to HSBC Mortgage
Services, Inc.'s ("HSBC") acquisition of the mortgage on their home
by way of an assignment from Mortgage Electronic Registration
System, Inc. ("MERS"). The Wilsons claim the assignment is void
because it was executed not by MERS, but by an HSBC employee who
falsely purported to sign on MERS's behalf. According to the
Wilsons, HSBC never acquired the mortgage to their property and has
no right to initiate foreclosure proceedings.
A homeowner in Massachusetts who is neither a party to
nor a third party beneficiary of a mortgage assignment has standing
to challenge the assignment on the grounds that it is void.
Although the Wilsons' complaint sets forth some rather troubling
accusations about HSBC's business practices and foreclosure
procedures, the Wilsons have not set forth a colorable claim that
the mortgage assignment in question is void. Because we agree they
lack standing to raise certain claims, and because they have failed
to state a claim for promissory estoppel with respect to a loan
modification, their request for injunctive relief must also fail.
Accordingly, we affirm.
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BACKGROUND
The facts are straightforward. We recite them as alleged
in the Wilsons' Amended Verified Complaint ("Complaint"),
supplementing as necessary with information found in the mortgage
itself, public records, documents incorporated into the complaint
by reference, and other matters susceptible to judicial notice.1
Giragosian v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2008).
On June 28, 2004, the Wilsons granted a mortgage on their
property in Northborough, Massachusetts to Ameriquest Mortgage
Company ("Ameriquest") in order to secure a promissory note. The
mortgage was recorded on July 6, 2004, and on that same day
Ameriquest assigned its interest in the mortgage to MERS (the "2004
Assignment").2 The 2004 Assignment was recorded on February 8,
2005.
HSBC entered the picture on March 19, 2009, the date on
which MERS purported to execute a document assigning the Wilsons'
mortgage to HSBC (the "2009 Assignment"). The 2009 Assignment was
recorded in the Worcester County Registry of Deeds on April 13,
1
Although purporting to be an "Amended Verified Complaint,"
the document was signed by counsel rather than the Wilsons and was
not signed under oath. The Wilsons' original complaint, filed in
the Massachusetts Land Court, was verified by Plaintiff Timothy A.
Wilson.
2
While the Complaint refers to this as an "alleged"
assignment, none of the counts relate to the 2004 Assignment.
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2009. According to the Complaint, the 2009 Assignment "was
executed by Shelene Strauss, as Vice President of MERS."
The Wilsons attached a copy of the 2009 Assignment to
their Complaint. The document is entitled "Corporate Assignment of
Mortgage" and identifies MERS as the assignor and HSBC as the
assignee. It goes on to identify the original mortgage granted by
the Wilsons for their property in Northborough. The assignment's
text states, in pertinent part, "Assignor [MERS] hereby assigns
unto the above-named Assignee [HSBC], the said Mortgage together
with the Note or other evidence of indebtedness" with respect to
the Wilsons' property. The signature block towards the bottom of
the document reads as follows:
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.
On March 19, 2009
By: /s/ Shelene Strauss
SHELENE STRAUSS, Vice-President
The face of the 2009 Assignment further shows it was notarized on
March 19, 2009, the same date upon which it was signed.
In spite of the 2009 Assignment's text, and
notwithstanding their prior allegation that Strauss executed it on
behalf of MERS, the Wilsons allege Strauss prepared the 2009
Assignment "on behalf of the assignee [i.e., HSBC] and not the
assignor [i.e., MERS]." The Complaint further alleges that Strauss
has notarized other mortgage assignments from MERS to HSBC on at
least two occasions, and that she "prepared and signed a
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Satisfaction of Mortgage on behalf of Beneficial Financial, Inc."
The Complaint goes on to allege that Strauss has "robo-signed
documents assigning mortgages, including the [Wilsons'] mortgage,
to [HSBC] from various lenders." The Wilsons do not define the
term "robo-signed" in their Complaint.
Following the 2009 Assignment, HSBC, "relying on the
robo-signed assignment[]," began foreclosure proceedings by sending
certain notices to the Wilsons and making various filings in the
Massachusetts Land Court. Throughout these proceedings, HSBC
claimed that it held the mortgage on the Wilsons' property. The
Wilsons, however, assert that HSBC did not, in fact, hold their
mortgage because the 2009 Assignment was "robo-signed and therefore
fraudulent."
The Wilsons go on to introduce allegations of
irregularities regarding HSBC's foreclosure processes. In November
2010, HSBC reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission that
it had halted its foreclosures because of "certain deficiencies in
the processing, preparation and signing of affidavits and other
documents supporting foreclosures . . . including the evaluation
and monitoring of third-party law firms retained to effect [its]
foreclosures." In April 2011, HSBC's parent company entered into
a Consent Order with the United States Department of the Treasury
Comptroller of Currency (the "Consent Order") stating, in part,
that it had "identified certain deficiencies and unsafe or unsound
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practices in residential mortgage servicing and in the Bank's
initiation and handling of foreclosure proceedings." According to
the Complaint, the Consent Order required HSBC's parent company to
hire an independent consultant to review certain residential
foreclosure actions and to determine "whether loss mitigation
activities with respect to foreclosed loans were handled in
accordance with the requirements of the HAMP, and consistent with
the policies and procedures applicable to the Bank's proprietary
loan modifications or other loss mitigation programs."3
Then, on November 21, 2011, MERS again purportedly
assigned the Wilsons' mortgage to HSBC (the "2011 Assignment").
This 2011 Assignment was recorded on November 23, 2011. The
Wilsons allege that HSBC was no longer a member of MERS at this
point in time, having ceased its membership sometime in 2009. The
Wilsons further allege that, as of the time they filed their
Complaint, their mortgage was in "inactive" status with MERS. They
have not alleged that HSBC (or MERS) has taken any further actions
towards foreclosing on their property.
3
The Home Affordable Mortgage Program ("HAMP") is "a federal
initiative that incentivizes lenders and loan servicers to offer
loan modifications to eligible homeowners." Young v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 228 (1st Cir. 2013). HAMP's ultimate
goal is to encourage mortgage holders to renegotiate the loans in
order to reduce a homeowner's "'mortgage payments to sustainable
levels, without discharging any of the underlying debt.'" Id.
(quoting Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F. Supp. 2d 342, 347
(D. Mass. 2011)).
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Indeed, it appears there was no further action at all
with respect to the Wilsons' mortgage until the Wilsons submitted
a hardship letter and income information to HSBC on March 26, 2012,
in connection with a request for a loan modification. HSBC
requested further information from the Wilsons the following day.
According to the Wilsons, HSBC then "suggested" to the Wilsons that
they would be required to pay 40% of the arrearage on their
mortgage, approximately $25,000, as a condition of any loan
modification. This offer does not comply with HAMP requirements,
the Wilsons claim, because (1) HAMP does not require a down payment
for a loan modification and (2) the Wilsons never received written
notice that their request had been denied.
Wasting no time after making their request for a loan
modification, the Wilsons filed their original complaint in the
Massachusetts Land Court on March 30, 2012. HSBC promptly removed
the matter to the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, and the Wilsons filed their "Amended Verified
Complaint" on April 5, 2012. In addition to the facts recounted
above, the Wilsons' eight-count Complaint contains the following
allegations: (1) HSBC was not the present holder of their mortgage
when it served them with a Notice of Right to Cure in 2009 and
Notice of Intent to Foreclose in 2010, (2) HSBC fraudulently
represented it was acting on behalf of MERS "when in fact it was
acting on behalf of [HSBC] and assigning the mortgage to itself"
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with respect to the 2009 Assignment, (3) HSBC breached its contract
with the Wilsons by attempting to foreclose on their property when
it did not hold the mortgage, (4) HSBC violated its obligation of
good faith and fair dealing with respect to its foreclosure
attempts, (5) HSBC made a promise, upon which the Wilsons relied,
that all documents to be recorded with respect to their mortgage
would be reliable and "free from fraud," (6) HSBC wrongfully
attempted to foreclose on their property, (7) HSBC should be
promissorily estopped from offering the Wilsons a loan modification
whose terms varied from HAMP requirements, and (8) the Wilsons are
entitled to injunctive relief. The Complaint seeks both an award
of damages and "a permanent and preliminary injunction to issue
against [HSBC] enjoining [HSBC] from conducting a foreclosure
sale."
HSBC fired back with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the
motion and dismissed the case on September 14, 2012. Key to the
district court's decision was its conclusion that the Wilsons did
not have standing to challenge the 2009 Assignment because they
were not a party to that assignment and were not third-party
beneficiaries thereof.4 The next day the Wilsons filed a motion
4
The district court also dismissed Count II, which alleges
fraud against HSBC, for failure to plead the claim with the
specificity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. We need not consider this separate ground in light of
our resolution of the standing issue.
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for relief from judgment, which the district court denied on
February 13, 2013. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court's grant of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion de novo. Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 733 F.3d 349, 353
(1st Cir. 2013). In doing so, we "construe all factual allegations
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine if
there exists a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted."
Id. The parties do not dispute that Massachusetts law applies to
all substantive issues in this case. Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness
Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007). We are not wedded to
the district court's reasoning and may "affirm the decision below
on any ground made manifest by the record." Id.
Although we view the Complaint in the light most
favorable to the Wilsons, we disregard statements or allegations
that are "merely conclusory." Woods, 733 F.3d at 353. Nor are we
required to take every single allegation at face value: "'[w]e
exempt, of course, those facts which have since been conclusively
contradicted by [the Wilsons'] concessions or otherwise . . . .'"
Soto-Negrón v. Taber Partners I, 339 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2003)
(omission in original) (quoting Chongris v. Bd. of Appeals, 811
F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 1987)). We can also take into account the
mortgage itself, "'documents incorporated by reference in [the
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Complaint], matters of public record, and other matters susceptible
to judicial notice.'" Giragosian v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59, 65 (1st
Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d
12, 20 (1st Cir. 2003)). And where, as here, standing is at issue
we may consider "'further particularized allegations of fact deemed
supportive of [plaintiffs'] standing,'" such as those contained
within an affidavit. McInnis-Misenor v. Me. Med. Ctr., 319 F.3d
63, 67 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501
(1975)).
B. Standing (Counts I-VI)
The district court dismissed the first six counts of the
Wilsons' Complaint for want of standing. Specifically, the court
found that under Massachusetts law "parties cannot challenge
mortgage assignments to which they were neither a party nor a
third-party beneficiary." Our first task, therefore, is to
determine if the Wilsons have standing. McInnis-Misenor, 319 F.3d
at 67 ("Standing is . . . a threshold question in every
case . . . ."). We, as did the district court, consider these
first six counts together because each one relies on the Wilsons'
contention that HSBC never acquired the mortgage on their home from
MERS.5 Because the question of whether certain facts establish
5
The Wilsons acknowledge they "raised the issue of the
validity of the assignments in Counts I-VI of the Complaint."
Notably, the Wilsons utilize the plural form, "assignments," but
the Complaint does not allege the 2004 Assignment is void, nor do
the Wilsons develop this argument on appeal. In their brief, the
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standing is a question of law, we review the district court's
resolution of the issue de novo. Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of
Neb., 708 F.3d 282, 289 (1st Cir. 2013)
Standing--a litigant's right to be in the courtroom--must
be established in every case, as the Constitution permits the
federal courts to address only "actual cases and controversies."
Id. (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1). A party does not
establish standing simply because the other side agrees to submit
a controversy to a federal court. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
398 (1975). Instead, a plaintiff must show that he or she has a
personal stake in the litigation's outcome by "establish[ing] each
part of a familiar triad: injury, causation, and redressability."
Culhane, 708 F.3d at 289; see also McInnis-Misenor, 319 F.3d at 67
(observing "[a] litigant bears the burden" of establishing
Wilsons state that while the 2004 Assignment is dated July 6, 2004,
it was not notarized until six days later. In the very next
breath, however, they concede in a footnote that "there was no
requirement under Massachusetts Law at the time of the filing of
this Complaint that an assignment was required to be notarized."
The closest they come to making a legal argument is a single
sentence asserting they "raised sufficient facts in their Amended
Verified Complaint to support the contention that the Second, and
perhaps even the First assignments are void." This wishy washy
statement--one without analog in the Complaint--is a far cry from
an allegation that the 2004 Assignment is void. Any argument with
respect to its validity has, therefore, been waived. United States
v. Slade, 980 F.2d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1992) ("Passing allusions are
not adequate to preserve an argument in either a trial or an
appellate venue."). While HSBC has dedicated a substantial part of
its brief to arguing that the 2004 Assignment is valid, because its
validity is not at issue we focus our inquiry on the 2009
Assignment.
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standing). The third aspect of the test, redressability, is the
most important one for our purposes today. To satisfy this prong,
a "plaintiff must adequately allege that a favorable result in the
litigation is likely to redress the asserted injury." Pagán v.
Calderón, 448 F.3d 16, 27 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). Further,
separate and apart from these constitutional concerns, a plaintiff
must also generally show "that his claim is premised on his own
legal rights (as opposed to those of a third party), that his claim
is not merely a generalized grievance, and that it falls within the
zone of interests protected by the law invoked." Id. (citing
Ramírez v. Ramos, 438 F.3d 92, 98 (1st Cir. 2006)).
Here, we must determine whether the Wilsons have standing
to assert their particular claims with respect to the 2009
Assignment. Far from being done in a vacuum, our analysis is
guided by Culhane. In that case, we analyzed Massachusetts
mortgage law and concluded that "a mortgagor has standing to
challenge the assignment of a mortgage on her home to the extent
that such a challenge is necessary to contest a foreclosing
entity's status qua mortgagee." Culhane, 708 F.3d at 291.
Although this language may appear to grant standing to a broad
group of individuals, we immediately dispelled any such notion by
explaining how this "holding, narrow to begin with, is further
circumscribed." Id. Pursuant to Culhane, under Massachusetts law
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a mortgagor has standing only "to challenge a mortgage assignment
as invalid, ineffective or void (if, say, the assignor had nothing
to assign or had no authority to make an assignment to a particular
assignee)." Id.; see also Woods, 733 F.3d at 354 ("[S]tanding
exists for challenges that contend that the assigning party never
possessed legal title and, as a result, no valid transferable
interest ever exchanged hands."). By contrast, "a [Massachusetts]
mortgagor does not have standing to challenge shortcomings in an
assignment that render it merely voidable at the election of one
party but otherwise effective to pass legal title." Culhane, 708
F.3d at 291.
The underlying reasoning behind this distinction is
straightforward. A homeowner in Massachusetts--even when not a
party to or third party beneficiary of a mortgage assignment--has
standing to challenge that assignment as void because success on
the merits would prove the purported assignee is not, in fact, the
mortgagee and therefore lacks any right to foreclose on the
mortgage. Id.; see also U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass.
637, 647 (2011) ("Any effort to foreclose by a party lacking
'jurisdiction and authority' to carry out a foreclosure under these
[Massachusetts] statutes is void.") (quoting Chace v. Morse, 189
Mass. 559, 561 (1905)). That same homeowner, though, lacks
standing to claim the assignment is voidable because the assignee
still would have received legal title vis-a-vis the homeowner.
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Thus, even successfully proving that the assignment was voidable
would not affect the rights as between those two parties or provide
the homeowner with a defense to the foreclosure action.
Here, the district court--which did not have the benefit
of Culhane or Woods--erroneously concluded that, as a matter of
law, "parties cannot challenge mortgage assignments to which they
were neither a party nor a third-party beneficiary." In the wake
of Culhane and Woods, however, a trial court confronted with the
standing issue in this type of case must conduct an inquiry to
determine whether a plaintiff's allegations are that a mortgage
assignment was void, or merely voidable. We now turn to this task.
1. Void vs. Voidable Assignments
Before delving into the meat of the Wilsons' allegations,
a word on the distinction between "void" and "voidable." "Void"
contracts or agreements are "those . . . that are of no effect
whatsoever; such as are a mere nullity, and incapable of
confirmation or ratification." Allis v. Billings, 47 Mass. 415,
417 (1843). By contrast, "voidable" refers to a contract or
agreement that is "injurious to the rights of one party, which he
may avoid at his election." Ball v. Gilbert, 53 Mass. 397, 404
(1847). Thus, while the party injured by a voidable contract has
the option of avoiding its obligations, it may choose instead to
ratify the agreement and hold the other party to it. See Cabot
Corp. v. AVX Corp., 448 Mass. 629, 637-43 (2007).
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The Massachusetts courts have provided examples of
voidable assignments in other contexts. Cabot teaches that a
contract entered into under duress, whether economic in nature or
otherwise, is voidable by the victim. Id. (discussing elements of
economic duress with respect to a commercial supply contract).
Agreements induced by fraudulent misrepresentations are voidable as
well. See Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. Delgiacco, 410 Mass. 840,
842 (1991) (noting employer would have been entitled to rescind
employment contract that had been induced by the applicant's false
representations). Where the parties have made a mutual mistake
with regard to an essential element of an agreement, that agreement
is voidable by the adversely affected party. See LaFleur v. C.C.
Pierce Co., 398 Mass. 254, 257-58 (1986) (addressing an attempt to
set aside a workers' compensation lump-sum agreement). Further,
when a corporate officer acts beyond the scope of his authority,
"[h]is acts in excess of his authority, although voidable by the
corporation, legally could be ratified and adopted by it."
Commissioner of Banks v. Tremont Trust Co., 259 Mass. 162, 179-80
(1927) (finding an ultra vires purchase of stock by the
corporation's president was voidable, but that the corporation
ratified the action by accepting the dividends); see also Glovin v.
Eagle Clothing Co., 247 Mass. 215, 217-18 (1924) (holding a
corporation may ratify and become bound by obligations incurred on
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its behalf by its president where the president acted outside the
scope of his authority).
A void contract, on the other hand, is one that is of no
effect whatsoever and whose terms a court will not enforce. See,
e.g., Ball, 53 Mass. at 401-04 (refusing to enforce a contract
where the parties placed a wager on the outcome of an election).
Specific to the mortgage context, a void mortgage assignment is one
in which the putative assignor "never properly held the mortgage
and, thus, had no interest to assign." Culhane, 708 F.3d at 291.
We have also found that a party who challenges a mortgage
assignment on the grounds that the assignor was but a nominee for
the mortgage holder and "never possessed a legally transferable
interest" in the mortgage alleges a void, as opposed to merely
voidable, assignment. Woods, 733 F.3d at 354 (applying
Massachusetts law).
The common thread running through Culhane and Woods is
the allegation that the foreclosing entity had no right to
foreclose, as it had never become the mortgage holder in the first
place. In other words, the homeowners sought to establish that the
mortgage transfer from the assignor to the assignee--who in turn
attempted to foreclose--was void at the outset. Through this
allegation, the plaintiffs in those cases established standing
because they challenged the foreclosing entity's status as
mortgagee of their property. Similarly, we must determine whether
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the Wilsons have set forth a claim that the 2009 Assignment was
void and, therefore, that HSBC is not their mortgagee.
2. Have the Wilsons alleged a void or voidable mortgage
assignment?
As we are concerned with standing in this case, we do not
take the Wilsons' conclusory characterization of their allegations
as being about a "void" assignment as gospel. Instead, we review
the materials before us, including the text of the 2009 Assignment,
in light of Massachusetts law to determine whether the Wilsons'
Complaint sets forth allegations that the 2009 Assignment is void,
or merely voidable.
The parties, having taken standing for granted with
respect to the 2009 Assignment, have not presented any extensive
argument with respect to that issue. They have, however, provided
their views on the 2009 Assignment's validity under Massachusetts
law as part of their treatment of the district court's resolution
of the motion to dismiss. While presented for a different purpose,
these arguments nevertheless highlight issues important to the
standing analysis.
The Wilsons insist their Complaint alleges that the 2009
Assignment is void. The basis for this assertion is their claim
that HSBC assigned their mortgage to itself because Strauss
executed it on behalf of HSBC, not MERS. They urge us to find this
is so from the face of the 2009 Assignment itself. HSBC disagrees
entirely, arguing that the 2009 Assignment not only effectively
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transferred the mortgage interest from MERS to HSBC but, moreover,
is unassailable under Massachusetts law. Having considered the
arguments of counsel and in light of the materials before us, we
conclude that the Wilsons' Complaint does not allege that the 2009
Assignment is void. We explain.
The reasoning behind the Wilsons' argument that the 2009
Assignment is void runs as follows: Strauss is an employee of
HSBC; Strauss executed the 2009 Assignment; when Strauss executed
the assignment, she did so as an employee of HSBC; therefore, MERS
never assigned the mortgage to HSBC. The Wilsons' own Complaint,
however, flatly contradicts this position, as it explicitly alleges
that "[t]he March 19, 2009 assignment from MERS to [HSBC] was
executed by Shelene Strauss, as Vice President of MERS." Thus, the
Complaint actually alleges that Strauss wore multiple hats, serving
both as an employee of HSBC and an officer of MERS. Significantly,
the Complaint does not allege that such dual agency violates the
common law or any statute or applicable regulation.6 Accordingly,
the facts set forth in the Complaint actually describe a valid
assignment from MERS to HSBC.
While this defective pleading is likely enough on its own
to doom the Wilsons' first six counts, it is not the only thing we
have to go on. We also have available for consideration the text
6
Indeed, the Wilsons acknowledge the validity of such dual
agency in a footnote to their brief.
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of the 2009 Assignment. According to the Wilsons, "there is no
indication that Ms. Straus[s] executed the assignment with
purported authority from MERS." This statement is simply
incorrect: the 2009 Assignment clearly identifies MERS as the
assignor and HSBC as the assignee.
The 2009 Assignment's signature block, reproduced supra,
brooks no argument as to the identity and roles of the parties
thereto. MERS is listed as the assignor and HSBC the assignee. To
make matters even more clear, Shelene Strauss's signature and
position of vice president appear in the signature block. Notably,
her signature is found underneath printed text stating the
assignment was being made "by" MERS. In sum, the four corners of
the document show in no uncertain terms that Strauss executed it in
her capacity as a vice president of MERS. The Wilsons' claim that
this instrument was executed on behalf of HSBC is wholly without
merit.
Nevertheless, the Wilsons press on, arguing that an
affidavit from HSBC Vice President Jeffrey Davis establishes
Strauss executed the 2009 Assignment on behalf of HSBC, not MERS.7
The affidavit does no such thing. Davis's affidavit, which HSBC
originally filed in the Massachusetts Land Court, states only that
Strauss has been an HSBC employee since January 2005, and that she
7
Although not incorporated into the Complaint, it is
appropriate for us to consider this affidavit as part of our
standing analysis. See McInnis-Misenor, 319 F.3d at 67.
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served as a vice president of HSBC on March 19, 2009. The
affidavit is silent as to the circumstances surrounding the 2009
Assignment's execution. Contrary to what the Wilsons set forth in
their brief, the affidavit is entirely consistent with and does
nothing to disprove the Complaint's allegations that Strauss was a
dual agent of both HSBC and MERS.
Indeed, the most that can be gleaned from the affidavit
and Complaint is that Strauss was an employee or agent of both HSBC
and MERS on March 19, 2009. The Wilsons themselves admit this sort
of arrangement is utilized "many times" in assigning mortgages.
The Wilsons do not argue there is anything illegal or untoward
about Strauss acting in such a dual capacity.
This is just as well. In Culhane we determined the
applicable Massachusetts statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, § 54B,
"neither places restrictions on who may be elected as an officer of
the assignor nor imposes special requirements (say, regular
employment) on who may serve as a vice president of an assignor
corporation." 708 F.3d at 294. Significantly, we concluded that
a remarkably similar mortgage assignment was valid under
Massachusetts law, even though the individual executing the
assignment was appointed "a vice president of MERS . . . purely as
a matter of administrative convenience." Id.
There is no evidence in the record here as to the nature
or length of Strauss's association with MERS. Yet, even had she
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been appointed as a vice president solely for purposes of this
assignment, this would make no difference. We said in Culhane that
while this type of practice "can be disparaged on policy grounds,
such policy judgments are for the legislature, not the courts."
Id. Thus, the Wilsons' allegation that Strauss was also a vice
president of HSBC at the time of this assignment does nothing to
call into question the legality or validity of her executing it on
MERS's behalf.
Moreover, Massachusetts statutory law has something to
say about this mortgage assignment. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, § 54B
("Section 54B") pushes the Wilsons' position, already moribund in
light of our holdings in Culhane and Woods, over the brink.
Section 54B provides, in relevant part, that
[an] assignment of [a] mortgage . . . if
executed before a notary public . . . by a
person purporting to hold the position of
. . . vice president . . . of the entity
holding such mortgage . . . shall be binding
upon such entity.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, § 54B.
Recognizing the danger Section 54B poses to their
position, the Wilsons attempt to get out from under its shadow by
urging us to find it inapplicable to the 2009 Assignment. The
Wilsons begin their struggle by reiterating their contention that
the 2009 Assignment was void at the outset because it was no more
than HSBC's attempt to assign the mortgage to itself. They then
argue simply that Section 54B "does not make an otherwise invalid
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assignment valid" and, therefore, has no effect on the 2009
Assignment. In rebuttal, HSBC turns the Wilsons' argument on its
head and takes the position that Section 54B actually renders the
assignment "unassailable" because Strauss executed it in her
capacity as a vice president of MERS, in accordance with the
statutory language.
Neither party argues Section 54B is ambiguous, and the
statutory language strikes us as quite clear. In Culhane, too, we
found no need to depart from its plain language. 708 F.3d at 293-
94. Furthermore, the Massachusetts Appeals Court recently
addressed Section 54B in two recent unpublished opinions in which
the Appeals Court simply applied the statute as written. See
generally Jones v. Bank of New York, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 1123 (2013)
(finding that because an assistant vice president of Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc. had been authorized by a MERS corporate resolution
to execute assignments on its behalf, she "had authority to assign
[a] mortgage on behalf of MERS as a matter of law pursuant to G.L.
c. 183, § 54B"); Adao v. Federal Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 84 Mass. App.
Ct. 1121 (2013) (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, § 54B) (finding
that a mortgage holder that executes an assignment through a vice
president "is bound by it"). Because Section 54B is "unambiguous,
our function is to enforce the statute according to its terms."
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See Reading Co-Op. Bank v. Suffolk Constr. Co., 464 Mass. 543, 547-
48 (2013).8
As we have said, the 2009 Assignment clearly shows that
Strauss signed it on behalf of MERS as its vice president. The
instrument further demonstrates Strauss executed it in the presence
of a notary. Even the Wilsons admit that Section 54B "say[s] that
once a person with purported authority executes a document in front
of the notary . . . the document can be recorded and is 'binding on
[such] entity.'" See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, § 54B.
Here, the record leaves no doubt that Strauss purported
to execute the 2009 Assignment pursuant to her authority as a vice
president of MERS. The plain language of Section 54B, from all
that appears to us in this record, would render that assignment
binding upon MERS. See Culhane, 704 F.3d at 294 (concluding a
mortgage assignment that "adhered to" Section 54B's requirements
was valid under Massachusetts law). An assignment binding on the
assignor is not, by definition, void. The Wilsons have simply
failed to come forward with anything that indicates to us that
Section 54B should operate any differently here than it did in
Culhane, or that calls the 2009 Assignment's validity into question
under Massachusetts law.
8
The Wilsons have not argued that Section 54B is invalid or
that its operation here would deprive them of any right protected
by the United States Constitution or the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights.
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Finally, the Wilsons' allegations that the 2009
Assignment is "fraudulent" and thus, void, because it was "robo-
signed" are of no moment. The Wilsons have not defined the term or
cited any authority showing it has any legal significance under
Massachusetts law. This Court's own research has found none in
Massachusetts or in our Circuit. Moreover, it does not appear that
other jurisdictions have assigned a single definitive meaning to it
either. Compare Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 735
F.3d 220, 223-24 (5th Cir. 2013) ("'Robo-signing' is the colloquial
term the media, politicians, and consumer advocates have used to
describe an array of questionable practices banks deployed to
perfect their right to foreclose in the wake of the subprime
mortgage crisis, practices that included having bank employees or
third-party contractors: (1) execute and acknowledge transfer
documents in large quantities within a short period of time, often
without the purported assignor's authorization and outside of the
presence of a notary certifying the acknowledgment, and (2) swear
out affidavits confirming the existence of missing pieces of loan
documentation, without personal knowledge and often outside the
presence of the notary."), with Ohio v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 760 F.
Supp. 2d 741, 743 (N.D. Ohio 2011) ("Several national banks have
been accused of using robosigners--loosely defined as bank
employees tasked with rapidly signing large numbers of affidavits
and legal documents asserting the bank's right to foreclose without
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the employees actually checking the documents to ensure their
accuracy--to fraudulently foreclose on homeowners during the recent
financial downturn."), and Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v.
Doe, 433 Md. 685, 688-89 (2013) ("Robo-signing is a term that most
often refers to the process of mass-producing affidavits for
foreclosures without having knowledge of or verifying the facts.")
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We decline to
speculate on the meaning the Wilsons ascribe to the term.
Accordingly, the bare allegation of "robo-signing" does nothing to
undermine the validity of the 2009 Assignment or render Section 54B
inapplicable.
Summing it all up, there is no question that MERS held
the Wilsons' mortgage on March 19, 2009, as the Wilsons have not
challenged its acquisition of the mortgage through the 2004
Assignment. The Complaint and other record materials demonstrate
that the Wilsons have alleged, at most, that the 2009 Assignment is
potentially voidable under Massachusetts common law.9 After
consideration of the entire record, we find that the Wilsons have
not alleged any facts which, if proven, would lead to a finding
that the 2009 Assignment was void. Accordingly, the Wilsons do not
have standing to assert their claims with respect to the 2009
Assignment. Finally, because the record demonstrates the 2009
9
As the record indicates that the 2009 Assignment complies
with Section 54B, it is likely that it is valid and binding upon
MERS, which would foreclose even the claim that it is voidable.
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Assignment is not void, the 2011 Assignment is superfluous and of
no legal effect or significance with respect to this case.10 We
thus affirm the district court's dismissal of Counts I through VI.
C. Promissory Estoppel (Count VII)
Count VII alleges promissory estoppel against HSBC.
Massachusetts law is clear with respect to the elements of that
claim. A plaintiff must allege and prove "(1) a representation
intended to induce reliance on the part of a person to whom the
representation is made; (2) an act or omission by that person in
reasonable reliance on the representation; and (3) detriment as a
consequence of the act or omission." Sullivan v. Chief Justice for
Admin. & Mgmt. of Trial Court, 448 Mass. 15, 27-28 (2006). The
district court dismissed this count in accordance with Rule
12(b)(6) after determining the Wilsons "fail[ed] to proffer even
the basic elements of promissory estoppel, most notably some sort
of promise and detrimental reliance."11 On appeal, the Wilsons
10
The Wilsons intimate in their brief that the 2011 Assignment
can only be explained by HSBC's recognition that the 2009
Assignment was invalid, as they note that the 2011 Assignment does
not indicate that it "is confirmatory in any respect." However, it
seems reasonably clear to this Court that the 2011 Assignment was
made as a prophylactic "belt and suspenders" response to the 2011
Consent Order and was intended to assure that HSBC had acquired
good title by curing any potential defect in the 2009 Assignment.
11
The court also noted that the Wilsons were attempting to
ground their cause of action in an agreement between HSBC and the
government, rendering the Wilsons incidental beneficiaries who do
not have standing to sue for an alleged breach of that agreement.
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contend they have sufficiently set forth the elements of promissory
estoppel.
First, the Wilsons argue that HSBC did not comply with
the requirements contained within the Statutory Power of Sale with
respect to their mortgage. In their view, HSBC violated those
terms when it attempted to foreclose without actually holding the
mortgage. This argument may be quickly disposed of, as it clearly
depends entirely on the supposition that the 2009 Assignment is
void. Having already considered and rejected this proposition, the
argument is similarly unavailing here.
The Wilsons' remaining argument, as set forth in their
brief, is that HSBC represented to them it would review their
application for a mortgage modification in accordance with "HAMP-
like procedures," but instead offered them a "non-HAMP-like
modification requiring a 40% downpayment [sic]." Rather than
alleging an explicit promise or representation from HSBC, the
Complaint brings up the 2011 Consent Order, claiming it is
"[i]mplicit in" the Order that HSBC would "review loan modification
applications in accordance with HAMP-like procedures," and that a
40% down payment is "not required under HAMP procedures."12 The
12
The Wilsons also allege that HSBC violated HAMP by failing
to inform them of any action taken with respect to their loan
modification application. This allegation is curious in light of
their claim that HSBC is requiring a 40% down payment as a
condition of any modification. Regardless, we fail to see how this
allegation lends any support to the Wilsons' averment that Count
VII adequately alleges the elements of promissory estoppel.
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Wilsons' ultimate position appears to be that the Consent Order is
a promise from HSBC to the government, which is functionally
equivalent to a direct promise from HSBC to them. Under this
logic, their argument must be that HSBC is bound to extend a loan
modification offer that complies with HAMP requirements and is
estopped from requiring a 40% down payment as a precondition for
loan modification.13
For its part, HSBC urges us to uphold the district
court's dismissal of Count VII. In its view, the Wilsons' claim
for promissory estoppel is based upon either the Consent Order, the
procedures of HAMP itself, or both. With respect to the Consent
Order, HSBC contends it may not serve as the basis for a promissory
estoppel claim because the Order, by its very terms, does not
confer "any benefit or any legal or equitable right, remedy or
claim" upon any person or entity that is not a party thereto. As
for the Wilsons' attempt to rely on HAMP, HSBC argues first that
there is nothing in the Complaint to indicate whether the Wilsons'
loan is subject to HAMP at all and, further, that homeowners do not
13
The Wilsons' brief also reiterates allegations from one of
their earlier counts addressing the 2009 Assignment which alleges
HSBC agreed to "conduct the foreclosure sale on the terms of the
Power of Sale in the mortgage" and that "[i]mplict in this contract
is an agreement by [HSBC] that all documents recorded by [HSBC]
relative to this [m]ortgage shall be free from fraud and shall be
reliable." These allegations have nothing to do with and are
irrelevant to the Wilsons' request for a loan modification in 2012.
They relate only to the Wilsons' claims about the 2009 Assignment,
which we have already determined the Wilsons lack standing to
pursue.
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have a private cause of action under HAMP.14 At bottom, HSBC posits
that the Complaint "simply fails to identify any promise made by
[HSBC] to the [Wilsons] relative to the [Wilsons'] efforts to
obtain a loan modification" and, therefore, they have failed to set
forth a claim for promissory estoppel.
Our review of the Complaint shows that none of the
allegations contain even the barest hint that HSBC made any sort of
promise or representation to the Wilsons as to how it would handle
their application for a loan modification. This is fatal to the
Wilsons' promissory estoppel claim unless they are able to utilize
HSBC's agreement with the government as set forth in the Consent
Order as a stand-in for a direct representation made to them by
HSBC. The Wilsons do not cite any authority--and we can find
none--in support of this novel proposition. Accordingly, we need
not discuss the substance of the Consent Order beyond noting that
the Wilsons are not a party to it. Put simply, "borrowers are not
third-party beneficiaries of agreements between mortgage lenders
and the government." MacKenzie v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 738 F.3d
486, 491 (1st Cir. 2013) (adopting this reasoning from the
Massachusetts District Court). Therefore, the Wilsons may not
14
We need not and do not consider whether HAMP imposes any
requirements with respect to the Wilsons' mortgage because the
Wilsons have not raised or argued this issue themselves. Any such
potential argument, therefore, has been waived.
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utilize the Consent Order to make up for the absence of any promise
or representation to them by HSBC.
In the absence of any allegation of a promise or
representation to them by HSBC, the Wilsons' Complaint fails to set
forth a claim for promissory estoppel. The district court did not
err in dismissing Count VII.
D. Injunctive Relief (Count VIII)
Count VIII is styled as a request for injunctive relief.
The district court dismissed this count as well, characterizing it
as "merely a remedial measure disguised as a cause of action which
would only be relevant if this Court held in Plaintiffs' favor on
any of the previous counts enumerated herein." On appeal, the
Wilsons make only a cursory argument that the count should be
reinstated along with the rest of the complaint, as the request for
injunctive relief flows from the allegations therein. It is enough
to say that we agree wholeheartedly with the district court's
rationale for dismissal. As we uphold the dismissal of the first
seven counts, it inevitably follows that the Wilsons are not
entitled to an injunction under any circumstances, and the district
court correctly dismissed this count.
CONCLUSION
Under Massachusetts law, homeowners in the Wilsons'
position only have standing to challenge a prior assignment of
their mortgage on the limited grounds that the assignment was void.
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After careful review, we conclude the Wilsons have not set forth
any potentially meritorious claim that the 2009 Assignment is void.
Indeed, everything the Wilsons have put before us gives us no
reason to question the validity of the 2009 mortgage transfer from
MERS to HSBC. We also conclude that the Wilsons' Complaint fails
to set out a claim for promissory estoppel, and that their claim
for injunctive relief fails as well.
Although the Wilsons set forth troubling allegations that
HSBC did not follow proper foreclosure procedures even after entry
of the Consent Order and the 2011 Assignment, we have no cause to
conduct an inquiry into those activities within the context of this
case. Further, if the Wilsons have complaints about the mortgage
assignment procedures used here, any requests for redress must be
directed to the Legislature.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's dismissal
of the Wilsons' Complaint is affirmed.
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