Soto-Cintrón Ex Rel. A.S.M. v. United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 17-1180
EDUARDO SOTO-CINTRÓN,
on his own behalf and on behalf of his minor son A.S.M.;
A.S.M., Minor,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
WINDY MARRERO-COLÓN,
solely on behalf of her minor son A.S.M.,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Lipez and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
Jorge Martínez-Luciano, with whom Emil Rodríguez-Escudero was
on brief, for appellants.
Mainon A. Schwartz, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and
Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney, Acting Chief,
Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.
August 20, 2018
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Eduardo Soto-Cintrón
and his 17-year-old son went to a post office in Coto Laurel,
Puerto Rico to pick up some mail. While Soto-Cintrón waited in
his red Ford F-150 truck, his son retrieved some envelopes from
the post office and returned to his father's vehicle. As the two
pulled out of the parking lot, they were stopped by a number of
federal law enforcement agents with guns drawn. Soto-Cintrón was
removed from his vehicle and handcuffed, and he and his son were
detained for up to twenty minutes.
The agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives ("ATF") had stopped the wrong people. Once they
realized their mistake, the agents arrested the person who had
received the illegal shipment of firearms, and released Soto-
Cintrón and his son. Soto-Cintrón later filed a claim against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") for false
imprisonment. The district court granted summary judgment to the
government, and Soto-Cintrón appealed. Though our analysis of
Soto-Cintrón's FTCA claim differs from the district court's, we
ultimately reach the same conclusion, and affirm.
I.
In May 2013, the United States Postal Inspection Service
("USPIS") intercepted a package sent from Orlando, Florida to
Puerto Rico. Suspecting that the package contained six illegal
Glock semi-automatic pistols, USPIS personnel requested the
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assistance of the ATF to set up a controlled delivery. The
agencies devised a plan to leave a notice at the addressee's
residence informing him that he could claim the package at the
U.S. Post Office in Coto Laurel. Pursuant to the plan, USPIS
personnel would assume the primary surveillance positions inside
the post office and in the parking lot, while ATF agents would be
posted around the perimeter of the parking lot. Whoever showed up
to collect the package would be arrested, as would anyone else
linked to the receipt of the package.
During the operation, a USPIS inspector used radio
communication to announce the separate arrival of two vehicles to
the post office parking lot. First, the inspector identified a
red Ford F-150 which turned out to be Soto-Cintrón's. The
inspector stated that the occupants of the vehicle remained seated
for some amount of time before the younger occupant went into the
post office. Second, the inspector announced the arrival of a
white Ford F-150 which, as it turned out, was driven by the
suspect.
While both vehicles were still in the parking lot, the
USPIS inspector broadcasted that the package had been delivered to
the suspect. Then, without identifying which vehicle the suspect
placed the package in, the radio operator stated that the red Ford
F-150 -- belonging to Soto-Cintrón -- was leaving the parking lot.
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One of the ATF agents on the receiving end of these radio
communications was Special Agent Vladimir González. He was
stationed on an access road at the perimeter of the parking lot in
a vehicle driven by ATF Task Force Officer Jose Fajardo, and also
occupied by Special Agent Raul Peña-López. When Special Agent
González heard the radio transmissions he could not discern which
truck contained the suspicious package. After unsuccessfully
attempting to obtain clarification from a USPIS inspector, he made
the decision to stop the red truck driven by Soto-Cintrón before
it could leave the parking lot. Special Agent González instructed
Officer Fajardo to block the parking lot exit with his vehicle,
and the three agents approached Soto-Cintrón's truck with guns
drawn, identifying themselves as police and ordering Soto-Cintrón
and his son to put their hands up.
Soto-Cintrón and his son had the windows rolled up and
the air conditioning and radio turned on, so they could not hear
the agents' commands. One of the officers pulled Soto-Cintrón out
of his vehicle, handcuffed him, and placed him face down on the
pavement. His son was also handcuffed and placed next to him, but
was soon uncuffed and allowed to sit on the ground away from the
vehicle. The agents questioned Soto-Cintrón about the package and
performed a visual inspection of his truck. Soto-Cintrón, of
course, denied any knowledge of the illegal firearms, and the
agents' visual inspection did not reveal the suspicious package.
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At some point during Soto-Cintrón's detention, the
agents learned that the actual suspect -- the person in the white
truck -- had been apprehended, and that Soto-Cintrón and his son
were not involved in the illegal firearms delivery. The agents
accordingly released Soto-Cintrón and his son. Their detention
lasted approximately fifteen to twenty minutes.
Based on this incident, Soto-Cintrón sued the United
States in February 2015.1 The complaint alleges that the ATF
agents committed false imprisonment under Puerto Rico law and that
the United States is liable for the tort under the FTCA. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 2674, 2680(h).2 Following a period of discovery in which
Soto-Cintrón chose not to conduct any depositions, the government
moved for summary judgment, arguing primarily that Soto-Cintrón's
detention constituted a Terry stop based on the ATF agents'
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968). The district court granted the government's motion,
explaining that Puerto Rico would not impose tort liability for
1 More specifically, Soto-Cintrón sued on his own behalf and
on behalf of his minor son, and the minor's mother, Windy Marrero-
Colón, also sued on her son's behalf. We refer to Soto-Cintrón as
the sole plaintiff for simplicity.
2 The complaint also asserts a claim for assault under Puerto
Rico law, but that claim is dependent on the success of Soto-
Cintrón's false imprisonment claim. Because we affirm the district
court's grant of summary judgment to the government on the false
imprisonment claim, we do not need to separately address the
assault claim. That claim necessarily fails as well.
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false imprisonment where an officer conducts a stop based on his
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See id. at 30.
On appeal, Soto-Cintrón contends that the court erred by
importing Terry's reasonable suspicion standard into Puerto Rico
tort law. He argues that Puerto Rico requires officers to meet a
more demanding "reasonable cause" standard, which both parties
treat as interchangeable with the familiar probable cause
standard. Abandoning its Terry argument,3 the government counters
that the ATF agents satisfied Puerto Rico's reasonable (or
probable) cause standard. Alternatively, it argues that even if
the agents did not have probable cause to arrest, Puerto Rico would
not impose liability for false imprisonment because they would be
entitled to qualified immunity if plaintiffs had filed a Bivens
claim. We agree with the government's alternative argument, and
affirm.
3
At oral argument, the government denied that it had
abandoned its Terry theory, asserting instead that it had merely
shifted focus to its other positions. We find this argument
untenable. The government's response brief repeatedly refers to
the appropriate standard for false imprisonment under Puerto Rico
law as being "reasonable cause," and does not even cite to Terry.
It is axiomatic that arguments not developed on appeal are
abandoned. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.
1990).
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II.
A. The FTCA and Puerto Rico False Imprisonment Legal
Standards
The FTCA provides "a limited congressional waiver of the
sovereign immunity of the United States for tortious acts and
omissions committed by federal employees acting within the scope
of their employment." Díaz-Nieves v. United States, 858 F.3d 678,
683 (1st Cir. 2017). In an amendment to the FTCA, Congress
expressly waived sovereign immunity for false imprisonment when
the tort is committed by a "law enforcement officer[] of the United
States Government." Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (1974)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)); see also Solis-Alarcón v. United
States, 662 F.3d 577, 583 (1st Cir. 2011). The government's
liability under the FTCA is coextensive with that of "a private
individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674. We look
to local law to determine whether the government is liable for its
agents' allegedly tortious conduct. See Díaz-Nieves, 858 F.3d at
683; 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). "In this case, then, we must extract
the substantive rules of decision from Puerto Rico law." Calderón-
Ortega v. United States, 753 F.3d 250, 252 (1st Cir. 2014).
Puerto Rico imposes liability for false imprisonment
when "[a] person, whether or not a law enforcement officer,"
tortiously or negligently "detain[s] or cause[s] the unlawful
detention of another person." Ayala v. San Juan Racing Corp., 12
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P.R. Offic. Trans. 1012, 1021 (P.R. 1982); see also P.R. Laws Ann.
tit. 31, § 5141 (imposing liability for fault or negligence that
causes injury). To prevail on a false imprisonment claim, "it is
essential that the individual performing the arrest lack
reasonable cause for believing that the arrestee committed a
felony." Díaz-Nieves, 858 F.3d at 684. This is so because Puerto
Rico Criminal Procedure Rule 11 authorizes law enforcement
officers to make warrantless arrests where they have "reasonable
cause" to suspect that a person committed a felony. P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 34a, Ap. II, § 11(c).
"[A]side from the requirements of legality contained in
[Rule 11]," the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has explained that "we
should resort to the concept of the reasonable man" to assess
liability for false imprisonment. Ayala, 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. at
1024.
The reasonableness of the actions of a person
sued in a civil action for damages for an
alleged unlawful detention of the plaintiff,
and his liability for them, should be weighed
together with the following factors: the
defendant's person, age, schooling, moral
condition, and prior experience; the person,
age, appearance and conduct of the detained
person; knowledge that defendant had, on the
day of the events, about the detained person
and those people that had relations with him,
suspicious conduct, including the seriousness
of the crime it could imply, the place,
occasion, and frequency of said conduct. This
is in no way intended as an exhaustive list.
Each case has its own characteristics, which
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must be taken into account when determining
whether or not there was a false arrest.
Id. at 1025. Put another way, Puerto Rico imposes liability for
false imprisonment where, considering all the circumstances, an
arresting officer "not only makes a mistake" but also "incurs
negligence." Valle v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 157 D.P.R. 1,
24 (P.R. 2002) (emphases omitted)).
We have interpreted this standard as being consistent
with federal qualified immunity principles -- a doctrine that
allows room for officers' "reasonable mistakes," Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001), and protects from liability "all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,"
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). In Solis-Alarcón,
officers from the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") had reason to
believe that a suspect in a major drug ring resided at the
plaintiffs' house. 662 F.3d at 579. The DEA obtained an arrest
warrant for the suspect and, wielding guns, entered the house
without the plaintiffs' consent. Id. The officers then allegedly
detained the plaintiffs while they searched the house for 15-20
minutes. Id. at 580. They did not find the suspect at the house.
Id.
Two years later, the plaintiffs brought a Bivens claim
against the DEA agents, alleging that the search violated the
Fourth Amendment, and a Puerto Rico false imprisonment FTCA claim
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against the United States. Id.; see also Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971)
(recognizing a private right of action against federal agents for
violation of the Fourth Amendment). The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants on both claims, and the
plaintiffs appealed. Solis-Alarcón, 662 F.3d at 580.
We first held that the DEA agents were entitled to
qualified immunity on the plaintiffs' Bivens claim. Under the
Fourth Amendment, officers executing an arrest warrant at a
residence must have a "reasonable belief that the target named in
the arrest warrant resides at the dwelling in question and will be
present at the time of the entry." Id. Given the information
available to the agents at the time, we concluded that even if
their "judgment" that the suspect resided at the plaintiffs' house
was "unreasonable, it was not 'manifestly unreasonable.'" Id. at
582 (quoting Ringuette v. City of Fall River, 146 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 1998)). Hence, "if there was error at all . . . it was not
so egregious as to defeat qualified immunity." Id.Having performed this qualified immunity analysis in the
Bivens context, we turned to the plaintiffs' false imprisonment
FTCA claim against the United States. We reasoned that the scope
of liability under Puerto Rico's false imprisonment tort mirrored
the federal qualified immunity principles that applied to
individual officers in a Bivens case.
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Puerto Rico imposes liability for fault or
negligence that causes injury, but protecting
law enforcement agents for reasonable mistakes
is common, and in at least two decisions, this
court assumed that Puerto Rico tort law would
not impose personal liability for mistaken
arrests where the officers would be protected
in Bivens claims by qualified immunity.
Id. at 583 (internal citations omitted) (referencing Abreu–Guzmán
v. Ford, 241 F.3d 69, 75-76 (1st Cir. 2001) and Rodriguez v. United
States, 54 F.3d 41, 45-47 (1st Cir. 1995)). We further explained
that Puerto Rico recognizes the need to balance "the right to
compensation of a citizen who is injured by the wrongful or
negligent acts of a state officer," against "the duty of government
authorities to act vigorously in the investigation of criminal
causes." Id. (quoting Valle, 157 D.P.R. at 25). This was the
same "view that animates federal qualified immunity doctrine."
Id.
Given the parallel between Puerto Rico's false
imprisonment tort and federal qualified immunity principles, we
held that the DEA agents who were entitled to qualified immunity
on the Bivens claim would not be subject to liability for false
imprisonment under Puerto Rico law. And, because the agents did
not commit a tort, the United States was not liable for its agents'
actions under the FTCA.4
4The Solis-Alarcón court also noted that if Puerto Rico's
false imprisonment jurisprudence had not mirrored qualified
immunity principles, "a significant question might arise whether
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B. Applying the Puerto Rico Law of False Imprisonment
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Soto-
Cintrón, the ATF agents' actions reflect the type of reasonable
mistake for which Puerto Rico would not impose liability. In
reaching this conclusion, we apply the reasonableness approach
detailed by the Ayala court, focusing on the "knowledge that
defendant had . . . about the detained person and those people
that had relations with him, suspicious conduct, including the
seriousness of the crime it could imply," as well as the other
factors identified there. Ayala, 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 1025.
We also remain mindful of our precedent holding that the scope of
liability under Puerto Rico false imprisonment mirrors liability
under qualified immunity principles. See Solis-Alarcón, 662 F.3d
at 583; Abreu–Guzmán, 241 F.3d at 75-76.
Given that Special Agent González initiated Soto-
Cintrón's arrest, we focus our analysis on his knowledge at the
any local court could impose damage liability on federal officers
where they would be exempt in a federal lawsuit and whether
Congress under the FTCA would expect the federal government to
shoulder such liability." Id. at 583-84. Compare Norton v. United
States, 581 F.2d 390, 393 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that the
government in an FTCA case is entitled to assert defenses available
to its agents individually), with Castro v. United States, 34 F.3d
106, 111 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that "qualified immunity will not
immunize the United States from liability" in an FTCA case). The
Solis-Alarcón court did not need to answer this "significant
question," and neither do we. 662 F.3d at 583; cf. Guerra v.
Sutton, 783 F.2d 1371, 1375-76 (9th Cir. 1986) (declining to decide
whether qualified immunity "would . . . preclude recovery under
the [FTCA]").
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time of that decision. At that point, the radio operator had
announced that the suspect had left the post office with a package
containing six illegal firearms and then announced that the red
truck was leaving the parking lot. The temporal proximity of these
announcements led González to believe that the suspect -- who
González knew "matched the description of the driver of the white
Ford F-150" -- had placed the firearms in the red truck. He could
"not think of any other reason why the USPIS inspector would have
announced the departure of the red Ford F-150," and, from his
experience, it was common for a person picking up an illegal
package to hand it off to someone else at the post office to
minimize the risk of being caught. Still, he attempted to obtain
clarification from USPIS personnel about whether the firearms were
in the white truck or the red truck, but his efforts were
unsuccessful.
Despite this uncertainty, Special Agent González had to
make a decision. On the one hand, if he let Soto-Cintrón's truck
leave the parking lot, he risked letting six illegal firearms make
their way into the community. On the other, if he stopped the
truck, he risked detaining two innocent persons. Special Agent
González chose to stop the truck. He directed Officer Fajardo to
block the parking lot exit with his vehicle, and González, Fajardo,
and Special Agent Peña-López initiated the arrest. They released
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Soto-Cintrón and his son once it became clear that the two were
not involved in the firearms delivery.
At worst, these facts show a team of agents making a
reasonable mistake -- in the heat of a dangerous moment -- about
the existence of the reasonable cause necessary to arrest Soto-
Cintrón and his son. Indeed, "it is reasonable for police to move
quickly if delay 'would gravely endanger their lives or the lives
of others,'" even if when "judged with the benefit of hindsight,
the officers may have made 'some mistakes.'" City & Cnty. of S.F.,
Cal. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775 (2015) (applying qualified
immunity) (quoting Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 298-99 (1967) and Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530,
536 (2014)). As we have explained, Puerto Rico does not impose
tort liability for such mistakes. See Solis-Alarcón, 662 F.3d at
583 (concluding that Puerto Rico's position is consistent with the
"common" approach of "protecting law enforcement agents for
reasonable mistakes"); Abreu–Guzmán, 241 F.3d at 75-76 (holding
that agents' "objectively reasonable belief that there was
probable cause . . . extinguishe[d] any basis for finding liability
for . . . false imprisonment" under Puerto Rico law).
Soto-Cintrón's argument to the contrary is unavailing.
He contends that it could not have been reasonable for the ATF
agents to make the arrest because: (1) Special Agent González "had
eyes on" Soto-Cintrón and his son and thus knew that the son
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returned from the post office with only a few envelopes in hand;
and (2) that it would be unreasonable to conclude that six Glock
pistols could fit in the envelopes.
Even if we were to infer that Special Agent González
personally observed Soto-Cintrón's son, it would not undermine his
basis for stopping Soto-Cintrón's truck. The radio operator told
González that "the package had been delivered to the suspect who
was then exiting the Post Office" and González knew that the
suspect "matched the description of the driver of the white Ford
F-150." Thus, González's basis for stopping Soto-Cintrón's truck
was not that Soto-Cintrón's son had retrieved the package from the
post office and placed it in his father's truck. González believed
that the driver of the white truck was the one who received the
package. His suspicion -- based on the radio operator's
communications regarding the red truck's exit from the parking lot
-- was that the driver of the white truck had placed the package
in Soto-Cintrón's truck. González's supposed knowledge that Soto-
Cintrón's son returned from the post office carrying only envelopes
is irrelevant to the reasonableness of this suspicion.
In sum, when the USPIS inspector's radio communications
caused confusion as to the whereabouts of the firearms,5 González
5Soto-Cintrón does not allege that the USPIS radio operator's
actions created any tort liability for the United States under
Puerto Rico law.
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made the decision to prevent Soto-Cintrón and his son from leaving
the parking lot. That reasonable decision would not expose the
arresting agents to liability for Puerto Rico false imprisonment,
and, given the vicarious liability premise of the FTCA, it does
not expose the United States to liability.
III.
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the district
court's judgment.
So ordered.
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