United States v. Soto-Mateo

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 13-2031
13-2088
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
LENNY FERNANDO SOTO-MATEO,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Kayatta, Selya and Dyk*,
Circuit Judges.
Eduardo Masferrer, with whom Masferrer & Associates, P.C. was
on brief, for appellant.
Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
August 26, 2015
* Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
SELYA, Circuit Judge. This is a criminal case in which
the appellant is challenging his conviction for illegal reentry
into the United States as a previously removed alien. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a). The appeal turns on the validity of the underlying
order of removal. The district court found that the appellant
could not satisfy the criteria for mounting a collateral attack on
that order and, thus, denied the appellant's motion to dismiss the
indictment. The appellant now seeks to reverse the denial of his
motion. After careful consideration, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant-appellant Lenny Fernando Soto-Mateo, a citizen
of the Dominican Republic, was admitted to the United States as a
lawful permanent resident in 2000 at age 16. Some seven years
later, a federal grand jury sitting in the District of
Massachusetts charged the appellant with aggravated identity
theft, see 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, making false statements in a passport
application, see id. § 1542, and making a false claim of
citizenship, see id. § 911. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced
to serve a total of 25 months in prison.
In due course, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
instituted removal proceedings against the appellant on the ground
that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(G); see also id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (authorizing
removal of "[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony").
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The appellant received a notice concerning bond and custody
indicating that he was subject to mandatory detention as a result
of his conviction for an aggravated felony. A second custody
notice advised him that he could "not request a review of [the
custody] determination . . . because the Immigration and
Nationality Act prohibit[ed] [his] release from custody." See id.
§ 1226(c)(1)(B) (mandating detention of aliens deportable under
id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)).
The appellant acknowledged receipt of the removal and
custody papers. He also completed a form entitled "Record of Sworn
Statement," which began with a statement of rights printed in both
English and Spanish. The enumerated rights included the right to
consult an attorney. The form listed a number of questions aimed
at determining the appellant's nationality, immigration status,
and eligibility for asylum. The appellant expressly waived his
right to a lawyer and answered all of the questions in writing.
To a question asking whether he was willing to sign a stipulated
request for removal and give up the right to appear before an
immigration judge (IJ) before being removed, he answered in the
affirmative.
Given his acknowledged willingness to stipulate to his
removal, DHS provided the appellant with a form entitled
"Stipulated Request for Order of Removal and Waiver of Hearing"
(the Stipulation). See id. § 1229a(d); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b).
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The Stipulation was printed in both English and Spanish. By
signing it, the appellant conceded removability based on the
charges contained in the removal papers, confirmed that he was not
applying for any form of relief from removal, and waived his right
to a hearing before an IJ. At the same time, he "waive[d] [his]
right to appeal the written decision for [his] removal." The
Stipulation concluded with a declaration that the appellant "fully
understand[s] [the Stipulation's] consequences" and "unequivocally
state[s] that [he has] submitted this document voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently."
On March 13, 2009, an IJ ordered the appellant removed.
A few days later, the appellant wrote to an immigration officer
whom he had met while in detention, imploring the officer to "try
to speed up the process so I can leave soon to join my family."
On April 17, 2009, the removal process was completed: the appellant
departed Atlanta on a flight bound for the Dominican Republic.
Only a few months passed before a Border Patrol agent
apprehended the appellant at a bus station in Louisiana. In short
order, a federal grand jury sitting in the Western District of
Louisiana charged the appellant with illegal reentry into the
United States by a previously removed alien. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a), (b)(1). A guilty plea and a 15-month incarcerative
sentence followed.
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In January of 2011, the appellant was again removed to
the Dominican Republic.1 Undeterred, the appellant again entered
the United States illegally and, in February of 2012, was
apprehended in Massachusetts. The government once more charged
him with illegal reentry. This time, the appellant moved to
dismiss the indictment on the ground that his 2009 removal as an
aggravated felon could not form the predicate for an illegal
reentry charge since none of his underlying convictions was
consistent with the aggravated felony designation. Specifically,
he posited that aggravated identity theft was not a "theft offense"
within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) because it did
not categorically involve a nonconsensual taking of a person's
means of identification. See United States v. Ozuna-Cabrera, 663
F.3d 496, 500-01 (1st Cir. 2011).
The district court refused to dismiss the indictment.
See United States v. Soto-Mateo, 948 F. Supp. 2d 77, 80 (D. Mass.
2013). It ruled that the appellant had not exhausted his
administrative remedies and, thus, could not collaterally attack
1 The government does not claim that the 2011 removal
constitutes an independent predicate for the offense of
conviction. Presumably, the government has refrained from such a
claim because invalidity of the 2009 removal would undermine the
2011 removal. After all, the 2011 removal was undertaken pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1326 — a statute that applies only to an alien who
"has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion,
deportation, or removal is outstanding . . . ."
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the underlying removal order. See id. The appellant thereafter
entered a conditional guilty plea, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2),
preserving the right to appeal the district court's denial of his
motion to dismiss. Following the imposition of a 21-month term of
immurement, these appeals ensued.2
II. ANALYSIS
A defendant facing a charge of illegal reentry after
removal may, under some circumstances, challenge the validity of
the underlying order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d); United
States v. Luna, 436 F.3d 312, 317 (1st Cir. 2006). To wage such
a collateral attack, he must demonstrate that
(1) [he] exhausted any administrative remedies
that may have been available to seek relief
against the order;
(2) the deportation proceedings at which the
order was issued improperly deprived [him] of
the opportunity for judicial review; and
(3) the entry of the order was fundamentally
unfair.
8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). In reviewing a district court's determination
as to whether a particular defendant has satisfied these
requirements, we assay the district court's subsidiary factual
2The appellant initially filed a timely notice of appeal,
mistakenly stating an intent to challenge his sentence. One day
after the filing deadline had passed, see Fed. R. App. P.
4(b)(1)(A)(i), he filed — and the district court allowed — an
unopposed motion to file a corrected notice of appeal challenging
the denial of the motion to dismiss. We consolidated these two
appeals for briefing and argument.
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determinations for clear error, see United States v. DeLeon, 444
F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 2006), and afford plenary review to its
conclusions of law, see Luna, 436 F.3d at 316. Moreover, when
"performing the collateral attack analysis under § 1326(d), [an
inquiring] court ordinarily should address the initial test of
exhaustion of administrative remedies before going on to the other
two tests." DeLeon, 444 F.3d at 45. The elements of section
1326(d) are conjunctive, and an appellant must satisfy all of those
elements in order to prevail on a collateral challenge to his
removal order. See Luna, 436 F.3d at 317.
The appellant stumbles at the first step. He concedes
that he did not exhaust available administrative remedies but,
rather, waived his right to appeal the IJ's removal order to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). A failure to take such an
available administrative appeal is a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies within the meaning of section 1326(d).
See DeLeon, 444 F.3d at 50 & n.7. The appellant nonetheless
strives to circumvent this failure by asserting that his waiver
was neither knowing nor intelligent and, accordingly, he should be
excused from the exhaustion requirement.
Several courts have recognized an exception to the
exhaustion requirement for cases in which the alien's waiver of
administrative review was not knowing and intelligent. See, e.g.,
Richardson v. United States, 558 F.3d 216, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2009);
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United States v. Sosa, 387 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2004); United
States v. Martinez-Rocha, 337 F.3d 566, 569 (6th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Muro-Inclan, 249 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001); see
also United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 840 (1987)
(holding, prior to enactment of section 1326(d), that a person
charged with illegal reentry has a constitutional right to
collaterally attack the underlying removal order when a due process
violation in a removal proceeding "amount[s] to a complete
deprivation of judicial review"). We have reserved judgment on
whether to recognize such an exception, see DeLeon, 444 F.3d at
51, and it is unnecessary for us to revisit that reservation today.
Assuming without deciding that due process concerns sometimes may
warrant an exception to the statutory exhaustion requirement, the
appellant's case would not qualify for such an exception. We
explain briefly.
To begin, section 1326(d) places the burden on the
defendant to "demonstrate[]" an entitlement to relief.
Richardson, 558 F.3d at 222 & n.5; see also Luna, 436 F.3d at 317("[A] defendant must satisfy all of [the statutory elements] to
successfully attack his removal order."). We think it follows
that a defendant bears the burden of proving his eligibility for
any exception to the statutory requirements. See United States v.
Baptist, 759 F.3d 690, 694-95 (7th Cir. 2014); Richardson, 558
F.3d at 222; United States v. Rangel de Aguilar, 308 F.3d 1134,
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1137 (10th Cir. 2002).3 We hold, therefore, that — at least where,
as here, the government produces a written and signed waiver of
rights — the defendant must carry the burden of showing that the
waiver was infirm.
The appellant has not come close to carrying this burden.
He was expressly informed, in writing and in a language he
understands, about his right to appeal; and he unequivocally
relinquished that right by signing the Stipulation.4 By the same
token, he freely accepted the proposition that the IJ's decision
would be "a final disposition of the[] removal proceedings." He
does not claim illiteracy, nor does he limn any plausible basis
for believing that he was pressured into surrendering his rights.
To the precise contrary, his unsolicited letter to the immigration
officer attests to his eagerness to "speed up the process" and be
deported as quickly as possible. On this record, then, the
district court had ample support for its conclusion that the
appellant's written waiver of the right to appeal his removal order
was knowing and intelligent. See Soto-Mateo, 948 F. Supp. 2d at
3At least one court has allocated the burden of proof
differently. See United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 680 (9th
Cir. 2010). We discuss the Ramos case in more detail infra.
4In this regard, we note that the appellant did not proffer
any evidence to the district court, in the form of an affidavit or
otherwise, suggesting that he did not fully understand either the
Stipulation or the attendant waiver of appeal.
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80; see also DeLeon, 444 F.3d at 51; Martinez-Rocha, 337 F.3d at
569.
The fact that the appellant was not represented by
counsel during the removal proceedings does not, without more,
alter this calculus. The statute providing for stipulated removal
explicitly contemplates that aliens may act pro se. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(d). So, too, the relevant regulations provide that an IJ
may enter a stipulated order of removal against an unrepresented
alien "without a hearing and in the absence of the parties," as
long as the IJ "determine[s] that the alien's waiver is voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b). In the case at
hand, the IJ made just such a determination, consistent with the
appellant's affirmation that he fully understood the consequences
of the Stipulation and had signed it "voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently."
The appellant demurs, relying chiefly on the Ninth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672 (9th
Cir. 2010). See supra note 3. In that case, the Ninth Circuit
excused the exhaustion requirement for an alien who had acted pro
se in stipulated removal proceedings. See 623 F.3d at 682. The
appellant reads Ramos through rose-colored glasses, suggesting
that the case stands for the proposition that an IJ's failure to
hold a hearing and personally to inform an unrepresented alien of
the full compendium of his rights is itself a due process
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violation. But that aspect of Ramos stems from the Ninth Circuit's
assignment of the burden of proof to the government, which required
the government to establish by "'clear and convincing evidence'
that [the appellant] received adequate advisement of the
consequences of his waiver of appeal." See id. at 681 (quoting
United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir.
2004)). This is not where the burden of proof belongs. See supra
at 8-9 (citing cases). Where, as here, the government has produced
a written and signed waiver, the Ninth Circuit's allocation of the
burden of proof is a minority view and untenable.5
At any rate, Ramos is distinguishable. The decision
there turned less on the lack of an attorney and more on the lack
of a "competent translation" of the waiver. Ramos, 623 F.3d at
680. The alien (a Spanish speaker) had been asked to sign a
removal stipulation by an immigration officer who spoke only
"broken" Spanish, and that officer could not confirm that the alien
understood what he was signing. Id. at 681.
The Ramos court's determination that "[t]he government bears
5
the burden of proving valid waiver in a collateral attack of the
underlying removal proceedings," 623 F.3d at 680, appears to be
based on a misreading of United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d
751 (9th Cir. 1993). While the Lopez-Vasquez court allocated the
burden of proof to the government, the government proffered no
written, signed waiver. Instead, the appellant, along with a
number of other aliens, had silently "waived" his right to appeal
at a group hearing. Id. at 754-55.
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Here, in contrast, there was no language barrier and the
appellant plainly knew what he was doing. What is more, the
trappings of fundamental fairness were present in abundance. The
record indicates that the appellant was twice informed, in his
native language, of his right to retain an attorney and was
provided a list of organizations offering free legal assistance.
He nonetheless elected to go it alone and proceed pro se. He does
not suggest that he wanted an attorney but was unable either to
find one or to afford one. The short of it is that the record
here — unlike in Ramos — contains no hint of any cogent reason to
doubt the validity of the Stipulation. In the absence of anything
that might independently prompt due process concerns, the mere
fact that the appellant appeared pro se does not invalidate the
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his rights. See
Baptist, 759 F.3d at 697; cf. Response to Comment on Proposed Rule
on Conduct of Removal Proceedings, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,322
(Mar. 6, 1997) (explaining that requirement that IJ make a finding
of voluntariness "safeguards against an imprudent waiver of a
formal adjudication on the part of an unrepresented alien" and
that "[i]f an immigration judge is confronted with a stipulated
request raising due process concerns, he or she may examine that
request in the context of a hearing").
The appellant also argues that the removal papers and
custody notices led him to believe (incorrectly) that he was
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removable as an aggravated felon and, thus, statutorily ineligible
for cancellation of removal. Building on this premise, he submits
that "it is inconceivable that [he] would have made a considered
and intelligent stipulation and waiver of his right to appeal if
he had known that he was not removable as an aggravated felon and
eligible for cancellation of removal." Appellant's Br. at 27.
There are at least three things wrong with this argument.
First, it suffers from a basic infirmity. An alien may be deported
as an aggravated felon if he is convicted of a crime that involves
every element of an offense enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
See Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 55 (1st Cir. 2006). At the
time of the appellant's removal in 2009, the BIA had construed
"theft offense," as used in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), to require
a nonconsensual taking of or exercise of control over another's
property. See Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I&N Dec. 436, 440 (BIA
2008). However, in 2011 — after the appellant's removal — this
court concluded that a conviction for aggravated identity theft
under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A can be sustained even where there is no
"theft" — in other words, even where the owner consents to the use
of the means of identification. See Ozuna-Cabrera, 663 F.3d at
500-01. This holding was not a foregone conclusion, and the issue
has since engendered a circuit split. Compare id. with United
States v. Spears, 729 F.3d 753, 756-58 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
The appellant argues, in effect, that the decision in Ozuna-Cabrera
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means that his conviction for aggravated identity theft in 2009
was not a "theft" offense; that he was therefore not an aggravated
felon in 2009 under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G); and, consequently,
that DHS misled him.
We do not agree. Since the law governing the
classification of aggravated identity theft was unsettled at the
time of the appellant's removal, we cannot fairly conclude that
the appellant was misled at all. A waiver of rights based on a
reasonable interpretation of existing law is not rendered faulty
by later jurisprudential developments. See Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970); see also Baptist, 759 F.3d at 698
(explaining that "the law in effect at the time of [the
defendant's] challenged removal is what matters to [the court's]
analysis"); cf. Ovalles v. Holder, 577 F.3d 288, 299 (5th Cir.
2009) (per curiam) (finding no due process violation in BIA's
refusal to entertain a motion to reopen removal proceedings even
though offense underlying removal was later determined not to be
an aggravated felony).
Second, even if the appellant's prior convictions did
not comprise aggravated felonies, he would not have been entitled
as of right to remain in the United States. This is important
because "a majority of circuits have rejected the proposition that
there is a constitutional right to be informed of eligibility for
— or to be considered for — discretionary relief." United States
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v. Santiago-Ochoa, 447 F.3d 1015, 1020 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing
representative cases). Today, we join that majority.
Third, and finally, it is entirely conceivable that the
appellant would have opted for speedy deportation in lieu of the
long-shot chance of obtaining discretionary relief from removal
after a protracted legal battle. See Richardson, 558 F.3d at 223;
see also INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 446 (1985) (noting
Attorney General's authority to refuse to suspend deportation even
where alien meets threshold statutory requirements). Indeed, the
appellant's unsolicited request to speed up the removal process is
some indication that he had no stomach for deportation proceedings
(during which he was likely to have been detained).
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the
appellant's waiver of appeal was voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent; that he was not misled in any material respect; that
no due process violation occurred; and that, therefore, his waiver
must be given effect. This means, of course, that the appellant
did not exhaust his administrative remedies in connection with the
underlying removal and, thus, could not collaterally attack that
removal in his criminal case.
We add a coda. Given the appellant's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies as required by section 1326(d)(1), we need
not reach the question of whether he satisfied either the judicial
review requirement of section 1326(d)(2) or the fundamental
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fairness requirement of section 1326(d)(3). See Luna, 436 F.3d at
317. It is worth noting, however, that the appellant's collateral
attack surely would fail under section 1326(d)(3). After all,
that provision requires a showing of prejudice, see id. at 319;
DeLeon, 444 F.3d at 49, and such a showing entails "a reasonable
likelihood that the result would have been different if the error
in the deportation proceeding had not occurred." Luna, 436 F.3d
at 321 (quoting United States v. Loaisiga, 104 F.3d 484, 487 (1st
Cir. 1997)). For essentially the reasons previously discussed,
the appellant plainly cannot satisfy this standard.
III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. The district court's order
denying the appellant's motion to dismiss his indictment is
Affirmed.
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