[NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT] United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 97-1516 DAVID DANIELS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. DIAMOND GIRL FISHERIES, INC., Defendant, Appellee. No. 97-1709 DAVID DANIELS, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. DIAMOND GIRL FISHERIES, INC., Defendant, Appellant. APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge] Before Torruella, Chief Judge, Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge, and Boudin, Circuit Judge. Thomas M. Bond with whom David B. Kaplan and The Kaplan/Bond Group were on brief for David Daniels. Joseph A. Regan with whom Paige L. Tobin and Regan & Kiely LLPwere on brief for Diamond Girl Fisheries. July 1, 1998 ALDRICH, Senior Circuit Judge. According to the complaint filed March 18, 1996, plaintiff David Daniels, when a member of the crew of the lobster vessel F/V DIAMOND GIRL, injured his back, on or about April 1, 1993, as the result of an incident in the pilot house with the captain. Either the captain pushed him against a console on his way to the galley for a cup of coffee (plaintiff's account), or plaintiff, "horsing around," grabbed the captain from behind and they both stumbled and plaintiff fell against a couch (captain's account). Plaintiff had been with the vessel for some time and, admittedly, had engaged in such horseplay with the captain (without injury) on a prior occasion. Plaintiff brought suit for negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 688, as well as for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure. The jury found for the defendant on negligence and unseaworthiness, and plaintiff appeals on the ground that the court improperly admitted a recorded statement of an absent witness under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5), now Rule 807, substantially confirming the captain's testimony. On these counts we affirm. Without going into details, this ruling stretched the residual hearsay exception, intended for exceptional occasions, perhaps to the breaking point. But also, in our opinion, the captain's account is so strong, when viewed against plaintiff's extraordinary one, that we are not interested in a new trial simply because it was, perhaps, wrongfully corroborated. Plaintiff's account was, "The captain came by me, pushed me out of the way. And in the process of doing that, I banged my back on the edge of the console and had nothing but trouble ever since." Passing the fact that plaintiff waited two years and 11 months before suing, "nothing but trouble" consisted of remaining with the DIAMOND GIRL, at a full percentage share, for a year and a half, leaving, when her earnings decreased, to go first with one, and then another, vessel, in each case stating, in writing, that he was well and capable of doing a full job. Equally, why would the captain leave the wheel, when they were running a river to the dock, to enjoy a cup of coffee, when he could readily have asked plaintiff to get him one, or, at the least, put him at the wheel rather than shove him against the console and depart? All this may have happened, but we think one trial is enough. There is a second matter, the jury's award of maintenance and cure, which defendant appeals. Plaintiff's demands, and the jury findings, may seem large, particularly having in mind that he continued to work on board defendant's vessel (and even signed a receipt for reimbursement for a chiropractor, but denied having been paid), but the appeal was not well taken. It reads, "from the Jury Verdict on Count III of the plaintiff's complaint . . . and the court order denying Judgment as a Matter of Law entered in this action . . . ." It is elementary that one cannot appeal from a verdict, but only from some order of the court, for example, denying a motion to set the verdict aside as excessive. Defendant failed to file such a motion. The motion for judgment as a matter of law was procedurally proper, but substantively inappropriate because there was at least some evidence in plaintiff's favor that could have been credited. Affirmed. No costs to either party.