United States v. Vaughn

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-1416
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY VAUGHN,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Selya, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
David J. Apfel, with whom Goodwin Procter LLP was on brief,
for appellant.
Jennifer Hay Zacks, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
November 18, 2015
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Anthony Vaughn appeals the
district court's denial of his motion for a sentence reduction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Because he is ineligible for the
reduction, we affirm.
I.
This sentencing appeal is about two separate and
independent federal crimes, committed at separate times and
sentenced separately by two different judges.
As to the first crime, on April 11, 2002, Vaughn pleaded
guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The district
court calculated a guideline sentencing range of 168 to 210 months
of imprisonment. On August 28, 2002, Vaughn was sentenced to 168
months of imprisonment.
As to the second crime, on November 27, 2012, while
Vaughn was serving his 2002 sentence, he pleaded guilty to a
separate charge of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
cocaine and heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1).
The charge related to Vaughn's attempts to have heroin smuggled
into the federal prison where he was imprisoned. On June 13, 2013,
Vaughn was sentenced as a career offender to 120 months of
imprisonment, to run consecutively to the 168-month term he was
already serving. Asked by the district court about the interaction
between the two sentences, the probation officer stated during the
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sentencing hearing that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) would
"aggregate the entire sentence," meaning that "[BOP] will add it
to the other [2002] sentence and then reconfigure the whole
sentence."
Vaughn completed the part of his prison time
attributable to his 2002 sentence on December 27, 2014. He remains
in prison because of his second crime. His anticipated date of
release is September 12, 2023.
In November 2014, Vaughn filed a pro se motion in the
district court for reduction of his sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). His motion was based on U.S.S.G. Amendments 782 and
788, which retroactively reduced by two levels the base offense
level for many drug offenses. He argued that he was entitled to
a sentence reduction of 33 months to reflect the lower guideline
sentencing range as to his first crime. The district court
appointed counsel for Vaughn and requested a joint status report
outlining the parties' positions.
In the joint status report, the government opposed the
motion. It argued that only Vaughn's 2002 sentence was eligible
for reduction but that there could be no reduction on that sentence
because he had already finished serving that sentence. Vaughn did
not contest the government's position that his 2013 sentence,
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standing alone, was ineligible for reduction.1 However, he argued
that he was serving a single aggregated sentence of 288 months
(168 months on the 2002 sentence plus 120 months on the 2013
sentence), and that he was entitled to a 33-month reduction on
that combined sentence.
On March 26, 2015, the district court denied the motion
in a summary order.
II.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review a denial of a sentence reduction for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir.
2008). Because Vaughn claims legal error by the district court
and "[a] material error of law is perforce an abuse of discretion,"
id., our review is effectively de novo. United States v. Fanfan,
558 F.3d 105, 107 (1st Cir. 2009).
A federal court generally “may not modify a term of
imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). One
exception is that:
[I]n the case of a defendant who has been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on
a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . the
court may reduce the term of imprisonment,
after considering the factors set forth in
1 Both parties agree that the 2013 sentence is ineligible for
reduction because that sentence was based on a career offender
base offense level, which was unaffected by Amendment 782. See
United States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2008).
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section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable, if such a reduction is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The relevant policy statement is contained
in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10.
Section 3582(c)(2) establishes a two-step inquiry under
which the district court must first determine whether a reduction
is authorized by § 1B1.10 and, if so, the extent of any authorized
reduction. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826–27 (2010).
The second step is to determine whether a reduction is warranted
according to the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. at
827. The decision at step two is "a matter committed to the
sentencing court's sound discretion." United States v. Aponte-
Guzmán, 696 F.3d 157, 161 (1st Cir. 2012).
Section 1B1.10 authorizes a sentence reduction only when
one of an enumerated list of guideline amendments applies.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1), (d). Among those amendments is Amendment
782, effective as of November 1, 2014, which reduced by two levels
the base offense level for many drug offenses. Amendment 788
amended § 1B1.10 to authorize district courts to apply Amendment
782 retroactively, provided that "the effective date of the court's
order is November 1, 2015, or later." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(e)(1).
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B. Eligibility for Sentence Reduction
The district court did not explain the reason for its
denial of Vaughn's motion. It is unclear whether the district
court found that Vaughn was ineligible for a sentence reduction or
whether it thought he was eligible but exercised its discretionary
power under § 3582(c)(2) to deny the reduction. We believe from
the circumstances that the denial was based on ineligibility.2
Because we conclude that Vaughn was ineligible for the sentence
reduction, we affirm the result. We resolve the problem on the
plain language of the relevant statutes and guideline provisions.
Vaughn is ineligible for relief under Amendment 782
because he has already served the entirety of his otherwise
eligible sentence. Because the applicable policy statement
provides that "[i]n no event may the reduced term of imprisonment
be less than the term of imprisonment the defendant has already
served," U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(C), no reduction is available to
him. The sentence he is currently serving is a separate sentence
for his second crime that is not eligible for a reduction under
Amendment 782.
Vaughn argues that he is nonetheless eligible for a
sentence reduction because he is serving an aggregate sentence of
2
We encourage the district courts to give some explanation
for such orders, so as to avoid questions about the grounds on
which they are based.
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288 months that should be considered a single, undivided whole.
He relies principally on 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), which provides that
"[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or
concurrently shall be treated for administrative purposes as a
single, aggregate term of imprisonment." He also points to the
probation officer's statement at his 2013 sentencing hearing that
BOP will "aggregate the entire sentence."
Section 3584(c) does not support Vaughn's position
because it specifies that aggregation is "for administrative
purposes," and the issue at hand is judicial, not administrative.
The BOP is responsible for administration of sentences. See United
States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992) ("After a district court
sentences a federal offender, the Attorney General, through the
BOP, has the responsibility for administering the sentence."
(emphasis added)). A sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2), on
the other hand, involves discretionary decision-making by the
district court and cannot be described as administrative. Applying
§ 3584(c) to this situation would essentially rewrite the statute
to extend aggregation to all purposes.
Vaughn also relies on case law from the Seventh Circuit
and various district courts that have, in limited circumstances,
aggregated consecutive sentences for the purpose of a § 3582(c)(2)
sentence reduction. See United States v. Clarke, 499 F. App'x
579, 582 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Kaman, No. 3:09-CR-141,
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2015 WL 2226213, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. May 12, 2015); United States v.
Brown, No. 2:04-cr-00088, 2013 WL 1819795, at *5–6 (W.D. Pa. Apr.
29, 2013); United States v. Wilkerson, No. 00-cr-10426, 2010 WL
5437225, at *1–3 (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 2010); United States v. Martin,
602 F. Supp. 2d 611, 614–15 (E.D. Pa. 2009); United States v.
Bolin, No. 2:02-cr-176-1, 2008 WL 928397, at *1–3 (S.D. Ohio Apr.
7, 2008). But see United States v. Yarber, No. 00-CR-20031, 2008
WL 695362, at *3–4 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2008). To the extent that
those cases relied on § 3584(c)'s direction to the BOP to aggregate
consecutive sentences for administrative purposes, their reasoning
is unpersuasive as to our problem, for the reason stated above.
Furthermore, those cases are distinguishable on the basis that
each of them concerned consecutive sentences that were imposed at
the same time by the same judge. Even supposing that
simultaneously imposed consecutive sentences could be aggregated
for the purpose of a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction -- an issue
that we do not decide here -- this case is different because
Vaughn's sentences were imposed separately. Simultaneously
imposed consecutive sentences often do not make clear in what order
the sentences should be served, so fairness concerns may be raised
by a denial of a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction on the basis that
the only eligible part of the total time of imprisonment has
already been served. See Brown, 2013 WL 1819795, at *6 (expressing
concern that it was "impossible to discern" the order of the
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sentences); cf. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 386 (1989) ("There
is no indication that the order of the sentences was of the
slightest importance to the sentencing judge, and there is no
reason constitutional adjudication should turn on such
fortuities."). There is no such fairness concern when, as here,
a defendant commits a crime while incarcerated and receives an
additional consecutive sentence while he is already serving the
first sentence. In fact, other courts that have considered a
sentence reduction for the first of two separately imposed
consecutive sentences have rejected Vaughn's argument. See United
States v. Parker, 472 F. App'x 415, 417 (7th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Gamble, 572 F.3d 472, 473–75 (8th Cir. 2009).
Vaughn also makes an unpersuasive textual argument.
Relying on the district court's reasoning in Bolin, Vaughn begins
with the premise that a defendant is eligible for a sentence
reduction when he "is serving a term of imprisonment, and the
guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been
lowered." Bolin, 2008 WL 928397, at *2 (quoting U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10(a)(1)). Vaughn argues that § 1B1.10 "refers simply to
'a' term of imprisonment, not to any specific portion of the
consecutive or continuous term of imprisonment impacted by the
amendment." Id. But that argument assumes its own conclusion.
The fact that § 1B1.10 uses a singular "a" says nothing about
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whether Vaughn is serving one single term of imprisonment or two
separate back-to-back terms of imprisonment for purposes of § 3582.
Finally, Vaughn analogizes to Supreme Court precedent in
habeas cases concerned with the "in custody" requirement. In
Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39 (1995), the Supreme Court held
that a habeas petitioner remained "in custody" and could challenge
a state conviction underlying the first of two consecutive
sentences even after the technical expiration of the first sentence
because the consecutive sentences "compos[ed] a continuous
stream." Id. at 41. The Court relied on its earlier decision in
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), which held that prisoners
incarcerated under consecutive state court sentences could apply
for federal habeas relief from sentences they had not yet begun to
serve. Id. at 55. However, it is far from certain whether Garlotte
applies to separately imposed consecutive sentences. The Court in
Garlotte placed weight on the portion of the sentencing hearing in
which the prosecutor expressed indifference about the order of the
two consecutive sentences and the defense counsel did not argue
the issue. 515 U.S. at 41–42. The Court expressed its concern
that it was mere happenstance that the sentences were not in
inverse order such that the petitioner would have been granted
relief under Peyton. Id. at 44–45. It is not clear whether it
was necessary to the Court's holding that the consecutive sentences
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there were simultaneously imposed.3 Even if Garlotte does apply
to separately imposed consecutive sentences, federal habeas is a
unique context and the "in custody" requirement has traditionally
received a liberal construction that may be fairly viewed as sui
generis. See id. at 45 (recognizing that the Court has "very
liberally construed the 'in custody' requirement for purposes of
federal habeas" (quoting Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989)
(per curiam))); see also Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738,
752 (1975) (recognizing special constitutional status resulting
from unique interest in maintaining the availability of habeas).
As such, we decline to rely on the habeas analogy.
III.
For the reasons stated, we affirm.
3 Two circuits have decided it was not. See DeFoy v.
McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 2005); Foster v. Booher,
296 F.3d 947, 950 (10th Cir. 2002). Our circuit has not decided
the issue, and we express no opinion on the question here.
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