Rivera-Velázquez v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-1301
RAMIRO RIVERA-VELÁZQUEZ ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
THE HARTFORD STEAM BOILER INSPECTION
AND INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges.
Sonia B. Alfaro de la Vega, with whom Sonia B. Alfaro de la
Vega Law Offices was on brief, for appellants.
Pedro J. Torres-Díaz, with whom Zahira D. Díaz-Vázquez and
Jackson Lewis LLP were on brief, for appellee.
April 16, 2014
SELYA, Circuit Judge. Attorneys represent clients. A
familiar incident of this relationship is that an attorney's
actions within the scope of her representation normally bind her
clients. A corollary of this proposition is the sad fact — but the
fact nonetheless — that the sins of the attorney are sometimes
visited upon the client. This is such a case.
The facts are easily assembled. In March of 2010,
plaintiff-appellant Ramiro Rivera-Velázquez, then 58 years old,
applied for a job as a boiler inspector with defendant-appellee
Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company (the
Company). On May 18, the Company extended a written offer of
employment, which the appellant accepted. Before he started on the
job, however, the Company rescinded the offer.
Distressed by this turn of events, the appellant sought
legal recourse: he sued the Company in a Puerto Rico court.1 His
complaint alleged, inter alia, that rescission of the employment
offer was a by-product of age discrimination and, thus, violated
Puerto Rico law. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 (Law 100). The
Company, seizing upon the existence of both diversity of
citizenship and the requisite amount in controversy, removed the
1
The appellant's wife (Sandra Robles) and the couple's
conjugal partnership are additional plaintiffs. Because their
claims are wholly derivative, we refer throughout to Rivera-
Velázquez as if he were the sole plaintiff and appellant. Our
decision is, of course, binding on all parties.
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case to the federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1),
1441(a).
Over the next year, the appellant's attorneys blundered
time and again. For one thing, no fewer than three of the
Company's motions were deemed unopposed due to the appellant's
failure to respond. For another thing, the appellant's attorneys
were thrice chastised by the district court and threatened with
sanctions for failure to comply with court orders and/or discovery
requests. On yet another occasion, the court imposed a monetary
sanction for the inclusion, in an amended complaint, of claims that
the appellant had previously promised to drop.
This sorry series of sophomoric stumbles sets the stage
for what happened next. On September 4, 2012, the Company filed
its portion of a previously ordered joint pretrial submission. The
appellant failed to furnish his portion of the joint submission
within the time allotted. The district court responded to this
default by issuing a stern minute order. Using red font for
emphasis, the court denounced the appellant's "foot-dragging
litigation strategy" and warned that "[t]he next sanction imposed
. . . for failure to obey a Court order shall be the dismissal of
[the appellant's] complaint." The court then gave the appellant
one week to show cause why his case should not be dismissed.
The appellant made no discernible effort to set matters
straight but, instead, ignored the show-cause order. He neither
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proffered his overdue portion of the joint submission nor attempted
to explain his repeated failures to comply with court orders and
deadlines. True to its word, the district court proceeded to
dismiss the case with prejudice. The appellant did not appeal this
order. He did, however, eventually file a motion pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
This motion beseeched the court to set aside the
judgment. It explained that one of the appellant's attorneys had
been ill for several months; that this illness had caused her to
neglect the case; and that this illness-induced neglect had led to
the repeated failure to comply with court orders and deadlines.
In a carefully considered opinion, the district court
denied the appellant's Rule 60(b) motion. See Rivera-Velázquez v.
Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., No. 11-1763, 2013 WL
210268, at *5 (D.P.R. Jan. 17, 2013). This timely appeal followed.
Our inquiry is guided by the abecedarian principle "that
relief under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary in nature and that motions
invoking that rule should be granted sparingly." Karak v. Bursaw
Oil Corp., 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2002). Thus, a party who
seeks relief under the rule must establish, at the very least,
"that his motion is timely; that exceptional circumstances exist,
favoring extraordinary relief; that if the judgment is set aside,
he has the right stuff to mount a potentially meritorious claim or
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defense; and that no unfair prejudice will accrue to the opposing
parties should the motion be granted." Id.
It is a common-sense proposition that "the district court
is best positioned to examine these criteria." Nansamba v. N.
Shore Med. Ctr., Inc., 727 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2013).
Consequently, we review the grant or denial of a Rule 60(b) motion
only for abuse of discretion. See id.
Rule 60(b) offers six independent routes to relief. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6). The motion filed in the court below
did not clearly identify which of these routes might lead to relief
in this case. The district court concluded (appropriately, we
think) that only clauses (1) and (6) might fit. See Rivera-
Velázquez, 2013 WL 210268, at *3. The appellant does not challenge
this conclusion on appeal. We proceed accordingly.
Clause (1) of Rule 60(b) authorizes the district court to
grant relief from a final judgment due to "mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect." Clause (6) is a catch-all, which
authorizes relief for "any other reason" — that is, any reason not
encompassed within the previous five clauses — that may justify
relief.
The court below correctly wrote off any possibility of
relief under Rule 60(b)(6). It is a "bedrock principle that clause
(6) may not be used as a vehicle for circumventing clauses (1)
through (5)." Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274, 278 (1st Cir.
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1993). In other words, Rule 60(b)(6) and Rule 60(b)(1) "are
mutually exclusive." de la Torre v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 12,
15 n.5 (1st Cir. 1994). Where, as here, a party's asserted basis
for relief falls squarely within the compass of Rule 60(b)(1), Rule
60(b)(6) is not available. See Cotto, 993 F.2d at 278.
This brings us to the appellant's claim under Rule
60(b)(1). The claim, as framed, implicates the rule's "excusable
neglect" component. Deciding what constitutes excusable neglect is
a case-specific exercise, which requires "an equitable
determination, taking into account the entire facts and
circumstances surrounding the party's omission." Dávila-Álvarez v.
Escuela de Medicina Universidad Central del Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 64
(1st Cir. 2001). The pertinent facts and circumstances typically
include such things as "the danger of prejudice to the non-movant,
the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, and whether the
movant acted in good faith." Id. (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co.
v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)).
Nevertheless, these factors are not entitled to equal weight.
"Within the constellation of relevant factors, the most important
is the reason for the particular oversight." Nansamba, 727 F.3d at
39.
The court below acknowledged that a few circumstances
tilted in favor of granting the motion. See Rivera-Velázquez, 2013
WL 210268, at *3. In that regard, it cited the lack of any serious
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prejudice to the Company should the case be reinstated, the general
policy in favor of disposing of cases on the merits, and the
absence of any evidence of bad faith on the appellant's part. See
id. Despite these ameliorative factors, however, the court
concluded that "the totality of the circumstances weigh[ed]
strongly against granting relief." Id.
In reaching this conclusion, the court supportably found
that the appellant had remained silent for months in the face of
several court orders of which he had been "duly notified,"
including an order that "specifically warned that further inaction
would entail dismissal." Id. (emphasis omitted). This silence was
inexcusable, the court reasoned, because the attorney's illness
(which the court accepted as real, notwithstanding the lack of any
documentation) neither justified nor explained the utter lack of
communication. See id. at *3-4 & n.3. To cinch matters, the
appellant had two attorneys of record, one of whom had not
professed illness at all. The court concluded that "[a]t the very
minimum, [the appellant's] counsel should have informed the Court
and opposing counsel of their situation," which they did not do.
Id. at *4. In the court's view, the sheer weight of these
accumulated failures tipped the decisional scales against the
appellant.
The appellant launches a three-pronged attack on the
district court's reasoning. We consider each prong separately.
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The appellant's first line of attack, which is cast in
terms of the district court's use of precedents, leads nowhere.
This line of attack calumnizes the district court for concluding,
based on inappropriate case law,2 that "illness standing alone is
not sufficient to justify relief" under Rule 60(b)(1). Id.
The appellant's argument rests upon an artificially
cramped reading of the district court's rationale. Fairly read,
the court reasoned that an attorney's illness does not constitute
a per se justification for Rule 60(b) relief. See id. Such an
approach is both reasonable and consistent with precedent. While
an attorney's illness may constitute an extraordinary circumstance
warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(1), see, e.g., Gravatt v. Paul
Revere Life Ins. Co., 101 F. App'x 194, 195-96 (9th Cir. 2004),
that is not always the case. Everything depends on context: a
party seeking relief must persuade the court not only that his
attorney was ill but also that the illness prevented the party from
taking reasonable steps to prosecute the case or to inform the
court of an inability to do so. See, e.g., Cintrón-Lorenzo v.
Departamento de Asuntos del Consumidor, 312 F.3d 522, 527-28 (1st
Cir. 2002). In the case at hand, nothing about the attorney's
illness suggests a complete inability to communicate with the
2
See, e.g., Lender v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 519 F. Supp. 2d
1217 (M.D. Fla. 2007); Carcello v. TJX Cos., 192 F.R.D. 61 (D.
Conn. 2000); Miranda v. Am. Airlines, 176 F.R.D. 438 (D.P.R. 1998).
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court3 and, in any event, another attorney had entered an
appearance in the case.
The decision in Cruz v. Municipality of Dorado, 780 F.
Supp. 2d 157 (D.P.R. 2011), loudly bruited by the appellant, is not
to the contrary. There, the district court stated in dictum that
when "an attorney's mishandling of a movant's case stems from the
attorney's mental illness, extraordinary circumstances justifying
relief under Rule 60(b)(6) may exist." Id. at 160 (emphasis
supplied) (internal quotation marks omitted). This statement in no
way undermines the reasoning of the court below.
The appellant's second sortie is an attempt to impugn the
district court's balancing of the equities. This sortie is
hopeless. In denying Rule 60(b)(1) relief, the district court
identified the relevant factors, weighed them with care, and
reached a defensible conclusion. There is no principled way that
we can second-guess a reasoned appraisal of the equities which,
like this one, falls well within the ambit of a trial court's
discretion.
The last front on which the appellant attacks is composed
of a loosely knit collection of criticisms. Deconstructing this
list, we conclude that none of these criticisms makes a dent in the
district court's determination.
3
The record reflects that the ailing attorney retained the
ability to communicate. One example of this is her filing of a
motion to compel discovery, discussed infra.
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To begin, the appellant complains that he is blameless
and should not be made to suffer for his counsel's failings. We
are not without some measure of sympathy for a client whose lawyer
lets him down. But in litigation matters, lawyers act for their
clients; and this case is not the first (nor will it be the last)
in which the failings of an attorney are visited upon her client.
After all, it is settled beyond hope of contradiction that "the
neglect of an attorney acting within the scope of his or her
authority is attributable to the client." Nansamba, 727 F.3d at
38; accord Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962);
United States v. Proceeds of Sale of 3,888 Pounds Atl. Sea
Scallops, 857 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 1988) (collecting cases).
The appellant's next criticism is directed at the
district court's factfinding. Specifically, he contends that the
court erred in recalling that he had been sanctioned more than
once. But this contention is woven out of whole cloth; the
district court made no such statement. Rather, the court wrote
that "on several occasions . . . the Court had to resort to
monetary sanctions (or at least the threat of the same) to obtain
[the appellant's] compliance." Rivera-Velázquez, 2013 WL 210268,
at *3 (emphasis supplied). This declaration is firmly supported by
the record.
The appellant's final criticism is a red herring. He
takes the district court to task for failing to resolve his motion
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to compel discovery prior to dismissing the case. However, the
court's failure to rule on the discovery motion had no bearing on
the order of dismissal. We explain briefly.
During the course of the litigation, the appellant moved
to compel outstanding discovery. One month later, the Company
filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Both of these motions
were pending, unadjudicated, when the district court dismissed the
case. The appellant now argues that the court's failure to compel
discovery rendered him defenseless vis-à-vis the summary judgment
motion.
But the summary judgment motion was not what led to the
appellant's present predicament. The crucial fact is that the
district court never reached the merits of that motion. Rather,
that motion was rendered moot by the appellant's persistent pattern
of noncompliance, capped by his failure to respond to the show-
cause order, which prompted the court's dismissal of the case.
There is simply no meaningful connection between the unadjudicated
motion to compel and the order of dismissal.
We have said before, and today reaffirm, that "a party's
'first obligation is to make every effort to comply with [a]
court's order. The second is to seek consent if compliance is, in
fact, impossible. And the third is to seek court approval for
noncompliance based on a truly valid reason.'" Cintrón-Lorenzo,
312 F.3d at 527 (quoting Damiani v. R.I. Hosp., 704 F.2d 12, 17
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(1st Cir. 1983)). Given the appellant's failure to comply with
these obligations, the district court's refusal to set aside the
order of dismissal was not an abuse of discretion.
In circumstances such as these, litigants would do well
to remember what Woody Allen famously said: "Eighty percent of
success is showing up." We need go no further.
Affirmed.
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